The former Kurdish President of Iraq, Dr. Barham Salih, was appointed on December 12 as the new head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
On December 18, the UN General Assembly, where 193 states are represented, confirmed the appointment by consensus.
Dr. Barham Salih, a former Kurdish refugee in the United Kingdom, will succeed the current High Commissioner, Filippo Grandi, on January 1, 2026.
In a message posted on X, he stated, “As a former refugee, I know firsthand how protection and opportunity can change the course of a life.”
Born in 1965 in Sulaymaniyah to a middle-class family (his father was a judge and his mother a figure in the feminist movement), Barham Salih was arrested at the age of 19 by Saddam Hussein’s police, accused of ties to the Kurdish resistance. He spent 43 days in prison. After his release, he chose to go into exile in the UK upon completing high school, where he pursued higher education and earned a doctorate.
This experience of persecution and exile “shaped a leadership approach grounded in empathy, pragmatism, and a principled commitment to international law,” says Dr. Salih.
Becoming a representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), first in London and then in Washington, Dr. Barham Salih went on to serve as Iraq’s Minister of Planning, then Deputy Prime Minister until 2009 after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Returning to Kurdistan, he was appointed Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region in 2011. In 2018, he was elected President of the Republic of Iraq, a position he held until 2022.
Since then, he has divided his time between the American University of Sulaymaniyah, which he founded, and Harvard University, where he teaches at the Kennedy School of Government.
His appointment as UN High Commissioner for Refugees has been welcomed with pride in Kurdistan and across Iraq.
It is the first time a Kurd has held the top position in a UN agency.
Although the Kurdish people have no state representation, this is also the first time that someone from the Middle East has held this post, which is traditionally reserved for a prominent European figure.
Dr. Barham Salih’s achievement is all the more remarkable given that he was competing against several prominent European candidates.
The year 2025 ends with a new and powerful wave of popular protests against the economic collapse and the rising cost of living. The protests began spontaneously on December 27 in Tehran’s largest mobile phone market. Very quickly, merchants from the grand bazaar joined the protest by pulling down their shutters on December 28.
The movement then spread like wildfire to 21 of the country’s 31 provinces. Students, including those from Iran’s elite universities, joined the demonstrations, which initially remained peaceful.
The merchants denounce the collapse of the national currency, which against the dollar, symbolizes the drastic drop in the population’s purchasing power. By the end of December, one US dollar traded at 1.4 million rials (compared to 820,000 a year ago), and one euro reached 1.7 million rials (compared to 855,000 the previous year).
This chronic depreciation has led to hyperinflation and extreme price volatility, making it very difficult for merchants to operate, especially those who depend on imported technological goods, gold, or even basic necessities.
According to Le Monde (December 31), over nine months, the price of cheese rose by 140%, bread by 250%, milk increased by 50% in two months, and ground meat by 20% in one month. The official annual inflation rate of 52% published by the Iranian Statistics Center remains far below the actual price increases.
The fact that the "bazaris" – mostly Azeri and Persian Shiite merchants, traditionally loyal supporters of the regime – have now joined the protest and denounce government corruption and incompetence likely marks a turning point, revealing the regime’s growing isolation.
The middle classes, already pushed into poverty, had already turned against the regime, while the lower classes try to survive on monthly wages of 100 to 150 dollars.
This major economic, social, and political crisis follows the severe summer drought, which deprived much of the population of water and electricity and exposed the catastrophic mismanagement of the country’s water resources, as well as the negligence and shortsightedness of its rulers.
These authorities blame the “difficulties” on US sanctions imposed since 2018 and, more recently, on European sanctions reinstated in October due to the continuation of Iran’s nuclear program.
But people are not fooled. They reject both the costly nuclear program and the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, which heavily funds armed militias in several Arab countries in the name of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” On the streets, protesters chant, “Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, my life for Iran,” and “Death to the dictator” (Khamenei).
President Massoud Pezeshkian stated he was listening to the “legitimate demands” of the protesters. He tasked his Interior Minister with initiating dialogue and replaced the head of the Central Bank, accused of failing to stabilize the currency. However, he admitted that he could not “perform miracles” to quickly resolve the country’s problems.
The population is fully aware of this, since the president holds little power in a system where real authority lies with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the security and judicial apparatus he oversees. This apparatus quickly cracked down, sending SMS warnings to mobile users, stating that intelligence services had detected their presence “near illegal gatherings” (Le Monde, December 31).
To prevent further protests and their spread, the authorities declared December 31, as well as January 2 and 3, as public holidays, hoping the protests would lose momentum. That hope seems unfounded, as this wave of demonstrations reflects a deeper unrest dating back to the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement following the death in custody of Kurdish student Jina Mahsa Amini in September 2022, arrested for improperly wearing her headscarf.
The issue of mandatory hijab has resurfaced. On December 2, 155 out of the 290 members of the Iranian parliament signed a letter addressed to the head of the judiciary, criticizing some officials for failing to enforce hijab laws.
“This negligence has encouraged nudity, non-compliance with hijab, and other abnormal behaviors” (RFI, December 2).
A year ago, the president had refused to enact a parliamentary law that would have imposed stricter penalties on women not wearing the hijab correctly. In recent months, several cafés and restaurants have been shut down for failing to comply with hijab rules or for allegedly serving alcohol, which is banned in Iran.
On December 5, two organizers of the Kish marathon were arrested and charged with “indecency” after images circulated on social media showing unveiled women participating in the race.
A criminal case was opened against the organizers on the grounds that the event was “contrary to public decency,” according to the prosecutor of Kish Island, who called for “firm, dissuasive, and uncompromising measures” (Le Monde, December 6).
On December 6, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi was sent back to prison one year after being released for health reasons.
She was arrested along with about forty other dissidents during a memorial ceremony for Kurdish lawyer Khosrow Alikordi, a well-known defender of political prisoners who had died under suspicious circumstances six days earlier. According to her family, with whom she briefly spoke by phone, Mohammadi was beaten on the head and neck with batons during her arrest. She had to be hospitalized twice.
Her condition is reportedly “concerning,” according to her family’s account published in Le Monde (December 14), and she now faces charges of “collaboration with the State of Israel,” an offense punishable by death.
A respected human rights lawyer, Khosrow Alikordi was found dead in his office. Authorities claimed he died of a stroke.
But his relatives reject the official version and say he had received threats related to his defense of political opponents. They are also puzzled that the police and intelligence services, who arrived quickly at the scene, immediately seized all the office’s surveillance footage.
During the seventh-day commemoration of Alikordi’s death, anti-government slogans were chanted, including “Woman, Life, Freedom” and “Death to the dictator.” Dozens of plainclothes agents violently attacked and arrested those in attendance.
The Mashhad prosecutor confirmed the arrest of 39 individuals accused of “propaganda against the regime,” “illegal gathering,” and “collusion with enemies of the Islamic Republic” (Le Monde, December 15).
On December 8, the first anniversary of the fall of the al-Assad dictatorship was marked by military parades and demonstrations by the Sunni Arab population in several Syrian cities. The celebrations began in Damascus with the dawn prayer at the Umayyad Mosque. According to AFP, tens of thousands of people carrying Syrian and Islamic flags filled the streets.
In a speech before a group of officials, interim President Charaa declared, “Today, at the dawn of freedom, we officially declare a definitive break from the era of despotism and tyranny, opening a new radiant era based on justice, kindness and coexistence.”
Earlier that morning, following prayers at the Umayyad Mosque, the 43-year-old former jihadist had stated that “the current phase requires all citizens to unite their efforts to build a strong Syria, consolidate its stability and preserve its sovereignty.”
These declarations of good intentions failed to convince the Alawites, who boycotted the celebrations and closed their shops in the coastal cities where they live. The Druze, who broke with the regime after the massacres committed in July by the new Syrian Arab Army, also abstained. Christians, deeply worried about the Islamist nature of the new regime and the demonstrators waving banners of Islamist parties, remained confined to their homes. The memory of the Mar Elias church bombing, which killed 25 people on June 22 near Damascus, is still vivid, as is the trauma of the massacre of more than 1,700 Alawites in March 2025, which continues to haunt the Alawite community.
The Kurds, in latent conflict with the new regime, banned all anniversary celebrations for security reasons.
Meanwhile, Amnesty International, in a public statement on the occasion, wrote, “The new government’s response to the serious violations committed since taking power will be a decisive test of its commitment to justice and accountability.”
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said the anniversary was “an opportunity to rebuild shattered communities and heal wounds.” These words ring hollow, lacking any mechanisms for transitional justice or monitoring of the regime's evolution.
The international community, relieved by the fall of a brutal dictatorship that lasted 54 years and the end of a 14-year civil war that left more than 500,000 dead and millions displaced or in exile, wants to believe in the new regime’s promises of stabilization and reconstruction.
The regime’s influential backers, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, convinced President Trump to receive the interim Syrian president and to lift US sanctions on Syria. On December 17, the US Congress approved the full removal of these sanctions. The European Union, preoccupied with the issue of Syrian refugees, also unconditionally lifted its sanctions, hoping that the new Syria is now a stable and safe country to which it can repatriate asylum seekers. In doing so, it has lost financial and political leverage over the regime, which now has a free hand to impose its authority as it sees fit within its borders. Its reputation has also improved by joining the international coalition against ISIS led by the United States and beginning a normalization process with Israel.
The United States, which will now have an official military base in Syria, no longer seems to consider the Syrian Democratic Forces, the backbone of the fight against ISIS since 2014, as indispensable allies. They are now testing their new Arab Syrian partners.
But this test has proven risky. A military mission that visited the Syrian army base in Palmyra on December 17 was ambushed. Three Americans, including two soldiers and an interpreter, were killed, and three others wounded by gunfire from a Syrian security force member. The Syrian government offered condolences and stated that the attacker, suspected of ISIS affiliation, was under investigation for extremism.
The Americans, who have been in the region for over a decade, seem unaware that the Syrian Arab Army, their new ally, is a patchwork of Islamist militias. Some of these include thousands of foreign jihadists and loosely reformed members of al-Qaeda and ISIS. This is the force with which they intend to fight ISIS.
Furious, the American president promised a blistering response. On December 19, he posted on Truth Social threats of major retaliation against ISIS, mentioning over 70 targets in multiple locations in central Syria, which reportedly killed at least five jihadists (AFP, December 20, New York Times, December 19, Le Monde, December 19).
ISIS is taking advantage of the power vacuum in desert regions to redeploy its activities, encouraging sleeper cells to resurface, even in territories under Kurdish control.
On December 18, Kurdish forces narrowly foiled an escape attempt by 18 women detained in the al-Hol camp. According to the camp’s director, Jihan Hanan, the group of ISIS prisoners was preparing to escape.
According to figures shared by Sheikman Ahmad, head of prison camps in Rojava, with Kurdish TV channel Rûdaw on December 11, al-Hol camp housed 25,183 detainees at the end of November, including 14,920 Syrians, 3,988 Iraqis, due to be repatriated by year’s end, and over 6,200 foreign nationals from other countries.
On December 14, in a preventive operation, the SDF dismantled an ISIS cell in Deir ez-Zor province and arrested four jihadists preparing attacks and providing logistical support to other cells in the area (Rûdaw, December 15).
On December 7, in another operation, local ISIS leader Saker Ahmed al-Khalaf al-Abdullah, directly involved in seven of the twenty recent attacks against the SDF, was arrested.
Jihadists appear to benefit from protection by certain Arab tribes in the region, which are calling for the return of the Syrian army and maintain ties with Turkish intelligence services.
Throughout the month, the SDF faced sporadic artillery and drone attacks from the Syrian army.
But the situation is especially explosive in the Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo, which have been under siege and food blockade for months.
Islamist militias, formerly operating as auxiliaries of the Turkish army in the Afrin canton, are now mobilized under Turkish influence but wearing the uniform of the Syrian Arab Army. They are trying to seize control of the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, home to over 460,000 Kurds, many of them displaced from Afrin.
Clashes with local self-defense forces, the Assayish, on December 22 and 23 left at least three civilians dead.
The ceasefire agreed between the SDF and the Syrian Ministry of Defense remains fragile, as previous ceasefires were regularly violated by the Islamist militias.
Meanwhile, violence against the Alawite community continues.
On December 26, an explosion inside a mosque in the Alawite neighborhood of Homs killed at least eight and injured 18 others, according to a preliminary official report. The attack was claimed by the Sunni jihadist group Saraya Ansar al-Sunna.
According to the Syrian Ministry of Interior, this bombing was a desperate attempt to destabilize the country and spread chaos.
On December 28, Alawite towns participated in demonstrations in several Syrian cities, calling for an end to violence against their community.
Security forces cracked down on these protests, leaving three dead and 60 injured, according to the official Syrian agency SANA.
The head of the Alawite Islamic Council in Syria, Ghazal Charaf, posted an appeal on Facebook:
“We do not want a civil war, we want political federalism. We do not want your terrorism. We want to decide our own fate.” (Le Monde, AFP, December 28)
On December 14, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court ratified the results of the November 11, 2025 legislative elections. This decision, taken unanimously by the Court after reviewing a few minor disputes, has now cleared the way for the new parliamentary session.
Although the electoral law has been criticized as “unfair” by several political parties, particularly Kurdish ones, due to the unequal distribution of electoral districts, the vote and the counting process were considered “genuine and honest” by all stakeholders as well as by UN observers.
These were likely the first truly free and fair elections in Iraq’s history, reflecting both a degree of political maturity in the country and the competence and independence of its Independent High Electoral Commission.
Two weeks after the official announcement of the election results, the new Parliament convened on December 29 in Baghdad.
After taking their oaths, 309 out of 329 MPs voted to elect the Speaker of Parliament from among three candidates. The leader of the Sunni Taqaddum (Progress) list, Mohamed al-Halboussi, was elected with 208 votes.
Aged 45, Mr. al-Halboussi had previously served two terms as an MP and chaired the Parliamentary Committee on Oil and Energy during those terms.
According to the Iraqi Constitution adopted by referendum in 2005, Parliament must, after this first session, elect the President of the Republic within 30 days, meaning before January 28, 2026.
By established tradition, this largely ceremonial role goes to a Kurdish figure. Until now, candidates presented by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), often with the tacit or explicit support of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), have been elected to this position.
In return, the KDP obtained the posts of President and Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region. However, the balance of power between these two main Kurdish parties has shifted over the years, and this gentleman’s agreement is now being challenged. Especially since, more than a year after the elections to the Kurdistan Parliament, the PUK has still not accepted the KDP’s proposal to form a coalition government in Erbil.
By putting forward its own candidate for the Iraqi presidency, the KDP appears to be exerting significant pressure, using its potential support for the PUK in Baghdad as leverage for concessions in the formation of a coalition government in Erbil. Among the KDP’s presidential candidates, Dr. Fuad Hussein, currently Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, has strong chances of being elected, as this Kurdish Shia is well regarded by major Shia parties in the Iraqi Parliament and by most Kurdish MPs.
Once elected, the new President of the Republic will need to appoint a Prime Minister from the Shia majority. The Coordination Framework, which brings together the main Shia parties represented in Parliament, must present a candidate who is approved by the Shia religious leadership in Najaf as well as, as usual, by both Iran and the United States.
Two main candidates appear to be competing: outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who is close to Tehran.
The outcome will also depend on developments in Iran–US relations. Having lost some of its regional allies (Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas), the Islamic Republic is trying by all available means to maintain its influence in Iraq.
In December, after suffering a severe drought over the summer, the Kurdistan Region experienced heavy rains that caused flooding in several areas, especially in the Chamchamal plain in Sulaymaniyah province and in Kirkuk. At least five people were killed and 19 injured.
According to a report issued on December 14 by the Kurdistan Crisis Coordination Center, 2,225 houses and 215 businesses were severely damaged in three days of flooding. Around one hundred orchards were devastated. Schools and government offices remained closed during the worst of the rainfall (Rudaw, December 14).
A solidarity effort involving local communities and major regional companies such as Dana Gas helped provide aid and compensation to the victims.
Meanwhile, on December 3, the United States officially inaugurated its new consulate in Erbil. Spanning more than 20 hectares, this complex is reportedly the largest American consulate general in the world.
"This is a symbol of the long-term partnership between the United States and Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq," said Michael Rigas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Resources, during the inauguration ceremony, alongside the Kurdish Region’s president, prime minister, and key political figures (AFP, December 3).
On December 17, Kurdish Flag Day was celebrated in major cities across Kurdistan and in the diaspora. In Paris, a ceremony was organized by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) representation in France, attended by Paris mayor Anne Hidalgo and many French and Kurdish dignitaries. The Kurdish flag was first designed by Kurdish patriots in the aftermath of World War I, during a time when an independent Kurdistan was supported by US President Woodrow Wilson and included in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, though never implemented.
The flag first flew atop Mount Ararat during the Kurdish uprising of 1927–1930, and was later adopted by the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946, in Iranian Kurdistan.
In 1992, the Parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan officially adopted the flag, which now flies on public buildings across the Region.
A symbol of Kurdish resistance and the people’s struggle for freedom, the flag continues to be raised during demonstrations in Turkey, Iran, and Syria, despite official bans.
President Erdoğan’s health is visibly deteriorating. Though his speech remains combative and assertive, his gait is unsteady, and he increasingly needs assistance to climb stairs or walk a few steps. His twilight grip on power has already triggered fierce succession battles, which, once silent and concealed, are now breaking out into the open.
Among the many contenders, two names stand out: his son-in-law Berat Albayrak, former Finance Minister and wealthy businessman, and current Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Erdoğan’s “black box,” who previously headed the powerful and omnipresent National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Fidan, a bureaucrat of Kurdish origin with relatives still in PKK guerrilla zones, has rallied to Erdoğan’s side and represents the hardline nationalist wing of the ruling AKP.
The succession war is currently being fought indirectly, through the entourages of each contender. Like a game of chess, each side is attempting to eliminate the other’s pawns. And in this ruthless game, Fidan has just lost a key ally: Mehmet Akif Ersoy, a star presenter on the influential news channel Habertürk. The son of a radical Islamist linked to international jihadist networks, this journalist, who spent several years in Syria learning Arabic and promoting Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, also served as “special advisor” to the head of the powerful Diyanet, Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs, which funds, manages and controls the country’s Sunni mosques and their staff, including muftis and imams.
On December 9, this very popular figure among AKP voters was arrested and jailed for cocaine use, based on allegations from a supposed and anonymous “well-known drug dealer.” This was followed by accusations of sexual advances toward television presenters. All seven members of his Habertürk team were also arrested.
This “media prince” of the pro-government press, a relentless critic of regime opponents, now finds himself behind bars. The Turkish daily Sabah, owned by the Albayrak brothers, has gleefully reported on the misconduct and disgrace of this celebrity “very close to Minister Fidan.”
Another of Fidan’s allies, Furkan Torlak, resigned from his post as “coordinator of the fight against disinformation” (Le Monde, December 22). However, Minister Fidan moved to reaffirm his Turkish patriotism and value to the regime. On December 22, he visited Damascus to meet with his Syrian counterpart and to pressure the Syrian Kurds into integrating their forces into the Syrian national army. He was accompanied by Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler to conduct a “general assessment” of the relations between the two countries.
At a joint press conference, Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shalbani announced that his ministry had received a response from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) regarding the proposal to integrate into the Syrian army. “We are reviewing this response and how it aligns with the national interest and the goal of a unified Syrian territory” (AFP, December 22). The two Turkish ministers also met with Syria’s interim president.
During this high-profile visit, deadly clashes broke out between local Kurdish security forces (Asayish) and Islamist militias of the “Free Syrian Army,” who have been besieging the Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in Aleppo’s outskirts for months. These districts shelter some 460,000 residents, many of them displaced from Afrin following the 2019 Turkish invasion. Encouraged by its Turkish sponsor, the Syrian regime is determined to seize control of these neighborhoods at all costs.
Concerned by these clashes, imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on December 30 called on “Turkey to help facilitate an agreement between Syrian Kurds and Damascus.” “It is essential that Turkey play a constructive, facilitating, and guaranteeing role in the dialogue process. This is crucial for regional stability and for strengthening its own internal peace,” said the Kurdish leader, who appears to believe that Turkey, the arsonist, could also act as firefighter in this potentially devastating new fire.
On December 3, Öcalan had reaffirmed his “support for the peace process,” which made little progress in December despite several meetings of the special parliamentary commission and visits by the pro-Kurdish DEM party delegation to major Turkish political parties, in an effort to build consensus around concrete legislative reforms and peace initiatives.
Turkey is also now facing a renewed threat from dormant ISIS cells that it had long tolerated. On December 29, a large operation across 21 provinces led to the arrest of 357 suspects linked to the Islamic State. Three Turkish police officers were killed during the raids, which lasted several hours in Yalova province in the northwest, according to Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya at a December 30 press conference (AFP). Six ISIS members, all Turkish nationals, were killed. On December 24, the Istanbul prosecutor ordered the arrest of 137 suspected ISIS members “following intelligence that the terrorist organization was planning attacks during Christmas and New Year celebrations.”
On the diplomatic front, Erdoğan’s relationship with his ally Vladimir Putin is faltering. Russian attacks on merchant ships, many flying the Turkish flag, in the Black Sea have alarmed Turkish authorities, who maintain significant trade relations with both Ukraine and Russia.
To edge closer to Washington and eventually rejoin the American F-35 fighter jet program, Turkey is reportedly considering returning its Russian-made S-400 missile systems, according to Le Monde (December 19). Washington has also asked Ankara to reduce its dependency on Russian oil and gas, under threat of sanctions. Erdoğan, who long sought to balance both sides, now finds himself in a delicate position, facing pressure he can no longer ignore. It seems that even he realizes there’s no joking with Donald Trump.
