After weeks of negotiations punctuated by reciprocal threats and various incidents, the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding on June 17, putting an end to hostilities. The document was signed by President Trump at the Palace of Versailles during a dinner hosted in his honor by President Macron following the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains. On the Iranian side, President Massoud Pezeshkian signed it online.
The memorandum announces the end of hostilities on all fronts, including in Lebanon, whose territorial integrity is specifically mentioned. Iran is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to navigation, while the United States will lift its naval blockade against Iranian vessels. The United States undertakes to unfreeze Iranian funds held in foreign banks. It will also gradually lift all sanctions imposed on Iran. Thanks to a temporary easing of financial sanctions, Iran will be allowed to export its oil freely for 60 days. The memorandum also mentions the creation of a $300 billion fund for the reconstruction of Iran, although neither its source nor its potential contributors are specified. This promise recalls the previously announced $1 trillion fund for the reconstruction of Gaza, which was to be raised and managed by a Board of Peace chaired by Donald Trump himself but never materialized.
In return, Iran undertakes, in particular, not to develop or acquire a nuclear bomb, a commitment it had already made under the agreement concluded with the Western powers in 2015 and denounced by President Trump in 2017. During his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025, the Iranian president had once again, hand on heart, reaffirmed this commitment, which nevertheless did not prevent Iran from accelerating its nuclear program and enriching approximately 420 kilograms of uranium, enough to produce roughly a dozen bombs within a few months when the time comes.
In the memorandum, only one paragraph out of fourteen is devoted to the nuclear issue. Iran undertakes to dilute its 420 kilograms of enriched uranium under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency within 60 days. Experts point out that the dilution process is not irreversible, and Iran has made no other commitment regarding the possible dismantling of its vast arsenal of centrifuges or the future of its nuclear facilities. The war launched to put an end to Iran's nuclear program and, possibly, to the regime of the mullahs, ends with a political strengthening of that regime and major uncertainties regarding the future of Iran's nuclear program, which is, in principle, to be the subject of new negotiations over the next two months. The memorandum provides no measures concerning Iran's ballistic missile arsenal, which the American president had wrongly claimed to have destroyed by 85 percent. Nor does it contain any provision to end the financing and arming of pro-Iranian militias in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iraq, and Yemen (the Houthis).
Navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which had been free under international law before the war, could become subject to tolls or "maritime service fees" once the 60-day period covered by the memorandum expires.
In an analysis published in its June 18 edition, Le Monde notes that "despite a shattered economy and military capabilities that have been severely weakened, Iran emerges triumphant and gives up nothing. Despite the overwhelming superiority of its military, Washington has no choice but to acknowledge its strategic drift." This is certainly far removed from the capitulation of Iran that President Trump was still demanding not long ago.
The memorandum of understanding has been denounced by American Democrats as a "strategic disaster." Most American conservatives also see the document as strengthening the Iranian regime. "Appeasement," in the words of former Republican Vice President Mike Pence: "History teaches us that giving billions of dollars to theocratic lunatics who want to assassinate us is not a good idea. I think the President is receiving very bad advice on this agreement," Senator Ted Cruz (Texas) told The Hill. His colleague Bill Cassidy wrote on X that it was "the worst foreign policy failure in decades. Reagan is turning in his grave. Iran's nuclear ambitions have not been curbed. It has learned that threatening to block the Strait of Hormuz works—and will undoubtedly exploit this leverage again in the future."
The Arab allies of the United States are disappointed by such an agreement. Some, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are seeking to restore relations with Iran. Their confidence in the American security umbrella protecting them against the belligerent ambitions of the Islamic Republic has been weakened, but they appear to have little alternative.
The harshest criticism of the memorandum has come from Israeli officials as well as pro-Israeli American lawmakers and media outlets. In their view, the war had started well but was interrupted by an American administration in a hurry and constantly focused on stock market indices and oil prices. Such short-term economic concerns prevented any strategic vision.
These criticisms provoked the anger of Donald Trump and his Vice President J. D. Vance. The latter reminded everyone that the United States remained Israel's last ally and that two-thirds of the weapons protecting Israel were paid for by American taxpayers.
"Donald Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who has sympathies for the nation of Israel right now, and he also happens to lead the world's superpower. If I were in the Israeli cabinet, I would not have attacked the only powerful ally it has left in the entire world," the American Vice President declared during a press briefing at the White House (New York Times, June 18).
These cracks in the Israel–United States alliance can only please the Iranian leadership, which entered the new round of negotiations in Switzerland with confidence.
On June 22, at the Bürgenstock resort, located on a mountain in central Switzerland and owned by Qatar, the American delegation led by Vice President J. D. Vance met the Iranian negotiators headed by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a key figure in the regime, accompanied by the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Petroleum, and the Governor of the Central Bank.
"Before making any concession on the nuclear issue, the Iranian regime intends to obtain from the Americans the release of tens of billions of dollars in frozen assets in order to replenish its exhausted finances," Le Monde reported on June 23, quoting an Iranian source who described the negotiations as proceeding "at a rapid pace, in the Trump style": "The Iranian negotiators are not trying to gain time. On the contrary, they want to move very quickly."
This is a fleeting window of opportunity. The American president appears eager to limit the damage and believes he is dealing with a new generation of Iranian leaders who are "very rational," "pleasant, strong and intelligent," and "not radicalized." "They are trying to help their country." These compliments did not prevent him from once again threatening to strike Iran when negotiations were not progressing as quickly as he wished. The Iranian delegation said it was offended and threatened to withdraw. Intensive negotiations then resumed and, according to the American delegation, made significant progress.
Since Iran's primary objective is money, on June 23 the U.S. Treasury issued an initial waiver, lifting sanctions on the sale of Iranian petroleum products on a scale unprecedented in four decades, valid until the end of the current negotiating period scheduled for August 21.
As early as June 21, the Iranian president had stated that "$6 billion in Iranian funds held in Qatar will be unfrozen." According to the American Vice President, the released funds would be used exclusively to purchase "American soybeans, corn, and wheat" for the benefit of the Iranian people. Tehran, however, maintains that it will use these funds as it sees fit.
After eighteen hours of intensive discussions, J. D. Vance stated that he had secured an agreement in principle allowing the IAEA inspectors to return to Iran "fairly quickly" so they could visit sensitive sites.
Qatar's mediation also made it possible to establish a direct emergency hotline between Tehran and Washington, a red telephone intended to enable senior security officials to contain any uncontrolled escalation in the Strait of Hormuz.
No date has been announced for the next round of negotiations, which will undoubtedly continue behind the scenes through Qatari and Pakistani intermediaries, at least until the end of the funeral ceremonies for Ayatollah Khamenei, scheduled to begin on July 4, the very day marking the 250th anniversary of American independence.
The hardline faction of the Revolutionary Guards also criticizes the negotiation process with the American enemy and wants the war to continue in order to "avenge the death of Ayatollah Khamenei." On June 26, a commercial vessel carrying cargo containers was attacked in the Strait of Hormuz by Iranian drone strikes. The U.S. military responded by bombing Iranian missile launch sites and air defense systems located along the Strait of Hormuz. Thanks to the efforts of Qatari and Pakistani intermediaries, the incident was temporarily contained (New York Times, June 26). However, the fragile ceasefire could once again be broken at any moment by the Revolutionary Guards, who are counting on a prolonged war of attrition.
On the domestic front, as Le Monde noted in its June 26 edition, "Iran has intensified internal repression since the war." NGOs warn of the continuation of executions and mass arrests. On June 16, Javad Zamani and Abolfazl Saeidi, two protesters arrested last January, were executed in Shahroud, in northern Iran. They had been accused of "waging war against God" and corruption on earth. On June 1, two other January protesters, Mehrdad Mohammadi-Nia and Ashkan Malek, had been hanged after being accused of "setting fire to a mosque in Tehran." On June 5, Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, announced that since the beginning of the year Iran had executed approximately 40 people accused of "threatening national security," half of them in connection with last January's protests. According to the Center for Human Rights in Iran, at least 75 people are currently at risk of imminent execution. In 2025, Iran executed 2,159 people, more than double the number recorded in 2024.
Among them were eight Kurdish political prisoners, including a 16-year-old teenager. At a press conference held in Paris on June 10, other NGOs stated that 749 people had been executed during the first five months of the year and that 55,000 protesters had been arrested and imprisoned during the same period. Zahra Tabani, a 68-year-old electrical engineer, was sentenced to death on April 14 for having written "Woman, Life, Freedom" on a piece of cloth. Young graduates, intellectuals, and 24 athletes are among the thousands of people arrested (Libération, June 11). On June 7, an Iranian court upheld the one-year prison sentence imposed on filmmaker Jafar Panahi, winner of the 2025 Palme d'Or at Cannes for his film It Was Just an Accident. He was convicted of propaganda against the state (Le Figaro, June 8).
In Iranian Kurdistan, according to a partial assessment compiled by Kurdish NGOs, 26 Kurdish civilians were arrested, including several minors, in Mahabad, Kamyaran, Malekshahi (Ilam), Dehloran, and Bukan. On June 10, Zakaria Khezri-Mezhad, a Kurdish prisoner from Mahabad, was executed. On June 15, Aram Zarei was executed in Sanandaj (Sine). On June 16, Mohammad Ahmadi, aged 23, was executed.
Other Kurdish prisoners, including Karim Karami from Kermanshah, were also executed during the month. Two Kurdish prisoners, Ashkan Maleki and Mehrdad Mohammadinia, both from Qorveh and arrested during the January protests, were secretly executed at the beginning of June.
On June 11, Matlab Kheyberi, a humble Kurdish cross-border porter (kolber), father of two and originally from Baneh, was shot dead near the Iraqi Kurdistan border. According to witnesses, he was not carrying any smuggled goods at the time he was killed. On the same day, Nash Khodaei, a young married kolber and father of one child, was seriously wounded in the leg.
The Iranian population is living through one of the most painful periods in its recent history, with no prospects and no hope for change. According to the weekly Le Point, after the massacres and the bombings, the population is reconnecting with the outside world while bitterly realizing that "no one cares about the people of Iran."
Long-time allies, Turkey and Israel have in recent years become two hostile regional powers, at least on the rhetorical level. The Turkish President has established himself as one of the most outspoken critics of the war in Gaza, repeatedly comparing Israeli leaders to Nazi officials. For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has regularly responded to his attacks by describing him as "an anti-Semitic dictator committing genocide against the Kurds."
Tensions escalated further following the Israeli government's recognition of the Armenian genocide perpetrated in 1915 by the Young Turk leaders of the Ottoman Empire. On June 28, the Israeli government unanimously approved Foreign Minister Gideon Saar's proposal to recognize the "Armenian genocide," the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in a statement, describing the decision as "historic." Responding to criticism over this belated recognition, Minister Saar replied: "It is never too late to do what is right (...). It is both a moral duty and a historical duty" (AFP, June 28).
As expected, this decision provoked the anger of the Turkish President, who denounced it as "a despicable political maneuver to divert the attention of world public opinion from the ongoing genocide in Gaza" and described "the gang of murderers in power in Israel as worse than the Nazi regime." On June 11, he had already accused the Israeli Prime Minister of "following in Hitler's footsteps." Claiming that Israel has become "a factory of suffering," feeding "on blood and tears," R. T. Erdogan once again compared B. Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler, predicting for him "the same fate as the other tyrants of history" and denouncing "the genocidal Zionist network led by Netanyahu." Reporting on these exchanges, AFP headlined its June 11 dispatch: "Genocide yourself! Erdogan and Netanyahu trade insults over the Middle East."
Turkey does not recognize the Armenian genocide and continues to refer to "the events of 1915," during which many civilians lost their lives. Those who planned them are still celebrated as war heroes; some are buried on Liberty Hill (Hürriyet Tepesi) in Istanbul. Many others went on to enjoy distinguished political and ministerial careers in Atatürk's Turkey and played a leading role in the policy of denial and massacres of the Kurds during the 1920s and 1930s. Far from considering himself a dictator and a tyrant, the Turkish President presents himself as "the defender of the oppressed throughout the world," except, of course, for the oppressed Kurds.
His Kurdish and Turkish opponents take a very different view. On May 31, in a joint statement, 262 Turkish writers, including Aslı Erdoğan and Buket Uzuner, denounced "a judiciary under the orders of the government," which on May 21 removed the elected leader of the main opposition party from office: "The ruling party has once again struck at our fundamental constitutional rights through a judicial system that it controls," the signatories of the statement declared (Le Monde, June 1).
As a result of this judicial decision, the Republican People's Party (CHP) has been plunged into an existential crisis. The elected leader, Özgür Özel, who was removed from office by the judiciary, enjoys the support of around one hundred MPs who elected him chairman of the CHP parliamentary group in the National Assembly. The "legal" leader, former CHP chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, occupies the party headquarters with his supporters and controls its substantial financial resources. Invoking ongoing legal proceedings before the Court of Appeal, he refuses to convene an extraordinary party congress promptly so that the delegates may elect the new leadership and governing bodies of the party.
Faced with this deadlock, numerous voices among Özgür Özel's supporters are calling for the creation of a new democratic party that would break with the CHP's doctrines inherited from the era of its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The outcome of these internal disputes tearing apart this old party, which has more than 1.5 million members, remains uncertain. President Erdogan, however, is quietly savoring his tactical victory in dividing the main opposition force that threatened his grip on power. He is already preparing the next move: the opportune moment to call early elections, which he hopes to win against divided or neutralized opponents.
The regional context also appears to be strengthening the Turkish President's hand as he hopes to enjoy his moment of glory with the NATO summit to be held in Ankara on July 7 and 8. His "friend" Donald Trump, who seems to have appreciated his role as intermediary in the Gaza ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, Turkey's protégé, has confirmed his attendance at the summit and declared that he would not come to Ankara empty-handed. At his request, the proceedings launched in 2019 against the Turkish state-owned Halkbank, accused of having massively violated U.S. sanctions against Iran, were dismissed by a federal judge in Manhattan (Le Figaro, June 17). The possible sale of F-35 aircraft to Ankara is also on the agenda, although it would require approval by the Senate, where Turkey has many influential opponents. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration has stated that it is ready to sell jet engines to the Turkish defense industry.
The Turks aspire to produce their own combat aircraft using electronic and optical equipment purchased relatively freely from their NATO allies. As for jet engines, they are cooperating, more or less discreetly, with the British and the Ukrainians, according to certain sources. The Italians and the Spaniards have developed defense cooperation programs with Ankara for the manufacture of drones and warships. The delivery of American jet engines can only delight the Turkish President, whose relations with his other "friend," Vladimir Putin, appear to be somewhat deteriorating (New York Times, June 8). Turkey has still not said what it intends to do with the S-400 air defense systems purchased from Russia, which provoked strong reactions in the United States.
Playing on every front, but on its own terms, Turkey is now asking to join European defense structures (RFI, June 29). Although it has applied none of the Western sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, has multiplied its trade with Moscow by serving as a regional hub for circumventing sanctions, it now claims to participate in the defense of Europe. Against whom? Certainly not against Russia, on which it depends heavily for its energy supplies, exports and millions of tourists. Nor against Iran, for that matter.
On the domestic front, the PKK "disarmament" process made little progress in June. Kurdish MPs are calling for a legal framework capable of transforming the end of the armed conflict into a lasting political settlement. On June 24, the Turkish President announced that the government was preparing such a legal framework, to be submitted to Parliament, without indicating any timetable. According to him, this legislation will accelerate the dissolution of the PKK.
However, Kurdish civil society has multiplied conferences and symposiums in order to formulate Kurdish linguistic and cultural demands. On June 27 and 28, a conference bringing together political leaders, academics, legal experts and representatives of the Kurdish cultural world was held in the Kurdish capital of Diyarbakır. The conference called for constitutional protection of the Kurdish language, its teaching in public schools, and the removal of numerous legal obstacles restricting the use of Kurdish in public institutions. The participants stressed that the Kurdish question cannot be resolved as long as the Kurdish language remains absent from official education and does not enjoy protected legal status.
On June 4, Kurdish MP Sırrı Sakık from Ağrı (Ararat) was received by President Erdogan. During the meeting, the MP, a veteran of Kurdish politics who has already spent several years behind bars for offences of opinion, outlined the expectations and hopes of the Kurdish population for a lasting peace.
"The current process needs concrete measures. The Kurds have legitimate demands for democracy and justice. We must move quickly. MPs should postpone their parliamentary recess so that the National Assembly can adopt the necessary legislation this summer. Both Kurds and Turks aspire to peace, to an end to bloodshed and tears. You bear immense responsibility for resolving this issue, which has persisted for a century," the MP pleaded before the Turkish President.
He also quoted him a Kurdish proverb: "Water that stagnates in a pond eventually rots" (Rudaw, June 5).
On June 30, a Kurdish militant from the district of Lice was killed by Turkish soldiers in an armed clash. On the same day, another PKK fighter, seriously wounded, was captured alive in the Şırnak region. Military operations against the PKK therefore continue despite the ongoing political process.
On the Syrian front, Ankara maintains military pressure on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), despite the agreement signed in March between the SDF Commander-in-Chief, General Mazloum Abdi, and the Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Turkey continues to demand the complete dismantling of the Kurdish armed forces and their integration on an individual basis into the future Syrian army.
The Turkish authorities also remain firmly opposed to any form of administrative or political autonomy for the Kurdish regions of north-eastern Syria. According to Ankara, such a status would constitute a direct threat to Turkey's national security and encourage the demands of its own Kurdish population.
The Turkish army therefore continues to maintain its military positions in northern Syria and to support the pro-Turkish Syrian militias operating in the region. Turkish drones regularly carry out surveillance and strike missions over Kurdish-controlled areas, while artillery shelling continues intermittently.
The Syrian authorities, for their part, are attempting to maintain dialogue with the Kurdish administration while avoiding any direct confrontation with Turkey. This balancing act remains extremely fragile and largely depends on the positions adopted by the United States and the European countries.
The United States continues to support the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against the remnants of the Islamic State. American military bases remain deployed in north-eastern Syria, where several thousand soldiers are stationed.
France has also reiterated its support for the SDF and stressed the need for the Kurds to participate fully in Syria's future political institutions.
Despite these declarations of principle, the Kurdish authorities fear that geopolitical considerations may eventually prevail over the commitments made by their Western allies.
Meanwhile, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria continues its efforts to rebuild the regions devastated by years of war, despite serious budgetary constraints and repeated Turkish military attacks.
The authorities are also facing the difficult management of camps holding tens of thousands of former Islamic State fighters and their families. The suspension or reduction of several international aid programmes has further complicated this humanitarian mission.
The Kurdish authorities continue to call on European countries to repatriate their nationals detained in these camps, warning that the current situation cannot continue indefinitely.
Relations between Erbil and Rojava have also improved during recent months. Contacts between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Autonomous Administration have intensified in order to coordinate their positions regarding the major regional developments resulting from the fall of the Assad regime.
The Kurdish political forces, despite their differences, increasingly share the view that preserving Kurdish unity has become a strategic necessity in the face of profound changes affecting Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran.
In this context, numerous Kurdish political figures continue to call for greater coordination between all Kurdish parties in the four parts of Kurdistan, while insisting that each movement should pursue solutions adapted to the political realities of the country in which it operates.
Although the military conflict has diminished in some areas, uncertainty remains considerable regarding the future political status of the Kurdish regions in Syria and the guarantees that could eventually be granted to their population within a future Syrian constitutional framework.
The coming months, particularly the evolution of relations between Damascus, Ankara, Washington and the European capitals, are therefore likely to prove decisive for the future of the Kurdish question in Syria as well as for the broader regional balance.
The new Iraqi Prime Minister, Ali al-Zaidi, who took office in mid-May, wants to make a strong impression both in Iraq and abroad by launching a broad campaign against the endemic and systemic corruption from which the country has suffered for decades.
No one yet knows the exact scale of this corruption, which indeed amounts to outright predation. A cautious assessment has been put forward by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Representative in Iraq, Titon Mitra: "International experts and even senior Iraqi government officials estimate that around 20% of the country's public funds have been lost due to corruption. According to him, between 150 and 450 billion dollars in assets may have been transferred abroad or hidden inside Iraq, making their recovery impossible" (Rudaw).
For his part, the Iraqi Prime Minister's legal adviser, Munir Haddad, stated in an interview broadcast on the state television channel Al Iraqiya News on 31 May that the amount of public funds embezzled since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 actually exceeds two trillion dollars and that the chances of recovering even a significant part of these funds are extremely low.
What, then, is the purpose of Operation "Dawn", launched by the Prime Minister on 28 June? It has led to the arrest of around sixty bureaucrats, including a former Deputy Minister of Oil, Adnan Al-Jumaili, as well as about a dozen Sunni and Shiite members of parliament.
The Kurdistan Regional Government handed over to the Baghdad authorities eight Arab suspects residing in or present in Erbil. Arrests also took place inside the Green Zone, where most foreign embassies and government ministries are located.
Further arrests may follow in the coming weeks but, for the time being, only lower-ranking officials are being targeted, while the networks of pro-Iranian Shiite militias and the patrons of certain political parties who have placed the country's resources under their control remain untouched.
It should be noted that this Operation "Dawn", targeting the small fry of Iraq's vast corruption network, comes only two weeks before the Iraqi Prime Minister's visit to Washington.
During his visit to Baghdad on 16 June, the U.S. Ambassador Tom Barrack, who also serves as President Trump's Special Envoy for Syria and Iraq, handed Ali al-Zaidi an official invitation to the White House for mid-July.
The main item on the agenda will be the disarmament of the pro-Iranian armed militias, which have repeatedly attacked American military bases and diplomatic missions in Iraq throughout the confrontation between the United States and Iran.
Washington expects Baghdad to take "concrete measures" before resuming the delivery of U.S. dollars to Iraq, which has been suspended since last April, and before discussing partnerships in other areas.
On that occasion, the Iraqi Prime Minister reaffirmed his country's commitment "to deepening trade and investment relations with Washington." After conflicts that devastated its infrastructure, Iraq is seeking to attract investors, particularly in the energy sector. The American giant Chevron has for several months been negotiating to develop the West Qurna 2 and Nassiriya oil fields. However, the absence of a genuine rule of law and the scale of corruption discourage most foreign investors.
According to Iraqi media, the U.S. Treasury has reportedly provided a list of nearly one thousand individuals and Iraqi entities involved in the vast corruption network operating throughout the country.
It remains unclear whether Operation "Dawn" is based on this list, whether it will continue over time, or whether it will ultimately end in failure like a similar operation launched by the previous Prime Minister in 2022 against the "heist of the century", during which a handful of well-connected individuals managed to divert 2.5 billion dollars from the Iraqi public treasury. That money simply disappeared; some of the accomplices initially arrested were later released so that they could recover the stolen funds from where they had hidden them. They disappeared in turn.
Another ambitious promise made by the Iraqi Prime Minister before his trip to Washington is that he has given the armed militias until the end of September to surrender their weapons to the State.
The militia of the influential Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr has declared that it will lay down its arms, but two powerful pro-Iranian militias refuse to comply with this order on the grounds that their disarmament would weaken the resistance.
The plundering of the country's resources continues and heavily affects the population, which has suffered for decades from the deplorable condition of public services (water, electricity, schools, roads and hospitals).
In Kurdistan, the Ministry of Finance of the Regional Government has demonstrated, with supporting figures, that while this systematic plundering was taking place in Baghdad, the federal government paid only 42% of Kurdistan's budget allocation during the 2019-2025 period.
In a detailed, fully documented report, the Ministry established that during those seven years Kurdistan's budget allocation should have exceeded 79 trillion Iraqi dinars, or approximately 60 billion dollars.
Baghdad transferred 48.7 trillion dinars, using the remaining funds to pay the salaries of federal civil servants while allocating no money for operational or investment expenditures.
According to the report, Iraq's total budget during this seven-year period amounted to 1,155.733 trillion Iraqi dinars, equivalent to approximately 881 billion dollars.
Of this amount, 12.67%, or 118 billion dollars, should have gone to the Kurdistan Region, yet Baghdad paid only 55 billion dollars, citing excessive and unjustified federal "sovereignty" and government expenditures in order to substantially reduce the share that, under the Constitution, should be allocated to Kurdistan (25 June 2026, Rudaw).
Discussions over the financial disputes between Baghdad and Erbil continued throughout June. On 10 June, Kurdistan Prime Minister Masrour Barzani proposed the establishment of a permanent high-level committee bringing together ministers and senior officials from both governments. The negotiations appear to have made some progress on three major issues: oil exports, financial auditing and non-oil revenues.
The stated objective is to establish predictable mechanisms for calculating revenues and paying salaries in order to reduce the recurring crises affecting relations between Baghdad and Erbil.
On 18 June, a 16-point agreement was signed between Kurdish and Iraqi officials on the ASYCUDA customs system, intended to digitalize and harmonize customs procedures at all Iraqi border crossings.
The agreement notably provides for the implementation of unified customs tariffs, the integration of the Kurdish language into customs procedures, as well as the establishment of a joint committee responsible for border crossings that have not yet been officially recognized by Baghdad.
Discussions on oil also made progress.
Kurdistan's Minister of the Interior, Reber Ahmed, stated that Baghdad and Erbil had reached an agreement concerning the security guarantees required for oil fields, a condition demanded by international energy companies before any increase in production and any resumption of exports.
The oil companies had requested guarantees concerning both the physical security of their facilities and the protection of their contractual and financial rights.
On 24 June, several oil companies, including the British company Gulf Keystone, announced the gradual resumption of their operations in Kurdistan, which had been suspended since last March.
The American company Hunt Oil will resume its operations on 8 July.
According to a spokesperson for the Kurdistan Regional Government, quoted by AFP, the delay in restarting production is due to the "considerable damage caused by the attacks against the facilities."
As for Iraq, which before the war exported approximately 3.5 million barrels of oil per day, most of it passing through the Strait of Hormuz, the return to pre-war production levels could only take place "within one to two months," according to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil (AFP, 24 June).
Despite the difficulties in obtaining its share of the federal budget, Kurdistan continues to benefit from its geographical position as an essential transit route towards Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Iran. Most of Iraq's trade with Turkey and Europe passes through Kurdistan. The volume of this trade reached 173 billion dollars during the past seven years, while customs revenues amounted to 6.8 billion dollars over the same period, nearly one billion dollars annually, according to a report by the Kurdish Ministry of Finance (Rudaw, 26 June).
The economic benefits generated by this trade are significant for the local economy, as are revenues from tourism and, of course, the rapidly expanding sectors of oil, gas and electricity production.
Kurdistan's gas-fired power plants are expected to meet the Region's electricity needs by the end of 2026.
Water supply networks have been extensively renovated and modernized.
The Kurdistan Government's next ambitious objective is to further green the major cities in order to combat climate change.
Thus, the capital Erbil is expected to be surrounded by a broad forest belt covering approximately 25% of its surface area.
These projects are being designed and implemented by a government which, in principle, is responsible only for handling day-to-day affairs until the formation of a new coalition government.
That government has yet to materialize.
Discussions failed to produce an agreement during June. The proposal put forward by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which has allied itself with the New Generation Movement to form a coalition government with the KDP on the basis of an equal distribution of ministerial portfolios, has still not received a favourable response.
The KDP holds 39 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament, while the PUK–New Generation alliance controls 38.
It should also be noted that, despite the ceasefire between Iran and the United States, the Iranian Kurdish opposition groups established in Iraqi Kurdistan have continued to be subjected to Iranian attacks.
On 7 June, the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) announced that one of its bases located in Erbil province had been targeted by a drone.
Two other drones were intercepted over the Akre region.
A few days earlier, the headquarters of the Komala party had been struck by Iranian missiles.
On 16 June, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) reported another drone attack against its Zewiya Spî camp near Koya, which houses its members and their families.
According to the KDPI, its camps, hospitals and schools have been targeted by more than 138 missiles and drones since the beginning of the war between Iran and the United States.
The political process aimed at providing a minimum of "democratic" legitimacy to the new Syrian Islamist government is continuing. On 30 June, the interim President al-Charaa made public the list of the 70 "members of parliament" whom he unilaterally appointed in accordance with the rudimentary "Constitutional Declaration" he had promulgated, which grants him most of the executive, legislative and judicial powers.
Among the "members of parliament" appointed by the interim President are about half a dozen women, two Kurds, two Druze and two Christians, giving the appearance of a semblance of diversity. These 70 appointed "members of parliament" join the other 140 designated by some 4,000 to 5,000 "grand electors" carefully selected from among the supporters of the new regime. The newly constituted "Parliament" is expected to convene in early July. The "members of parliament" will take the oath of office and then appoint the committees and bodies of their "Parliament."
The Kurdish leaders protested against this "electoral charade" and the glaring underrepresentation of the Kurds in Damascus's political and administrative institutions.
Having no real alternative and abandoned by their Western allies, they are concentrating on implementing the provisions of the agreement signed with the Syrian regime on 29 January.
Within this framework, progress has been made regarding the "integration" of Kurdish forces into the Syrian army and police. Approximately 5,000 Kurdish SDF fighters have joined the new military brigades based in Kurdish areas, while another 4,000 have been incorporated into the internal security forces under the authority of the Syrian Ministry of the Interior. One thousand fighters have returned to the Afrin canton, and approximately another 2,000 are expected to join them "soon" in order to become part of a new military formation.
Moreover, according to a senior official of the Assayish (Kurdish police), the files of approximately 1,000 members of the Kobané security forces had been submitted to the joint committee responsible for the integration process. This would represent approximately 60 to 70% of the roughly 1,500 to 1,600 Assayish members stationed in the city of Kobané.
According to a senior SDF official quoted by the Kurdish news channel Rudaw, approximately 8,000 Kurdish fighters of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had still not been integrated, "due to the lack of available positions in the new brigades." Discussions are continuing regarding their future assignments, the recognition of their ranks, and whether these brigades will retain a specific regional character or be dispersed throughout the Syrian army.
Another major issue under discussion is the future of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ). The General Commander of the YPJ, Rohilat Afrin, stated that this exclusively female force should be officially recognized within the Syrian army. According to her, women's rights would no longer enjoy institutional protection if the YPJ were dissolved or reduced to a simple police force, as proposed by Damascus.
Kurdish women's organizations stress that the military status of the YPJ, which played an emblematic role in the war against ISIS, goes far beyond its purely operational function. They regard it as "an essential guarantee of women's participation in political, security and administrative institutions." The future of all Rojava's women's institutions remains uncertain, as they appear largely incompatible with the political, social and societal orientations of the new Islamist regime in Damascus.
The fate of approximately 2,000 Kurdish civilians and fighters reported missing since the Kurdish-Syrian clashes last January remains unresolved. Although the Syrian regime has released several dozen detainees, it still has not published a complete and verifiable list specifying the fate of those who were captured, disappeared, released, transferred or died. On 26 June, Damascus released another group of SDF detainees without providing any indication regarding the continuation of these releases stipulated in the Kurdish-Syrian agreement of 29 January 2026.
In accordance with this agreement, nearly 1,700 displaced Kurdish families from Afrin were able to return to their homes on 10 June. In total, approximately 8,720 displaced families have now returned to the Afrin canton, representing the most positive outcome to date of the implementation of the 29 January agreement. However, the Syrian government has not yet established a credible and effective mechanism for restoring confiscated Kurdish properties or ensuring legal accountability for those responsible for the crimes committed in recent years by Syrian militias acting as auxiliaries of the Turkish army, which have since been integrated into the Syrian army and the official institutions of the Syrian State.
Because of the almost daily developments in the confrontation between Iran and the United States, which dominate the international media, the situation in Syria has become less visible, as can also be seen from our extensive press review, where Syria is covered by only three or four AFP dispatches. The heroic Kurdish fighters of the war against ISIS have themselves fallen into oblivion.
It is in an effort to break through this "wall of silence" that the Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), General Mazloum Abdi, accompanied by Ilham Ahmed, Head of Foreign Relations, undertook a short diplomatic tour.
The tour began in Erbil, where the delegation received a warm welcome from President Nechirvan Barzani. There they also met, on 17 June, Ambassador Tom Barrack, the U.S. President's Special Envoy for Syria and Iran. He reaffirmed the United States' support for "dialogue and stability in Syria."
President Barzani, who serves as a privileged channel between Rojava and the Western mediators, stressed the need to guarantee the rights of the Kurds and of the other components of Syrian society.
The Kurdish delegation then travelled to Rome, where it held meetings with officials from the Italian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.
In Paris, French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot warmly received General Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed on 20 June. The two Kurdish leaders informed the French Minister about the state of their negotiations with Damascus and called on France to use all its influence to ensure that Kurdish linguistic rights are guaranteed by the future Syrian Constitution and that Kurdish political participation within State institutions is secured. They also advocated the official recognition of institutions dedicated to women and administrative decentralization allowing all components of Syrian society to participate in the management of their own affairs.
The Kurds hope that, during his official visit to Damascus in July, the French President will plead their case before his Syrian counterpart.
