After weeks of threats and attempts at negotiations, the American president launched on February 28 a large-scale air offensive coordinated with Israel against the military and political targets of the Iranian regime.
This joint offensive, called “Epic Fury” by Washington and “Lion’s Roar” by Israel, decapitated the regime on the very first day. In addition to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, around forty senior military officers were killed, including the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards and dozens of generals who had gathered for a defense council at Khamenei’s residential complex. They died in Israeli air strikes after the Israeli air force had been informed of the place and time of the meeting by the American intelligence agency CIA. The fate of other regime leaders remained unknown at the end of this first day of war.
It was the American president himself who announced on the evening of February 28 on his Truth Social network: “Khamenei, one of the most evil people in history, is dead.” This announcement triggered scenes of joy and celebration in the streets of Tehran and in most Iranian cities. Khamenei, nicknamed “the dictator” or “the tyrant,” was hated by a large majority of the population.
Iran had long been preparing for a new military confrontation with the United States and Israel. According to an investigation published in the New York Times on February 22, Ayatollah Khamenei had entrusted Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme Defense Council, with organizing the survival of the regime in the event of a new war and the elimination of its leaders. A former commander of the Revolutionary Guards and a man of secret missions in Moscow and in the capitals of the Gulf petro-monarchies, Larijani, aged 67, also supervises the Iranian nuclear program and negotiations with the Americans.
He had instructed the Iranian delegation at the talks in Oman on February 5 and later in Geneva on February 17 to accept a compromise on the nuclear issue but to refuse any discussion on Iran’s ballistic arsenal and on its regional role through Shiite militias under its command in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen.
On February 15, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravandi said in an interview with the BBC that Iran might accept sending its stock of more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium out of the country or diluting it to a lower level of enrichment (Le Monde, February 15).
On February 17, after more than three and a half hours of indirect discussions with the American delegation led by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Iran and the United States had agreed on “guiding principles” for an agreement (Le Monde, February 17). However, US Vice President J.D. Vance noted that disagreements remained over American “red lines,” adding that “the American president reserves the right to say when he believes the diplomatic path has reached its limit. We hope it will not come to that.” According to him, Donald Trump keeps “all options open,” including the possibility of using the considerable strike force that the US military has assembled in the region.
These threatening statements were presented by many commentators as a way of influencing the ongoing negotiations and forcing Tehran to negotiate under pressure. But for Iranian leaders, giving in to Washington’s demands on the nuclear and ballistic issues may be even more dangerous for the regime’s survival than risking a new war, according to analysts familiar with the inner workings of the Iranian regime cited by the New York Times on February 23.
For his part, the American president, who during the protests against the rising cost of living in Iran last January had promised the population that he would “soon” help them, seems to have agreed on the broad outlines of a new war against Iran during his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 11. The twelve-day war of June 2025 had not achieved all its objectives.
What followed appears to have been a game of bluff, war tactics and media confusion on both sides.
On February 22, Iran mentioned new talks with the United States, scheduled for February 26 in Switzerland, claiming that an agreement on the nuclear issue was within reach. The American delegation led by Steve Witkoff communicated through the Omani Foreign Minister with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who continued day after day to refuse any discussion of Iran’s ballistic program.
That same evening the American president declared that he was “not happy” with the results of the diplomatic negotiations. On February 27 Washington announced the visit to Israel of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Monday March 2.
It is unclear whether the Iranian leaders concluded from this that a possible military offensive would only be launched after Rubio’s return from Israel and whether they therefore imprudently organized the meeting of senior military leaders at Ayatollah Khamenei’s residence on Saturday February 28 early in the morning. At that fatal hour the Angel of Death, Azrael, through Israeli bombers, knocked on their door and carried away their souls.
The Americans have deployed in the region an armada unprecedented since the 2003 war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. It includes two aircraft carriers with their accompanying frigates and bombers ranging from F-15 to F-35 and B-2 aircraft. American bases in the Gulf countries have been equipped with significant air defense systems in anticipation of Iranian missile and drone attacks. Such an armada suggests an intensive war that could last several weeks, possibly several months.
From the beginning of the offensive the American president demanded Iran’s capitulation and declared his intention to destroy once and for all Iran’s nuclear and ballistic capabilities. He also hopes that the Iranian regime, weakened by war, will collapse under the pressure of a popular uprising and a coup bringing to power a new leadership compatible with American interests in the region.
The Israelis, who launched the largest air attack in their history on the first day with more than 200 aircrafts, openly express their ambition to provoke regime change in Tehran after destroying most of the country’s military infrastructure, possibly even civilian infrastructure, and decapitating the Islamic Republic. They are betting on the exiled son of the former Iranian monarch, Reza Pahlavi, who has repeatedly expressed sympathy for Israel and promised to establish close relations of cooperation if he comes to power.
His popularity, despite extensive promotion in Western media, remains limited to part of the urban elites and Persian nationalist circles. Non-Persian peoples, especially the Kurds, are largely hostile to him, as are many among the popular classes who still retain a very negative memory of the monarchy.
The Iranian regime, fighting for its survival, is mobilizing all its resources and regional support networks to spread chaos throughout the Middle East by attacking countries hosting American military bases, embassies and interests.
The objective is clear: to make the Americans pay a very high price for this new war of aggression and thus deter them from undertaking such an adventure again for at least a generation.
This strategy had already been implemented in Iraq where, from 2003 onward, Iran organized Shiite militias to fight American troops and inflict maximum damage on them. At the same time, together with Syria, it supported the Sunni Arab insurgency of Saddam Hussein’s supporters, first within Al-Qaeda and later within ISIS, forcing the Americans to withdraw their troops from Iraq in 2011.
This strategy of war is accompanied by a policy of relentless repression against any form of opposition inside the country, as seen again recently during the popular demonstrations in January when the regime did not hesitate to massacre thousands, more than 30,000 according to some estimates, of unarmed civilians protesting against the rising cost of living and dictatorship.
This repression continued in February.
On February 8 an Iranian court sentenced Narges Mohammadi, the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, to six years in prison “for gathering and colluding with the intent to commit crimes,” according to her lawyer Mostafa Nili. In another case she was sentenced to one and a half years in prison for “propaganda activities” and two years of internal exile in the city of Khash in Khorasan (Le Monde, February 9).
France called for the immediate release of this “tireless defender” of human rights. On February 9 several figures of the Reform Front were arrested after publishing a statement denouncing the repression of demonstrations and calling for the creation of a “salvation assembly” to “save Iran.” According to the statement, based on available assessments, a large portion of Iranian citizens has lost confidence in all institutions that were supposed to represent them and defend their demands. The Reform Front and the reformist current themselves are not exempt from this profound distrust.
After the first arrests the Tehran prosecutor’s office, which initiated the operation, announced that the targeted reformists had carried out coordinated activities behind the scenes and online aimed at whitewashing violent and terrorist acts and undermining the country’s internal security. The same day the head of the judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, declared that those inside the country who publish statements “against the Islamic Republic,” although they had once supported the revolution, were now “aligned” with Israel and the United States. Former dignitaries of the regime who have become critics are now treated as enemies to be prosecuted (Le Monde, February 11).
The regime continues to multiply death sentences. According to Le Monde on February 25, seven young Iranians were sentenced to death after the January protests while thousands of others were arrested. Summary trials, forced confessions and inhumane detention conditions in Tehran’s prisons demonstrate how the judiciary is being used as an instrument of repression.
Four foreign nationals, whose nationality was not specified, were arrested during a raid in Tehran for participation in riots, state television announced on February 2.
While the Iranian opposition remains deeply divided inside the country and torn by disputes in exile (RFI, February 10), Iranian Kurdish political parties announced on February 22 the creation of an Alliance of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan.
This alliance brings together the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Kurdistan Komala Party and the Kurdistan Struggle Organization, known as Khabat. The agreement was signed by the secretary general of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Moustafa Hijri, the president of the Kurdistan Freedom Party, Hossein Yazdanpanah, the leader of Khabat, Baba Sheikh Hosseini, the leader of Komala Reza Kaabi and the co-chair of PJAK, Viyan Peyman.
According to the joint statement announcing the alliance, the goal is greater unity in order to advance the common struggle of the Kurdish political movement in Iran, strengthen the role and position of Kurdistan and its political movement in the struggle against the Islamic Republic, ensure the rights and freedoms of the Kurdish people and determine how to rebuild the future of Iran.
The text continues by stating that the main shared objectives of the alliance are the struggle to overthrow the Islamic Republic, the realization of the Kurdish right to self-determination and the creation of national and democratic institutions based on the will of the Kurdish nation in Eastern Kurdistan, known as Rojhelat.
The Alliance considers it a duty to work for a democratic and secular system in Iran that guarantees the rights of the country’s various national and religious communities.
The united Kurdish opposition declares itself ready for the possible collapse of the Islamist regime in Tehran in order to liberate Kurdistan from the rule of the clerical dictatorship and contribute to the creation of a republican and secular bloc capable of facilitating a transition toward a republican and secular Iran, at peace with its populations and with its neighbors.
The agreement signed on January 29 between the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), General Mazlum Abdi, and the interim Syrian president al-Charaa is gradually being implemented.
Thus, after Hassaké on February 2, Syrian government forces entered the Kurdish stronghold of Qamishli on February 3. At this stage, these are small contingents of internal security forces tasked, in cooperation with the Assayish, the local Kurdish police, with maintaining public order. The Syrian army remains outside the Kurdish cities and at a certain agreed distance from the bases of the Kurdish forces. The latter also remain outside the cities while awaiting formal “integration” into the Syrian army.
The government in Damascus also took control of Qamishli airport on February 21 after the evacuation of a Russian contingent that had been stationed there under an agreement concluded with the regime of Bashar al-Assad and with Ankara.
The withdrawal of Kurdish forces from the al-Hol camp, where more than 24,000 family members of jihadists from several countries were still being held, was followed by massive prisoner escapes. Islamist militiamen who form part of the Syrian army entered the camp and were welcomed as liberators amid scenes of “fraternization” circulated on social media. Escape networks were quickly organized to facilitate the flight of these detainees to the Arab provinces of Syria, particularly Idlib, which has for years been administered by the Islamist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Chaam led by interim president al-Charaa.
Many families of foreign jihadists were evacuated to Turkey and Lebanon. As early as February 13, a humanitarian source contacted by AFP indicated that “only about twenty families remained.” The camp had housed up to 70,000 detainees after the fall of the Islamic State, representing 42 nationalities, including a large number of women and children from Russia, the Caucasus and the republics of Central Asia (Libération, February 13).
On February 20, Syrian authorities closed and dismantled the camp, transferring the remaining families to a “new secure camp” north of the Aleppo region (RFI, February 20). On February 25, the Syrian Minister of the Interior confirmed that “thousands of relatives of jihadists from the Islamic State organization had fled the al-Hol camp.” “More than 138 openings were discovered in the 17 kilometer perimeter wall after Kurdish troops withdrew at the end of January under a comprehensive agreement with Damascus” (AFP, France 24, February 25).
The precedent of al-Hol has created a wave of hope among the detainees of the Roj camp, who are convinced that they will soon be released, reports Le Monde special correspondent Madjid Zerrouky. In this camp, still under Kurdish control, 742 foreign families are detained, representing 2,207 women and children of 40 to 50 nationalities. These are families of jihadists who came from different countries to join the ranks of the Islamic State.
Among them are 40 French families, around fifty women and about one hundred children who are becoming increasingly radicalized. “Why have their countries never taken them back? They preferred to spend millions to keep them here, leaving us to manage this ticking time bomb,” protested the camp director quoted by Le Monde on February 6. “We will probably be the first victims of the resurgence of the Islamic State. But make no mistake, Western countries will be next,” she warned.
American forces have completed their operations to transfer the most dangerous jihadists to Iraq. According to a CENTCOM statement of February 12, since January 21 “more than 5,700 adult fighters” have been transferred to Iraqi prisons. The aim of the operation is “to ensure that ISIS detainees remain secure in detention facilities,” the statement added.
Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of CENTCOM, praised the joint task force that successfully carried out “this exceptionally difficult mission on the ground and in the air.” The vast majority of prisoners, about 3,200, are Syrians, while 900 come from Europe, Asia or Australia. Among them are 460 Iraqis, 234 Tunisians, 187 Moroccans, 181 Turks, 165 Turkmen, 130 Russians, 116 Egyptians, 68 Saudis, 63 Tajiks, 55 Azerbaijanis, 46 Indonesians, 42 Kyrgyz, 36 Uzbeks, 27 Germans, 25 Algerians, 23 Bosnians, 23 Iranians, 13 Australians, 13 Ukrainians, 10 Britons, 8 Swedes, 5 Chinese, 5 Canadians, 4 French, 3 Swiss and 1 Israeli (Rudaw, February 20).
To make room for these dangerous jihadists, the Iraqi government decided to transfer nearly 4,000 Iraqi detainees from Karkh prison in Baghdad to detention centers in the provinces of Babil and Nassiriya (Rudaw, February 13). It also announced on February 2 the opening of investigations into Islamic State prisoners in order to bring them to trial as quickly as possible.
American forces evacuated their base at al-Chaddadi in the countryside of Hassaké. This base, which previously hosted Kurdish forces and a prison for jihadists, was handed over to the Syrian army on February 15. A few days earlier, on February 11, they had evacuated the al-Tanf base near the Jordanian border, which also passed under Syrian control (AFP, February 11 and 12).
In its February 20 edition, Le Monde notes that the price of Trump’s new position in Syria is the abandonment of the Kurds.
A first American economic return from the new Syrian regime appears to be the agreement signed on February 4 between Damascus, the oil giant Chevron and a Qatari company for offshore exploration of oil and gas off Syria’s Mediterranean coast. The agreement was signed at the presidential palace in Damascus in the presence of the US special envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack. On January 24 he had cynically announced that the mission of Kurdish forces against ISIS in cooperation with the United States was now over. Business now takes priority (AFP, February 4).
The abandonment of the Syrian Kurds by their Western allies was accompanied by several diplomatic gestures of consolation. At the request of American diplomacy, a delegation from Rojava led by General Mazlum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed was invited for the first time to the Munich Security Conference from February 12 to 15.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Mazlum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed during a meeting that also included the Syrian Foreign Minister. On that occasion he reaffirmed that Syrian Kurds should enjoy all their political, cultural and linguistic rights within a united Syria. He stated that President Trump had personally called interim Syrian president al-Charaa to request an end to clashes with Kurdish forces and to encourage an agreement recognizing their legitimate rights.
General Mazlum Abdi also received a warm embrace from President Macron the day before in Munich. Together with Ilham Ahmed he was received by the German Foreign Minister, a first since Germany had previously avoided political contact with Syrian Kurdish leaders in order to preserve its alliance with Turkey.
The Kurdish representatives were able to hold discussions with diplomats from several other countries present in Munich. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, during his visit to Erbil on February 6, also received General Abdi and Ilham Ahmed for a long and cordial meeting.
He reaffirmed France’s support so that “our allies and brothers in arms find their rightful place and obtain their legitimate rights within the new Syria.”
The leaders of Rojava were also received by Massoud Barzani on February 6 and again by President Nechirvan Barzani. Both emphasized the importance of Kurdish unity during this difficult period and advised them to ensure the implementation of the agreement signed with Damascus. Any foreseeable difficulties in implementing the agreement should be resolved through dialogue, they repeated, drawing on their own experience of negotiations with Baghdad.
Difficulties soon emerged. Despite the signed agreement, the symbolic city of Kobané remained under siege in February. Militias belonging to the Syrian army have also engaged in the looting of Kurdish property in surrounding Kurdish villages. On February 9 the United Nations promised to launch an investigation into these incidents. Humanitarian aid has been arriving only in small quantities to a population under siege and distress since January 17. The Turkish border remains closed to humanitarian convoys. However, a convoy of 25 aid trucks organized by the city of Diyarbakir managed to use another crossing point to reach Kobané. The displacement and suffering of approximately 176,000 Kurdish displaced persons from Rojava continue (Le Monde). According to the agreement signed with Damascus they were supposed to return to their original homes in Afrin, Serê Kaniyê and Girê Spî, which remain under the occupation of the Turkish army and its auxiliary militias, now officially incorporated into the Syrian army.
Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Güler denied statements by Syrian officials announcing a forthcoming withdrawal of Turkish contingents from these occupied Syrian Kurdish territories. “We are evaluating the situation but no withdrawal timetable has been planned,” he said.
There has also been no progress regarding the fate and possible release of more than a thousand missing or imprisoned Kurds. The Kurdish population is bitter. Kurdish women who played a decisive role in the war against ISIS and who had begun freeing themselves from the chains of patriarchy fear a return to Islamic sharia.
The future remains highly uncertain for the Syrian Kurds.
One year after calling on his movement to dissolve, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) made a statement that was read in his name in Ankara by a representative of the pro-Kurdish DEM party. In it he declared that he wants to “open a process based on a democratic society and the rule of law.”
“The door is opening to a new political era. Many of today’s difficulties and crises are caused by the absence of the rule of law,” he continued, calling for “a favorable space for democracy and solid legal guarantees.” “I believe in the power of politics and social peace, not in weapons. I call on you to put this principle into practice,” declared the PKK leader from his island prison of Imrali (AFP, February 27).
Despite his conversion to a nonviolent democratic struggle and his decision to end the armed struggle of the PKK, no significant concrete progress has been recorded over the past year. The Turkish government has not even considered easing his detention conditions or discussing the possibility of his release. After several months of hearings and debates, a cross party parliamentary commission issued its report on February 18 on the “reintegration into Turkish society” of PKK fighters. However, it excluded any form of amnesty for them. The report also recommends no specific measures for the official recognition of the Kurdish people, their language, their culture, or their collective political, cultural and linguistic rights, even though Kurds are estimated to number around 26 million in Turkey.
Isolated since 1999 on a prison island, the PKK leader seems to display excessive optimism when speaking of a “new political era” in Turkey. In reality, apart from the end of the PKK guerrilla struggle, nothing has truly changed along the shores of the Bosphorus. Opposition mayors, including the mayor of the Istanbul metropolis Ekrem Imamoglu, are arrested like criminals and removed from office even before being judged by a court. Journalists, including those from Western media such as Deutsche Welle, are arrested for “insulting President Erdogan.”
A famous impresario, Ayşe Barım, aged 55, an agent representing television and cinema stars, has been sentenced to twelve years in prison for allegedly playing an active role in anti government demonstrations in 2013. According to Le Monde correspondent Nicolas Bourcier, writing in the February 27 edition, the prosecution mainly reflects a struggle for cultural dominance over Turkish audiovisual production. He adds that “the wave of arrests has rarely reached such a level of intensity and duration in Turkey outside the turbulent periods of military coups.”
On February 18 the journalist Alican Uludağ was taken into custody for “insulting the president” and for “denigrating the Turkish nation.” Police officers who entered his home early in the morning reproached him for a report published in 2024 about the release of six members of the Islamic State organization and for about ten posts on the social network X in 2025. He faces up to four years in prison.
It is an open secret that in Turkey the police occasionally arrest members of ISIS sleeper cells preparing or carrying out attacks, but trials are rarely seen. They are discreetly released by Turkish services. Now an imprudent journalist has publicly mentioned such a release. He risks suffering the same fate as the journalist from the old Kemalist daily Cumhuriyet who, after a meticulous investigation, revealed secret arms deliveries by Turkish intelligence services, the MIT, to Syrian Islamist militias. Among them was the group led by the current Syrian president al-Charaa, which at the time was still called the al-Nosra Front, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. Threatened with many years in prison, the journalist Can Dündar took refuge in Berlin.
On February 19 six European human rights activists who had come to investigate the Turkish prison system were detained after meeting with a law firm in Istanbul. The authorities accuse the law firm of having links with a far left organization considered terrorist by Ankara (Le Monde, February 27). On the same day the pro-Kurdish DEM party reported that at least 99 minors had been detained in Kurdistan following demonstrations supporting the Kurds of Syria.
Meanwhile the real criminals who, because of corruption and poor construction quality, caused the death of thousands of people during the February 2023 earthquake are still free because they were affiliated with the business networks of those in power. “Three years after the earthquake that killed 54,000 people, judicial procedures remain stalled. Families of victims denounce the extreme slowness of proceedings and the persistent impunity of those responsible. Nearly 270,000 people still live in containers,” reported Le Monde in its February 7 edition.
Yılmaz Tunç, the Istanbul prosecutor who had arrested and imprisoned the mayor of Istanbul and his colleagues on instructions, was promoted Minister of Justice on February 11. For the opposition this appointment is a reward and symbolizes the total control of the authorities over the judiciary while announcing new judicial operations. “The new minister will lead the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. He will appoint the magistrates,” declared the leader of the parliamentary opposition Özgür Özel. “Erdogan will call this the rule of law and claim it is part of democratic politics. Let me tell them one thing: may your tyranny grow so that your end may come sooner” (RFI, February 11).
In the same minor cabinet reshuffle a governor with a degree in theology, Mustafa Çiftçi, was appointed Minister of the Interior. His swearing in ceremony before parliament led to violent altercations between members of parliament.
On the same day the Inter-Parliamentary Union published in New York its annual report on the situation of parliamentarians in the world. According to the criteria used in the report, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression, Turkey ranks as the third most repressive country in the world after Yemen and Venezuela. In 2025, the report states, 110 parliamentarians suffered violence and human rights violations. It lists the names of the parliamentarians concerned, all belonging to opposition parties, most of them Kurdish. Among the most frequently documented violations are the absence of a fair process in prosecutions against parliamentarians and violations of freedom of opinion and expression.
During this month of Ramadan a lively controversy erupted between supporters of secularism in schools and members of the ruling Islamist conservative AKP party who seek to Islamize all state institutions, including the education system, and to create a new generation of devout Muslims. On February 12, one week before the beginning of the Muslim fasting month, the Minister of Education sent a directive to the governors of the country’s 81 provinces asking them to organize events in schools around the theme of Ramadan and to encourage informal gatherings around the iftar meal, the breaking of the fast, within schools, including middle schools and high schools. The directive recommends organizing common iftar tables in schools with the participation of families. It also suggests taking children aged four to six to the mosque accompanied by two teachers. This directive, especially the last recommendation, provoked strong reactions.
A petition launched by 168 secular intellectuals and artists and signed by nearly 45,000 citizens states that “the Islamist political regime is gradually dragging the country into the reactionary swamp of the Middle East” and that “efforts aimed at gradually dismantling the secular education system have taken on new proportions.” According to the petition Turkey is sinking “under the reactionary siege of sharia.” The petition concludes with the words “We will not submit to darkness.”
The reaction of the Turkish president to this petition, entitled “Let Us Defend Secularism Together,” was virulent. On February 25 he denounced the “fanaticism” of the signatories and their “infamous” statements. A legal complaint was filed against them in the name of the government. Speaking before the parliamentary group of his AKP party he declared: “Why does it bother you that our children learn prayer and fasting? Why does it bother you that they sing religious hymns together in schoolyards? If this bothers someone, let them question their belonging to this country, to this flag, to this land” (Le Monde, February 27).
Indeed, from the moment he came to power, Recep Tayyip Erdogan never concealed his project of creating a new generation of devout Muslims, carrying in one hand the Quran and in the other a computer. During his long rule Turkey has doubled the number of its mosques, and the number of students in Imam Hatip religious schools has risen from 60,000 to more than 600,000. Their graduates, originally intended to become preachers and imams, are now present in all universities and form the backbone of the Islamist AKP party state.
Iraq is facing a political deadlock. More than three months after the parliamentary elections of November 11, 2025, the country has still not managed to elect a president and a prime minister or to form a new coalition government.
On February 1, the Iraqi Parliament met in an attempt to elect a president of the republic. However, due to the lack of a quorum, the vote was postponed indefinitely. The Coordination Framework, which brings together the country’s pro-Iranian Shiite factions, had after weeks of negotiations decided on January 26 to support the candidacy of Nouri al-Maliki for the position of prime minister. Yet this former prime minister, who already held the position from 2006 to 2014, remains a divisive figure rejected by Sunnis and Kurds as well as by a significant minority of Shiites, including the Al-Hikma Movement of influential religious leader Ammar al-Hakim and Qais al-Khazali, head of the militia party Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Above all, the American president Donald Trump publicly declared on January 28 that if Mr. al-Maliki were appointed prime minister, “the United States of America would no longer help Iraq and if we are not there to help, Iraq has no chance of success, prosperity or freedom.”
Many within the American administration consider Maliki too close to Iran. His discriminatory policies toward Sunnis were perceived by them as persecution and contributed to the emergence of the Islamic State, whose main military leaders came from the security apparatus of Saddam Hussein. He also alienated the Kurds by depriving the Kurdistan Regional Government of its constitutional budget allocation starting in 2014. It was during his second term that the Islamic State was able to seize large portions of Iraqi territory, including the country’s second largest city, Mosul.
Maliki’s political record makes him unacceptable to the American administration. The threat of an American veto could encourage Tehran to support another Shiite candidate, since Iran has no interest in seeing Iraq become a pariah state under American sanctions. Iraq currently allows the Iranian regime to maintain access to the international financial system and to American dollars.
The ongoing Iranian-American confrontation gives leaders of Iraqi Shiite factions time to reflect on another alternative, which will largely depend on the new balance of power that will emerge after the war.
This « wait and see » attitude is plunging the country into a period of political paralysis for an indeterminate duration.
In the meantime the current coalition government will handle routine affairs, but it may struggle to control certain pro-Iranian Shiite militias that could launch attacks against American interests in Iraq.
The Kurds have been asked to delay choosing a candidate for the presidency of the country. According to the Iraqi Constitution, once elected, the president must designate within fifteen days a prime minister proposed by the main coalition of Shiite parties, which would complicate the situation for those factions.
It was in this complex context that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot traveled first to Baghdad and then to Erbil. On February 6 he was warmly received by Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, to whom he presented a copy of a letter that his father, General Mustafa Barzani, had sent on February 3, 1967 to General de Gaulle asking him not to sell weapons to the Iraqi government of that time, which was at war with the Kurds.
“A historical leader who embodied resistance and the struggle for the freedom of his people should not sell weapons to a dictator who will use them against a small nation fighting for its survival,” Barzani wrote at the time to General de Gaulle. Unfortunately the issue remains still relevant today.
The French minister emphasized the role of President Macron and President Barzani in encouraging Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces to “reach an agreement in Syria.” He also praised the prominent role of the Kurdish leader in addressing challenges in Iraq and in the region.
Masoud Barzani stated that he had spared no effort “to prevent political disagreements from escalating into an ethnic conflict between Kurds and Arabs and to prevent ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish people in Syria.” He also reiterated his support for the agreement signed between the Syrian government and the SDF, expressing “the hope that it will serve as a foundation for stability and for solving problems at this stage” (Rudaw, February 7).
During this visit the French minister also met with Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani and with the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, General Mazlum Abdi, with whom he discussed developments in Rojava.
He again reaffirmed “France’s support for its Kurdish allies, whom it will not abandon,” and advocated “the integration of the Kurds into a united Syria” and the full implementation of the January 29 agreement. “Recognition of Kurdish identity is a condition for Syria’s recovery, just as it was in Iraq,” he emphasized. “France stands and will always stand alongside the Kurdish people so that their rights are respected,” Mr. Barrot stated. “The horizon of the Kurds of Syria must not be limited to their region. Like in Iraq, they are destined to take their full part in Syrian political life,” he added (AFP, February 6).
On February 12, the European Parliament adopted an important resolution on the situation of the Kurds in Syria, proposed by the French Member of the European Parliament Nathalie Loiseau, with 363 votes in favor, 71 against and 81 abstentions.
After a lengthy review of recent events, the resolution emphasizes:
“The decisive contribution of Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS, particularly the role of women fighters, and commends their excellent cooperation with the international coalition in the European Union’s fight against terrorist acts committed by ISIS and the threat they pose to Europe, its population and its capitals. It recalls and salutes the courage and determination of the countless Kurdish women who bravely fought against ISIS and who suffered, in retaliation, brutality beyond comprehension at the hands of ISIS. It calls on the Syrian authorities to investigate the atrocious crimes committed by ISIS, particularly against the Yazidi community. It stresses that lasting peace in Syria requires recognition of the sacrifices made by the Kurdish community, its legitimate security concerns and its political representation, particularly through guarantees concerning women’s rights and the meaningful participation of women in public life.”
It also “calls for free access for humanitarian aid from the European Union and its Member States to the besieged city of Kobane and support for rapid recovery in north east Syria, with particular emphasis on the protection of civilians, the resilience of local communities and support for Syrian civil society, independent human rights organizations and local peacebuilding initiatives. It stresses the importance of predictable and multi annual humanitarian funding for Syria in order to ensure the continuity of vital assistance and enable the implementation of rapid recovery activities.”
The resolution further “calls on all regional actors, including Turkey, to refrain from any military action or support for armed groups likely to break the ceasefire, undermine civilian protection and damage the prospects for an inclusive settlement of the conflict. It denounces the continuation of Turkey’s military intervention and aggression in north east Syria, including deadly attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure in Kurdish majority towns and provinces along the border between the two countries. It urges the Turkish government to immediately end its military intervention in north east Syria and to allow negotiations aimed at reaching a peaceful solution between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF. It calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and Member States to address the role played by Turkey in Syria during bilateral exchanges with the Turkish government. It stresses that any security agreement must respect international law and Syria’s territorial integrity and must not result in forced displacement or demographic engineering.”
The resolution also “expresses deep concern about the risk posed by the large number of ISIS fighters and supporters who have escaped from detention centers and camps in north east Syria. It stresses that the gradual transfer of the ISIS prisoner issue to Iraq risks creating new forms of uncertainty and dependence on the capacity and political will of third countries. It further emphasizes that the transfer or release of adult ISIS fighters or suspects in Syria or in third countries, including Iraq and Turkey, must remain subject to effective custody, monitoring and information sharing arrangements, particularly in the case of cross border transfers, in order to prevent escapes or uncontrolled movements. Accountability must be ensured through the preservation of evidence and the prosecution of suspects in accordance with international standards and the guarantee of fair trials. It notes that transfers and repatriations lacking effective safeguards and judicial follow up would represent a security risk for Syria, the wider region and Europe. It calls on the international coalition, including the United States, to take without delay all necessary measures to mitigate this security risk and urges the European Union to provide the necessary support.”
The European Parliament also “welcomes the recent agreement concluded between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government. It reaffirms that it will continue to support the ceasefire and the recognition of the civil and educational rights of the Kurds. It calls on all parties to refrain from actions that could lead to a new escalation of violence, to respect the existing ceasefire agreements and to support mechanisms designed to monitor and preserve the ceasefire.”
Finally, and importantly, the European Parliament stresses that “any cooperation with the Syrian authorities must remain conditional upon tangible and verifiable progress in the protection of civilians and in respect for the ceasefire, human rights and the rights of minorities.”
(The full text of the resolution in French can be consulted at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0053_FR.html)
During the debate preceding the adoption of this resolution, numerous Members of the European Parliament spoke in defense of the Kurds of Rojava, including Evin Incir, Abir al-Sahlani, Nathalie Loiseau, Ilaria Salis, Assita Kanko, Özlem Alev Demirel, Daniel Attard and Nikolas Farantouris (their interventions can be viewed on the Facebook and Instagram accounts of the Institute).
On the same day the resolution was adopted, an AFP dispatch confirmed that the al-Hol camp, where more than 24,000 jihadists and their families had been detained and guarded by Kurdish forces until the January 29 agreements, had been emptied by Islamist militias of the Syrian army who were tasked with guarding them. Most of them reportedly moved to the province of Idlib, an Islamist stronghold administered for years by Hayat Tahrir al-Cham, the former Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, led by interim president al-Charaa. The ISIS prisoners released by their Islamist brothers from HTC and other pro-government militias are now enjoying their revenge.
