After more than twelve hours of debate, on 10 August the Turkish Parliament adopted a law governing the disarmament of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the return to civilian life of its fighters who have laid down their arms.
This law, entitled the "Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration", was adopted by a very large majority of 468 votes out of 562. MPs from the governing AKP, its far-right ally the MHP and the pro-Kurdish DEM Party, as well as most of the elected representatives of Özgür Özel's Yeni Parti (New Party), voted in favour of the law. Those from the ultra-nationalist İYİ Party and some MPs from the old, nationalist Republican People's Party, 88 MPs in total, voted against it. Six abstained.
Drafted following nearly a year of discussions, consultations and hearings within an ad hoc committee of the Grand National Assembly, chaired by the Speaker of the Assembly, this law contains 12 articles setting out the conditions for the "suspension of prosecutions and sentences" for members of the "PKK-KCK terrorist organisation".
Its first article states that the purpose of the law is to have the security authorities establish that "the PKK-KCK terrorist organisation and all organisations of any kind affiliated with it have effectively ended their existence", that they have surrendered "all weapons and ammunition of any kind in their possession" and that, once "this finding has been confirmed by the publication in the Official Gazette of a decree of the National Security Council", the procedures for deferring ongoing prosecutions and the enforcement of sentences handed down, as well as the other procedures to be followed, will be determined.
With the exception of murders and crimes committed as part of the organisation's activities before 1 June 2005, punishable by life imprisonment, sentences of up to 15 years in prison will be suspended for five years. Prosecutions and sentences carrying more than 15 years in prison or life imprisonment will be suspended for ten years. The files and documents relating to these prosecutions will be retained. In the event of a repeat offence during the suspension periods, the sentences will be enforced. If no repeat offence is committed, the conviction and prosecution files will be closed without further action.
This framework law is therefore not a partial amnesty law, still less a total one. It excludes convictions dating from before 2005, including, among others, that of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has been held since 1999 on the prison island of İmralı, near Istanbul.
Above all, this law is conditional: it will enter into force only once the complete disarmament of the PKK has been established by the Turkish security services, which must draw up a detailed and precise inventory of the weapons and military equipment surrendered by PKK fighters at centres to be established in Iraqi Kurdistan. The finding of disarmament must then be confirmed by a decree of the National Security Council before the legal mechanism for suspending or deferring sentences can be triggered. Potential beneficiaries must then apply to the appropriate Turkish judicial authorities to obtain this suspension of sentence.
According to estimates by Turkish MPs, of the approximately 10,000 Kurdish political prisoners, around 3,500 could benefit from this measure, which might be followed by others.
This is obviously far from a "peace of the brave" or a reconciliation worthy of the name. At no point does this law even mention the word Kurdish, nor does it refer to any recognition of the rights of the Kurdish people. It is a procedure for liquidating a guerrilla movement which, after mobilising an entire generation of young Kurds for an independent Kurdistan, is laying down its arms without having obtained a minimum of cultural and linguistic rights or autonomy for a population of approximately 26 million Kurds in Turkey.
There is great bitterness among the population that has suffered through these four decades of war, which left more than 50,000 dead and over two million displaced. Others are relieved that the devastating war is finally coming to an end. Still others, including some PKK leaders, consider it a first step in the right direction.
According to one of the PKK's leaders, Murat Karayılan, "this law is a new and important step. But it has many shortcomings and errors. Above all, it does not include Leader Apo, the architect of this process. Nor does the word Kurdish appear in it. There is no mention of democracy. It reduces the issue to the disarmament of the PKK. Yet this issue has existed for a century. There is a narrow approach. This narrow approach will undoubtedly not bring a solution. As a result of what did the guerrilla movement emerge onto the stage of history? If this is not properly understood, there will be no fundamental settlement of the issue" (Rûdaw, 17 August).
On this occasion, he revealed that since the PKK was founded in 1976, 25,922 militants had been killed, including 3,262 in the war against ISIS, and that, including those whose deaths had not been recorded, the number of dead was approximately 27,000. This figure does not include the tens of thousands of Kurdish civilian victims of the war or the disappeared. The Turkish army, for its part, is said to have lost approximately 5,000 soldiers and militiamen.
For its part, the Turkish Presidency welcomed "an important step towards the implementation of a Turkey without terrorism. This historic stage will strengthen peace as well as the unity and integrity of our country" (France 24, 10 August).
The leader of the Yeni Parti, the main opposition party, Özgür Özel, believes that only "peace, democracy and justice will serve as a remedy" for Turkey.
The implementation of the framework law requires the creation of several technical committees and a parliamentary monitoring commission, under the authority of the Vice-President of the Republic.
No precise timetable has been put forward for the subsequent stages, but Ankara has already sent envoys to Baghdad and Erbil to seek their assistance with the disarmament process of the PKK guerrillas. On 13 August, the delegation of DEM Party "mediators", which shuttles between the PKK leader and the Turkish authorities, was received for more than an hour by the Turkish President, who signed this framework law on 17 August. It was immediately published in the Turkish Official Gazette.
Faced with criticism from its Kurdish electorate, the DEM Party has chosen to present the framework law as a mechanism for moving from armed conflict to democratic politics. It promises to continue its struggle to obtain broader rights, such as recognition of Kurdish identity and language, as part of subsequent political and constitutional reforms.
In the meantime, former leaders of this party such as Selahattin Demirtaş are still in prison, and several elected Kurdish mayors, such as Ahmet Türk of Mardin and Ahmet Özer of Esenyurt (Istanbul), who were removed from office and replaced by government-appointed administrators, have still not returned to their posts.
Under Erdoğan's presidency, limited linguistic rights have been recognised. The use of Kurdish is no longer prohibited. There is a public television channel, TRT 6, which broadcasts programmes in Kurdish, often with religious overtones. The Ministry of Culture has published works by classical Kurdish poets from the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Optional Kurdish courses are offered to children in the Kurdish provinces. For the beginning of the 2026 school year, more than 60,000 children are enrolled in these courses. There are departments of Kurdish language and literature at six universities in Kurdistan. A total of 448 students are pursuing bachelor's, master's and doctoral studies there.
These advances, unprecedented in the history of the Turkish Republic, which until 1992 prohibited even the oral use of the Kurdish language, appear symbolic, even "homeopathic", to the great majority of Kurds, who are demanding the official recognition of Kurdish as another national language of the country and an education system in Kurdish in order to preserve this ancient language and pass it on to future generations.
The Catalan and Basque examples are often cited in the debate, and some Kurdish intellectuals ask on what principle Turkey demands a federated state for the 200,000 Turkish Cypriots while denying the 26 million Kurds of Turkey basic rights such as education in their mother tongue.
The fate of the Kurds in Turkey is often raised by Israeli leaders in conflict with Ankara. For his part, the Turkish President continues his virulent polemics against the Israeli Prime Minister, against whom the Turkish judiciary has issued an international arrest warrant. Washington, which penalises the judges of the International Criminal Court for its proceedings against Benjamin Netanyahu, has chosen not to react to Erdoğan's diatribes, as his influence over Hamas and the Syrian regime is valued.
The commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), General Mazloum Abdi, announced from the Presidential Palace in Damascus on 25 August "the end of the mission of the Syrian Democratic Forces" and declared "with full responsibility their dissolution as an independent military force".
In a speech delivered first in Arabic and then in Kurdish, following his meeting with the Syrian interim President and before an audience of senior Kurdish and Arab military and civilian officials, he stated in particular: "Since the creation of the SDF, its fighters have assumed a great responsibility during one of the most difficult periods for Syria. They liberated many Syrian cities and localities, first from the Baathist regime and then from ISIS terrorism. Circumstances have changed today and the country has entered a new phase marked by peace and participation."
According to state television, General Abdi's announcement also provides for the dissolution of the Kurdish autonomous administration, as well as all the military and civilian structures that depend on it, and their complete integration into the institutions of the Syrian state. The SDF commander specified that "the dissolution of these forces comes after the agreement concluded with President al-Charaa on 29 January 2026 and the completion of the process of integrating our forces into the brigades of the Syrian army".
On 28 August, the Syrian President appointed Mazloum Abdi as presidential adviser in charge of Kurdish affairs. On the same day, the Syrian Ministry of Education issued an order "authorising the teaching of the Kurdish language in public and private schools in regions where Kurdish citizens form a significant proportion of the inhabitants", in application of a presidential decree recognising Kurdish as a national language (France 24, 28 August).
The dissolution of the SDF marks the end of an era. These forces, created in 2015 with the support of the United States and the International Coalition against ISIS, numbered approximately 100,000 Kurdish and Arab fighters until the fall of the al-Assad regime. They controlled and administered nearly 30% of Syrian territory. In 2019, after bitter battles, they defeated the Islamic State and liberated the territories where it operated. They captured and guarded in their camps and prisons nearly 6,000 dangerous jihadists and more than 60,000 of their relatives, for the security of the entire international community.
More than 13,000 young Kurdish fighters were killed and thousands of others wounded in this war against Islamist terrorism. The courage of Kurdish women in these battles aroused the admiration of international public opinion and inspired films, novels and manga. Then, victims of bargaining between the Trump administration and Erdoğan's Turkey, the protector of the new Islamic regime in Damascus, the SDF were abandoned by their former allies and "brothers in arms", and betrayed by Arab tribes that changed alliances according to circumstances and financial benefits. They had to resign themselves to "integrating" into the Syrian army, a disparate conglomerate of around forty Islamist militias or mercenaries of the Turkish army. Thus ends an epic amid the indifference of international public opinion.
The women's brigades remain excluded from this integration process because, for the Islamic regime in Damascus, any female military presence is illicit (haram). On 25 August, the commander of the YPJ (Women's Protection Units), Newroz Ahmed, met Syrian President Ahmed al-Charaa in Damascus to discuss the fate of her forces. He is proposing their integration into the police force of the Kurdish regions.
The SDF were perceived as guarantors of Kurdish rights and of the continued existence of autonomous Kurdish institutions in Syria. Their self-dissolution seals, for an unforeseeable period, the dream of Kurdish autonomy in Syria. Official recognition of these rights will now depend on the goodwill of the all-powerful Syrian interim President and the approval of his Turkish protectors.
The institutions of Kurdish civil society created over the past decade remain active and dynamic. They are now focusing on Kurdish-language education at every level of schooling and on women's rights. The Syrian authorities are willing to concede only the possibility of optional Kurdish-language instruction for two to three hours per week in public schools, as is now the case in Turkey. Similarly, Kurdish signage in public spaces is under pressure from the new Syrian authorities, as are the judicial system of the former Kurdish autonomous administration and its laws guaranteeing equality between the sexes and between religions and beliefs. A difficult and conflictual period appears to lie ahead.
Another source of recurring conflict is the return to their homes of the Kurdish displaced persons who fled the Turkish occupation of the Syrian Kurdish cantons. By the end of August, approximately 16,000 Kurdish families had returned to Afrin since the beginning of the year. Many were able to return to their villages and homes, which were often devastated, and began reconstruction work. Others remain in temporary accommodation centres, often lacking drinking water, electricity and basic services.
There are still nearly 7,000 displaced families from Syria's Arab regions in the canton of Afrin awaiting repatriation in difficult survival conditions (Rûdaw, 6 August).
On 10 August, a convoy of 400 Kurdish families displaced by the Turkish invasion attempted to return to Serê Kaniyê (Ras al-Aïn) under the return programme of the Kurdish-Syrian agreement of 29 January. Their return quickly descended into violence.
On their arrival in Serê Kaniyê, the unarmed families were assaulted, threatened and intimidated by Arab militiamen serving as auxiliaries of the Turkish army, who had become soldiers of the Syrian army and were occupying homes belonging to these Kurdish displaced persons. The filmed attacks, images of which circulated on social media, triggered demonstrations throughout Rojava.
The demonstrators demanded protection for these families and a guarantee of their safe return to their lands and homes, as well as the prosecution of those responsible for the violence. Kurdish political parties condemned the attacks and accused the armed factions and militiamen illegally occupying the displaced persons' homes of seeking to prevent their return and consolidate the demographic changes imposed after the Turkish invasion of 2019.
Preparations for new convoys were suspended until security and legal guarantees could be put in place. Tens of thousands of people displaced from Serê Kaniyê therefore remain awaiting guarantees of a safe and peaceful return.
Conflicts between returning displaced persons and Arab militiamen occupying their lands and homes also occurred in the district of Girê Spî (Tel Abyad) and in other Kurdish localities.
The threat from Islamic State sleeper cells still persists. On 11 August, armed men attacked a post belonging to the Qamishlo brigade of the Syrian army's 60th Division, a formation that had previously been part of the SDF. Two fighters were killed and two wounded, one of whom later died from his injuries.
A joint security operation by the Ministry of Defence and the local internal security forces was conducted against suspected Islamic State positions in Hassaké Province. Since the beginning of the year, at least 68 ISIS attacks have been recorded across Syria, including the two spectacular attacks carried out in Damascus last July.
Deir ez-Zor, a region bordering Iraq's Sunni Arab provinces, remains the main centre of ISIS activity.
The new regime continues to cultivate its foreign relations. It has succeeded in concluding an agreement with Moscow on the fate of the Russian bases located on the Mediterranean coast. According to the announcement made by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9 August, the port facilities at Tartus and Hmeimim airport on the Mediterranean coast will be transformed "into joint training centres". Until the end of 2024, they were used in Russian military operations in support of Bashar al-Assad's regime. Many Syrian dissidents died under Russian bombs over a period of nearly ten years (France 24, 9 August).
Furthermore, on 18 August the International Atomic Energy Agency announced the discovery of "a few tonnes of nuclear material" at an undeclared Syrian site. The Agency did not disclose the type of fissile material, uranium or plutonium, or its level of enrichment. In 2007, Israel bombed the Al-Kibar site in Syria, where there was a "nuclear reactor" built, according to the United States, with North Korean assistance and intended to produce plutonium. Damascus has shown goodwill in cooperating with the nuclear watchdog on this sensitive matter (RFI, 18 August).
The new regime is also conducting a charm offensive aimed at investors from the Gulf petromonarchies. In a country devastated by 14 years of war, everything has to be rebuilt. A Syrian sovereign wealth fund, headed by interim President al-Charaa's own brother, is overseeing these projects. According to Syrian media, Gulf investors have signed agreements for the construction of 40,000 homes in the Damascus metropolitan area and around the coastal city of Latakia, with a total value of 20 billion dollars.
The imposing headquarters of the Syrian army's general staff, located in the heart of Damascus and damaged by Israeli bombing last year, will become a luxury tourist complex. State assets are being transferred to private Arab investors under opaque conditions. Western countries remain cautious because of the uncertainties surrounding the future of the new regime.
The US-led international coalition against ISIS has begun withdrawing its forces from Kurdistan, a withdrawal that is due to be completed by 30 September 2026 in accordance with an agreement concluded with the Iraqi government.
The coalition forces had already evacuated their bases in the Arab regions of Iraq and handed them over to the Iraqi army a year ago. The bases in Kurdistan were granted a one-year extension because of operational and logistical requirements for actions conducted in Rojava and for the air defence of Kurdistan.
At the end of December, the Trump administration decided that it would henceforth ally itself with the new Syrian regime in order to continue the war against the resurgence of ISIS. Last January, through the US Ambassador to Ankara, Tom Barrack, it announced the end of the alliance with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Consequently, US troops in Rojava withdrew and handed their bases over to the Syrian army, which also assumed responsibility for the camps and prisons holding jihadists. Nearly 6,000 jihadists detained by the SDF were transferred to Iraq, where they will be tried.
From then on, the mission of the international coalition in Kurdistan was limited to training the Kurdish Peshmergas and providing air defence for the bases in Erbil and Harir against Iranian drone and missile attacks.
At the beginning of August, US and allied forces began reducing their personnel and air defence resources at Erbil International Airport. However, CENTCOM refused to confirm or deny reports that the Patriot systems had been withdrawn from Erbil.
On 26 August, Germany officially ended its military advisory mission in the Kurdistan Region at a ceremony held at Camp Stephan, near Erbil airport. The German contingent had been operating in Kurdistan since 2015, providing training, advice and logistical assistance to the Peshmergas during and after the war against the Islamic State. This contingent still had around thirty members in Kurdistan at the time of the withdrawal.
At its peak in 2015-2017, the international coalition included nearly one hundred countries, with French, British, German, Italian and Australian forces, among others, in addition to the Americans. Its personnel have been greatly reduced since all territories controlled by ISIS were recaptured in 2017. The brotherhood in arms forged in the common fight against ISIS created strong ties between the Kurdish Peshmergas and the soldiers of the allied coalition.
The timetable for the withdrawal of coalition forces, in the midst of the war between Iran and the United States, is causing serious concern among the Kurdish population because Kurdistan will be deprived of any air defence system against Iranian missile and drone attacks.
These attacks continued throughout August, particularly against the camps of Iranian Kurdish parties that have taken refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan. During the first half of August, 16 drone attacks and three missile attacks against targets in the governorates of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah were recorded.
On 11 August, three missiles struck positions of the Kurdish opposition organisation Komala in the Alana Valley, in Erbil Governorate, wounding two Kurdish fighters. On 14 August, three explosive drones were intercepted over Erbil.
The most serious incident occurred on 17 August. Two Hadid-110 drones loaded with explosives targeted the private office of Kurdish Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, as well as the residence of the head of the Kurdistan Region's Security and Intelligence Agency in Pirmam, near Erbil. The Kurdistan Counter-Terrorism Unit stated that the two drones had been launched from Iranian territory at around 12.28 a.m. No casualties were reported.
This direct attack on the Prime Minister's office was perceived as a direct threat to the security of Kurdistan and the sovereignty of Iraq. A great many foreign figures, including the French President and the UN Secretary-General, strongly condemned the attack.
Baghdad responded by establishing a commission of inquiry tasked with determining the origin of the attack and identifying its perpetrators. The Iraqi Prime Minister telephoned his Kurdish counterpart and condemned the strike. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein requested an official explanation from Tehran.
However, the Iranian regime denied any responsibility for the attack. The Iranian Foreign Minister even condemned the strike and suggested that it might have been intended to create hostility between the Kurds and Tehran.
In this climate of regional tensions and insecurity, Kurdistan continued to suffer from a certain shortage of petrol, particularly because of the halt in local production and the inadequacy of the quota allocated by Baghdad. This quota is 50,000 barrels per day, while requirements amount to approximately 126,000 to 140,000 barrels per day.
The Kurdistan Regional Government maintained the price of subsidised regular petrol at 750 Iraqi dinars per litre, approximately 45 euro cents, and distributed around 3.5 million litres of subsidised petrol per day. At the end of August, some companies, including Gulf Keystone Petroleum, resumed operations and the situation gradually improved.
On 1 August, Iraq and Turkey agreed to extend for one year the agreement concerning the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline linking Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, which has a capacity of approximately 750,000 barrels per day. However, exports through this pipeline fell to around 120,000 to 135,000 barrels per day in August, compared with nearly 300,000 barrels per day in July, because the security situation had prompted oil companies to suspend production.
The difficult dialogue between Baghdad and Erbil over their disputes, particularly financial ones, continued in August. After several weeks of delay, on 17 August the federal government transferred 830.782 billion Iraqi dinars, approximately 526 million euros, to Kurdistan for the payment of July salaries to civil servants and pensions to retirees. The delay was reportedly partly linked to a liquidity problem in Iraq. Negotiations will now begin on Kurdistan's financial allocation in the draft 2027 Iraqi federal budget.
On the diplomatic front, it is worth noting the visit to Baghdad by the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, to ensure the support of his Shiite allies. On this occasion, Iraq's National Security Adviser, Qasim al-Araji, reaffirmed that Iraq prohibits the presence on its territory of armed groups threatening other countries, a clear reference to the Iranian Kurdish parties that have taken refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan. Tehran is demanding their disarmament, or even their extradition, something Baghdad regularly promises without having the means to keep its promises (Rûdaw, 20 August).
For his part, the President of Kurdistan, Nechirvan Barzani, made a highly publicised visit to Damascus on 3 August, where he was received with full honours by Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Charaa. President Barzani, who had played a major role in the conclusion of the Kurdish-Syrian agreement of 29 January, continued his efforts to revive the process of equitable integration of the Kurds into the institutions of the Syrian state. Following the meeting, President Barzani reaffirmed his "support for a stable and prosperous Syria where the rights of all ethnic and religious components are preserved". He advocated Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights to his interlocutor and cited the example of Iraqi Kurdistan, where all communities receive education in their own language in schools (RFI, 4 August).
In August, several meetings took place between the leaders of the two main Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, although they were unable to reach an agreement on the formation of a new coalition government.
The war of attrition between the US military and the Revolutionary Guards since the breakdown of the June 2026 ceasefire agreement has now settled into a steady rhythm and is focused mainly around the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians claim to be imposing their control over navigation through this strategic strait and occasionally bombard commercial vessels which, often at night and under US escort, cross the strait while sailing along the coast of Oman.
The US military responds by bombing the Iranian islands and islets in the strait, such as Qeshm Island, as well as military and port facilities on the Iranian coast. Above all, it is maintaining a strict naval blockade preventing vessels and tankers from travelling to or from Iranian ports. This blockade prohibits Iranian oil exports and is suffocating the Iranian economy a little more each day, with the risk that it may collapse in the near future.
The Iranian leaders, divided over the attitude to adopt towards the Americans, are trying to make them pay the highest possible price by in turn preventing oil exports from the Gulf countries and bombing US bases in the region with a certain degree of effectiveness, thanks to intelligence provided by Russian satellites and to ballistic and cruise missiles of Russian design, but assembled and renamed in Iran.
They hope that the soaring price of a barrel of oil and of a litre of petrol at the pump will force Trump to return to the negotiating table and accept Tehran's increasingly maximalist conditions. In addition to recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran wants the immediate release of its $24 billion in frozen assets and rejects any foreign interference in its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
To strengthen its hand, the Iranian regime has for months been seeking an agreement with the Sultanate of Oman, the other country bordering the Strait of Hormuz, on the joint management of navigation through this waterway (The New York Times, 3, 8 and 9 August). Tehran is also seeking to open a dialogue and find a modus vivendi with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which have been severely affected by the war and disappointed by the ineffectiveness of US protection. But the Arab Gulf countries are not deceived. They clearly perceive that the Iranian slogan of a "Middle East without an American policeman" barely conceals the Islamic Republic's age-old strategic ambition of regional domination!
How long will this low-intensity war of attrition last, in which the Americans are exhausting their missiles and their stocks of costly ammunition, much to the delight of the Chinese and Russians? Who will blink first in this trial of strength, asks a New York Times editorialist (20 August)?
The Iranian regime, which believes that time is on its side and says it is ready for a prolonged confrontation in order to "teach arrogant America an unforgettable lesson", appears to be counting on President Trump's inconsistency and the weariness of American public opinion.
The US President, for his part, is counting on the collapse of the Iranian economy as a result of the naval blockade and, for the time being, is turning a deaf ear to calls for moderation and for the rapid conclusion of a "deal" to end the war. He says that the confrontation will last until the US elections on 3 November and that it could end afterwards, without ruling out the possibility of a further escalation at the end of the year before the newly elected Congress takes office.
Vice-President Vance refuses to speak of a war. He prefers to refer to operations intended to ensure free passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
A major collateral victim of the conflict, particularly because of disruptions to its oil and gas supplies and the rising cost of energy and fuel for its citizens, a divided Europe remains voiceless, inaudible and almost entirely absent from the negotiating table.
The Iranian population is the main victim of this war, whose economic consequences for the cost of living are terrible. Because of the lack of supplies of raw materials and imported goods, industry has almost ground to a halt and trade is operating at a reduced pace. Unemployment reaches new records each month, the national currency is plummeting and hyperinflation is rampant. Those fortunate enough still to have a job struggle to survive on their meagre wages. A secondary school teacher earns approximately 50 dollars a month. How can anyone support a family, or even survive, on such a poverty wage? (Le Monde, 25 August).
The state media and the mullahs, in their sermons in the mosques, constantly call upon the population to accept sacrifices in the name of their faith and the defence of the endangered homeland. To anyone willing to listen, they cite examples of the sacrifices, real or supposed, once made by Shiite saints in defence of their faith, sacrifices that went as far as martyrdom.
These moralising and edifying sermons have an effect only on the most devout sections of the population. The great majority remain resistant and are fighting above all for their daily survival. With the massive repression of the demonstrations last December and January still very much in people's minds, few dare, or consider it useful, to take to the streets in protest.
For those who do venture out, the heavy police presence and a summary judicial system swiftly provide a firm and brutal response.
The repression is no longer directed at morals or at whether women wear the Islamic veil. It targets every form of opposition to the regime, every protest against the war and every form of dissent.
Because of the difficulties in accessing the Internet and social media, it is hardly possible to establish a precise assessment of the repression throughout Iran. The following is a summary of information collected by human rights NGOs, particularly the Kurdish NGO Hengaw and the Washington Kurdish Institute, concerning repression in Iranian Kurdistan.
The Iranian regime continued to execute Kurdish prisoners throughout August, particularly prisoners convicted in national security cases.
Among the most politically sensitive cases was that of Omid Behzad, a 21-year-old Kurdish university student from Urmia. Behzad was executed at Urmia Central Prison on 3 August alongside Pouria Safvat, after both men had been accused of spying for Israel. Behzad was a student at the Islamic Azad University of Urmia and had been arrested in March 2026.
On 8 August, Payam Pakzad, a 41-year-old Kurdish prisoner from Bojnord and father of four, was executed at Zanjan Central Prison. On 18 August, Kaveh Refousheh, a 35-year-old Kurdish man from Senna, was executed at Senna Central Prison despite a public campaign to prevent the execution. He had been sentenced to death under qisas following a homicide during an altercation approximately three years earlier. On the evening before his execution, residents and civil society activists gathered outside the prison, called for clemency and chanted slogans against executions. The regime carried out the sentence early the following morning.
The next day, Donya Mohammadi, a 20-year-old Kurdish woman from Eyvan-e Gharb who was 18 at the time of her arrest, and Khodad Mohammadi, a retired Kurdish teacher, father of five and from the same region, were executed at Ilam Central Prison in two separate cases. Both had been imprisoned for approximately two years before their execution on 19 August. Neither execution had been publicly announced by the state media.
Also on 19 August, Mohsen Darabi, a Kurdish prisoner from Kermanshah, was executed at Isfahan Central Prison on drug-related charges. He had been transferred to solitary confinement before the execution and was put to death alongside several other prisoners convicted in separate drug-related cases. His execution was not publicly announced by the regime.
On 23 August, Ardalan Sabzi Balkhkhanlou, a 38-year-old Kurdish prisoner and father of one, was executed at Makou Prison after approximately four years of imprisonment.
On 10 August, the regime's border guards shot dead Mohammad Towhid-Panah, a 25-year-old kolbar from Saqqez, in the Hangeh-ye Zhal border area near Baneh. The border forces opened fire at close range on a group of kolbars without prior warning, killing Towhid-Panah on the spot. He had married approximately four months earlier and his wife was pregnant.
Three days later, Musa Zibapour, a Kurdish kolbar from Piranshahr and father of three, was killed by direct gunfire from the regime's guards near Baneh. The border forces opened fire without warning at around 4 p.m. on 13 August, killing him on the spot.
Other kolbars were seriously wounded during the first days of August. Goran Khedri was shot and wounded by border guards on 4 August, while Hassan Mostafazadeh was shot and wounded the following day in the same Hangeh-ye Zhal border area and had to be transferred to a medical facility in Tabriz because of the severity of his injuries. Bakhtiyar Amini, a father of three from Baneh, was seriously wounded in the leg by the explosion of a landmine in the same border area.
On 18 August, Milad Tabad, a 28-year-old kolbar from Marivan and father of one, died from injuries inflicted when the regime's border forces had shot him in the head nearly a year earlier. Tabad had been shot on 25 August 2025 in the Tateh border heights while he was not carrying any goods. He spent months in intensive care and remained in a precarious physical condition before succumbing to his injuries on 18 August.
On 19 August, the regime's border forces killed Yousef Mamehpour in the Barda Spian border area, near Sardasht. Mamehpour, a 30-year-old Kurd from the village of Vardeh and father of a young boy, was transporting livestock towards the Kurdistan Region of Iraq when the forces opened fire. A bullet struck him in the kidney and abdomen, and he died from his injuries. Another Kurdish civilian was seriously wounded in the same shooting.
Mamehpour's death reflects the economic reality of Kurdish border communities, where kolbar work, the movement of livestock and small-scale cross-border trade frequently overlap. For families in these regions, such activities remain an important source of income, but the regime's forces continue to treat these routes as security zones in which unarmed Kurdish civilians risk being targeted by lethal gunfire.
The violence also affected Kurdish civilians far from the border. On 20 August, Pouria Naderi, a 29-year-old Yarsani Kurd from Kermanshah who had previously been arrested during the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi uprising, was killed during an operation by forces of the Ministry of Intelligence in Kermanshah. Naderi had previously spent several months in security detention and had remained under pressure from the security services. An armed clash broke out after intelligence forces surrounded him, leaving Naderi dead and two intelligence officers wounded.
The Iranian regime arrested or detained at least 66 Kurdish citizens during August, with operations concentrated throughout Rojhelat, particularly in Mahabad, Boukan, Marivan, Kamyaran, Piranshahr, Oshnavieh, Urmia, Sardasht, Senna, Divandarreh, Takab and Ilam.
One of the first large-scale operations took place around Marivan and Kamyaran. On 4 August, Jamal Rostami, 57, a founding member of a local charitable organisation, was arrested in Kamyaran. Two days later, the regime's security forces surrounded the village of Ney, near Marivan, and arrested Saman Khosravi, Hawre Parvazeh, Arya Maroufi, Zanyar Asvar, Poshtivan Tatar and Saro Roshani. Several of these men were involved in environmental or community activities.
In Mahabad, Shirzad Payaniani, 32, was arrested on 3 August after forces from the Ministry of Intelligence, Ettela'at, raided his family home without presenting a warrant. His place of detention was not disclosed after his arrest. The following day, Bahman Modirzadeh, a member of the Qotur municipal council, was arrested by Revolutionary Guards intelligence forces. His arrest followed online activity opposing executions.
The Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights also reported the arrest of Zanyar Fathi in Marivan, while Rahim Hassanpour was arrested in Sardasht and transferred to a Revolutionary Guards intelligence detention centre in Urmia. Environmental activist Awat Karami, known for his work connected with the protection of the Zagros forests, was violently arrested at his home in Negel, near Senna. Seyed Latif Sabri was subsequently arrested in Mahabad.
The repression also affected Kurdish activists outside Rojhelat. Shahriar Shams, a former political prisoner and student activist, was arrested in Tehran on 11 August. In Ilam Province, Arian Tarvand, 21, was violently arrested by Revolutionary Guards intelligence forces in Mehran on 12 August. Tarvand's arrest followed an operation by Revolutionary Guards intelligence forces at his home.
By mid-August, the regime had extended the repression to Boukan, Miandoab, Mahabad and Oshnavieh. Kurdistan Human Rights also reported that at least 11 Kurdish citizens had been arrested in these four areas between 13 and 15 August, including Sediq Karimi, Masoud Alani, Kohneh-Ghaleh, Hadi Azizi, Omid Chavbazi, Amir Soleimani, Mohammad Hajizadeh, Shwana Divazi, Loghman Ghorbani, Rahman Khouzan, Esmaeil Badsar and Zakaria Badsar.
Children were also caught up in the security operations. On 16 August, Revolutionary Guards intelligence forces raided the village of Kachaleh, near Urmia, and arrested Eyvaz Behnamoun, Shaban Ahmadvash and Ebrahim Ahmadvash. Bafrin Ahmadvash, a Kurdish child, was also arrested during the operation.
In Piranshahr, Nazanin Hosseinpour, 34 and a mother of two, was arrested on 16 August after being summoned to the office of the Ministry of Intelligence. She was denied access to a lawyer and visits from her family. Her father is reportedly affiliated with a Kurdish opposition party outside Iran, placing her case among several arrests in August in which relatives of political figures were themselves subjected to pressure from the regime.
Another family was targeted in Divandarreh. Maryam Moradian, Sirous Hamidi and their 16-year-old daughter, Kurdia Hamidi, were arrested on 14 August and placed in detention. Kurdia was released four days later, while her parents remained in detention without access to a lawyer or family visits when their case was documented. The arrest of the Divandarreh family notably involved their 16-year-old daughter.
The regime also targeted local civic and community figures. In Mahabad, village council member Karim Rasouli was arrested, while Farzin Khediripour and municipal engineer Mohammad Vatmani were arrested in separate operations. Civil activist Shirin Masoudi was violently arrested at her workplace on 19 August and transferred to a Ministry of Intelligence detention centre in Urmia, where she was denied access to a lawyer and all contact with her family. Masoudi was arrested at her workplace in Mahabad.
Cultural and media activities also came under pressure. Abed Alizadeh, a Kurdish media activist from Takab, was arrested after years of public activity concerning social issues, protest movements and the Kurdish language and culture. In Mahabad, blogger Seyran Arabi was arrested by the cyber police after publishing a video connected with Kurdish singer Mohammad Mamli, and her social media page was taken offline.
A new wave followed on 23 and 24 August. In Piranshahr and Naqadeh, regime forces arrested Soran Mahmoudi, Mohammad Danesh-Mayeh, Loghman Seyyideh and former political prisoner Salam Azari, and transferred them to undisclosed locations.
Mahmoudi and Azari had previously been the subject of proceedings relating to alleged links with the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.
In Oshnavieh, Sanan Farasati, Saadoun Dastari and Rahman Azarakhsh were arrested on 23 and 24 August by forces of the Ministry of Intelligence and taken to unknown locations. Moloud Roosta and Kamran Jangoli were also arrested during operations conducted in the region at the end of August.
The repression again reached Ilam Province on 23 and 24 August. Kurdish singer Amin Naseri was arrested after being shot and wounded in the leg during a security operation. Younes Bakri, Yaser Havazizadeh and Rouhollah Gholami were arrested the following day without warrants, without immediate access to a lawyer or contact with their families.
One of the most significant judicial cases of August took place in Mahabad, where 16 Kurdish residents were sentenced to a total of more than 77 years in prison. Abdullah Houshmand and Abdulrahman Qoveh each received seven years and one month. Twelve other defendants were sentenced to five years in prison, while Nazanin Elyasi, also known as Golaleh, was sentenced to two years and Kamal Masoudi to five months. The charges included "assembly and collusion", alleged membership of the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), "propaganda against the state" and social media activities in support of Kurdish opposition parties.
In Boukan, Rahim Shilani and Azad Rasouli-Fard were each sentenced to two years in prison for buying and selling Starlink satellite equipment. The two men had been arrested on 30 January and transferred to a Ministry of Intelligence detention centre in Urmia, where they were held for 52 days. During their detention, they were denied access to lawyers and visits from their families and were subjected to physical and psychological torture.
In another case in Boukan, Manijeh Khoshnoud, a 58-year-old Kurdish activist, was sentenced to three months in prison for "propaganda against the state". She had been arrested at the family home on 26 May after the regime's security forces raided the residence without a warrant and seized her laptop, mobile phone and books. She had already been sentenced to ten months in prison in 2024 on the same general charge.
