The standoff between the Iranian regime and the Trump administration continued throughout May, with announcements of "significant progress in negotiations" and even an "imminent agreement" alternating with threats of renewed massive strikes and a few exchanges of missile fire.
In Iran, in the absence of the new "Supreme Leader," who has remained out of sight since the beginning of the war, effective power is reportedly being exercised by a group of generals from the Revolutionary Guards advocating a hard-line policy of confrontation, according to an investigation published by The New York Times on May 21. Considering themselves, and declaring themselves, "victorious," they wish to continue the war until the entire Gulf region is free of any American presence.
In their view, the Strait of Hormuz, which is an international waterway just like the Strait of Gibraltar, belongs definitively to Iran. On May 18, they announced the creation of an Iranian authority responsible for the management of Hormuz, which will be subject to tolls (Libération, May 18). They are even considering taxing users of the submarine telecommunications cables crossing the Strait of Hormuz. These powerful submarine fiber-optic arteries are vital to the functioning of the Internet and sensitive sectors such as energy and banking, Le Monde noted in its May 22 edition.
Faced with these belligerent generals seeking glory and martyrdom, seemingly unconcerned about the fate of the population, political figures considered "moderate" and "pragmatic," such as President Massoud Pezeshkian and the Speaker of Parliament, appear to have been sidelined, while Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been reduced to the role of a mere executor.
Iran's warlike rhetoric, reinforced by occasional drone and missile attacks against certain Gulf countries, appears to have had some effect on a number of them. Saudi Arabia is attempting to keep its distance (RFI, May 11), Qatar seeks to act as a mediator, but the United Arab Emirates remains convinced that sooner or later it will have to confront the Iranian military challenge.
President Trump's strategy remains unclear. He repeatedly claims a "total victory," threatens to wipe Iran off the map unless it accepts peace conditions within a given deadline, then backtracks to "give peace another chance." Markets, highly sensitive to such statements, fluctuate wildly, and this repeatedly invoked posture of "hold me back or I'll do something terrible" hardly seems to impress the Iranians.
Nevertheless, the dual blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, imposed both by Iran and the United States, is inflicting considerable economic damage on Iran, whose oil exports have reportedly fallen by a factor of ten since the beginning of the blockade. Trade by land through Turkey and Pakistan continues, but it is far from sufficient to meet the needs of a country of 92 million people suffering from a severe shortage of foreign currency and lacking the means to pay for imports.
As a result of the dramatic depreciation of the Iranian currency, the rial, against the U.S. dollar, salaries have become far too low to sustain the modest purchasing power of the vast majority of Iranians, and imported goods have become unaffordable.
As reported by the French daily La Croix in a feature dated May 26, "for many Iranians, the value of the rial is the most obvious indicator of their country's economic decline. Ten years ago, one U.S. dollar was worth about 32,000 rials. Today it is close to 1.8 million rials, almost double the rate recorded at the end of February, before the war began."
According to Iranian media, at least one million jobs have already been lost directly because of the war, the Catholic daily noted under the telling headline: "In Iran, Daily Life Has Become Unaffordable for the Population."
Faced with growing public discontent and determined to crush any potential uprising or opposition movement before it can emerge, the regime has intensified repression. Cities considered sensitive or rebellious, including those in Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and major urban centers such as Tehran, Mashhad, and Tabriz, are heavily controlled by militias and Revolutionary Guards.
With Internet access restricted to a small elite of regime-loyal professionals, information concerning repression circulates only with difficulty, making it hard to establish even a provisional assessment.
The following is a summary of information collected and documented by human rights organizations, particularly Hengaw, and compiled by the Washington Kurdish Institute.
According to statistics published in early May, at least 26 people were executed in Iran during April, including 14 political prisoners. Hengaw also reported that at least 30 people arrested during the January 2026 protests had been sentenced to death and that several of them may already have been secretly executed. Kurds are among the groups most severely affected by this repression.
One of the most serious incidents reported in May was the secret execution of several Kurdish political prisoners. Hengaw reported that Iranian authorities executed Kurdish detainees without informing their families beforehand and without returning their bodies afterward. The cases of Naser Bakrzadeh and Mehrab Abdollahzadeh caused particular concern, as their families were denied the return of the remains, constituting an additional violation of the dignity of the victims and the rights of their relatives.
On May 21, Hengaw also reported the secret execution of two other Kurdish political prisoners, Ramin Zaleh and Karim Maroufpour, in Naqadeh Prison.
At the end of May, Hengaw reported the deaths of two Kurdish brothers, Meisam Veisi and Mojtaba Veisi, in Kermanshah Province. According to the organization, Revolutionary Guard forces surrounded their home and opened fire without prior warning. Iranian authorities presented a different account, claiming that the two men were armed and had fired on security forces.
Elsewhere in Iran, on May 4, three men were executed in Mashhad. Mehdi Rassouli and Mohammad Reza Miri, accused of being Mossad agents involved in the January unrest and responsible for the death of a member of the security forces, were hanged. Another opposition figure, Ebrahim Dolatabadi, accused of being one of the principal instigators of the January protests, was also hanged in Mashhad (AFP, May 4).
On May 11, a 29-year-old engineer, Erfan Shakourzadeh, accused of ties to Mossad and the CIA, was executed by hanging (Le Figaro, May 11).
On May 25, a man presented as one of the local "ringleaders" of the January protests, Abbas Akbari, was hanged. He was accused of opening fire on security forces in the city of Na'in (Le Monde, May 25).
Throughout May, arrests multiplied across Kurdistan. In Bukan, 67-year-old Asti Mohammadi was arrested during a nighttime raid on May 11. Intelligence Ministry agents entered her home without a warrant, seized personal belongings, and transferred her to a security detention center in Urmia. She was denied all contact with her family, legal assistance, and access to her medication, while her relatives received no information about the charges against her or her health condition.
In the same city, Seyyed Ali Ghoreishi, a 66-year-old Kurdish folk singer known for his role in preserving Kurdish musical heritage, was arrested on May 11 following a warrantless search of his home. Several days after his arrest, he remained incommunicado, without access to a lawyer or any possibility of contacting his family. Another Kurdish resident, Amir Yousofi, from the village of Salamat in the Bukan district, was arrested on May 9 by intelligence services and transferred the following day to a detention center in Urmia for interrogation. No charges were made public.
In Piranshahr, several similar arrests were reported. Mani Abdollahzadeh was violently arrested in the village of Darbakeh following a warrantless raid on his home. Abdollah Nabizadeh, from the village of Chiane, was arrested on May 4 under similar circumstances and transferred to an undisclosed location. Shahram Pasupish, also from Chiane, was arrested on May 13 during a similar operation. Sabah Bivareh, aged 23, from the village of Kelekin, was arrested on May 14 and transferred to an undisclosed location. Vahed Soltani, aged 21, from the village of Khorenj, was arrested on May 8 and detained without access to a lawyer, family visits, or communication with the outside world.
In Ilam Province, several Kurdish civilians were also targeted. Mohammad-Reza Faryadi, from Sarableh, was arrested on May 13 without a warrant. Despite his family's efforts, no information was provided regarding his place of detention or his condition.
Arshia Qeysarbeigi, also from Sarableh, was arrested on May 5 during a raid on his home. According to reports, he was placed in solitary confinement and subjected to severe torture, suffering fractures to his jaw, nose, and teeth. He was subsequently charged with "enmity against God" and "corruption on earth," offenses punishable by death in Iran.
In Dehloran, Abbas Mamousi was arrested on May 14 and transferred to the quarantine ward of Ilam Central Prison. His arrest was reportedly linked to expressions of satisfaction following the announcement of the Supreme Leader's death. On May 21, Ali Eskandari, aged 41, was also arrested during a warrantless raid on his home and taken to an undisclosed location.
In the village of Kuseh Kahriz, near Mahabad, Revolutionary Guard intelligence agents arrested 17-year-old Ehsan Khorramabad and Mikaeil Dudkanlou Milan, known as "Shouresh," after storming their homes.
In Naqadeh, Mamand Khodadadi remained incommunicado after his arrest, without access to a lawyer or contact with his family. Alan Hekmatirad, a Kurdish English teacher arrested in April, was transferred in May to Naqadeh Prison after being held in a security center in Urmia. His computer equipment and several books had been confiscated during a search of his home.
The repression also targeted cultural and educational figures. Forouzan Nojavan, an English teacher, blogger, and director of a language institute in Urmia, was arrested without a warrant on May 13 and transferred to Urmia Central Prison. Her detention was extended, and she was not allowed to freely choose a lawyer.
In Tehran, Majid Karimi, a writer, poet, and volunteer Kurdish language teacher originally from Quchan, was arrested on May 14. His phone and laptop were seized during the search. During interrogation, he was reportedly accused of collaborating with Kurdish political parties.
In Javanrud, Kurdish singer Amir Sobhani was arrested on May 18 following a security forces raid on his home. He was later transferred to Kermanshah Central Prison, known as Dizelabad.
Pressure on Kurdish cultural activities intensified. In Bukan, artists, singers, musicians, and owners of music centers reportedly received threats from security institutions following the arrest of Seyyed Ali Ghoreishi. They were warned not to perform epic or Kurdish identity-themed songs, which authorities described as "counter-revolutionary." These pressures form part of a broader crackdown targeting Kurdish music, language, and identity.
The use of the death penalty increased sharply in May. Mehrab Abdollahzadeh, a Kurdish political prisoner arrested during the "Woman, Life, Freedom" uprising, was secretly executed in Urmia Central Prison without prior notification to his family or lawyers. Authorities refused to return his body.
On May 21, Ramin Zaleh and Karim Maroufpour were also secretly executed in Naqadeh Prison after being convicted of "armed rebellion" in connection with their alleged membership in the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI). Their families were not informed in advance and were unable to pay them a final visit.
Finally, in Mashhad, Javad Alkordi, brother of the imprisoned Kurdish human rights lawyer Alkordi, was sentenced on May 17, 2026, to ten years in prison.
It should also be noted that Ms. Narges Mohammadi, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, was rushed to hospital on May 2. According to her lawyer, her condition was serious and she was "between life and death." "This is the first time that a risk of death has been mentioned. Action must be taken before it is too late," insisted Jonathan Dagher, Reporters Without Borders' Middle East director (Le Monde, May 5).
Iranian democrats are going through an especially difficult and painful period in a country without prospects and deeply disillusioned.
On May 21, an Ankara appeals court invalidated, on the grounds of alleged irregularities, the election of the CHP leadership and its chairman, Özgür Özel, at the party congress held in November 2023. The court also ordered the return to the helm of the main opposition party of its former leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the man of 13 electoral defeats who had fallen into disgrace among party members and supporters.
A few weeks earlier, President Erdoğan had written on his X account: “Turkish democracy will have the opposition it deserves.” Thanks to a judiciary under political control and acting on command, this has now become reality. The party founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and, until 1946, the country's sole legal political party, has now had its momentum toward power broken. That momentum had been demonstrated notably through its victories in the March 2024 municipal elections, when, with the support of the pro-Kurdish DEM Party, it won all of the country's major metropolitan municipalities, including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, inflicting the AKP's most severe electoral defeat since it came to power in 2003.
Revenge is a dish best served cold, as the saying goes. Defeated at the ballot box, the government mobilized its judicial apparatus and compliant media to discredit and systematically dismantle the old party by targeting its most popular leaders. The elected mayor of Istanbul was arrested on the very day his presidential candidacy was announced. Prosecuted for “corruption,” he has since languished in the notorious Silivri prison along with dozens of members of his municipal administration. Since then, 24 other CHP mayors have been removed from office and 22 imprisoned. 85 municipalities have changed hands through the appointment of administrators, dismissals or changes in municipal councils (Le Monde, May 22). The authorities have presented many elected CHP mayors with a stark choice: resign from their party and join the AKP or face prosecution and imprisonment.
The pressure has worked, and many CHP mayors have switched sides in order to keep their positions. Others have resisted and have either already been removed and jailed or are on the verge of suffering the same fate. Through a politicized judiciary, the authorities have thus been able to reverse unfavorable election results. They have also restored to the leadership of the CHP their favorite opponent, the “eternal loser,” whom the Turkish president so enjoys ridiculing and attacking in his campaign speeches.
On May 24, hundreds of riot police stormed CHP headquarters in Ankara. Helmeted officers equipped with shields forced their way into the building, breaking doors and windows to remove CHP leader Özgür Özel, his executive team and hundreds of supporters who had barricaded themselves inside to defend the premises. The elected leaders, most of them members of parliament, then headed to Parliament.
On May 30, speaking before a massive crowd gathered in central Ankara, the 51-year-old Özgür Özel denounced a “coup d’état” orchestrated by those in power and condemned the “autocrats in government” who had attacked both his party and the democratic system as a whole. The former mayor of Istanbul also wrote on X that this was “a blow to the CHP, a blow to Turkey, and a blow to democracy.”
The same day, in front of CHP headquarters, Kılıçdaroğlu addressed a handful of associates and several hundred loyalists, reading a prepared statement in which he condemned the party leadership that succeeded him and what he claimed was widespread corruption within it. He promised to convene a congress to elect a new leadership team but gave no specific date.
Turkey's main opposition party is now plunged into an existential crisis. The two camps appear irreconcilable. At the November 2023 congress, Özgür Özel was elected with 812 votes against 536 for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a substantial margin of 276 votes. Since then, the balance of power has continued to shift in Özel's favor. He enjoys the support of 111 of the CHP's 138 members of parliament. His rival has the backing of fewer than 20, while several deputies have so far chosen to remain neutral.
According to a Konda Institute poll, only 5% of CHP voters support Kılıçdaroğlu's return to the party leadership (Le Monde, May 31). The only way out of the current deadlock would be to organize a new congress to renew the party leadership. This would require collecting signatures from delegates across the country. Another option would be to force a congress within 45 days through the collective resignation of the party council. 35 of the council's 57 members support Özgür Özel, who needs to convince three or four more members in order to reach the two-thirds majority required for a vote on collective resignation.
Elected chairman of the CHP parliamentary group in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Özgür Özel is mobilizing his team to pursue both avenues in order to convene a congress as soon as possible. His rival, Kılıçdaroğlu, is seeking to buy time and make full use of the legal tools placed at his disposal by the Turkish judiciary, as well as the logistical and financial resources he now controls as the party's “legal,” if not legitimate, leader, all under the watchful and amused gaze of President Erdoğan, a master of political engineering and manipulation.
The CHP, which remained silent when the authorities removed elected Kurdish mayors after every municipal election since 2016, is now discovering with bitterness that the methods of demonization and political liquidation are no longer reserved for Kurdish opposition parties but are now directed against all forms of political, social, trade-union and intellectual opposition by a weakened and increasingly contested regime that is becoming ever more “Putinized.”
However, this “Putinization” is shaking the fragile confidence of foreign investors upon whom the Turkish economy so heavily depends. On the day the court revoked the CHP leadership, Turkish Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek was in London meeting with potential investors. The meeting ended in failure, and the Turkish stock market closed down 6.1%, wiping out $14 billion in value in less than two hours. When Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu was arrested, the markets had also reacted sharply, forcing the Central Bank to inject around $40 billion within a few days to support the Turkish lira, which was rapidly depreciating. One euro is now worth more than 53 Turkish lira, compared with just 2 lira in 2010.
To soften its image, the government occasionally makes a few conciliatory gestures. Thus, the 576 demonstrators arrested during the May Day celebrations were later released. A journalist from Deutsche Welle, Alican Uludağ, was released on probation on May 21 after spending three months in detention in Istanbul. He still faces charges of “insulting the president” and “public dissemination of false information.” President Erdoğan, who had issued a decree on May 22 ordering the closure of Istanbul’s Bilgi University, known for its liberal orientation, reversed his decision two days later after widespread outrage throughout the academic community.
On the Kurdish front, the “peace process” and PKK disarmament initiative remain bogged down. Apart from a few statements from various actors, no concrete measures have emerged. Two members of the PKK leadership in Qandil, Mustafa Karasu and Serdar Avesta, stated that no real progress would be possible until the status of their leader, Abdullah Öcalan, is clarified and he is granted the conditions necessary to work freely.
In response, the leader of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, who initiated the “process,” proposed that Abdullah Öcalan assume an official role as “coordinator of the peace process and political transition.” Without recognition of an official status for Öcalan, he argues, progress will be impossible.
In this carefully choreographed division of roles, where Bahçeli plays the part of the conciliatory partner, the AKP continues to advocate a hard-line approach, demanding the disarmament of the PKK before any legal reforms are considered, while the content and timetable of such reforms remain unknown.
DEM Party MP Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit observes that the process is “on pause, but not completely halted,” and considers the government’s demand for the PKK’s immediate and total disarmament without genuine democratic advances to be “unrealistic.”
On May 24, a DEM delegation visited Öcalan in İmralı prison. On May 25, it released a message from the PKK leader warning against any further delays in resolving the Kurdish conflict. “Of course it is important that everything undertaken be based on a legal framework. But prolonging the wait only creates risks. We have no time to lose,” Öcalan stated. He added: “A legal framework will allow us to enter a genuine political construction (...). Democratization is a vital necessity, and the success of this process will bring us closer to that objective.”
Commenting on current political developments, he condemned the events that took place at CHP headquarters on the day of the delegation’s visit, May 24: “Can it be conceivable in a democracy to force entry into a party headquarters by smashing down its doors with sledgehammers? The practices and events targeting the Republican People’s Party are linked to the absence of democracy” (AFP, May 25).
Some Kurdish parliamentarians emphasize the issue of the linguistic and cultural rights of Turkey’s 26 million Kurds. For them, the much-discussed “process” cannot be limited to the disarmament of the PKK and accompanying measures.
According to DEM MP Newroz Uysal Aslan from Şırnak, the status granted to the Kurdish language will largely determine the fate of the “process” itself. She notes that her party has submitted several proposals aimed at removing restrictions affecting Kurdish-language newspapers, books, music, universities, hospitals, courts, cultural funding and public services.
“Kurdish linguistic rights cannot be reduced to broadcasts on the public channel TRT Kurdî or a few optional classes, since education in the mother tongue and official recognition of Kurdish remain absent,” the MP stresses. She recalls that Kurdish continues to be referred to in parliamentary records as “a language other than Turkish” or is replaced with ellipses, demonstrating that policies of linguistic denial are still ongoing.
It has also emerged that at Ankara’s Sincan No. 2 High Security Prison, several inmates reported that their correspondence written in Kurdish was being blocked unless they paid translation fees. Prisoners’ associations have referred the matter to human rights organizations, arguing that these restrictions further weaken the already limited means of communication available to prisoners held under strict isolation regimes.
Amid this bleak political landscape, the Kurdish population found a reason to celebrate in the achievements of Diyarbakır’s football club, Amedspor. Despite modest financial resources, numerous obstacles placed in its path and repeated campaigns of anti-Kurdish racism during away matches, Amedspor secured promotion to Turkey’s top division on May 2, a victory that extends far beyond football and resonates deeply throughout the Kurdish community.
“As soon as the match ended, cheers echoed from city to city across the southeast and in major western cities such as Istanbul, where the large Kurdish community marched beneath the club’s red and green banners and the Kurdish flag,” AFP reported on May 2.
“The whole city is in the streets,” AFP’s correspondent in Diyarbakır reported, where Amedspor is considered “a family treasure.” According to club president Nahit Eren, Amedspor is more than just a football team: “it is an identity, colors, values and positions.”
According to DEM Party MP Ceylan Akça, “whether it wins or loses, the club will continue to be the bond uniting Kurds scattered across the region and around the world.”
A former footballer himself, Turkish President Erdoğan also took to X to “wholeheartedly congratulate Amedspor, which will represent our Diyarbakır next season in the Süper Lig, and my Kurdish brothers” (AFP, May 2).
The Iraqi Prime Minister-designate, appointed on April 27 by the Coordination Framework, the alliance of Shiite parties holding a parliamentary majority, had a legal deadline of fifteen days to form his cabinet. He succeeded in doing so after lengthy negotiations with his Shiite partners, the Kurdish parties, and the Sunni Arab factions.
On May 14, fourteen members of the new government, which is expected to comprise twenty-three ministers, won the confidence of an absolute majority in Parliament. The remaining ministerial portfolios will be allocated progressively as ongoing negotiations yield results and, once assigned, each nominee will have to be submitted individually to Parliament for a vote of confidence and ratification.
As the majority of ministers were approved by Parliament within the constitutional deadline, the new Iraqi federal government is constitutionally invested and legitimate. The distribution of ministerial positions generally follows a well-established practice. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, a Shiite, will have two deputy prime ministers: one Kurdish, nominated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and one Sunni Arab from one of the two major Sunni Arab coalitions. The post of Minister of Foreign Affairs goes to Fuad Hussein of the KDP, who already held the position in the outgoing government. The KDP also secures the Ministry of Municipalities, Housing and Reconstruction.
A Kurd nominated by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Khaled Shwani, has been appointed Minister of Justice, while another Kurd, Serwa Abdulwahid of the New Generation Movement, allied with the PUK, becomes Minister of Environment.
The Sunni Arab coalition Taqaddum (Progress) receives the Ministries of Education and Industry, while the Ministries of Oil, Electricity and Agriculture are assigned to the other Sunni Arab coalition, Azem Alliance. The remaining portfolios are divided among the various Shiite parties.
Mr. Zaidi's governmental program has been presented to lawmakers but has not yet been made public. In a conflict-ridden regional environment where the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, Iraq, whose economy is highly dependent on oil exports, will face considerable difficulties balancing its budget and meeting operating expenses such as public sector salaries. The new government is also under strong American pressure to disarm the pro-Iranian Shiite militias that Washington considers terrorist organizations. These militias have repeatedly attacked American military bases and civilian and diplomatic facilities in Iraq, Kurdistan and neighboring countries. The Gulf states are likewise demanding the disarmament of these militias, which have carried out drone and missile strikes against targets within their territories.
Baghdad appears to be taking Washington's threats of sanctions very seriously. On May 5, a senior American official declared that the United States would not resume financial transfers to Iraq or security assistance until Baghdad had taken "concrete measures" against the pro-Iranian armed militias (AFP, May 6). The resumption of American support requires "the expulsion of terrorist militias from all state institutions, the termination of their funding through the Iraqi budget, and the refusal to pay salaries to their fighters," the official told AFP (May 6). According to him, American facilities in Iraq have been subjected to more than 600 attacks since the beginning of the war with Iran, and "certain elements within the Iraqi state have continued to provide political, financial and operational cover to these terrorist militias."
Last month, the United States suspended dollar deliveries to Baghdad as well as military cooperation programs in an effort to force Iraq to dismantle the pro-Iranian militias.
For his part, French President Emmanuel Macron spoke on May 3 with Iraq's new Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, whose mission, he said, would be "decisive for Iraq's future in a particularly demanding regional context." According to President Macron, "a stable, sovereign Iraq fully in control of its own destiny is essential for the security of both the Middle East and Europe."
Shortly after taking office, Iraq's new Oil Minister, Bassem Mohammed Khudair, stated on May 16 that Iraq's oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz had fallen by nearly 90 percent in April compared to pre-war levels. "Iraq previously exported 93 million barrels per month through the Strait of Hormuz, but in April we exported only 10 million because of the war," he added (AFP, May 16).
Iraq had previously exported around 3.5 million barrels per day, and oil revenues account for approximately 90 percent of the state's budgetary income. Deprived of these resources, Iraq has launched a continuous convoy of roughly one thousand tanker trucks per day to the Syrian port of Baniyas in order to maintain exports, although the volumes remain modest compared to those enabled by maritime routes. Iraq is also using the pipeline linking Kurdistan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan to export approximately 250,000 barrels per day.
The other major development of the month was the discovery in the Iraqi desert of a secret Israeli base used to conduct certain operations against Iran. The story was revealed by the Wall Street Journal on May 9. According to the American newspaper, Israel had built the clandestine military outpost with American approval shortly before the war against Iran. The base housed special forces and served as a logistical platform for the Israeli Air Force.
It also included search-and-rescue teams positioned to assist Israeli pilots shot down during operations.
Iraqi security sources confirmed the information to AFP on May 10: "Israeli forces established a base on a disused airstrip built by Saddam Hussein in the Najaf desert," in southern Iraq, although "there are no longer any forces on site." Another Iraqi official confirmed to AFP that CH-47 Chinook helicopters had been present there and that equipment, including a radar system, had been left behind. Iraq protested to the International Coalition against ISIS and stated that "these issues have been dealt with by the Iraqi state (...) and that the diplomatic route was the preferred strategic approach" (Le Monde, May 12).
The Iraqi Parliament summoned the Ministers of Defense and Interior to provide explanations. Arab public opinion and Iran, which for years have repeatedly accused Kurdistan of hosting Israeli installations, now find themselves confronted with the existence of secret Israeli military bases in the Najaf desert, only a short distance from some of Shiite Islam's holiest sites.
Despite the ceasefire, Kurdistan suffered 21 drone and missile attacks during May, leaving nine people injured in camps belonging to Iranian Kurdish parties. The attacks were announced and claimed by Iran's Revolutionary Guards, who stated that they were "targeting groups linked to the United States and Israel."
On May 19, three of the main Iranian Kurdish parties in exile in Iraqi Kurdistan denied Iranian accusations that they had attempted to smuggle "a large shipment of American weapons and ammunition" into Iran. "Reports about arms shipments are completely false and serve only as a pretext for Iran to continue its drone and missile attacks against Kurdistan," a spokesperson stated (AFP, May 19). Since the beginning of the war, Kurdistan has been subjected to 856 drone and missile attacks carried out by Iran and pro-Iranian Shiite militias.
Meanwhile, the appeal trial before the Iraqi Russafa Court of one of the most notorious perpetrators of the Anfal genocidal campaign, Ajaj Ahmad Hardan al-Tikriti, has stirred strong emotions in Kurdistan, reopening still painful wounds from that dark period. Twenty-six survivors testified before the court against the serial killer and rapist who operated in the infamous Nugra Salman prison. For a summary of these testimonies, see Rudaw, May 7, in our press review.
The political situation in Kurdistan remains deadlocked. The PUK, allied with the third-largest parliamentary force, the New Generation Movement, is demanding the formation of a coalition government in which this new alliance, holding 38 seats, would receive half of the ministerial positions, while the other half would go to the KDP, which holds 39 seats in the 100-member Kurdistan Parliament. Negotiations are expected to resume in June.
As part of the gradual integration of Kurds into the civilian and military institutions of the new Syrian regime, local committees formed by an High Electoral Commission appointed by Damascus “elected” on May 24 eleven “members of parliament,” including eight Kurds and three Arabs, to represent predominantly Kurdish territories such as the provinces of Hasakah, Kobane, Qamishli, and Derik in the future Syrian “Parliament.”
The electoral college of 200 members in Qamishli designated four “MPs,” the 198-member college in Hasakah designated three “MPs,” the 100-member college in Kobane selected two “MPs,” and Derik elected two “MPs.” According to several testimonies, some candidates had reportedly been selected even before voting began.
The Syrian Kurdish parties stayed away from this unusual consultation and did not present any candidates. On May 25, they all rejected in a joint statement the appointment of these “individuals who represent only themselves,” denouncing “a logic of exclusion and marginalization” (AFP, May 25). They are calling for parliamentary elections by universal suffrage to be organized as soon as possible, which would allow the Kurdish population to be represented proportionally to its demographic weight by approximately 40 deputies out of a total of 210 members in the future Syrian Parliament. Only a parliament elected by direct universal suffrage can claim democratic and popular legitimacy. This view is also shared by the country's Druze, Armenian, Syriac and Alawite minorities.
The new Syrian regime, born out of a coup and supported by a disparate coalition of Islamist militias, is thus attempting to give itself a veneer of popular legitimacy while refusing the risk of holding genuine elections. Last October, a High Electoral Commission created by the interim Syrian president established local committees comprising fewer than 5,000 regime-aligned “grand electors,” who then “elected” two-thirds of the 210 members of the regime’s “Parliament.” The predominantly Kurdish and Druze regions had been excluded from that process “for security reasons.” The Druze region of Suwayda still refuses to hold such a vote on its territory.
The future “Parliament” will consist of 140 members selected by local committees and 70 members appointed directly by interim President al-Charaa. The mandate of this appointed “Parliament” is two and a half years and is renewable. No timetable has been proposed for a democratic transition through the election of a constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution. The new regime relies instead on a brief “Constitutional Declaration” that grants most executive, legislative, and judicial powers to the interim president.
It is within this particular context that Kurdish representatives have multiplied meetings with Damascus officials to implement gradually the Kurdish-Syrian agreements signed on January 29 concerning the integration of Kurdish forces and civilian institutions. A large proportion of the displaced people from the Afrin canton have been able to return home. Their houses, businesses, and lands are still sometimes occupied by Arab militiamen who demand ransoms or “compensation” before leaving. Disputes and legal conflicts are widespread. According to local Kurdish official Fouad Mannan, quoted in a report published by Le Monde on May 6, around 10,000 displaced families are still waiting to return.
The issue of the release of nearly 300 Kurdish prisoners of war made little progress in May, nor did the question of the possible integration of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). Kurdish forces still control a border crossing with Iraqi Kurdistan and the Roj camp, where relatives of Islamic State jihadists are being held. The countries concerned remain reluctant to repatriate their nationals. However, after lengthy complications, a group of 13 Australians, four women and nine children, followed by another group of seven women and nine children, were finally able to return home in May (AFP, May 26). Australian authorities made no arrests upon their arrival, limiting themselves to searches of their belongings and mobile phones. Further investigations may take place at a later stage.
In the absence of Kurdish forces and American aerial surveillance, ISIS sleeper cells have begun to reappear through sporadic attacks. On May 11, two Syrian soldiers were killed and others wounded in “an attack carried out by unknown assailants” against a military bus on the road linking Ras al-Ain/Serê Kaniyê, under Turkish occupation, to the town of Ain Issa (AFP, May 11).
A few days earlier, on May 2, the Jordanian army announced that it had “conducted a deterrence operation targeting several sites used by drug and weapons traffickers” along the Syrian-Jordanian border in the predominantly Druze province of Suwayda. According to Syrian state television, the Jordanian army had “probably targeted a headquarters containing weapons and drugs controlled by rebel groups in the village of Shabba, in Suwayda,” without specifying which “rebel groups” were involved (Le Monde, May 3).
It is also worth noting the visit of General Mazloum Abdi to Erbil, where he was warmly received by President Nechirvan Barzani on May 27. During their meeting, the commander of the Syrian Kurdish forces expressed “his gratitude and appreciation for the continuous support of President Barzani and the leaders of the Kurdistan Region for the rights of the Kurds and other communities in Syria.” President Barzani, for his part, emphasized “the necessity of dialogue and understanding among Syrian Kurdish parties in order to resolve their issues with Damascus” (Rudaw, May 27).
