After threatening Iran with the fury of “total destruction,” U.S. President Donald Trump announced on the evening of April 7 a two-week ceasefire, “at the urgent request of Pakistan,” in order to give diplomacy a chance. According to him, this ceasefire was “conditional upon the agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the complete, immediate, and secure reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to free navigation.”
This announcement, made one hour before the 8 p.m. Washington deadline he had set for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to unrestricted maritime traffic, was preceded by a statement on social media from the Pakistani Prime Minister, who claimed that diplomatic efforts were “constantly, strongly, and powerfully progressing, with the potential to produce substantial results.” He called on President Trump to extend the ceasefire by two weeks and on Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz during that period.
The Iranians, who had been expecting devastating American bombardments, accepted the ceasefire with relief, though not without declaring victory. President Trump, for his part, also proclaimed victory, asserting that America had achieved all its objectives and even exceeded expectations, since Iran allegedly no longer possessed a navy, air force, radar systems, or air defenses, and its political and military leadership had been decapitated. He appointed Vice President Vance to lead peace negotiations with Iran in Islamabad. The Iranian delegation was headed by the Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a veteran of the Revolutionary Guards and a central pillar of the regime. After 21 hours of exhausting negotiations, the two delegations parted on April 12 without reaching an agreement, their positions being far apart. Washington demanded near-total Iranian capitulation, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to free navigation, the surrender of more than 400 kilograms of enriched uranium, and the abandonment of all uranium enrichment activities, in exchange for the United States supplying low-enriched uranium free of charge for nuclear power plants and medical purposes.
The Iranian delegation described the American demands as “maximalist” and “unreasonable.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on social media that an agreement could be reached if Washington “abandons its maximalist approach and respects the rights of the Iranian people.” According to former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, “the United States must learn that it cannot dictate its terms to Iran.” But “it is not too late to learn,” he added. According to the Iranian chief negotiator, the talks failed because the Americans had not succeeded in gaining Iranian trust.
This marked the first time since the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979 that direct talks at such a high level had taken place between Americans and Iranians. Their failure leaves the American president facing extremely difficult options: escalate with massive bombardments targeting infrastructure such as power plants and bridges in order to bring the Iranian regime to its knees, at the risk of alienating the Iranian civilian population, already victimized by both war and regime? Or impose a prolonged blockade of Iranian ports to paralyze the economy, at the risk of simultaneously suffocating the Gulf petro-monarchies, which are heavily dependent on oil and gas exports through the Strait of Hormuz?
The Revolutionary Guards, who succeeded on April 5 in shooting down an American warplane, likely using new portable surface-to-air missiles acquired from China or Russia, are pushing for the war to continue, convinced that the Americans will soon grow weary under pressure from public opinion and the economic cost of the conflict. The generals now effectively ruling Iran under the cover of “directives” issued by an invisible and unreachable Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei claim they can inflict a historic defeat on the American military, thereby consolidating and legitimizing their own power. The cost of this 40-day war has become an increasingly prominent issue in public debate. During testimony before Congress on April 29, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the war against Iran had cost 25 billion dollars. But the war has also significantly depleted critical weapons stockpiles. The military reportedly used 1,100 JASSM-ER missiles, each costing 1.1 million dollars, leaving only around 1,500 in stock. Patriot interceptor missiles, each costing 4 million dollars, along with Tomahawks priced at 3.6 million dollars each, were used extensively to intercept low-cost Iranian missiles and drones or strike military targets. Replacing them will take time, as American manufacturers produce only 600 Patriot interceptors annually.
In short, the war may soon come to a halt simply because the United States lacks sufficient appropriate munitions. Iran, meanwhile, is believed to retain around 70 % of its missile and low-cost drone stockpiles, as well as a flotilla of several hundred “mosquito boats,” small fast vessels capable of damaging civilian shipping and oil tankers. Iran therefore retains sufficient disruptive capacity to block the Strait of Hormuz and strangle the Gulf petro-monarchies, or even hold the global economy hostage for an indefinite period. Control of the Strait of Hormuz appears to be a weapon of mass deterrence nearly as formidable as the atomic bomb Iran has sought for decades in order to ensure regime survival.
The International Monetary Fund says global growth will slow. Fuel prices have risen sharply, heavily affecting poorer economies, especially in Africa and Southeast Asia. A feared gas shock has not yet materialized, but it remains a possibility.
Damage caused by Israeli-American bombardments in Iran is estimated by the Iranian government at 229 billion euros.
Iran’s economy is in ruins. With internet access cut since the beginning of the war, many businesses are laying off staff. Civil servants are going unpaid. Inflation has reached extreme levels and the Iranian currency is collapsing. Yet the generals now governing the country attribute all these daily hardships to the war. Suspected dissidents and opponents are being harshly repressed. Executions have intensified. Already, with 1,639 executions recorded in 2025, Iran had broken its own grim records. Le Monde on April 9 highlighted “the bitterness and anger of Iranians: the jailer has not changed, my friends, and we are all standing in the line of death.”
A second round of negotiations scheduled for April 21 in Islamabad, before the ceasefire expired, was ultimately canceled. Iran refuses to negotiate under coercion and demands the lifting of the American blockade in the Strait of Hormuz as a precondition. The American president refuses to lift the blockade of Iranian ports, viewing it as more effective than war. On April 22, he unilaterally extended the ceasefire without setting a new deadline. He claims to be waiting for the different security and political factions within the Iranian regime to reach a “unified proposal.” Indirect talks through Pakistan appear to be continuing behind the scenes. A period of “neither war nor peace” has begun. Iranian leaders are playing for time, while the American president, having repeatedly declared himself “victorious,” is eager to secure a “total and definitive victory” that would allow him to move on. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi undertook a diplomatic tour of Pakistan, Oman, and Moscow in search of support to break the deadlock. Around thirty countries gathered around France and the United Kingdom are preparing to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz once the war ends, though the end of hostilities remains uncertain as all parties prepare for renewed fighting should final efforts to reach an acceptable compromise fail.
It should also be noted that amid this highly turbulent period, French diplomacy succeeded in securing the release of two French hostages, Cécile Kohler and Jacques Paris, held since 2022. Released on April 5, they were evacuated to Baku before returning to Paris on April 7, to the immense relief of their families and loved ones. In exchange, Mahdich Esfandiari, an Iranian woman prosecuted and convicted for glorifying terrorism, was allowed to return to Iran.
Also noteworthy is the deployment of Iraqi Shiite militias, the Hashd al-Shaabi, in Iranian Kurdistan, particularly in the provinces of Kermanshah, Ravansar, Javanroud, and Marivan, to assist the Revolutionary Guards mobilized on the war front. These militias are tasked with monitoring and intimidating the Kurdish population. Human rights NGOs Hengaw and the Kurdistan Human Rights Network report numerous arrests in Bokan, Sanandaj, and Piranshahr. Kurdish prisoners Mohammad Heydari and Aber Sharafi were executed in Kermanshah prison on April 15, while around ten other Kurds were sentenced to death in Mahabad and Tehran.
After nearly five months of negotiations and political maneuvering, the Iraqi Parliament elected a Kurdish figure, Nizar Amedi, as President of the Republic on April 11, in the second round of voting, with 227 votes out of 300.
The Kurdish parties had failed to agree on a single candidate for the largely ceremonial post, which, according to a agreement established since the creation of Iraq’s parliamentary democracy in 2005, is traditionally reserved for a Kurdish personality. Under an agreement between the two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the first officeholder was Jalal Talabani. Following his death, his successors, Fuad Masum, Barham Salih and Abdul Latif Rashid, all came from the ranks of the PUK.
Arguing that recent elections had modified the balance of power, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), having won more seats both in the Kurdistan Parliament and in Baghdad, claimed the presidency in the name of democratic legitimacy. However, the PUK, backed by Iran, succeeded in securing enough support among Arab Shiite parties to elect its candidate.
Born in 1968 in Amadiya, capital of the former Kurdish principality of Bahdinan, Nizar Amedi chose from a young age to join the PUK, even though his home region was, and remains, a KDP stronghold. He built his political career there under the patronage of Jalal Talabani. He later served as adviser to Talabani’s successors, Fuad Masum and Barham Salih, before becoming Minister of Environment from 2022 to 2024 in the government of outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani. Little known to the broader Kurdish or Iraqi public, he is expected to play a mainly ceremonial role.
The new president’s first major decision came within the fifteen-day constitutional deadline, when he designated a Prime Minister on April 27. The nominee was Ali al-Zaidi, proposed by the Coordination Framework, the alliance of Shiite factions holding the parliamentary majority.
Seen as a compromise figure, al-Zaidi remains relatively unknown in political circles. A businessman, banker, and owner of a television channel, he appears, in principle, acceptable to the American President, who had publicly opposed the nomination of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the earlier favorite. He now has 30 days to form a cabinet that must receive parliamentary approval.
If confirmed, he will face daunting challenges, beginning with restoring trust with Washington without provoking hostile reactions from Iran and the Iraqi Shiite militias loyal to Tehran. Their disarmament is, moreover, one of the conditions set by the American administration for a stable political and economic partnership.
The new prime minister will also need to repair Iraq’s damaged relations with Gulf countries, which protested attacks carried out on their territory by Iraqi Shiite militias supported by Iran. Kurdistan, itself also targeted by these militias, is likewise demanding that Baghdad bring them under control.
Economic challenges are equally severe. The war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have largely blocked Iraqi oil exports, which account for approximately 90 percent of the country’s budgetary revenues. Meanwhile, in the absence of a functioning government, Iraq has still not adopted its 2026 budget.
The new prime minister’s approach toward Kurdistan will also be closely watched. Kurdish political leaders hope that this man, who does not emerge from the traditional Shiite political establishment and appears pragmatic, may be able to resolve many of the longstanding financial and political disputes with Baghdad.
Kurdistan is gradually recovering from the destabilizing and destructive effects of the 40-day Iran-US war. Despite the ceasefire declared on April 8, 48 drone and missile attacks targeted Kurdish territory. Thirty-seven of them struck camps and bases belonging to Iranian Kurdish parties.
On April 14, a drone attack killed Kurdish fighter Ghazal Manlan and wounded several others in a Komala camp near Sulaymaniyah. On April 17, another Iranian attack on a KDP-I camp in Erbil province killed three members of that party: Neda Miri, Samira Allah-Yari, and Shahin Azarbarzin. On April 22, three fighters from the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) were wounded in another drone attack.
The Alliance of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, which brings together the main Iranian Kurdish parties, strongly condemned these attacks on camps, including civilian refugee camps, by Iranian drones and missiles, stating that they violate Iraqi and Kurdish sovereignty, as well as international humanitarian law protecting refugees and civilian populations.
It should be noted that 75 percent of these post-ceasefire attacks were carried out by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, with the remainder attributed to pro-Iranian Iraqi militias. Before the ceasefire, 68 percent of attacks had come from those militias.
In total, Kurdistan has suffered 695 drone and missile attacks since the start of the war, resulting in 22 deaths and 107 injuries.
After the April 8 ceasefire, schools and public administration resumed normal operations. Economic life also returned to normal. The strategic Khor Mor gas field, suspended during the war, resumed operations on April 13. DNO’s oil production sites in Tawke and Peshkhabour restarted as early as April 9.
On April 23, the Kurdistan Ministry of Electricity announced that nearly 5.5 million residents, over 85 percent of the Kurdistan Region’s population, now enjoy electricity 24 hours a day, a historic first both for Kurdistan and Iraq. By the end of the year, thanks to the ongoing Runaki (“Light”) project, the entire Kurdistan Region is expected to have uninterrupted electricity access, 24/7.
On the domestic political front, however, little has changed. The two main Kurdish parties still have not reached a compromise to form a coalition government. Parliament remains paralyzed. To break the deadlock, some voices are now calling for new elections.
Meanwhile, on April 17, Kirkuk’s provincial council met to formalize the resignation of Kurdish governor Rebwar Taha and elect a new governor, Mohammed Samaan Agha, head of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, for a two-year term.
The KDP chose to boycott the session, declaring that “deciding Kirkuk’s future without referring to the true will of the city’s representatives and the voices of its loyal people undermines coexistence and national achievements.”
This marks the first time in Kirkuk’s history that a Turkmen has been appointed governor. The move was welcomed by Turkey and is expected to ease the PUK’s complicated relationship with Ankara.
One of the new governor’s first actions was to reduce the powers of his Kurdish predecessor, now serving as his deputy.
Under the agreement reached, the governorship will pass to an Arab in two years, and then return to a Kurd two years after that.
Even the most enthusiastic supporters of the so-called “peace process” or “PKK disarmament process” are beginning to lose their illusions. Despite repeated assurances from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that “the process toward a Turkey free of terror is continuing,” no tangible progress has been recorded for nearly a year and a half.
An ad hoc commission met for months to produce a lengthy report after hearing dozens of political, trade union, civil society, and military figures. Yet its proposals and recommendations, which were supposed to be debated in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and translated into legislation, remain shelved, with no timetable for the reforms that had been suggested or hoped for.
On April 20, DEM Party parliamentary group deputy chair Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit stated that legislative measures had been expected after the end of Ramadan, but nothing had happened. She called on all parties to assume their responsibilities.
A few days later, on April 24, Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş said that the legal basis for those laying down their arms needed clarification, that political parties should prepare draft laws, and that the commission report he chaired would serve as a roadmap. However, he carefully avoided giving any timeline.
The leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, who had initiated this “process” in November 2024, called for interparty dialogue and renewed his call for the release of Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtaş, imprisoned since 2016 for political speech offenses and still detained despite binding rulings from the European Court of Human Rights ordering his immediate release.
He also advocated reinstating elected Kurdish mayors who were removed for political reasons and replaced by government-appointed administrators.
These appeals from a central pillar of the governing coalition, whose views are usually heard by Erdoğan, have produced no result. The situation increasingly resembles a division of labor: the veteran ultranationalist Devlet Bahçeli, who throughout his career fiercely opposed Kurdish political demands, is tasked with offering hope and illusion to Kurdish audiences, while Erdoğan embodies the “Reason of State,” refusing to negotiate with what he calls “PKK terrorists” and demanding unconditional disarmament to close what he sees as an overly long and costly chapter of armed struggle.
In this apparent political charade, the PKK leader still seems to believe he has been entrusted with a “historic mission” to create a democratic Turkey where Turks and Kurds would live in peace and equality. Most of his supporters continue to embrace that vision.
But dissenting voices are also growing. To contain them, conferences are being organized and appeals for Kurdish unity launched, such as the message sent by Abdullah Öcalan on April 26 to a Kurdish national unity conference in Amed (Diyarbakır), where he stated that “democratic unity is a historical necessity” and that convening an “Comprehensive Democratic Unity Congress” is an urgent task.
Meanwhile, Turkey was shaken by school shootings reminiscent of American mass violence.
On April 14, a shooting at a primary school in Kahramanmaraş left at least nine dead and thirteen injured. The teenage attacker reportedly used a WhatsApp profile image referencing Elliot Rodger, perpetrator of the Isla Vista killings in California.
The previous day, another teenager born in 2007 and armed with a shotgun wounded sixteen people in a technical high school in Urfa.
Following these attacks, 162 individuals were detained and 1,000 social media accounts were blocked. On April 22, the Turkish Parliament passed legislation banning social media use for children under fifteen. Parents will be given monitoring tools, and in “emergency situations” major platforms must intervene within one hour of harmful content being posted.
Political violence also remains active.
On April 7, a shooting occurred outside the Israeli consulate in Istanbul. One attacker was killed and two police officers wounded. The consulate had been empty of diplomatic staff since October 2023. According to Turkish police, the attacker was linked to “a terrorist organization.”
Anti-Israeli rhetoric is omnipresent in Turkish media, and the near-daily heated verbal exchanges between Erdoğan and Benjamin Netanyahu have intensified tensions to the point that some Israeli commentators now describe Turkey as becoming “a new Iran.” The Jerusalem Post warned on April 13 about what it described as Erdoğan’s growing threat to Israel, suggesting that his rhetoric reflects a broader attempt to build a new Sunni regional axis replacing Iran’s former strategic role.
Le Monde’s Turkey correspondent Nicolas Bourcier similarly observes that “the chaos in the Middle East is intensifying rivalry between Turkey and Israel.”
Military rapprochement between Greece and Israel, marked by new defense agreements and cooperation, has angered Turkey and reignited tensions between Athens and Ankara.
Concerned, Turkey is seeking to strengthen its standing within NATO by establishing two new allied military structures on its territory. The next summit of heads of state and government is expected this summer in Istanbul.
Turkey continues to play multiple strategic games at once, courting Russia while selling weapons to Ukraine, maintaining ties with Iran, and positioning itself as indispensable to NATO and European defense.
Domestically, repression continues at a steady pace.
The main target remains the old Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP), whose elected mayors continue to face prosecution and arrest.
On April 12, CHP Ankara leader Ümit Erkol was arrested and detained on corruption charges.
On April 18, journalist Mehmet Yetim was arrested in Urfa.
On April 17, Cahide Töre, a local DEM Party official in Gever (Yüksekova), was arrested.
On April 28, more than forty people, including journalists, trade unionists, and opposition figures, were detained ahead of May Day celebrations in Istanbul.
The process of granting citizenship to Kurds rendered “stateless” in their own country began in April, and within the first days, thousands of people presented themselves at registration centers in Qamishli, Aleppo, Damascus, and other localities with Kurdish residents.
The initiative seeks to redress a massive injustice committed under the dictatorship of the Baath Party, whose Arab nationalist ideology aimed to define Syria exclusively as an Arab homeland. During a population census conducted in 1962, approximately 130,000 Kurds were arbitrarily stripped of Syrian nationality. They became undocumented, stateless, foreigners in their own homeland.
Unable to vote, stand for election, or own property in their own name, they also could not register their children in the civil registry. Kurdish students were denied official diplomas upon completing their studies. Yet they remained eligible for compulsory military service, often lasting three to four years, and were frequently sent to the Israeli front.
After more than sixty years of statelessness, the children and grandchildren of those deprived of nationality are estimated at between 300,000 and 400,000 people. Many eventually went into exile, particularly to Europe, where they rebuilt their lives and in many cases became citizens of their host countries.
Those who remained in Syria, around 150,000 people, are the primary beneficiaries of this naturalization process, established by a decree issued in January by interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa. Applicants have one month to submit their files, which Syrian authorities promise will be “reviewed favorably.”
This measure of justice forms part of the broader implementation of the Kurdish-Syrian agreements signed on January 29, whose execution continues, albeit slowly and cautiously.
On April 16, a Kurdish delegation led by General Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed met in Damascus with interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa to discuss the modalities for integrating Kurdish armed forces and Kurdish institutions into the Syrian army and state administration.
Numerous issues remain unresolved: prisoner exchanges, the return of war-displaced civilians, especially those from Afrin, Serê Kaniyê, and Girê Spî, where the Turkish military and its Syrian auxiliaries remain present and threatening.
The future of the judicial system in Kurdish territories remains a major point of contention. Damascus wants to appoint judges, often drawn from the former Baathist judicial apparatus or loyalists of the current regime. Kurdish representatives demand recruitment based on competence, but also on knowledge of the Kurdish language spoken by the region’s citizens.
On April 23, Kurdish leaders announced they would not hand over the Qamishli court to the Syrian delegation until the issue of appointing qualified judges had been resolved.
Integration of Kurdish armed forces also appears to be stalling. Under current plans, they would be reorganized into three autonomous brigades, including one for fighters from the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). However, the Syrian regime, which seeks to shape an Arab Islamic republic, appears reluctant to accept a female combat brigade within the national army, even if stationed in Kurdish areas.
Instead, Damascus proposes assigning these women fighters to a local police brigade. Thirty-five YPJ members reportedly remain imprisoned in Syrian detention facilities, and their repeatedly promised “imminent” release has still not taken place.
The return of displaced civilians is proceeding in stages. Those returning often find their homes occupied by Arab militia members demanding “compensation,” or outright ransom, in exchange for leaving.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported on April 15 that dozens of young displaced Kurds returning to Afrin were summoned by city security services and extensively interrogated about possible affiliations with the Assayish, the Kurdish internal security forces. This psychological harassment directly contradicts official promises of safe and dignified return.
Return is even more difficult for the approximately 148,000 Kurds who fled the armed clashes of January in Kurdish districts of Aleppo, which remain under the de facto control of Arab militias acting with broad impunity, imposing humiliation and violence. Most homes are destroyed, infrastructure is severely degraded, economic life has stopped, and no rehabilitation or reconstruction program has been established.
The Semalka border crossing has now passed under the control of Syria’s General Authority for Borders and Customs. Some Kurdish employees have been integrated into the new system, while others have been dismissed.
For its part, Iraq reopened on April 20 a “strategic” border crossing that had remained closed to trade for thirteen years because of the Islamic State conflict. With the reopening of this crossing near Rabia on the Iraqi side and al-Yarubiyah on the Syrian side, all three crossings between the two countries are once again accessible.
Meanwhile, Syria announced on April 16 that it had taken control of all military bases previously hosting American forces, which had been present since 2014 to combat the Islamic State. The Qasrak air base near Hassaké, a Kurdish stronghold, that served as a logistical hub, was the final installation evacuated.
According to the Syrian Ministry of Defense, the transfer took place “in full coordination between the Syrian and American governments.”
Elsewhere in Syria, the Alawite community continues to face serious insecurity.
According to The New York Times on April 3, kidnappings of women and young girls are intensifying fears among Alawites. The regime continues promising to investigate and punish those responsible, but these assurances have yet to produce visible results.
A broader climate of instability and disorder continues to affect Syria.
