On 11 November, parliamentary elections were held across all provinces and regions of Iraq, including in Kurdistan.
Iraqi citizens were called to elect 329 members of the unicameral Federal Parliament in Baghdad for a four-year term.
The main takeaway from the vote: the turnout was 56.11%, compared to 41% in the 2021 elections. While the rate was often below 50% in Shiite provinces and Baghdad, it reached 77.4% in Duhok, 71.65% in Erbil, 65.02% in Kirkuk, and 60.15% in Suleimaniyah. In the mixed Arab-Kurdish province of Nineveh (Mosul), it was 65.9%. The Sunni Arab electorate also turned out in large numbers in the predominantly Sunni provinces, with rates above 65%.
In total, out of 21,404,291 registered voters, 12,003,143 went to the polls. More than 9 million eligible Iraqis did not register to vote. Taking into account the unregistered voters, mostly Shiites, only 38% of Iraqis of voting age participated in the election. It remains unclear what impact the boycott call from influential Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, whose list came first in the 2021 elections, had on abstention and non-registration.
More than 7,000 candidates and nearly one hundred parties or coalitions competed for the 329 parliamentary seats. According to results announced on 17 November by the Independent High Electoral Commission, the Reconstruction and Development Coalition led by the Prime Minister came in first with 1,317,446 votes, or 11.08% of the vote. It won 46 seats, compared to only 2 seats in 2021 for al-Sudani’s then-small party.
In second place came the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), with 1,099,826 votes, or 10.09% of the vote, making it effectively the largest single party in Iraq and Kurdistan. Al-Sudani’s coalition is, in fact, a grouping of several Shiite parties. Despite improving its vote count significantly from 781,670 in 2021, the KDP secured only 27 seats compared to 33 in the previous elections, due to a new electoral system unfavorable to the Kurds. For instance, a Shiite MP from the Prime Minister’s coalition is elected with an average of 28,640 votes, while a KDP candidate requires 40,734 votes per seat.
The KDP came first in Duhok, winning 9 out of 12 seats, in Erbil with 9 out of 16 seats, and in Nineveh (Mosul) with 5 out of 34. In Suleimaniyah, it gained only 2 seats, 1 seat in Kirkuk, and 1 in Diyala. Including 3 Christian MPs, 1 Yazidi, and 1 Feyli Kurd elected through quotas, the KDP claims a total of 32 seats.
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the other historic Kurdish party, received 548,296 votes, about half of the KDP's total. It won 15 seats, down from 16 in 2021: 8 in Suleimaniyah, 4 in Kirkuk, 3 in Erbil, and 2 through a coalition in Mosul.
In third place came a new party from the Gorran (Change) movement called Halwest (Position), which won 5 seats, including 3 in Suleimaniyah and 2 in Erbil. Next was the Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtû), which with 166,904 votes, maintained its 4 seats from 2021, 2 in Duhok and 2 in Suleimaniyah. Another Islamic party, Komal, secured 1 seat in Suleimaniyah. The New Generation party, which surprised many by winning 9 seats in 2021, only secured 3 this time, likely affected by legal issues surrounding its leader.
In the symbolically important province of Kirkuk, the Kurds, divided among themselves, garnered 251,945 votes but obtained only 5 seats (down from 6 in 2021), including 4 for the PUK and 1 for the KDP. The two Turkmen lists secured a total of 98,896 votes and 2 seats. The 3 Arab lists combined earned 180,687 votes and 5 seats: 3 for the al-Taqaddum (Progress) coalition led by former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, 1 for the Arab Coalition, and 1 for the Azim Coalition.
A total of 252 candidates contested the 13 seats in Kirkuk, including one quota seat for Christians. For the first time, a list representing the Yazidi cause ran in Nineveh (Mosul), earning 49,197 votes and 1 seat.
In Iraq’s electoral system, 83 out of the 329 seats are reserved for women. Within this 25% quota system, female candidates can be elected with significantly fewer votes than their male counterparts. Nine seats are reserved for religious minorities: 5 for Christians, 1 for Yazidis, 1 for Shabaks, 1 for Mandaeans, and 1 for Feyli Kurds.
Kurdish party lists collectively won 65 seats, including 2 Yazidi Kurds, 1 Feyli Kurd, and 5 Christian MPs elected through quotas.
Nationally, the Prime Minister's Shiite-led coalition came in first with 46 seats. It was followed by the al-Taqaddum (Progress) coalition of Mohammed al-Halbousi, which won 27 seats.
A significant surge was seen among parties stemming from pro-Iranian Shiite militias. Within the Coordination Framework, a pro-Iranian alliance, the State of Law coalition led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki won 29 seats. The Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq faction of Qais al-Khazali, designated as a terrorist organization by the US, secured 28 seats. The Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, obtained 21 seats (AFP, 17 November).
Women's representation declined notably, from 95 female MPs in 2021 to 84 in 2025. Women now hold 25.4% of the federal parliament seats. Only 25 women were elected without the quota, compared to 53 in 2021.
The leaders of the Coordination Framework met as soon as the official results were announced. They claim to have the upper hand in selecting the next Prime Minister, a position traditionally reserved for a Shiite. The largely symbolic post of President of the Republic is usually assigned to a Kurd, while the Speaker of Parliament is traditionally a Sunni Arab.
On the morning of 18 November, during a press conference in Duhok where he was attending a conference, Prime Minister al-Sudani announced that his coalition, with its 46 seats, would join the Coordination Framework, ensuring a new majority in Parliament to form the next government. He stated that his candidacy was not about personal ambition, but a sense of responsibility to carry out his mission.
These negotiations could take weeks or even months to reach a comprehensive agreement among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds.
Meanwhile, on 25 November, a drone struck the gas facilities at the Khor Mor complex in the province of Suleimaniyah. The attack caused significant material damage at this facility, owned by the United Arab Emirates.
Gas supply to the Kurdistan Region’s power plants was interrupted. According to a spokesperson for Kurdistan’s electricity regulator, the disruption caused a power loss of 2,600 megawatts, representing 80% of the region's capacity.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and France immediately condemned the attack on this vital energy infrastructure, which threatens the country’s stability and the safety of its people. Kurdistan’s Deputy Chief of Staff appreciated the expressions of solidarity but called on the UK to act to enable the activation of the Khor Mor anti-drone system.
This defensive system, purchased from a British company, jams hostile drones. Though delivered, it remains inactive because the UK refuses to accept the end-user certificate provided by the Kurdistan Regional Government, and Baghdad refuses to issue such a certificate, which is required for its activation.
On X (formerly Twitter), the Kurdistan Prime Minister urged US and Western partners to provide the necessary defensive equipment to protect civilian infrastructure and support serious action to deter attacks on the Kurdish people (Rudaw, 26 Nov.).
The Iraqi government condemned the attack and pledged to launch an investigation. Previous investigations carried out jointly with Kurdish authorities successfully identified the perpetrators, but Baghdad refused to disclose their identities, fearing retaliation from Shiite militias and their Iranian sponsors.
Mark Savaya, the new US Special Envoy to Iraq, declared on 26 November: “Let us be clear, there is no place in a fully sovereign Iraq for such armed groups... Every illegal armed group and its backers will be monitored, confronted, and held accountable.” He reiterated US support for “a strong Kurdistan within a united and stable Iraq,” encouraging Baghdad and Erbil to deepen their security cooperation and jointly protect key economic and energy infrastructure (Rudaw, 26 November).
The Iraqi Prime Minister held an emergency security meeting and announced the formation of a high-level investigative committee composed of representatives from both the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government to identify and prosecute those responsible for the drone attack on the gas complex.
No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, but a spokesperson for the Kurdistan Prime Minister, Aziz Ahmed, pointed to “the usual Iraqi terrorists who are paid from the federal budget.”
Located in the Chamchamal district, the Khor Mor gas field is operated by Pearl Petroleum, a consortium of Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum based in the UAE. In a statement on 26 November, Dana Gas announced that production had been halted to “extinguish the fire and assess the damage.” The situation returned to normal a few days later.
The investigation may take a long time, especially since the outgoing Prime Minister, who is a candidate for reappointment, is reluctant to anger certain Shiite militias or their Iranian patrons, who are often behind such attacks on US and Kurdish interests.
Population Census
In a separate development, Iraq’s Minister of Planning announced the results of the general population census conducted on 20 October 2024.
According to the data, Iraq now has a population of 46,118,793. The population of the Kurdistan Region stands at 6,519,129, accounting for 14.13% of Iraq’s total. Women represent 49.61% of the Region’s population.
With 2,517,534 inhabitants, Erbil Governorate accounts for 38.62% of the Region’s population. The combined population of Suleimaniyah and Halabja is 2,401,724, while Duhok has 1,599,871.
Kurdish society is now 85% urban and 15% rural. In the rest of Iraq, 68% of the population lives in urban areas and 32% in rural zones.
The Kurdish population living outside the Kurdistan Region (in Kirkuk, Mosul, Khanaqin, etc.) is estimated at over 2 million people.
Kurds in Iraq thus number more than 8.5 million.
It is also worth noting that Baghdad Governorate, with its 9,780,429 inhabitants, is home to nearly one quarter of Iraq’s population.
The new Syrian regime continues to score diplomatic points in its process of gaining international recognition.
After visits to major Middle Eastern capitals, followed by Moscow and New York, the interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Charaa was received at the White House by Donald Trump on November 10. This meeting, as emphasized by the press, marked the first bilateral encounter between a Syrian head of state and the United States since the country’s independence in 1946.
Just a year ago, President al-Charaa was still leading the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the former Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. He was on the U.S. terrorism blacklist and under UN sanctions. On November 6, the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions against al-Charaa, welcoming in a resolution prepared by the United States the new authorities' commitment to "combat terrorism." On the eve of his "historic" visit to Washington, his name was removed from the U.S. terrorism blacklist, turning this former jihadist into a now legitimate interlocutor, even a partner, of the Americans and Europeans.
The meeting with President Trump took place away from television cameras, in unusually discreet conditions. Following the talks, Syria was inducted as a new member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
As part of this partnership, the United States will establish military bases in Syria, notably in Damascus, and act as facilitators between the new Syrian regime and Israel, with the aim of reaching a peace agreement between the two countries, which are still technically at war. No information has surfaced regarding the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian army, nor about the nature of the relationship between them and Damascus.
Syrian Kurds fear being used as a bargaining chip in negotiations and deals between Washington, Ankara, and Damascus. To avoid such a fate, they are trying to strengthen their unity, in principle established through an agreement signed between the ruling Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Rojava and the Kurdish National Council in Syria (ENKS), which brings together a dozen Kurdish opposition parties. Discussions are also underway with representatives of the Druze, Alawite, and Christian communities to form, if not a front, at least an alliance against the central government controlled by Arab Islamists, with the aim of promoting a decentralized system that guarantees the rights of all components of Syria’s diverse society.
Another key aspect of Syrian Kurdish policy is to ensure the support and solidarity of Kurds in neighboring countries, especially those in Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey.
In this context, an important meeting was held on November 20 in Duhok, Iraqi Kurdistan, between former Kurdistan Region President and KDP leader Massoud Barzani and a Syrian Kurdish delegation led by General Mazloum Abdi. He was accompanied by Ilham Ahmed, co-president of the Department of Foreign Relations of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). The president of the Kurdish National Council and one of his colleagues also attended, along with former Diyarbakir mayor and MP Osman Baydemir. The purpose of the meeting was to deliver a message of unity to both Kurdish and international public opinion during this critical period.
General Abdi thanked President Barzani for his unwavering efforts to promote Kurdish unity and expressed his gratitude for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which throughout the years has kept its border and doors open to the Kurds of Rojava, providing them with a vital supply route and access to the outside world.
The delegation then traveled to Erbil, where they were received by Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani. He reaffirmed his support for “our Syrian Kurdish brothers in their struggle to achieve their rights” and stressed that peace and stability in Syria require the establishment of a decentralized system that respects the identity and rights of all components of Syrian society. (Rudaw, November 20)
On his side, in a public appeal issued on November 24 and widely circulated on social media, the supreme religious leader of the Alawite community, Ghazal Ghazal, who is also president of the High Alawite Council of Syria and the Diaspora, urged his followers to protest peacefully against the threat of ethnic cleansing hanging over their community and to demand a federal status for Syria. He called on Druze and Kurds to support these demands. (Rudaw, November 24)
In an urgent message to the UN, he warned of "barbaric attacks" by Sunni Arab Bedouin tribes, supported by regime elements, against Alawite neighborhoods in the city of Homs.
The situation remains tense in the neighboring Druze-majority province of Sweida. Clashes regularly occur between Druze self-defense forces and Sunni militias affiliated with the Syrian army, despite the ceasefire agreement reached last July.
In a report published in its November 6 edition, the newspaper Le Monde highlighted the resurgence of the Islamic State organization in northeastern Syria, under Kurdish control.
On November 22, the SDF, supported by the Coalition, conducted a raid in the Zalzala neighborhood of the city of Marat, northeast of Deir ez-Zor, as part of continued and targeted efforts to dismantle ISIS infrastructure. Mid-November reports confirmed that the SDF was actively engaged in operations against the group, which had taken advantage of regional instability to escalate its attacks. According to SDF figures, 117 attacks occurred in northeastern Syria between January and August 2025, compared to 73 during all of 2024, demonstrating the need to maintain the role of the SDF.
Later in the month, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) documented a joint operation by the SDF and the Internal Security Forces in the Hassakeh countryside, where dozens of individuals suspected of being affiliated with ISIS were arrested and weapons were seized, highlighting the extent of underground networks still active in and around Rojava. Another SOHR report from Al-Bukamal, in eastern Deir ez-Zor, noted new ISIS graffiti threatening that "the Islamic State is coming," part of a pattern of intimidation aimed at destabilizing areas administered either by the interim government or the SDF. According to Kurdish officials in Rojava, these incidents reinforce their argument that sustained international cooperation with AANES and the SDF is essential to prevent a new wave of jihadist resurgence in Syria.
In the Kurdish regions of Syria occupied by Turkey, pro-Turkish militias continue to commit abuses.
The most serious violations have again been reported from Afrin. On November 3, SOHR stated that pro-Turkish groups had seized and burned about 5,000 olive trees belonging to displaced Kurdish villagers and were imposing arbitrary “taxes” on olive harvests, a key livelihood for Afrin’s original population. A follow-up report on November 5 described how these factions forced farmers to give up to half of their olive production under various pretexts, amounting to systematic looting of Kurdish property.
On November 22, members of a faction of the so-called “National Army” arrested a Kurdish man from the village of Borj al-Qas, in the Afrin countryside, because his son had worked as a teacher for AANES and was now in hiding. The father was transferred to the Azaz military prison, and the family was reportedly told to pay 10,000 dollars for his release.
Meanwhile, negotiations with Damascus made little progress in November.
In mid-November, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi gave a detailed interview to Enab Baladi to reaffirm the Kurds’ priorities in talks with Damascus. Abdi emphasized that the SDF is a multiethnic force that has fought alongside the US-led Coalition for over a decade and is now “the largest organized force in Syria.” He insisted that any integration into the Syrian Arab Army must respect the sacrifices made by SDF fighters and protect the political and security achievements of Rojava. He linked military arrangements to broader questions of decentralization, recognition of the Kurds as an indigenous people, and guarantees for the safe return of displaced persons to areas such as Afrin and Ras al-Ain, stressing that Kurdish rights and the right of return are non-negotiable pillars of any settlement.
Despite these efforts, Kurdish officials warned at the end of November that Damascus was stalling and trying to weaken the Kurdish position. Senior PYD official Aldar Khalil stated that all discussions between the SDF and Damascus had been halted without explanation, even after Syrian officials had verbally agreed to key measures, such as forming an SDF division, integrating the Asayish into the Ministry of Interior, and appointing a Kurdish chief of staff, only to later refuse to sign any written document. Khalil argued that a binding agreement must be reached while US forces are still present in the region, accusing Damascus of exerting pressure on AANES areas by closing major roads, shutting down Qamishli airport, and blocking essential civil services in an attempt to “push us out of Syria.” He also noted that attempts to stir Arab-Kurdish tensions in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor had largely failed, reflecting the resilience of the local social contract under AANES governance.
The Kurdish leader called on the international community to give Rojava a fair chance in its efforts and projects for Syria’s reconstruction and development. (Rudaw, November 19)
The National Solidarity, Brotherhood, and Democracy Commission of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), established in August to monitor the negotiation process between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), decided during its November 21 session to send a cross-party parliamentary delegation to Imrali prison island to meet the imprisoned PKK leader. This decision followed hearings with numerous political actors, academics, and NGO representatives. The motion was approved by a majority of the Commission’s 51 members, thanks to support from the ruling AKP party, its ally the MHP, and the pro-Kurdish DEM party. The main opposition party, the CHP (Republican People's Party), chose not to participate.
Following the vote, a delegation of three MPs (one each from the AKP, MHP, and DEM) visited Imrali Island—located off the coast of Istanbul—on November 24, where the PKK leader has been imprisoned for 26 years. The delegation sought to assess his views on the PKK disarmament process, the reintegration of its fighters into society, and a roadmap for normalizing Kurdish-Turkish relations. This was the first official parliamentary visit to Abdullah Öcalan, who had previously only met with Turkish intelligence officials (MIT), military personnel, or, occasionally, Kurdish or pro-Kurdish MPs on an individual basis.
The visit was conducted in strict confidentiality, with no press statements other than a brief communiqué from the presidency of the Turkish National Assembly stating that the visit “led to positive outcomes.” According to the communiqué, the discussion focused on the dissolution of the PKK and disarmament, as well as the integration of Kurdish forces into the Syrian army. The detailed content of the meeting will be presented at the Commission’s next plenary session, after which recommendations and proposals will be submitted to the Assembly for possible legislative action to support the peace process. Political parties are expected to submit their proposals by mid-December, and the Commission’s report is slated for completion by the end of 2025, if the timetable is respected.
During earlier hearings, academics and NGOs had already proposed recommendations. Human Rights Watch and its partner organizations stressed the need for structural reforms such as the overhaul of anti-terrorism laws to remove abusive provisions, the cessation of politically motivated prosecutions against Kurdish elected officials, the protection of the right to protest, and recognition of the “right to hope” for prisoners serving aggravated life sentences. Kurdish NGOs emphasized that peace cannot be limited to disarmament—it must include dismantling the legal arsenal that has criminalized Kurdish political life since the founding of the Turkish Republic.
Prior to the Imrali visit—and perhaps in preparation for it—the PKK announced on November 17 that it had withdrawn its fighters from the strategic Zap region on the Iraqi-Turkish border, between Northern and Southern Kurdistan. “On the evening of November 16, our forces likely to trigger conflict in the Zap region moved to alternative areas,” the PKK declared in a statement released by its Firat news agency. “This withdrawal represents a concrete and significant contribution to the development and success of the peace and democratic society process initiated by Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan,” the statement said. This region, long the scene of confrontations with the Turkish army, holds symbolic value for the PKK as it was initially home to its headquarters before relocating further east to the Qandil Mountains, where it maintained a strong presence until recently (AFP, November 17).
Having already withdrawn all its fighters from Turkish Kurdistan in October, the PKK stated on November 30 through one of its commanders, Amed Malazgirt, that it would “go no further in negotiations with Ankara.” “We have done what was asked of us. Now it's the Turkish State's turn. There have been discussions over the past five years but no concrete progress (…). We are now waiting for the Turkish State to take steps,” the spokesperson said. “We have two demands: first, the release of our leader Apo (Abdullah Öcalan). Without this, the process will fail. Second, the constitutional and official recognition of the Kurdish people in Turkey.” Given the current polarized political climate in Turkey, where official media still depict Öcalan as the head of a terrorist organization, his release seems a remote prospect. Even a definitive ruling by the European Court of Human Rights ordering the release of Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtaş, imprisoned since 2016 for expressing his opinions, has not led to his freedom. Demirtaş, a former presidential candidate, received more than six million votes in the 2015 elections, yet remains behind bars (AFP, November 4).
Now, even so-called “white Turks”—Westernized and secular—are being targeted by the regime. After going after mayors and municipal councilors from the CHP, as well as lawyers and opposition journalists, the government has turned its sights on high-profile media figures. On November 26, renowned journalist and TV presenter Fatih Altaylı was sentenced to more than four years in prison. This case “marks a new low for press freedom in Turkey, where 85% of national media are under government control,” observed Le Monde (November 26). The Turkish judiciary, in overdrive, even issued 37 arrest warrants for “genocide” on November 7 against top Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, and Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir. Israel denounced it as “a publicity stunt by tyrant Erdoğan” (Le Figaro, November 8), who continues to portray himself as a champion of the oppressed worldwide—except, of course, for his Kurdish neighbors and recently his “ethnic brothers” (soydas), the Uyghurs, who, according to Le Monde, “are no longer welcome.”
As Turkey strengthens ties with China, it has shifted its migration policy toward members of the Muslim Uyghur minority from Xinjiang, whom it historically supported. Cases of Uyghur deportations are on the rise, according to a Human Rights Watch investigation cited in Le Monde (November 13).
On the diplomatic front, Turkey hosted two symbolic visitors. Pope Leo XIV came to celebrate the 1700th anniversary of the Council of Nicaea—where the Christian Creed was established—alongside Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople. Arriving in Ankara on November 27, the Pope met with President Erdoğan, then traveled to Istanbul, where he was warmly received by the Patriarch. Together, they flew by helicopter to Nicaea (İznik), on the Sea of Marmara, where they held an ecumenical mass at the site of the original basilica. The Pope also visited the Hagia Sophia, now a mosque, and the Blue Mosque with the Grand Mufti, before departing for Lebanon. Since the 1915 genocide of Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans, and the forced expulsion of over a million Greeks from Anatolia, only a few thousand Christians remain in Turkey, once the heart of the Byzantine Christian empire. The Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople—supreme religious leader of the world’s Orthodox Christians—is referred to by Turkish authorities and media simply as “the Greek Patriarch of the Phanar,” as though he were a mere parish priest.
The second highly symbolic visit was made on November 30 by Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani to Cizîra Botan, capital for over five centuries of a brilliant Kurdish principality and one of the major centers of Kurdish civilization. The occasion was a symposium on the 16th-century Kurdish poet Melayê Cizîrî, as renowned in Kurdistan as Hafez in Iran or Goethe in Germany. Barzani attended the event at the official invitation of the organizers, including the University of Şırnak and the province’s governorate. After the symposium, he visited the famed Medresa Sor (Red Madrasa), a medieval university that educated many Kurdish scholars and poets; the tomb of Melayê Cizîrî; the legendary grave of Mem and Zin—the Kurdish Romeo and Juliet; then to the emblematic Mosque of the Prophet Noah (Nûh), where, according to the Quran, the Ark is said to have come to rest on Mount Cûdi (Judi), located not far from Cizîr and Şirnak (Şernex), whose name means the city of Noah.
A pilgrimage site that, like many lovers of Kurdish literature and history, Massoud Barzani seems to have long dreamed of. A large and emotional crowd gathered along his path, according to media reports. Turkish security forces prevented many Kurdish citizens from approaching the historic leader. The two co-mayors of Cizîra Botan were even barred from attending the symposium honoring their city’s most famous poet.
Barzani’s visit was warmly welcomed by the local population on both sides of the border, but it sparked controversy within Turkish political circles. The far-right leader Devlet Bahçeli criticized the government for allowing Barzani to enter Turkey accompanied by armed bodyguards, as if Turkey could not ensure his safety. While it is routine diplomatic protocol for foreign leaders to travel with their own security detail, such treatment for a Kurdish leader is unthinkable for Turkish nationalists.
Iran is experiencing its worst drought in six decades. The water reservoirs supplying several major cities, including the capital, are at critical levels—so much so that the potential evacuation of Tehran is now being publicly discussed. Experts attribute this disastrous situation to both climate change and the country's severe mismanagement of its water resources.
The country’s second-largest city, Mashhad, is also facing a serious water shortage and rationing. Of Iran’s 31 provinces, 15 have not received a single drop of rain since October, and all 19 of the country’s large dams are currently dry, reports the Iranian news agency Mehr (Le Monde, November 13; New York Times, November 9).
The infrastructure built in the 1960s is poorly maintained, resulting in “a huge waste problem.” There are major losses in the pipelines, notes Bernard Hourcade, director of the Iran research team at CNRS. According to him, “There is a real water mafia—certain people have a vested interest in monopolizing water.”
A staggering 92% of the water is used for agriculture. Some crops, like cotton, require enormous water resources. The irreversible environmental damage caused by intensive cotton farming in Soviet Central Asia—where the Aral Sea was ultimately drained—is well known. Now, Lake Urmia in Iranian Kurdistan faces a similar fate.
The water crisis is a flashpoint for public anger. It adds to the backdrop of war, severe economic and social crises, government incompetence, and a general sense of despair. Following the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, demonstrators now march under a new slogan: “Water, Electricity, Life!” (RFI, November 13).
Faced with this growing wave of discontent and rebellion across the country, the Iranian government is resorting—almost routinely—to repression, particularly in Kurdistan.
Throughout November, Iranian security forces carried out widespread arbitrary arrests of Kurds across Rojhelat (Iranian Kurdistan), often targeting activists or ordinary citizens without adhering to legal procedures. The Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN) recorded at least 35 Kurdish citizens arrested by the Ministry of Intelligence or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in November. Most detainees were held incommunicado in detention centers in Sanandaj (Senna) or Urmia, with no access to lawyers or contact with their families.
On November 5, IRGC intelligence agents in Saqqez arrested a group of seven Kurdish men—identified as Mansour Soltani, Mahmoud Amani, Khalil Shabani, Mehdi Majidi, Fardin Salehi, Farzad Rahimzadeh, and Zahed Moradi—without a court order or explanation. Authorities refused to disclose their whereabouts or the reasons for their detention to their families.
On November 9, agents of the Ministry of Intelligence in Saqqez arrested two respected environmental activists, Mohammad Ali Veysi and Sirwan Khoda-Karami, without any legal warrant. Veysi was arrested at his workplace and Khoda-Karami at his home. Both men, known for their wildlife conservation work, were immediately taken to undisclosed locations. Despite urgent pleas from their families, authorities refused to reveal where they were being held or what charges they might face.
The following day, November 10, security forces raided a house in Kamyaran to arrest Ramin Mohammadi, a Kurdish former member of the opposition party Komala. Although Mohammadi had resigned from the party and returned to Iran in 2018 under an amnesty deal—during which he was interrogated for weeks by intelligence services in Sanandaj—IRGC agents broke into his rural home and arrested him again without a warrant. His renewed arrest sent a chilling message: even Kurds who had supposedly been pardoned or were apolitical could be arrested at any time.
Human rights groups also reported that Kurdish community and religious leaders were not spared. On November 3, security forces in Jwanru (Ravansar), Kermanshah Province, conducted a pre-dawn raid to arrest Mamosta Zana Hosseini, a prominent Sunni Kurdish cleric and village imam, without specifying any charges. Hosseini, 59, was in poor health but was nevertheless forcibly taken from his home at 3 a.m.
A disturbing aspect of the November crackdown was the number of Kurdish detainees who simply disappeared while in state custody, with their families receiving no information about their fate. Iranian authorities routinely held arrested Kurds incommunicado, refusing to disclose their place of detention or health condition for weeks. One such case is Salar Khalifehzadeh, a 33-year-old Kurd from Mahabad. He was arrested at work on October 27 by plainclothes Ministry of Intelligence agents. Since then, “there has been no information about his whereabouts or status,” according to Hengaw’s investigation.
Likewise, on November 12, two Kurds—Mohammad Rashidzadeh from Baneh and Mostafa Qawsi—were arrested by security forces while traveling together on the Piranshahr–Mahabad road and were quickly transferred to a Ministry of Intelligence detention center in Urmia. For nearly two weeks afterward, no details emerged about their condition or legal status. Rashidzadeh’s family received no information despite numerous inquiries. Qawsi’s fate remained equally unknown ten days after his arrest.
November 2025 also saw a new wave of executions of prisoners in Kurdistan and across Iran. In several cases, Kurdish detainees convicted on questionable charges were executed in secret. On November 19, for instance, Iranian authorities executed Mohammadreza Hosseini, a Kurdish prisoner, at Ilam Central Prison. Hosseini had been sentenced to death for “premeditated murder,” and his execution took place at dawn without any prior public announcement.
The next day, Farshid Jamiari, a Kurd from Kermanshah, was executed at Qazvin Central Prison on drug-related charges. Later in the month, on November 29, Mohammad Karim Moradi—a Kurdish prisoner from Kermanshah—was hanged at Dizelabad Central Prison in Kermanshah after spending four years on death row. Moradi had initially been arrested for murder and sentenced to death by an Iranian Revolutionary Court.
None of these executions were officially reported in state media, a common practice aimed at avoiding public attention. According to data compiled by the NGO Hengaw, Kurds were disproportionately affected by Iran’s execution spree in 2025, accounting for approximately 15% of all executions in the country. By the end of November, at least 231 Kurds had been executed out of roughly 1,503 total nationwide—a rate far exceeding their share of Iran’s population and significantly higher than that of other minorities.
On the diplomatic front, Iran has made tentative overtures toward France. It released two French hostages, Cécile Kohler and Jacques Paris, who had been detained since May 2022. They were transferred to the French embassy in Tehran, where they are to remain pending the outcome of a trial in France involving an Iranian woman accused of terrorism. The verdict is expected at the end of January 2026.
The Iranian national was released simultaneously and transferred to the Iranian embassy in Paris. This was, in effect, a hostage swap between the two countries.
Nevertheless, amid a stalemate in nuclear negotiations and concerns over potential Israeli strikes, Tehran appears to be trying to leverage its relationship with France to restart talks. According to Le Monde (November 28), the Islamic Republic sees France as a more reliable interlocutor than the United States for resuming dialogue. Tehran thus continues to buy time without making any concessions regarding its nuclear program or capabilities. Meanwhile, Iran is still denying access to its bombed nuclear sites and has yet to reach any agreement with the IAEA (Le Figaro, November 14).
