Within a matter of weeks, Syria’s Kurds lost positions that had taken more than a decade to consolidate across north-eastern Syria - territory representing nearly one third of the country.
On January 4, while a Kurdish delegation was still in Damascus attempting to advance implementation of the March 2025 agreement signed with interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, radical realignments were unfolding simultaneously. On January 5, discreet US-sponsored talks were held in Paris between Syrian Foreign Minister Assaad al-Chabani and Israeli representatives, reportedly aimed at reaching a “balanced security agreement” between the two countries, which remain technically at war (Le Figaro, January 5).
In a statement, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized that during these discussions Israel had “reaffirmed its commitment to promoting regional stability and security, as well as the need to advance economic cooperation for the benefit of both countries.” (RFI, January 7)
US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack, who mediated the talks, welcomed what he described as a positive outcome and praised Washington’s decision to rely on the new Syrian authorities to stabilize the country and normalize relations with neighboring states, particularly Israel and Lebanon.
Later that day, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and US President Donald Trump held a lengthy phone call. According to multiple accounts, Trump gave tacit approval for a limited Syrian military operation against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), formerly key allies of the US-led coalition against the Islamic State. Erdoğan immediately informed his Syrian counterpart and protégé of the American “green light” and publicly referred to an operation targeting “YPG-PKK terrorists” in Aleppo.
On January 6, a large-scale offensive began against Kurdish districts of Aleppo. Surrounded by more than 30 thousands of militia fighters of the Arab army and subjected to heavy shelling and drone strikes, the neighbourhoods were defended by several hundred members of the Kurdish local security force (Asayish), who had administered the area since 2011. After five days of resistance, they withdrew under a ceasefire arrangement.
A benevolent and inclusive government would have thanked this local police force for its contribution to public security and sought a peaceful integration. Instead, the new regime chose to besiege these neighborhoods for three months before launching its large-scale offensive, forcing an estimated 176,000 civilians onto the roads of exile in the middle of winter, according to the UN.
With logistic backing from Turkey, pro-government militias then advanced into Arab-majority areas administered by the SDF. Under US pressure and seeking to avoid a broader civil war, the SDF agreed to withdraw first from territories west of the Euphrates and later from other Arab-majority cities it had governed since their liberation from the Islamic State.
With logistical support from Turkey, these militias then attacked Arab towns and localities administered by the SDF. Under US pressure, and in order to avoid a new and devastating civil war, the SDF had agreed to withdraw first from areas west of the Euphrates and later from other Arab-majority cities that they had liberated from the Islamic State and administered since.
The Syrian government portrayed the SDF withdrawal as a victory, though it has not asserted comparable successes against Israeli incursions or Turkish-controlled zones in northern Syria. In mosques across the country, sermons reportedly celebrated the development, referencing Qur’anic verses from Al-Anfal, authorizing the killing of infidels and the seizure of their property. The same reference had been invoked by Saddam Hussein during the 1986–1988 genocidal campaigns that left 182,000 Kurdish civilians dead.
The copy of this directive circulated widely on social media and alarmed Kurds, who take seriously the threat of massacre and ethnic cleansing. Such practices have already been carried out by the same militias in Kurdish territories under Turkish occupation. In the city of Serê Kaniyê, where Kurds made up 85 percent of the population before the occupation, they now represent barely 1 percent. In the Afrin canton, they have fallen from 90 percent to approximately 35 percent. The Turks have demonstrated expertise in ethnic cleansing and demographic engineering, as Armenians, Greeks, Assyro-Chaldeans and Kurds can attest.
Following intense fighting in Raqqa province between Kurdish forces and the Syrian army, and amid public outrage and criticism from US senators over the abandonment of Kurdish allies, on January 17, Washington called for “restraint.” French President Emmanuel Macron spoke on January 18 with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa urging de-escalation and an immediate ceasefire.
That evening, Damascus announced the signing of a ceasefire agreement with SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi. The fourteen-point agreement provides for the integration of the SDF and Kurdish security forces (Assayish) into the Ministries of Defense and Interior. It also includes the immediate transfer of Arab-majority provinces such as Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa to central government control and responsibility for Islamic State detainees.
Despite reportedly being unable to travel to Damascus “for weather-related reasons,” Mazloum Abdi had met the previous day in Erbil with US envoy Tom Barrack. Barrack described the agreement as “a decisive turning point”, framing it as a move from confrontation toward partnership.
Turkey reacted through its foreign minister, expressing hope that the agreement would contribute to security and peace in Syria and the wider region.
Yet subsequent negotiations on implementation failed. Meanwhile, US authorities expressed doubts about the Syrian army’s ability to securely manage Islamic State detainees, given that many Islamist militias within it include former jihadists. The Pentagon evacuated approximately 7,000 high-risk detainees to Iraq.
Despite extensions of the ceasefire, the siege of Kobane, begun on January 17, continued. Kurdish media showed daily images of 250,000 residents and displaced persons trapped without water or electricity. Nearly 200,000 civilians were forced onto winter roads of exile.
Mass mobilization took place across Kurdish regions. In Erbil, the Kurdish television network Rûdaw organized a telethon that raised more than one million dollars. The Barzani Foundation distributed aid to more than 60,000 displaced persons. A Turkish Kurdish aid convoy to Kobane was blocked by Ankara.
Kurdish media also broadcast images of the killing of six members of a displaced Kurdish family by Syrian army militias on January 25.
The abandonment of the Kurds by Western allies, especially the United States, was widely perceived as a “betrayal.” Demonstrations took place across Europe. In the US Senate, a bipartisan bill titled the “Save the Kurds Act” was introduced on January 30, proposing sanctions, recognition of the SDF’s role against ISIS, restrictions on lifting terror designations, and a snapback mechanism.
Under international pressure, a formal agreement was announced on January 30 providing for gradual military and administrative integration, including guarantees regarding civil and educational rights of the Kurdish population.
However, nothing guarantees implementation, including the decree recognizing Kurdish “national rights,” issued January 16, allowing Kurdish language education and restoring citizenship to stateless Kurds and Newroz will be recognized as a public holiday.
Yet these rights will only be meaningful if enshrined in a constitution and guaranteed by the United States and France.
The Rojava, as it existed as an experiment in democratic confederalism, ecological, feminist, multi-ethnic, associating Kurds, Arabs, Muslims, Christians and Yazidis, effectively came to an end in late January.
It remains to be seen whether the “integration process” will preserve some autonomy for civil and military institutions in Kurdish-majority Jazira. Whether a reduced and altered version of Rojava will survive as a political and symbolic entity, in the region and among parts of the European left, remains uncertain.
Protests against rising living costs that began on December 28 at Tehran’s Grand Bazaar rapidly escalated and spread nationwide. By February 2, security forces had intensified operations in the provinces of Fars, Lorestan, and Isfahan, as well as in at least 32 cities across the country, seeking to suppress what authorities described as “riots.” The Kurdish provinces were placed under heavy military lockdown.
Following the deaths of several demonstrators, US President Donald Trump posted a warning to Iranian authorities on his Truth Social platform, stating that if peaceful protesters were shot or violently repressed, the United States would be prepared to intervene. Iranian officials interpreted the message as encouragement for insurrection, prompting a full mobilization of state security forces to crush the movement. The crackdown proved especially severe in Tehran and in Kurdish regions.
On January 7, hundreds staged a sit-in at Tehran’s Grand Bazaar to denounce the violence used against demonstrators by security forces. President Masoud Pezeshkian urged law enforcement not to target protesters.
The appeal was ignored. That same day, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei and Security Forces Commander General Ahmad Reza Radan announced that protesters would be “identified everywhere and at all times, pursued and punished until the arrest of the last person” (New York Times, Janyary 7). By then, at least 38 deaths had been reported, including four minors.
On January 8, Kurdish political parties called for a general strike across the four provinces of Iranian Kurdistan. Hassan Rahmanpanah, spokesperson for the Kurdish bloc, told AFP the strike aimed to demonstrate unified Kurdish support for nationwide protests against the Islamic Republic.
Large demonstrations were also reported in Bandar Abbas and Rasht, with crowds chanting “Down with the dictator.” Twenty-five of Iran’s 31 provinces were affected by mass protests targeting both economic hardship and the political system itself. Videos circulated widely online and through opposition satellite channels, including graphic footage of demonstrators shot dead. In response, authorities shut down internet and social media access on January 8 by order of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to hinder coordination and limit the dissemination of images.
In several cities, repression of the so-called ‘rioters’ escalated into what human rights organizations described as behind-closed-doors massacres. In Eslamabad-e Gharb (Kermanshah province), the NGO Hengaw reported that at least twelve Kurdish civilians, including two children, were killed. On January 20, Hengaw confirmed dozens more Kurdish deaths in Kermanshah, Tehran, and Rey between January 8 and 9, including a 16-year-old, bringing the documented Kurdish death toll at that stage to 56, including six minors.
Outside Kurdistan, two Yarsani Kurds were killed during protests in Tehran. Behzad Abbassi Gurajubi and Mahram Mardan Ghadari, Additional Kurdish victims were identified in Tehran and Karaj, including a 19-year-old in Karaj.
Because of the internet blackout, casualty figures remained provisional, but testimonies gradually reached international media. The The New York Times published accounts under the headline “Shoot to Kill” (January 13), while Le Monde reported morgues in Kahrizak, south of Tehran, overwhelmed with bodies. Libération (January 14) cited figures from the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reporting 2,400 identified deaths.
French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot warned that the repression risked becoming “the most violent in Iran’s contemporary history,” urging Tehran to halt it immediately.
On the same day, exiled opposition figure Reza Pahlavi called on members of the armed forces to refuse unlawful orders and to protect civilians. He echoed Trump’s calls to continue the protests.
According to subsequent reporting by Le Monde (14 January), witnesses described “layers of bodies stacked in morgues” and “point-blank shootings during demonstrations”. Libération (January 19) reported overwhelmed medical staff and a three-day ultimatum issued by police for protesters to surrender.
Following partial restoration of internet access, further testimonies enabled updated estimates of what the renowned Iranian photographer Reza described in a letter to President Emmanuel Macron as a “massacre of the innocent”.
By January 26, HRANA reported 5,848 deaths, including 5,520 demonstrators, 77 minors, 209 security personnel, and 42 bystanders, while investigating more than 17,000 additional possible fatalities.
Norway-based Iran Human Rights (IHR) confirmed 3,428 protester deaths but suggested the true toll could be significantly higher. The satellite channel Iran International claimed more than 36,000 killed since late December.
HRANA also documented at least 41,283 arrests. The judiciary pledged trials “without the slightest leniency.”
These figures contrast sharply with the official toll of 3,117 deaths announced by authorities, most categorized as “martyrs,” typically referring to members of security forces or civilians aligned with the state.
Although President Trump repeatedly threatened intervention, no direct military action followed. Gulf monarchies opposed intervention, fearing Iranian retaliation, and Turkey warned against regional destabilization and refugee flows. Analysts also noted that regime collapse could embolden federalist or autonomist movements, particularly in Iranian Kurdistan - an outcome Ankara views as a threat.
According to reports, the Pentagon advised President Trump that any major intervention would require weeks of preparation. Trump later stated that his warnings had prompted Tehran to abandon plans to execute 800 protesters - an assertion denied by Iran’s attorney general as “totally false”.
In Le Monde (January 26), UN Special Rapporteur Mai Sato warned that the internet blackout concealed the true scale of the killings and suggested the possibility of “tens of thousands of victims.” She also alleged that authorities pressured families to classify deceased relatives as members of security forces, including Basij paramilitaries, thereby inflating official counts of state casualties.
International solidarity protests were held in Paris, London, Berlin, and Los Angeles, accompanied by petitions from intellectuals and human rights advocates.
Under mounting pressure, the UN Security Council took up the matter. On January 29, the 27 European Union member states agreed to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. Estonian Foreign Minister Kaja Kallas stated that “any regime that kills thousands of its own citizens is working toward its own demise.” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen welcomed the designation, calling it overdue, stating that “terrorist is indeed the word for a regime that represses its own people’s demonstrations in blood.”
The EU also imposed sanctions on senior Iranian officials, including the interior minister, attorney general, police chief, and several IRGC leaders. The measures took effect immediately (Le Monde, January 29).
The offensive launched by Islamist militias of the Syrian Arab Army against Kurdish forces has revived painful memories and sparked a powerful wave of solidarity among Iraqi Kurds.
Many recalled the March 1991 offensive that followed the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein’s army attacked Kurdish cities liberated by Kurdish resistance fighters. At the time, the Allies—particularly the United States—had encouraged Kurds and Shiites to rise up against the Iraqi dictatorship. Yet when repression began, they declined to intervene, citing Iraq’s internal sovereignty. Pursued by Iraqi forces, more than two million Kurdish civilians fled in harsh winter conditions toward the borders with Iran and Turkey.
Television images of what Pope John Paul II described as a “biblical” exodus shocked global public opinion and compelled international action. At France’s initiative, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688, establishing a “Safe Haven” that allowed displaced Kurds to return home. That protected zone would eventually evolve into today’s autonomous Kurdistan Region.
For many Kurds, history now appears to be repeating itself in Rojava. The United States is seen as abandoning its Kurdish allies - whose sacrifices were instrumental in defeating Daesh-in order to accommodate Damascus regime as it deploys forces toward Kurdish-held territories. The symbolic city of Kobane, where the Islamic State suffered its first major defeat, is reportedly besieged along with its approximately 250,000 residents and displaced persons, by Islamic militias seeking revenge. Kurdish media broadcast continuous images of children and elderly civilians enduring severe shortages of water, electricity, and medicine, while tens of thousands flee toward the Kurdish-controlled city of Qamishli.
Across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, demonstrations have drawn large crowds in major cities showing their solidarity with Rojava. Television networks have organized fundraising campaigns to assist displaced Syrian Kurds. A live appeal on Rûdaw reportedly raised more than one million dollars in Erbil - an amount considered significant relative to the Region’s population and purchasing power.
On January 26, schools throughout the Kurdistan Region observed a day of awareness and solidarity.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has mobilized its diplomatic channels in pursuit of a peaceful solution aimed at preventing a broader Arab-Kurdish confrontation. The Emir of Qatar reportedly contacted Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, urging him to use his influence with Syrian Kurdish authorities to avoid wider conflict.
It should be noted that Qatar has, for over a year, provided support to Syrian government structures and militias and could potentially press its allies in Damascus to halt the offensive. Kurdistan Region’s President Nechirvan Barzani, in contact with President Emmanuel Macron, US officials, General Mazloum Abdi, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has advocated for a lasting ceasefire and political settlement. On January 22 in Erbil, he hosted a meeting between the Kurdish commander-in-chief and the US Special Envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, seeking to extend a fragile four-day ceasefire agreed the previous day.
Meanwhile, Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, attending the Davos Forum, met with Western and Arab leaders, including French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, to raise awareness of the situation facing Kurds in Syria and to seek diplomatic support. During a January 21 audience with the Pope, former President Massoud Barzani also highlighted the issue. The Barzani Foundation provided emergency assistance to approximately 60,000 displaced persons in Qamishli, though its aid convoys bound for Kobane were reportedly blocked by Syrian forces.
This surge of solidarity has been widely described across all parts of Kurdistan as a strong symbol of Kurdish unity. Massoud Barzani’s statement that “even unjustly divided among four states, we are one nation, the Kurdish nation” resonated broadly. The slogan “2+2=1” circulated widely among Kurdish youth on social media.
On January 18, Baghdad announced the full withdrawal of the US-led international coalition against Daesh from bases located on federal Iraqi territory, excluding the autonomous Kurdistan Region. A military statement declared that these sites were now under complete control of Iraqi security forces and that Iraq would transition to bilateral security relations with the United States. (AFP, January 18)
US and allied forces have operated in Iraq and Syria since 2014 to combat the Islamic State group, which had seized extensive territory in both countries to proclaim a “caliphate.” The coalition’s mandate in the Kurdistan Region is currently set to expire in September 2026.
On the domestic political front, the Coordination Framework - an alliance of predominantly Shiite parties close to Tehran and holding a parliamentary majority - announced on January 24 its support for the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister. The announcement drew a sharp reaction from US President Donald Trump, who on January 27 warned that US assistance to Iraq could end if Maliki returned to office. Writing on his Truth Social platform, Trump criticized Maliki’s previous tenure adding: “The last time Maliki was in power, the country sank into poverty and total chaos. This must not happen again”. He warned that the United States would reconsider its support if he were reinstated.
That same day, Iraq’s Parliament postponed the election of the president of the republic. By longstanding convention, this largely symbolic post is held by a Kurdish politician. However, the two main Kurdish parties have yet to agree on a joint candidate and have also failed to form a regional coalition government fourteen months after Kurdistan’s parliamentary elections.
The delay appears to benefit the Shiite-led coalition, which may be seeking time to manage tensions with Washington. Under Iraq’s Constitution, once elected, the president must designate a prime minister within fifteen days. Maintaining Maliki’s candidacy could risk renewed friction with the United States, while withdrawing it could strain relations with Tehran, where he retains strong backing.
In January, news coverage was dominated by the repercussions of the war in Syria across Kurdistan, as well as by Turkish authoriteis’ alignment with Damascus and the Syrian army. At the same time, a parliamentary commission in Turkey continued its routine meetings to draft proposals for what officials describe as a “terror-free Turkey” - in other words, a Turkey rid of the PKK and its armed struggle.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is widely seen as having played a decisive role in the Syrian army’s offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). After months of preparation and once the deadline for implementing the integration agreement between the SDF and Damascus had expired, Erdoğan reportedly secured a green light for a “limited military operation” during a January 5 phone call with US President Donald Trump, striking a ‘deal’. The stated aim was to consolidate central government control across the Aleppo metropolitan area. The following day, allied Syrian forces launched attacks on the Kurdish districts of Sheikh Maqsoud and Achrafieh, which have been administered since 2011 by Kurdish local security forces (Asayish).
These districts, home to roughly 450,000 residents - many displaced from Afrin - had already endured nearly three months of siege. Heavy shelling involving tanks and drones reportedly supplied by Turkey caused around one hundred deaths and displaced approximately 176,000 people in the middle of winter. Erdoğan publicly praised what he described as a “meticulous” operation, asserting that civilians had been spared, and on January 8 declared that Turkey was “ready to support the Syrian army” against Kurdish fighters in Aleppo - support observers say was already substantial on the ground.
Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) reportedly intensified efforts to win over Arab tribes in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor against the SDF, some of which had previously shifted allegiances multiple times during the conflict. Financial backing from Qatar and promises from Damascus were said to have facilitated these efforts.
Abandoned by their American allies and facing betrayal by local Arab tribes, Kurdish forces ultimately withdrew toward core areas of control. During ceasefire negotiations, Turkish officials encouraged their Syrian counterparts to demand the full disarmament of what Ankara refers to as the “PYD-PKK terrorist organization.” However, Kurdish resistance, combined with US and French mediation, led to a ceasefire agreement on January 29 providing for the gradual integration of Kurdish civil and military institutions into the Syrian state framework.
Throughout the fighting, Turkish media extensively highlighted what they portrayed as the Syrian Arab army’s successes against “terrorist” forces. Meanwhile, Turkey blocked humanitarian access to the besieged city of Kobane beginning January 17. The city—symbolically associated with the first major defeat of the Islamic State in 2014 - was left without water and electricity while surrounded by hostile Islamic militias belonging to the Syrian army.
From Ankara’s perspective, the Turkish government may consider itself a short-term geopolitical beneficiary of the crisis. However, the costs are significant. Turkey’s image has further deteriorated among Western public opinion, which is broadly sympathetic to the Kurds in Syria. Domestically, the rhetoric of “Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood” promoted over the past year has lost credibility among many Kurds. Skepticism now surrounds what some had described as a renewed “peace process.”
Despite official bans, large solidarity demonstrations in support of Syrian Kurds were organized in major Kurdish cities and in Istanbul, which is home to more than three million Kurdish citizens.
On January 20, the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), formally involved in dialogue efforts with the government, held its parliamentary group meeting in Nusaybin, near the Syrian border opposite Qamishli, the Syrian Kurdish capital. Thousands of young Kurds reportedly attempted to cross into Syria to join their Kurdish brothers. Clashes with police left numerous injured; 356 demonstrators were detained, and several Kurdish social media accounts were blocked.
Faces with police brutality against peaceful pro-Rojava demonstrations and Ankaras overt support for the Syrian regime, DEM co-chair Tuncer Bakirhan spoke of a “crisis of confidence” with the government, arguing that beyond establishing a commission, no substantive measures had been taken for nearly a year. “Peace cannot be reduced to a matter of security management,” he stated.
On January 17, a DEM delegation visited jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island. He reportedly reaffirmed his commitment to “a process for a democratic society and peace,” maintaining that his February 27 position remained valid and calling for concrete steps forward. He described the fighting in Syria as “an attempt to sabotage the process,” without specifying by whom, and reiterated the importance of dialogue and negotiation.
At the same time, Turkish courts sentenced prominent Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş to an additional one year, five months, and fifteen days in prison for “insulting the president” (Le Monde, January 6). Detained since 2016 on charges related to political speeches- despite a European Court of Human Rights ruling calling for his release – Demirtaş, 52-year old, remains incarcerated in a high-security prison in Edirne, more than 1,500 kilometres from Diyarbakir.
On the diplomatic front, Erdoğan has sought to maintain favorable ties with Trump, reportedly through costly participation in his ‘Board of Peace’ and lucrative contracts, while relations with his other ‘friend, Russian President Vladimir Putin, appear to have cooled. He has also been troubled by the weakening of his ally Venezuela’s Maduro, though he refrains from public comment to avoid antagonizing Trump (Le Monde, January 6).
Ankara is also closely monitoring developments in Iran, concerned that potential US military action there could trigger a new refugee influx and embolden Iran’s large Kurdish population to press for greater autonomy- an outcome Turkish officials view with alarm. As Libération observed on January 16, Erdogan’s Turkey has effectively positioned itself as an advocate for the Iranian clerical regime.
Economically, although official inflation has fallen to 30.89 percent from 44.38 percent in 2024, the economy remains fragile and living standards strained. Turkey has moved to put on sale major infrastructure, including two Bosphorus bridges and key highways. Observers expect investors from Gulf countries, particularly Qatar, to play a significant role in these acquisitions.
Mr. Emin Bozarslan, a prominent figure of Kurdish intellectual life, passed away on January 22 in Uppsala, Sweden, at the age of 91.
His funeral will take place on February 9 in Uppsala, in strict family privacy.
The family will receive condolences from the Kurdish community of Sweden on February 11, 2026, from 1:00 pm to 4:00 pm, at Stabby Backe 1, Uppsala.
A tribute will be held at a later date in Paris, at the Kurdish Institute, and in Stockholm.
Born in 1935 in Lice, in the province of Diyarbakir (Amed), Mehmed Emin Bozarslan pursued his studies in one of the medressas of Kurdistan’s centuries-old educational system, the Meylani medressa in Hezro. Appointed mufti in the town of Kulp (Pasûr), in the province of Diyarbakir (Amed), he was first transferred to Şarköy (Tekirdağ) in Thrace and later dismissed from his position following the publication of his two progressive works: Doğu’nun Sorunları (1966) (The Problems of the East, Turkish Kurdistan) and İslamiyet Açısından Şeyhlik - Ağalık (1964) (The System of Sheikhs and Aghas from the Perspective of Islam).
He then settled in Diyarbakir, where he ran a bookstore frequented by Kurdish intellectuals and young people. Following the military coup of March 1971, he was arrested and imprisoned in the notorious Diyarbakir prison until the amnesty of July 1974. Upon his release, he joined the major Turkish daily Cumhuriyet (Republic), where, thanks to his command of Arabic, he covered the “Near and Middle East” section. At the same time, he contributed to the journal Ant and to a Turkish encyclopedia.
A pioneer, alongside Musa Anter, of the Kurdish cultural revival in Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s, he notably published a Kurdish primer (Alfabê, 1968), translated from Kurdish into Turkish Mem û Zîn (1968), the masterpiece of Ehmedê Xanî (17th century), considered the father of Kurdish nationalism, and translated into Turkish the Şerefname (1971) (Chéreff Nameh or The Glories of the Kurdish Nation) by the Kurdish prince Chereff Khan of Bitlis, a history of the Kurds and Kurdistan completed in 1596, whose two manuscripts are preserved at the Bodleian Library in Oxford and the National Library of Saint Petersburg.
He also produced the Turkish translation of a History of the Marwanid Kurds (Mervani Kürtleri Tarihi), the first Kurdish state of the Islamic era, whose capital was Mayafarqin and which ruled over a vast territory for more than a century until the Turkish invasions of the late eleventh century. This work, written by the thirteenth-century Kurdish historian Ibn al-Azraq al-Fariqi and preserved in its original manuscript at the British Library in London, had previously been inaccessible to Kurdish readers.
These publications led to renewed legal proceedings and threats against him.
He went into exile in Sweden in 1978. His friends who remained in Turkey were persecuted and tortured for many years in Turkish prisons.
During his Swedish exile, after becoming a member of the Swedish Writers’ Union, he devoted himself entirely to Kurdish studies. He notably published the transcription into the Kurdish Latin alphabet of Kurdish journals from the Ottoman era (Kurdistan and Jîn), a Kurdish dictionary (Ferhenga Kurdî), and children’s books, some of which were translated into Swedish.
A gracious, discreet and deeply learned man of remarkable modesty, avoiding honors and public acclaim, Mr. Emin Bozarslan dedicated his life to transmitting Kurdish culture to new generations. His passing is a great loss for the Kurdish people and for Kurdish cultural and intellectual life.
We extend our heartfelt condolences to our colleague Hamit Bozarslan, his son, his family, and all those close to him.
