In a statement made on 29 July regarding the "ongoing process for a terror-free Turkey", President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that "the scourge of terrorism" had cost the Turkish state 2.3 trillion dollars. (Yeni Şafak, 29 July; NTV, 29 July)
In official Turkish terminology, this refers to the war waged since 1984 against the Kurdish guerrilla movement of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). During this war, and as part of a scorched-earth strategy, the Turkish army, according to an assessment by a commission of the Turkish Parliament, destroyed approximately 3,400 Kurdish villages and forced between two and three million Kurds to migrate to the western part of the country.
Several thousand intellectuals, trade unionists, lawyers and students who were not involved in the armed conflict were assassinated by the death squads of the Turkish Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Unit (JİTEM). The perpetrators of these killings have never been identified, let alone prosecuted by the Turkish judiciary.
According to official figures, the war has claimed more than 45,000 lives, over 90% of whom were Kurds. In a recent statement, former Deputy Prime Minister and former Speaker of the Turkish Parliament Bülent Arınç estimated that there had been "more than 100,000 deaths."
The Turkish president did not explain the parameters used to calculate the cost of the war. It therefore remains unclear whether his estimate takes into account the considerable damage inflicted on the society, economy and ecosystems of Kurdistan.
The PKK, which until the capture of its leader in 1999 claimed to be fighting for an independent Kurdistan, has since advocated "democratic confederalism" or "a democratic Turkey." At the request of its leader, it has decided to dissolve itself and lay down its arms as part of a process that its supporters describe as a "peace process" and that the Turkish government presents as the "process for a terror-free Turkey."
A law intended to provide the legal framework for this "process" is currently under discussion in the Turkish Parliament. It contains no provision for recognising the identity or the cultural and political rights of Turkey's 26 million Kurds, nor does it even provide for a general amnesty for PKK militants and fighters who are being called upon to lay down their arms.
The future framework law has become the country's main political issue of the month. The debate focuses on whether this legislation will be ambitious enough to enable a genuine political transition or whether it will be limited to disarmament, the reintegration of combatants and mechanisms of state control.
Officials of the DEM Party have warned that an overly restrictive law could jeopardise the process if it excludes Abdullah Öcalan, the principal leaders of the Kurdish movement, political prisoners or the democratic reforms that are indispensable to lasting peace. According to the DEM Party, the law must not create categories of people or leave aside the key actors in a political settlement.
An initial discussion of a draft law comprising fifteen articles suggested that the government intended to submit the text to the Justice Commission before presenting it to Parliament. Its content, however, remains unknown, while Kurdish political leaders continue to insist that the process must neither be developed behind closed doors nor reduced to a purely security-based approach.
Throughout July, the DEM Party played a central role in the public debate by meeting representatives of the state, opposition parties and the Speaker of Parliament, while advocating that Abdullah Öcalan's status be incorporated into the future legal framework.
On 16 July, the DEM Party's İmralı delegation stated that its discussions with the various political actors had focused on the current state of the process, the need to adopt the legislative framework without delay and the objective of obtaining a new visit to Öcalan as soon as possible.
On 21 July, following a meeting with the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Numan Kurtulmuş, the DEM Party declared that the framework law should constitute the founding text for a democratic solution to the Kurdish question and for Turkey's democratisation process. The party also stated that Öcalan's status, his freedom to work and his ability to communicate freely were essential conditions for the success of the process.
For the DEM Party, peace cannot depend solely on the will of the state. A credible process requires the involvement of Parliament, legal guarantees, monitoring mechanisms and the participation of all the political actors concerned. Later in the month, DEM parliamentary group deputy chair Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit proposed the creation of a parliamentary commission to monitor the peace process, arguing that the framework law should be regarded as a starting point rather than an end in itself. She also stressed that democratic reforms should include amendments to the Turkish Penal Code, the Anti-Terror Law and the legislation governing the execution of sentences.
The peace process continued in a context marked by an intensification of repression against opposition forces. DEM Party Co-Chair Tülay Hatimoğulları warned that the legal proceedings initiated against the Republican People's Party (CHP) were undermining public confidence in the Kurdish peace process. According to her, it is impossible to build lasting peace when democratic life is restricted through judicial intervention, police pressure and attacks targeting opposition parties.
This issue is particularly important for Kurdish politics, since the Kurdish question has long been linked to the broader democratic crisis affecting Turkey. Kurdish parties believe that no peace process can succeed as long as elected officials remain exposed to the risk of being removed from office, opposition parties continue to be targeted and the courts are used to reshape political life.
The issue of kayyum (state-appointed administrators replacing elected mayors) also remains unresolved. Although no major new appointments were made this month, the replacement of elected Kurdish mayors by government-appointed administrators remains one of the principal obstacles to establishing a climate of confidence. The DEM Party and other Kurdish actors regularly point out that no democratic peace can be credible as long as the choices made by Kurdish voters can be overturned through security procedures or administrative decisions.
The Turkish public, saturated with official propaganda disseminated by media outlets that are nearly 90% controlled by the government, appears largely indifferent to this repression, which has become routine. The international media pay attention to it only sporadically. However, on the occasion of the NATO Heads of State Summit held in Ankara on 7 and 8 July, several Western newspapers devoted articles to the domestic situation.
A report published in The New York Times was entitled "Turkey Hosts NATO Summit While Cracking Down on Critics." It reported that, during the weeks preceding the summit, the Turkish authorities had blocked websites, imprisoned numerous people on terrorism allegations, arrested dozens of environmental activists, an associate professor of political science at Ankara University, the publisher of an LGBTQ magazine and a 32-year-old comedian.
Meanwhile, the French daily Le Monde of 6 July described "Ankara under lockdown on the eve of the 36th NATO Summit." "An impressive security apparatus has sealed off the Turkish capital, where all public gatherings have been banned for thirteen days," the newspaper reported, adding that the NGO Human Rights Watch denounced "the abusive use of anti-terror legislation to carry out mass arrests."
The NATO Summit in Ankara was presented by the Turkish media as a moment of "consecration" and "glory" for the Turkish president. They repeatedly broadcast images of President Trump’s arrival and his lavish compliments about his friend Erdoğan.
In an interview with The New York Times published on 6 July, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared that « the Erdoğan-Trump Friendship Can Help NATO. » Thus, thanks to Donald Trump's "chemistry" with his friend Erdoğan (France Info, 7 July), Turkey, long regarded as "a troublesome ally," has become "an indispensable partner" (Le Monde, 7 July).
Fearing an outburst of anger, or simply one of Donald Trump's unpredictable moods, the Europeans remained discreet and accommodating towards him. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, eager to satisfy the irascible American president, announced European contracts for the purchase of American weapons with a total declared value of 43 billion dollars.
Regularly threatened with an American withdrawal and even with disintegration, NATO nevertheless survived the Ankara Summit.
The American president nevertheless left the Turkish capital with a certain degree of apprehension. At the last moment, he had to change aircraft for his departure from Ankara. His new Air Force One, a gift from Qatar, apparently was not equipped with sufficient defensive systems against a possible Iranian missile attack. He therefore travelled aboard his former Boeing Air Force One, equipped according to the highest standards.
For the Turkish president, the month of July was undoubtedly a blessed one. Following what was presented as a "successful" NATO Summit, he also saw his other strategic project, aimed at breaking up the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), culminate in success.
This historic party, founded by Atatürk himself and counting 1,880,000 members, imploded. Its elected leader, Özgür Özel, who had been removed from office by a politically controlled judiciary, announced on 24 July, the anniversary of the signing of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the foundation in international law of the Republic of Turkey, the creation of a new party, the Yeni Parti, literally "the New Party."
Of the CHP's 134 members of parliament, 91 joined the new party, making it the leading force in the parliamentary opposition. Its rival, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, imposed by the Turkish judiciary as head of the CHP, now has only 44 deputies, reducing this historic party to the fifth-largest political formation in Parliament, behind the AKP, the Yeni Parti, the pro-Kurdish DEM Party and the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
Its only consolation is that the CHP retains its imposing headquarters in Ankara, together with its considerable financial and real estate assets.
As for the CHP's elected mayors, some have joined the New Party, others have resigned and joined the governing AKP in order to avoid judicial proceedings, while others are waiting for a more favourable moment before making their decision.
The implosion of the CHP and the neutralisation of the DEM Party leave President Erdoğan with a free hand to call early elections and secure a new term in office.
Like his "friend" Putin, he has succeeded in establishing in the country "a Putinism in Turkish colours" (Le Monde, 7 July).
The ceasefire negotiated over several months, announced and signed at Versailles by President Trump on 17 June in order to lend it greater solemnity, lasted only a short while. It lasted long enough for the Iranian regime to organize grand state funerals for Ayatollah Khamenei, who had been killed on the very first day of the Israeli-American offensive, in order to stage public support from part of the Iranian population and display national unity in the face of adversity. It also gave President Trump enough time to celebrate both his birthday and the 250th anniversary of the United States in peace on 4 July.
Iran had also chosen 4 July as the opening day of the funeral ceremonies for its late Supreme Guide. After three days of processions attended by mourning crowds in Tehran, his body was transferred to the "holy city" of Qom, home to numerous Shiite religious seminaries, and from there to Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, the two principal centres of Shiite Islam housing the mausoleums of Imam Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, and his son Imam Hussein, both revered by Shiite believers. The strong participation of Iraqi Shiites in the processions at Najaf and Karbala was presented by the Iranian regime as a sign of allegiance to Iran's Supreme Leader, whereas the overwhelming majority of Iraqi Shiites owe their allegiance to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who lives in seclusion in Najaf and opposes the velayat-e faqih system embodied by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. A deeply devout cleric, Ayatollah Sistani insists that religion should not be used or instrumentalized for political purposes. After the funeral procession through Iraq, Ayatollah Khamenei's body was buried in Mashhad, near the mausoleum of Imam Reza, who is revered by Iranian Shiite believers.
Throughout this period of mourning, the Iranian leadership, despite its internal divisions, displayed unity and engaged in conspicuous demonstrations of grief and self-flagellation. The only notable absentee was the new Supreme Guide, Mojtaba Khamenei, who was unable to attend his father's funeral, leaving room for every kind of interpretation and speculation.
Yet even during this period of mourning, the Revolutionary Guards did not fail to reaffirm Iran's claim to sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and to swear revenge for Khamenei's death.
Although, under the ceasefire agreement, passage through the Strait of Hormuz was to remain completely free for all commercial vessels, at least for sixty days, Iranian drones bombed, on 7 July, a merchant vessel using a shipping lane other than the one the regime was attempting to impose. President Trump's furious response was immediate. He declared at once that the ceasefire was over. A deadly cycle then began, with Iranian attacks in the Strait of Hormuz followed by massive American retaliatory strikes against Iranian ports and military infrastructure, and in some cases civilian infrastructure, on several islands in the Strait of Hormuz as well as other targets in southern Iran, including the important port of Bandar Abbas.
On 12 July, Iran officially declared the Strait of Hormuz closed to navigation and resumed negotiations with Oman on the joint management of transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Military confrontations continued until 24 July before giving way to a pause of several days, allowing the various mediators to pursue their efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement sought by the principal Gulf countries, which have suffered greatly from a war that was expected to last only a few weeks but has now entered its sixth month.
Reflecting the prevailing mood in the region, The New York Times published a report on 22 July under the headline: "Iran's Neighbors Long for a Deal, Any Deal, to End the War."
Aware of the widespread sense of fatigue in the region and of the growing unpopularity of the war among a large section of American public opinion, the Iranian regime appears determined to draw the United States into a prolonged war of attrition. This would be a low-intensity, sporadic conflict aimed at putting pressure on the Gulf petro-monarchies, which have much to lose, in the hope that they will distance themselves from Washington and reach a modus vivendi with an Iran seeking to establish itself as the dominant regional power.
The cost of such a war of attrition would also be enormous for Iran's economy and population. According to RFI (6 July), "in the absence of Chinese demand, Iranian oil can no longer find buyers." In any event, because of the American blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is now able to export only marginal quantities of its oil.
As a result, the economy is collapsing. The population is sinking deeper into poverty and despair. "A people crushed by repression," warned RFI on 17 July, while The New York Times published a field report on 24 July under the telling headline: "We're Trapped in Hell, Iranians Say Life Is Put on Hold by Months of War."
For the Iranian authorities and the media under their control, the population must "resist" for "the dignity and independence of the country." There is a price to pay for this "sacred cause." Those who do not subscribe to this official ideology are portrayed as enemies from within, as "traitors," American agents and Zionist collaborators. They deserve death. And the well-established judicial and security apparatus is there to punish the traitors.
Given the circumstances, censorship and the difficulties of accessing social media, no precise, let alone comprehensive, assessment of the repression carried out in July can be established. It is nevertheless worth noting the fragmentary information collected by human rights organizations.
On 14 July, Mohyedin Abdullahi and Hossein Palani Jafi, two Kurdish prisoners from Sarpol-e Zahab, were secretly executed at Kermanshah Central Prison. Arrested in connection with an armed clash that occurred in 2017, they were executed without being allowed a final visit with their families. Human rights organizations denounced acts of torture, prolonged periods of solitary confinement, denial of access to legal counsel, and their conviction on charges of "armed rebellion." On 22 July, Iraj Ebrahimzadeh, a Kurdish prisoner from Ilam, was executed at Ilam Central Prison.
Other executions were also reported during July, including those of Sardar Qaderi at Urmia Central Prison and Salman Kakeh-Khani, from Saqqez, at Tabriz Central Prison. At Ghezel Hesar Prison, at least five death-row prisoners were placed in solitary confinement pending execution, prompting a hunger strike involving several hundred inmates from Unit 2.
July was particularly deadly in the border areas adjoining Iraqi Kurdistan. On 9 July, Border Guard Regiment forces killed Sam Hassani, a 15-year-old boy, and wounded his father, Ahsan Hassani, after opening fire without warning on their vehicle near the village of Daraki, in the Sarvabad region. The shooting took place amid increased military deployment and restrictions imposed on local residents regarding access to their orchards and grazing lands.
On 22 July, Rasoul Qalandari, a 21-year-old kolbar (cross-border porter) and father of two from Balajuk (Khoy), was wounded by border guards in the Qotur border mountains. According to a source quoted by Kurdpa, the guards then approached him and shot him in the head despite his pleas, while he reminded them that he was the father of two young children.
The following day, Soheyl Ferdowsi, an 18-year-old kolbar from the village of Dezavar, near Paveh, was killed by direct fire from the Revolutionary Guards. According to the Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN), border guards killed four kolbars over the previous three weeks in the regions of Nowsud, Marivan and Sarvabad, as well as two other civilians, including a 15-year-old child.
Also in Iranian Kurdistan, a review of information published by Hengaw, Kurdpa and the Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN) indicates that at least 32 identified Kurdish citizens were arrested, detained or transferred to prison during July 2026.
As in previous months, this new wave of repression targeted activists, teachers, cultural figures, athletes, women, religious leaders, members of charitable organizations, families seeking justice, former political prisoners, as well as ordinary citizens.
In Mahabad, several Kurdish citizens were arrested at the beginning of the month. Mostafa Ebrahimi was arrested on 7 July following a warrantless search of his family home. The following day, Matin Faramarzi, a Kurdish cultural activist, was violently arrested in Sheikh Shaltut Park before being transferred to an unknown location. Other residents of Mahabad were also targeted, including Kamal Piranpour, Sardar Ostad-Ahmadi and Peyman Mohammadi Moradi, who was arrested after being summoned by the intelligence services under the pretext of recovering his confiscated mobile phone. Their families received no information concerning the charges against them, their legal status or their place of detention.
In Sardasht, Mamosta Abubakr Yousofi and Younes Mousapour were violently arrested on 5 July in Nalas after intelligence agents stormed a garden house belonging to their family. According to available information, the agents subjected both men to physical violence and degrading treatment before transferring them to an intelligence detention centre in Urmia. Several days later, their families still had no information regarding the reasons for their arrest or the conditions of their detention.
In Paveh, Sabah Valad-Beygi, a retired teacher, environmental activist and head of the Noor mountaineering group, was arrested during a raid on his home in the village of Nuryab before being transferred to a security detention centre in Kermanshah. His brother, Nawzad Valad-Beygi, was subsequently arrested, and his place of detention remains unknown. In the same town, Kurdish artist Rashid Emami and his wife, Shler Modirzadeh, were arrested after intelligence agents raided their home. The agents later returned to arrest Mrs. Modirzadeh as well. Their family has received no information regarding their legal status or place of detention.
The repression also targeted civic and environmental activists. In Ravansar, the Revolutionary Guards' Intelligence Organization (IRGC) arrested Khalil Parandak, Shahab Soleimani and Idris Golmohammadi on 17 July without presenting a warrant. Khalil Parandak is an environmental activist and a member of a justice-seeking family, Shahab Soleimani is a lawyer and civil rights defender, while Idris Golmohammadi is active in environmental and community organizations. The efforts made by their families with the judicial and security authorities yielded no information regarding the charges against them or their place of detention.
Women were also affected by this wave of arrests. Mona Maleki, a 27-year-old Kurdish woman from Sanandaj (Senna), was arrested on 14 July by the Ministry of Intelligence and placed in solitary confinement in Sanandaj Women's Prison. She was denied access to a lawyer as well as family visits. In Ilam, Zahra Mohammad-Vali, who had been arrested earlier, continued her protest in prison by staging a dry hunger strike against her arbitrary detention, the absence of any judicial prospects, and repeated interrogations, illustrating the constant pressure exerted on female detainees even after their arrest.
Kurdish athletes and young men were likewise targeted. Hamid Mohammadzadeh, a well-known champion of the traditional Kurmanji Choukha wrestling style from Ashkhaneh, was arrested on 4 July following a warrantless search of his home. In Saqqez, 23-year-old footballer Fereydoun Mostafaei remained in incommunicado detention after being arrested in late June or early July. In Ilam, Kiomars Hasanbeigi was violently arrested on 22 July, injured during his arrest and transferred to an undisclosed location without being allowed access to a lawyer or visits from his family.
The security forces also targeted religious and community leaders. Emad Mostafaei, a 19-year-old Sunni Kurdish religious activist from Javanrud, was arrested on 25 July and transferred to a security detention centre in Kermanshah. In Kamyaran, Esmail Khatari and Fouad Shadi, members of the Shayni charitable foundation, were arrested on 24 and 25 July and taken to undisclosed locations. Their families received no information concerning their health, the charges against them or their place of detention.
Some of the arrests made in July were linked to previous protest cases and the enforcement of prison sentences. Ribwar Marabi, a 26-year-old Kurd from Kamyaran who had been arrested during the January 2026 demonstrations in Tehran, was imprisoned on 25 July after reporting to the office responsible for the enforcement of sentences. He was transferred to Greater Tehran Prison to serve a six-year prison sentence. Arman Ebrahimi, from Oshnavieh, was likewise transferred to Urmia Central Prison to serve a one-year sentence.
During the month of July, the Alliance of Political Parties of Iranian Kurdistan presented a more unified response to the attacks and repression carried out by the Iranian regime. Following a meeting held on 23 July, the Alliance issued a joint statement affirming that Iran's internal crisis had been accompanied by an intensification of repression, state terrorism and military attacks against Kurdish political parties and the population of Rojhelat.
The Alliance condemned the missile, drone and ground attacks carried out against Kurdish political forces, arguing that the losses suffered concerned the entire Kurdish national movement and made unity among the Kurdish parties of Iran more strategic than ever.
The statement stresses that the Kurdish people's struggle for their national and political rights cannot be crushed by repression and violence. It also calls for stronger international efforts to denounce human rights violations in Kurdistan and affirms that the Alliance will develop closer political and field cooperation with a view to a democratic future for Iran.
July was also marked by a new form of pressure directed against Kurdish opposition figures living in exile. Iran requested INTERPOL Red Notices as well as extradition requests targeting leaders and members of several Iranian Kurdish opposition parties, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), Komala and other Kurdish political figures. Kurdish leaders denounced what they described as the political misuse of international mechanisms, arguing that Tehran was seeking to extend its campaign of intimidation beyond its own borders.
In a completely different context, it is worth noting the extraordinary case concerning the alleged recruitment of former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by the Israeli intelligence services (The New York Times, 13 July).
After a few days of relative calm during the funeral ceremonies of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards resumed, in mid-July, their drone and missile attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan, targeting in particular the camps of the Iranian Kurdish political parties that have been based there for more than thirty years.
The deadliest of these attacks took place on 17 July. Missiles struck Komala positions in the Zargwez area, south of Sulaymaniyah. At least nine members of this Iranian Kurdish opposition movement were killed and several others injured. On 13 July, three consecutive drone attacks had targeted a base of the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) in Erbil province without causing any casualties (Rûdaw, 13 and 17 July).
On 17 July, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) condemned these "unjustified attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Kurdistan Region." "The continuation of these attacks destabilises the entire region," the KRG statement declared, calling "on the Islamic Republic of Iran to stop these attacks" and urging "the Federal Government of Iraq and the international community to put an end to these violations of the sovereignty of Kurdistan and Iraq" (Rûdaw, 17 July). Once again, this appeal was ignored by Tehran.
On 20 July, the Revolutionary Guards launched drone attacks against Komala camps in the Alana Valley, in the Choman district (Erbil province), as well as another camp in Surdash.
Another recurrent target of Iranian attacks, the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), accused Iran of using white phosphorus during a drone attack and supported its accusations with eyewitness accounts, medical examinations and evidence of damage caused by the resulting fires.
On 27 July, another attack involving four drones targeted Komala positions, again in the Alana Valley. The Iranian Kurdish party stated that it had been subjected to 95 Iranian missile and drone attacks since the beginning of the war.
At a press conference held on 27 July, Kurdistan Prime Minister Masrour Barzani stated that "many of the drones that have recently targeted the Kurdistan Region were launched from Nineveh Province." He once again called on Baghdad to prevent armed groups from operating outside state control.
"We have once again conveyed our request to the federal government, and we believe that the federal government is responsible for stopping the sources of risks and threats against the Kurdistan Region. It must not allow those operating outside the law to endanger the security and stability of the Kurdistan Region and, consequently, of all Iraq," the Prime Minister warned (Rûdaw, 28 July).
The appeal was in vain, as the government in Baghdad is unable to control the pro-Iranian Shiite militias supervised by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which continue to launch drone attacks not only against Kurdistan but also against neighbouring Arab countries, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
After several warnings went unheeded, Saudi Arabia, acting in coordination with the United States, carried out a series of air strikes against the bases of these Popular Mobilisation Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) militias in half a dozen Iraqi provinces, including Baghdad, Kirkuk, Nineveh (Mosul), Karbala, Diyala and Basra.
According to an initial assessment, twenty militiamen were killed, including five members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, while thirty-two others were wounded. The seriously injured, together with the bodies of the Revolutionary Guards killed in the strikes, were evacuated to Iran. Material damage appears to have been considerable.
While denying any involvement in the recent attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia, the pro-Iranian militias grouped under the name Islamic Resistance in Iraq vowed retaliation and issued an ultimatum to the Baghdad government to act before 7 August, failing which they threatened reprisals.
While condemning "these unacceptable attacks against Iraq's sovereignty," Baghdad denied having been informed in advance by Washington, as President Trump had claimed.
The pro-Iranian militias have announced that their retaliation will take place "after the Arbaeen pilgrimage," marking the end of the forty-day mourning period commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, who was killed at the Battle of Karbala in 680.
These militias, which never hesitate to shed the blood of other Muslims, whether civilians or soldiers, nevertheless claim to be concerned about the smooth running and security of the Shiite pilgrimage, which every year brings together nearly two million Iranian and Iraqi Shiite believers in Karbala, home to the mausoleum of Imam Hussein.
For his part, the Iraqi Prime Minister had instructed all militias to lay down their arms by 30 September, and reiterated this commitment during his highly publicised visit to Washington, where he was received at the White House by President Trump.
The mandate of the international coalition against ISIS, which has already ended in Arab Iraq, will also come to an end in Kurdistan at the end of September. Iraq maintains that it is capable of defending itself against terrorist threats by its own means and is proposing broad military and economic cooperation with Washington.
The coalition of Shiite parties supporting the Iraqi government is, in principle, in agreement with the Prime Minister's "pragmatic" and "sovereigntist" approach. The Americans, however, insist that this concern for sovereignty must also be applied to Iran, and that the pro-Iranian Shiite militias must be disarmed and prevented from threatening neighbouring Arab countries and Kurdistan, where the United States has important interests.
During this visit, around fifty commercial agreements and memoranda of understanding were signed, representing a total announced value of 60 billion dollars (Rûdaw, 18 July).
Before the visit, Washington had resumed dollar transfers to Baghdad, which had been suspended since April, while Baghdad promised the oil giant Chevron the development of the vast West Qurna oilfield in southern Iraq.
Oil revenues account for more than 80% of Iraqi budget revenues. Oil exports are therefore of vital importance to the country. The uncertainties created by the Iranian-American war have had a severe impact on Iraqi oil exports, just as they have on those of the other Gulf oil monarchies.
According to the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO), Iraq was able to export only a total of 32.1 million barrels of oil in May and June, generating revenues of 2.3 billion dollars. Basra Province exported 20.2 million barrels through the Strait of Hormuz, the Kurdistan Region exported 1.56 million barrels through the Turkish port of Ceyhan, while Kirkuk Province exported 10.3 million barrels through the same port of Ceyhan.
Before the war, Iraq exported an average of 3.5 million barrels of oil per day.
In order to reduce its heavy dependence on exports through the Strait of Hormuz, the Iraqi government is seeking alternative routes and is returning to the policy adopted during the British Mandate in the 1930s, when Kirkuk oil was transported by pipeline to the Syrian port of Banias on the Mediterranean and to Haifa, in British Mandate Palestine.
On 18 July, Iraq and Syria signed, in Washington, under the auspices of U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, a Memorandum of Understanding for the construction of an oil pipeline linking Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Banias.
The agreement is intended to strengthen cooperation in the oil and gas sectors, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil announced in a statement on 18 July.
It provides for the implementation of a "vital energy corridor" designed to connect oil production with global export markets through the Mediterranean.
According to Ahmed Gabbaji, head of the Syrian Petroleum Company, the new pipeline will replace the old one. It will have a capacity of two million barrels per day and is expected to be completed within thirty months of the signing of the agreement. The pipeline will be built by a U.S.-led consortium including Chevron (Rûdaw, 18 July).
Upon his return from Washington, the Iraqi Prime Minister first travelled to Tehran to brief the Iranian leadership on the substance of his talks and, most likely, to convey an American message. He also discussed the resumption of Iranian gas supplies to Iraq, the interruption of which has seriously disrupted electricity production.
He then travelled to Ankara at the invitation of the Turkish President. The agenda of the talks included security cooperation in the context of the PKK disarmament process, the development of trade relations, and negotiations on the renewal of the agreement governing the transit of Iraqi oil exports through Turkish territory. The agreement signed under Saddam Hussein's regime has expired.
Turkey, taking advantage of Iraq's current difficulties in exporting its oil through the Strait of Hormuz, is seeking to impose more favourable terms.
Iraq has declared itself ready to sell one million barrels of oil per day to Turkey, which would considerably reduce Turkey's dependence on Russian and Iranian oil.
The capacity of the pipeline linking Kirkuk and the Kurdistan Region to the Turkish port of Ceyhan could be increased to two million barrels per day, thereby enabling Baghdad, if necessary, to dispense with transit through the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran seeks to impose its own rules.
Kurdistan remains the indispensable transit route for the pipelines leading to Banias and Ceyhan for Iraqi oil exports. In the event of a serious conflict with Baghdad, it could shut down the pipelines and interrupt Iraqi oil exports.
It is also the essential transit point for trade towards the Gulf countries. However, Turkey intends to redirect a significant part of its trade with the Middle East through Syria once that country has been stabilised and provided with modern transport infrastructure.
Meanwhile, financial disputes between Erbil and Baghdad remain unresolved.
At the beginning of July, a delegation from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) travelled to Baghdad to meet with the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Supreme Audit Board. The discussions focused on the salaries of civil servants, non-oil revenues, customs procedures and taxation.
The KRG maintained its position that salaries should not be used as leverage in political and technical disputes. Erbil reaffirmed that civil servants have a legal and constitutional right to receive their salaries, a right confirmed by the Federal Supreme Court, and that disagreements concerning non-oil revenues, the automation of customs procedures or oil exports should be resolved through audits and negotiations rather than by delaying salary payments.
As a result of the Iranian-American war, during which Kurdistan was subjected to more than 900 Iranian drone and missile attacks, the oil companies operating in the region were forced to suspend production.
This has resulted in a fuel shortage that is seriously hampering economic activity and causing widespread public frustration. To address the situation, the Kurdistan government asked Baghdad to increase the daily crude oil allocation to the Region from 50,000 to 126,700 barrels per day, arguing that this volume would more fairly reflect Kurdistan's demographic share and was essential to overcome the fuel shortages.
The Kurdistan Government has also moved to strengthen market regulation by launching an electronic card and coupon system in Erbil for the distribution of subsidised fuel, with the aim of improving access to fuel and reducing disorder at filling stations.
Finally, amid these multiple crises, the two main Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, have still failed to reach an agreement on the formation of a new coalition government.
The Syrian Legislative Council convened in Damascus on 12 July. It consists of 210 members, including 140 members designated in October 2025 by some 4,000 to 5,000 "grand electors" close to the Islamist regime, and 70 others appointed directly by Interim President Ahmed al-Charaa on 1 July. It includes only 12 Kurds, co-opted members who do not represent any Kurdish political party, with the exception of Abdul Hakim Bashar, a member of the Kurdish National Council (ENKS), and 22 women. Of these, 16 were appointed by President al-Charaa, since the October vote had produced only four women.
In an effort to achieve a minimum balance for women, who represent more than half of Syrian society, al-Charaa, no doubt on the advice of the Turkish and British communications agencies that have been "coaching" him since he took power, made a "gesture of openness", without, however, risking alienating his Islamist-Salafist base, since most of the women appointed also come from Islamist circles.
At the session of this Council, one could see a Kurdish female deputy, Fasia Youssef, dressed in Kurdish attire, who insisted on taking the oath in both Arabic and Kurdish, female deputies wearing Salafist niqabs, and a few others from civil society dressed in Western clothing. The only woman minister in the Syrian government, which has 24 ministers, Mrs Hind Kabawat, quoted by Libération on 28 July, welcomed this image as reflecting "Syrian diversity". Serving both as a Christian token and as a woman representing the new Syrian government, particularly in the eyes of Western public opinion, Mrs Kabawat, Minister of Social Affairs, regularly accompanies Syrian delegations during visits to the United Nations and Western countries. She represented Syria at the funeral of Pope Francis.
Since the Constitutional Declaration grants most legislative, executive and judicial powers to the Interim President, it is still unclear what role this appointed Parliament will actually play.
Meanwhile, Western leaders, eager to see Syria regain, if not democracy, then at least a certain degree of stability, have been lavish in their praise of the new regime and its leader. President Trump, who met him on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Ankara at the suggestion of Turkish President Erdogan, showered him with compliments. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the German Chancellor likewise expressed their goodwill and readiness for close cooperation.
President Macron, who paid a visit to Damascus accompanied by a large delegation of business leaders, hopes France will play a leading role in Syria's reconstruction, seemingly overlooking the high degree of the new regime's political and military dependence on its Turkish protector Erdogan, whose policies, from the Mediterranean to Greece and Africa, frequently conflict with those of France. As a sign of the times and of changing circumstances, the French President did not meet his Kurdish "brothers in arms" in Damascus, who have clearly fallen into oblivion.
This unfortunate precedent also served as an excuse for the United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, who, during his visit to Damascus on 25 July 2026, did not meet any Kurdish representatives. Questioned by a journalist from the Kurdish news channel Rûdaw, his Deputy Spokesperson Farhan Haq stated that, because of scheduling constraints, the Secretary-General had not had time to travel to Rojava and meet General Mazloum Abdi. The latter was not invited to Damascus for a symbolic meeting either by the French President or by the UN Secretary-General. Furthermore, no Kurdish journalist was invited to Mr Guterres' press conference, no doubt to avoid questions regarding the fate of the Kurds. He was nevertheless questioned on the subject by an Egyptian journalist.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, who said he had come to Syria "with humility and respect", merely stated that the "reunification" agreement between the Kurdish forces and the Syrian government constituted "a significant success". At this "pivotal moment", the United Nations stands alongside the Syrian people, the Secretary-General added, whose visit to Damascus was the first in 17 years (Rûdaw, 28 July).
The implementation of this "significant agreement", concluded on 29 January, has progressed in certain areas, particularly administrative ones, while making little headway on political and military issues.
In an interview with the Kurdish television channel Rûdaw on 30 July, the Kurdish Governor of Hassaké Province, Noureddine Ahmed, stated that around 70% of institutional integration had been completed in this predominantly Kurdish province, which was at the heart of the Kurdish-Syrian agreement of 29 January.
The Governor indicated that, in the education sector, around 20,000 employees had been fully integrated into the Syrian Ministry of Education and were now receiving their salaries regularly. In the health sector, 2,000 employees had been integrated, while half of the staff of the Electricity Directorate had also been integrated. The Directorates of Agriculture, Internal Trade and Consumer Protection have likewise been integrated. The Directorates of Culture, Tourism, Antiquities, the branch of the Central Bank of Syria and the Postal Directorate have been "reactivated" and are now providing their services.
According to N. Ahmed, ongoing efforts are aimed at integrating and reactivating the remaining directorates, including those responsible for transport, communications and finance, as well as the branches of the other banks.
"We are holding very positive discussions with the Ministry of Higher Education on the future of the universities of Rojava," the Governor added, welcoming the progress achieved in just a few months.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, which had governed these territories since 2011, is fully cooperating with this process of "reintegration", while noting that the Damascus regime is moving faster in restoring its administrative control than in providing political guarantees.
According to the Autonomous Administration, integration cannot be limited to the deployment of security forces and the return of state administrations if the new Syria does not recognise, in its Constitution, the rights of the Kurdish people, decentralised governance and the achievements of the Kurdish people.
The regime's approach remains deeply marked by centralising Arab Islamist-nationalism. Thus, its local representatives installed at the entrance to the Kurdish city of Kobané a sign bearing the Arabic name Ain al-Arab, imposed by the Baathist dictatorial regime in the 1960s.
The inhabitants of Kobané demonstrated massively against the installation of this sign, recalling a past of oppression. The campaign launched under the slogan "Kobané is our identity. Kobané is not Ain al-Arab" reflects the popular rejection of nationalist policies aimed at replacing the Kurdish name of a city that has become, throughout the world, a symbol of resistance against Daesh, where the organisation suffered its first military defeat.
The return of displaced Kurds to their lands continues at a slow pace because the Syrian militias acting as auxiliaries of the Turkish occupation army are in no hurry to leave and return to their rightful owners the property, houses and businesses they confiscated, particularly in the Kurdish territories of Serê Kaniyê (Ras al-Ain) and Girê Spî (Tell Abyad).
After months of negotiations, a first contingent of around 500 to 600 displaced persons is expected to be authorised to return to Serê Kaniyê. Several tens of thousands of others remain in makeshift camps awaiting their return, in accordance with the Kurdish-Syrian agreement.
In July, the last organised convoy of displaced families from Afrin reached its destination safely. This final convoy included around one thousand families, bringing the total number of families that have returned to their homes after several years of forced displacement to 8,720. Many of them were obliged to pay "compensation" in order to persuade the Arab occupants to leave their homes.
At the same time, the armed clashes between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian militias have largely subsided. However, Turkish drones continue to strike Kurdish military positions on a regular basis. In July, at least five SDF fighters were killed in such attacks.
The question of the camps and prisons holding thousands of Daesh members and their families also remains unresolved. The Autonomous Administration continues to insist that these facilities require international support and cannot simply be handed over without guarantees concerning security, logistics and funding.
For their part, the United States maintain their military presence in north-eastern Syria and continue to support the SDF in the fight against the remnants of Daesh. American officials regularly reaffirm that the Kurdish forces remain an essential partner in preventing the resurgence of the jihadist organisation.
France has also reiterated its support for a political solution guaranteeing the participation of the Kurds in the future institutions of the Syrian state. Paris continues to advocate a decentralised political settlement ensuring the rights of all components of Syrian society.
Despite these diplomatic efforts, the overall situation remains highly uncertain. The Syrian authorities have not yet provided any constitutional guarantees concerning the political status of the Kurdish regions, the recognition of the Kurdish language, or the future of the Autonomous Administration.
The implementation of the agreement of 29 January therefore remains partial and fragile. While progress has been achieved in administrative matters, the most sensitive political and military issues remain unresolved.
The iconic American Senator Lindsey Graham, an unwavering defender of the Kurdish people, passed away on 11 July 2026, at the age of 71, in Washington.
Senator Graham, notably the author of the Save the Kurds Act, was a steadfast advocate of the rights of the Kurdish people. He played a crucial role in facilitating a peace agreement between the Syrian regime and the Syrian Kurdish forces, helping to secure the support of General Mazloum Abdi, Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). General Abdi paid a moving tribute to him, as did the Kurdish leaders Nechirvan Barzani and his predecessor, Massoud Barzani.
Senator Graham was also a leading voice in the United States Senate against the Turkish government's authoritarian drift and a strong supporter of Ukraine. He had visited the country on the eve of his death, which was caused by a sudden aortic rupture.
His funeral took place on 28 July, attended by numerous foreign dignitaries, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
Over the past decades, a number of Democratic and Republican senators have stood firmly in defence of the Kurdish people. Among the most memorable were the Democrats Edward Kennedy, John Kerry and Nancy Pelosi, and the Republicans John McCain and Lindsey Graham.
The first head of state to advocate the creation of an independent Kurdistan was U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who, as early as 1918, called for the establishment of a Kurdish state in accordance with the principle of the right of every people to self-determination that he championed.
The Treaty of Sèvres, signed in August 1920, formally endorsed the principle of the creation of an independent Kurdistan. However, it was never implemented. The British Empire and France chose instead to redraw the map of the Middle East according to their own interests at the time, disregarding the Kurdish people. This marked the beginning of a Kurdish tragedy that has now lasted for more than a century.
