A campaign of air strikes of unprecedented intensity in recent decades has been carried out by the Israeli American coalition against a wide range of military, security and civilian targets across large parts of Iranian territory. Iran, for its part, has retaliated by launching missiles and drones against Israel, the Gulf countries allied with the United States, and also against Iraqi Kurdistan, in a deliberate strategy aimed at expanding and regionalizing the conflict, increasing the cost for neighboring countries hosting American bases, for Israel, and for the global economy, in the hope of surviving the war, possibly even outlasting Trump, and deterring its enemies from any future attempt at war against Iran.
The war objectives put forward by Washington have evolved throughout this first month of conflict, shifting from the capitulation of the Iranian regime and the total destruction of its nuclear and ballistic capabilities to the neutralization of its nuclear potential, a substantial degradation of its ballistic arsenal, and the guarantee of free maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Israel, for its part, maintains that without the end of the Islamic Republic, which since its founding in 1979 has called for the destruction of the Jewish state, it considers itself under existential threat and will continue its war against Tehran by any means necessary.
The developments of this month of war, along with the statements and positions taken by the belligerents and by third parties such as European countries, China and Turkey, are extensively covered and analyzed in the detailed press review of this issue of our bulletin.
In this summary, we will limit ourselves to highlighting the most significant facts, particularly from a Kurdish perspective. From this point of view, the most important event was undoubtedly the decapitation of the regime on the very first day of the war, which raised false hopes of change among most Iranians and among Kurds on both sides of the borders. The Israeli strike of February 28 against the vast and strategic residential complex of the Supreme Leader in Tehran, where a meeting of the country’s top military commanders was taking place, resulted in the death of nearly all of them, as well as that of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several members of his family. These deaths were confirmed in early March by Iranian state media.
The Iranian regime appeared shaken by the scale of the disaster but managed, amid the confusion, to reorganize under the leadership of a survivor, Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme Defense Council and close advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei. An ad hoc committee composed of President Massoud Pezeshkian, the head of the judiciary Ayatollah Ejei, and Alireza Arafi, a member of the Guardian Council chosen by the Expediency Council, was tasked with organizing the election of a new Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly was unable to hold a full session to hear and assess candidates, mainly for security reasons, as its usual headquarters had been destroyed in an Israeli raid. Consultations were reportedly conducted remotely or through the exchange of messages and emissaries. At the end of these consultations, the son of the late Ayatollah, Mojtaba Khamenei, aged 56, was declared the new Supreme Leader on March 8. Little known to the general public, he had primarily served as a close collaborator to his father and maintained strong ties with the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards. He is believed to have been chosen under significant pressure from them, despite lacking the required theological credentials and despite his father’s reported opposition to a dynastic succession. Seriously wounded and disfigured during the Israeli strike on his father’s residence, he has remained out of sight. His appointment was announced through a statement read by a presenter on state television.
Shortly afterward, the Revolutionary Guards declared their allegiance to him, stating their readiness for total obedience and self sacrifice. The armed forces and police also pledged loyalty. The more moderate and theologically qualified candidate, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, supported by Ali Larijani, thus lost in the power struggle between hardliners and the more pragmatic wing represented by Larijani and President Pezeshkian, who favored a compromise with the United States.
This radical choice was announced two days after a forceful statement by the American president demanding Iran’s unconditional surrender. The following day, Ali Larijani, acting as de facto leader during the transition, declared that Iran would neither surrender nor halt its attacks and was determined to avenge the death of the Supreme Leader. This stance did not convince other senior Iranian officials, who did not support him in the succession process. It also damaged his reputation as a moderate in the eyes of Washington, which had previously spared him in the hope that he could negotiate a compromise. His fate was sealed, and he was killed in an Israeli strike on March 17.
On March 5, Donald Trump, responding to reports about CIA support for Iranian Kurdish forces, stated that an assault by Kurdish fighters based in Iraq would be “wonderful.” This triggered widespread media speculation about Kurdish forces potentially crossing into Iran to spark an uprising. Western media reported on training camps of major Iranian Kurdish parties including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, Komala, the Kurdistan Freedom Party, and PJAK. Turkey quickly reacted through its Foreign Ministry, warning Washington that a Kurdish uprising in Iran would destabilize the region, including Turkey itself, which would not hesitate to intervene alongside Iran to suppress it. On the same day, an Iranian official visited Erbil to warn Kurdish authorities that any cross border action would have serious consequences. The Kurdistan Regional Government reiterated its neutrality and refusal to allow attacks from its territory. Nevertheless, Iranian forces carried out missile and drone strikes on Iraqi Kurdistan.
Iranian Kurdish parties stated that they had received no weapons or support from the United States or Israel and that they were preparing for a possible collapse of the Iranian regime, while refusing to serve as expendable forces. The recent memory of the abandonment of Syrian Kurdish forces by their American allies remains strong.
This phase ended on the eighth day of the war when the American president declared that Kurdish involvement was no longer being considered. Despite this, media speculation continued. Iranian intelligence services sent warnings to Kurdish citizens not to collaborate with what they described as mercenary forces. Surveillance vehicles were deployed to detect satellite internet connections, and arrests followed. Israeli American strikes in Iranian Kurdistan targeted Revolutionary Guard installations, police stations, customs posts, intelligence offices and militia bases, many of which were destroyed.
Revolutionary Guards relocated to civilian infrastructures such as sports complexes, schools and hospitals. In some cases, local populations resisted these occupations. Despite being weakened, the Guards remained active enough to maintain control, set up checkpoints and suppress dissent. Protests and prison riots occurred in some areas and were harshly repressed. Communications were disrupted, making it difficult to assess the scale of arrests.
Authorities disclosed only limited information about executions, including four political prisoners executed just before the Kurdish New Year on March 21. These executions were widely publicized to intimidate the population.
By the end of March, the war was still ongoing, with continuous strikes on Tehran and other strategic sites. Iran continued launching missiles and drones against Gulf countries and Israeli targets, as well as against American installations in Iraq and Kurdistan. Despite defensive systems, some attacks caused damage and casualties.
Iraqi Kurds, across all political factions, had agreed to remain outside the Israeli American war against the Iranian regime, considering it was not their war. However, the all-encompassing nature of Iran’s military response has heavily affected Iraqi Kurdistan and its economy, causing significant material damage and the death of 17 people, including 7 Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, 6 Iranian Kurdish Peshmerga, 1 French soldier, 1 security agent at Erbil airport, and 2 civilians, as well as around thirty wounded.
On the first day of the conflict, the American president called Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and Bafel Talabani, secretary general of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, to outline the objectives of his offensive against Iran, praise Kurdish fighters for their courage and bravery, recall the strong Kurdish American alliance of the past 35 years, and assess the possibility of cooperation in this war. Kurdish leaders responded politely that they only possessed limited forces for the defense of their region, that a war on the territory of a neighboring country was not theirs, and that for the safety of their population they would remain neutral and stay out of the conflict.
Donald Trump also contacted Mustafa Hijri, secretary general of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran. It remains unclear whether he proposed military assistance or the participation of Kurdish forces in potential ground operations inside Iran. The party later stated that it had received no weapons or ammunition from the United States, contrary to rumors circulated by some American media outlets. The alliance of Iranian Kurdish parties decided to maintain a wait and see stance, preparing for a possible collapse of the Iranian regime while avoiding any military engagement that could expose Iranian Kurds to massacres and Iraqi Kurdistan to retaliation from Tehran.
To avoid giving Iran any pretext for intervention, on March 3 the Kurdistan Regional Government deployed Peshmerga forces along the border to prevent any potential incursions into Iran by Kurdish fighters. On the same day, Revolutionary Guard commanders stationed on the Iranian side of the border contacted Kurdish leaders, requesting the immediate withdrawal of these forces to avoid any confrontation. This was eventually carried out in a spirit of de-escalation.
On March 5, the day when the American president told Reuters that it would be “wonderful” if Iranian Kurdish forces launched a ground invasion, a senior Iranian official traveled to Erbil to personally deliver a warning to Kurdish authorities. He stated that Iran’s command structure had changed, and that field commanders of the Revolutionary Guards and allied militias in Iraq might act independently. This meant that, in the event of attacks, appeals to Tehran might no longer be effective.
In the following days, Kurdistan was targeted by waves of missiles from Iran and drone attacks carried out by pro-Iranian Iraqi militias. Since the beginning of the conflict, Erbil had already been hit by around 70 missiles and drones, according to Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, who called for a ceasefire. Most of the attacks targeted Erbil airport, which hosts a base of the international coalition against the Islamic State, as well as the United States consulate. Coalition air defense systems intercepted most of these projectiles, though falling debris still caused damage. On March 4, Emmanuel Macron called Nechirvan Barzani to express France’s solidarity and stress the importance of maintaining stability.
By March 10, Kurdistan had been targeted by more than 200 missiles and drones in ten days. Several Peshmerga fighters from Kurdish parties were killed, along with a security agent at Erbil airport, and multiple people were wounded. Further casualties followed in the days after due to additional drone attacks.
On March 13, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that a French soldier, Adjutant Chief Arnaud Frion, had been killed in an attack near Erbil. Six other French soldiers were wounded. The Iraqi government promised an investigation, while France chose not to retaliate, likely to avoid being drawn into the broader conflict.
On March 24, a particularly deadly missile strike against a Kurdish base in Erbil province killed 6 Peshmerga and injured more than 20 others. Kurdish authorities protested to Tehran and called on Baghdad to restrain militias that formally belong to the Iraqi armed forces but act under Iranian influence.
On March 27, pro-Iranian militias carried out a drone attack against a secondary residence of President Nechirvan Barzani. Although it caused only minor damage, the attack had strong symbolic significance and was widely condemned by Iraqi leaders and European officials, including Ursula von der Leyen and Emmanuel Macron. The following day, the United States strongly condemned attacks carried out in Iraq by militias acting on behalf of Iran, describing them as a direct threat to Iraq’s sovereignty and stability. American forces also conducted airstrikes against militia bases in several Iraqi provinces in response.
By the end of March, hundreds of missiles and drones had been launched against Kurdistan, most of them intercepted by coalition defenses.
In this climate of insecurity, the Kurdistan Regional Government decided to temporarily close schools and universities starting from the Newroz holiday, shifting to online education for an indefinite period. Air traffic has been suspended, and those needing to travel must use the airport in Şırnak, from where they can reach Istanbul and then Europe. Due to the security situation, oil and gas production has also been halted, leading to electricity shortages. Kurdistan, despite its efforts to remain neutral, is therefore suffering significant consequences that affect the daily lives of its population.
Recognition of the Yazidi genocide by French justice
On March 20, the Paris criminal court delivered its verdict in the trial in absentia of French jihadist Sabri Essid, sentencing him to life imprisonment for genocide and crimes against humanity. The court ruled that the extermination plan targeting the Yazidis, driven by religious purification, constituted one of the most extreme expressions of the ideology of the Islamic State, and that Essid had knowingly participated in this criminal chain.
This marks the first time that French justice has officially recognized the genocide of the Yazidis, following similar recognitions by Germany, Sweden and Belgium. However, no international investigation has yet been conducted, as the International Criminal Court declared itself without jurisdiction, since neither Iraq nor Syria are parties to the Rome Statute.
Turkey made intense efforts to prevent the United States from going to war against the Islamic Republic. It attempted to mobilize the Gulf monarchies, Egypt, Pakistan, and other Muslim countries to oppose a new deadly conflict in the region, one that would carry major economic and human consequences.
These efforts were welcomed by Iranian leaders, yet this did not prevent Iran from firing four missiles toward the American base of Incirlik near Adana. The missiles were intercepted and neutralized by a NATO Patriot battery deployed by Spain. Germany, for its part, provided another Patriot system installed at a base in the Kurdish province of Malatya, closer to the Iranian border. Ankara does not possess a true missile defense system, as Washington has so far refused to sell it Patriot systems, citing concerns over the Turkish president’s foreign policy, considered unreliable by Western allies. Erdoğan had opted instead to purchase Russian S-400 systems, provoking American anger and leading to Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 program, while delays persist regarding the delivery of F-15 aircraft. The S-400 systems remain unused in storage, and pending the development of a domestic defense system by Turkey’s ambitious arms industry, the country has no choice but to rely on NATO protection.
The Iranian regime, through President Massoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, firmly denied having launched missiles toward Turkey. Ankara chose not to escalate the matter, refraining from questioning who else might have fired these Iranian made missiles whose trajectory was identified by military experts as originating from Iran.
The Turkish president has many reasons to maintain a careful relationship with the Iranian regime, with which he has long sustained strong trade ties despite Western sanctions. Iran remains one of Turkey’s main suppliers of natural gas, alongside Russia and Azerbaijan. A Turkish state bank, Halkbank, is currently on trial in New York for allegedly laundering more than 20 billion dollars on behalf of Iran in violation of US sanctions. On March 11, at the request of the American government, federal judge Richard M. Berman ordered a 90 day pause in the proceedings. The US administration cited Turkey’s critical role in negotiations for the release of hostages held by Hamas and in securing a ceasefire agreement.
Iranian opposition groups have repeatedly denounced Ankara’s close ties with Tehran. In addition, cooperation between the two governments against Kurdish movements is widely acknowledged. Even amid the current war, the Turkish president warned Donald Trump that if Iranian Kurds were to rise up, Turkey would intervene alongside Iran to suppress them. On March 8, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Turkey opposed any scenario that might trigger a civil war in Iran by exploiting ethnic and religious divisions. According to him, Rubio responded that the United States was not involved in such plans and had no intention of pursuing them.
Turkish domestic politics in March were also marked by yet another phase in the trial of former Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, arrested on March 19, 2025. He faces up to 2,352 years in prison across 142 separate charges. Hearings on March 9 and 10, held before a packed courtroom, were marked by incidents and interruptions. Addressing the judges, the detained mayor declared that they were damaging the credibility of Turkish justice and demanded to be heard. This Kafkaesque trial could last more than a year, depending largely on the will of the Turkish president, his political rival.
The so called peace process or disarmament of the PKK saw little progress in March. Meetings and exchanges took place in preparation for potential legislative measures that might pave the way for reforms, but discussions have been postponed until after Bayram, the Muslim holiday marking the end of Ramadan. Repeated calls during Newroz celebrations for the release of political prisoners, including many former Kurdish mayors and MPs, and for the reinstatement of elected Kurdish officials replaced by state appointees, have gone unanswered.
On March 31 in Geneva, UN experts called on Turkey to end what they described as the criminalization of human rights defenders. They stressed that anti terrorism laws should not be used to arbitrarily restrict freedom of expression, opinion, peaceful assembly, or association, nor to justify arbitrary detention.
However, there is little chance that these appeals will be heeded by Turkish authorities, which continue to ignore binding rulings of the European Court of Human Rights ordering the immediate release of Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtaş, imprisoned for nearly ten years on charges related to his political views.
In principle, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe should meet to address this clear violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and decide on possible measures against Ankara. Yet, for reasons of political convenience or opportunism, such a meeting has still not been convened. As a result, European justice remains effectively stalled.
One of the most well known political figures of the Syrian Kurdish movement, Salih Muslim, who long served as co leader of the Democratic Union Party, died on March 11 in a hospital in Erbil after a long illness.
He was born in 1951 in Kobané, a city that became a symbol of the first Kurdish resistance victory against the jihadists of the Islamic State. After completing high school, he went to Turkey to study engineering. From a young age, he was involved in activism for the recognition of Kurdish identity and national rights in Syria. Like many militants of his generation, he was influenced by the armed struggle led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, whose leader Abdullah Öcalan and leadership were based in Syria until their expulsion in 1998. He later played a key role in the creation of the Syrian branch of the PKK, the Democratic Union Party, which he co led for many years and through which he became a widely recognized political figure across Kurdistan.
Leading Iraqi Kurdish figures such as Massoud Barzani, Nechirvan Barzani and Bafel Talabani, as well as personalities from Turkey like Leyla Zana, paid tribute to him. His party described him as a man who devoted his life to the cause of his people and the defense of their legitimate rights. His body was returned to Kobané, where a large crowd attended his funeral.
Throughout the month, the implementation of the Kurdish Syrian agreement signed in January continued at a steady pace. As agreed, a senior Kurdish commander, Sipan Hamo, was appointed deputy minister of defense for the eastern region, meaning the predominantly Kurdish areas. Hamo is one of the founders of the People’s Protection Units and took part in negotiations regarding the integration of Kurdish forces into the Syrian army.
However, the details of this integration remain unclear. The agreement provides for Kurdish forces to be grouped into a division of the Syrian army composed of three brigades, including a women’s brigade. In line with this arrangement, a Kurdish figure, Dr Ahmed Issa, was appointed governor of Hassaké, a majority Kurdish province. Another Kurdish official was appointed deputy governor of Kobané, administratively attached to the province of Alep.
In early March, a special envoy of the Syrian president, Zied al Ayesh, visited Hassaké to discuss administrative integration and education issues. During the month, both sides exchanged prisoners, with 300 detainees released by each side. Nevertheless, many prisoners of war remain in detention. The commander in chief of Kurdish forces, General Mazloum Abdi, acknowledged during a visit to Kobané that many of his fighters were still held by the Syrian regime and that their release, along with the return of displaced persons, remained a priority.
In March, a first group of 400 displaced families was able to return to Afrin. However, many Kurdish homes remain occupied by Arab families since the Turkish intervention of 2018. Issues related to property confiscation by militias allied with the Turkish army and demographic changes remain unresolved, despite repeated promises from Damascus.
It was in this context of mixed hope and tension that Syrian Kurds celebrated Newroz, now officially recognized as a national holiday. From Qamishli to Kobané, Afrin, Aleppo and Damas, celebrations took place in a festive atmosphere. However, following these events, Kurdish civilians were attacked by Arab militias in Afrin and Aleppo. Vehicles were vandalized, and men and women were assaulted. In several incidents captured on video, the Kurdish flag was burned. Authorities in Afrin eventually imposed a curfew and promised to arrest those responsible. These promises remain largely unfulfilled, as perpetrators of far more serious crimes against civilians have not been held accountable, often because they belong to militias integrated into the Syrian army.
On March 27, a United Nations commission of inquiry reported having documented executions, torture, gender based violence and large scale arson carried out by government forces in the Druze city of Souweïda in July. Based on 409 testimonies and field visits, the report concluded that government forces and allied tribal fighters committed widespread violations of international humanitarian law and human rights against Druze civilians, including killings, torture, arbitrary detention and looting. It also stated that war crimes and crimes against humanity may have been committed during the violence, which left more than 1,700 dead. Nearly all of the 200,000 people displaced during that period remain unable to return home. Paulo Pinheiro, head of the commission, stressed the urgent need to hold those responsible accountable, regardless of their affiliation or rank, in order to restore trust among affected communities.
Despite these unpunished crimes, interim Syrian president Ahmed al-Charaa was received with full honors in Berlin on March 30. He met German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Chancellor Friedrich Merz, before attending a German Syrian economic forum at the Foreign Ministry to discuss reconstruction. He also met Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt to address voluntary returns of Syrians and the deportation of offenders. German officials urged him to pursue reconciliation and memory work, while he called on Syrians living in Germany to contribute their skills to rebuilding the country.
Nearly one million Syrians have found refuge in Germany, most arriving in 2015, and around 220,000 have since acquired German citizenship. The German chancellor recently stated that, with the end of the civil war, there is no longer any justification for asylum and that deportations could begin, targeting at least two thirds of Syrian refugees. However, left wing parties, trade unions and human rights organizations strongly oppose such mass deportations.
Several protests took place in Berlin against al Charaa’s visit, notably organized by Kurdish associations and German NGOs. At the same time, thousands of Syrians took to the streets in support of their president.
Inside Syria, the Islamist government is gradually consolidating its rule. After banning beauty and makeup salons for women, alcohol consumption has been prohibited in bars and restaurants in Damascus, a move widely seen as contradicting earlier promises to protect fundamental rights and freedoms.
The Kurdish New Year, Newroz, was celebrated this year in a climate marked by war and uncertainty in Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan. Public gatherings were largely avoided for security reasons. In Syria, for the first time in the country’s history, Newroz was officially recognized and celebrated as a national holiday. However, the festivities were followed by sometimes serious incidents in Afrin and Alep. Arab militias attacked and assaulted Kurdish men and women wearing traditional costumes, burned Kurdish flags, and carried out acts of vandalism.
In Turkish Kurdistan, the main event, as every year, took place in Diyarbakır, the political and cultural capital of the Kurds. Despite poor weather conditions, several hundred thousand people, up to one million according to organizers, gathered to listen to messages of peace and attend concerts by various Kurdish music groups. From Van to Şırnak, celebrations across Kurdish cities attracted large crowds marking the New Year in an atmosphere of peace and solidarity with Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan affected by a war that is not theirs.
As every year, Kurds in Istanbul gathered at Yenikapı square. The celebration took place without incident, although Turkish police arrested around twenty participants accused of displaying “prohibited” symbols such as Kurdish flags.
From Washington to Tokyo, and from Norway to Australia, Kurdish diaspora communities organized Newroz celebrations in many parts of the world. In Europe, the largest gathering took place on March 21 in a large park in Bonn, bringing together nearly 100,000 people. Many wore traditional clothing and came from different regions to sing, dance, picnic, and enjoy performances by musicians on the main stage.
In France, the Kurdish Institute organized a traditional Newroz celebration on March 26 at the town hall of the 10th arrondissement of Paris, attended in particular by Anne Hidalgo, several elected officials, friends of the Kurdish community, and nearly 700 guests including Kurds, French citizens and Europeans. After a series of speeches, participants celebrated the New Year accompanied by Kurdish music groups. Other celebrations also took place in Lyon and Marseille.
