A few days after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran possessed enough enriched uranium to build “several bombs,” Israel launched a massive aerial bombardment campaign on June 13 targeting Iran’s nuclear sites and ballistic missile bases. The Iranian regime, engaged in lengthy and stalling negotiations with the United States, appeared taken by surprise, not expecting a unilateral Israeli military offensive in the midst of ongoing talks—the next round was scheduled just three days later in Doha.
For its part, Israel, long preparing for a military confrontation with the Islamic Republic—especially after the collapse of its “Axis of Resistance”—waited until the symbolic “two-month” deadline set by Donald Trump for concluding these “last-chance negotiations.” The very day after that deadline expired, Israeli air forces launched strikes on long-identified military and civilian targets. Israel swiftly silenced what remained of Iran’s air defense systems, secured control of western and central Iranian airspace, and bombarded its targets at will.
With accurate intelligence from its services, the Israeli army eliminated about twenty senior military and civilian officials involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Around fifteen scientists and engineers working on those programs were also assassinated. The nuclear sites in Isfahan and Natanz were devastated, and a heavy water research reactor—still under construction and capable of producing plutonium—was destroyed. However, the civilian power plant in Bushehr, still being built by Russia, was spared.
Revolutionary Guard barracks suspected of housing missile launch sites were bombed and destroyed across large areas, including in Iranian Kurdistan, notably in Kermanshah. Factories producing components for centrifuges and ballistic missiles, along with dual-use industrial facilities, suffered extensive damage. Other symbolic targets of the Iranian dictatorship, such as the state television headquarters and the notorious Evin prison in Tehran, were also heavily bombed.
According to the media, the Israeli Prime Minister had planned to assassinate Ayatollah Khamenei—who has consistently called for Israel’s destruction—but was dissuaded by Donald Trump. The American president said he was “postponing” such an action to avoid plunging Iran into chaos—likely also to preserve an authority figure strong enough to enforce a future ceasefire or peace deal.
The deeply buried Fordow nuclear site, housing advanced centrifuge batteries for uranium enrichment, was only superficially hit by Israeli bombs. Under pressure from the pro-Israel wing of his majority and Benjamin Netanyahu, President Trump, after some hesitation, finally decided to “finish the job” by ordering a strike on Fordow.
On the night of June 20–21, a group of B2 strategic bombers, each carrying two powerful GBU-57 “bunker buster” bombs, were deployed. In total, 14 bombs—each weighing 13,600 kg—were dropped on the Fordow and Natanz sites in just 25 minutes.
Separately, a U.S. Navy submarine operating in the Persian Gulf launched two dozen Tomahawk cruise missiles at nuclear sites near Isfahan.
This Midnight Hammer operation mobilized 125 aircraft and cost an estimated $1 billion, according to U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Dan Caine (Le Figaro, June 23).
In retaliation, Iran fired 14 ballistic missiles at the U.S. base in Qatar, after warning Qatari authorities in advance. As a result, the U.S. military evacuated the base and intercepted the missiles, which caused no casualties or material damage.
President Trump thanked Iran for its prior warning and declared an end to the twelve-day war, forcing Israel and Iran to agree to a “complete and total ceasefire” on June 24.
He praised “Israel and Iran for having the endurance, courage, and intelligence to end what could have become a years-long war capable of destroying the entire Middle East” (Euronews, June 24).
During the twelve days of war, Iran fired over a thousand missiles at Israeli military and civilian targets. The “Iron Dome” defense system neutralized the vast majority of them, but some caused significant damage to an oil refinery in Haifa, residential areas in Tel Aviv, and even part of the Mossad headquarters building. In total, at least 24 civilians were killed by Iranian retaliation—but apparently no Mossad agents, as “they were all in Iran,” according to Iranian satirists.
On the Iranian side, the official death toll reported by state news agency IRNA was 935 deaths (Le Monde, June 30).
The total cost of material damage from the twelve-day war remains unknown. According to The New York Times, the war cost Israel approximately $10 billion.
Iran has minimized its losses, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei even claiming victory over Israel and the United States (Le Monde, June 27).
Diplomatically, however, the war was disastrous for Iran.
Beyond hollow condemnations from regional states fearful of a broader conflict, neither Russia nor China—supposed allies and oil clients—took any action.
Usual ally Syria remained completely silent, not even issuing a formal condemnation.
Other members of the “Axis of Resistance”—a conglomerate of Shia militias trained and funded by Iran—such as Hezbollah and the Iraqi Shia militias, also failed to come to Tehran’s aid.
The leaders of the Iraqi militias fled to Iran in haste, fearing Israeli strikes or U.S. reprisals.
Inside Iran, despite nationalist appeals, the deeply unpopular regime failed to rally public support.
Fearing mass protests, the government shut down internet access and social networks, including WhatsApp, which it accused of spying for Israel (Le Monde, June 20).
Prominent opposition figures, including Nobel Peace Prize laureates Narges Mohammadi and Shirin Ebadi, as well as filmmaker Jafar Panahi, stated in a Le Monde op-ed (June 16) that “the continuation of the nuclear program and the war between the Islamic Republic and the Israeli regime do not serve the interests of the Iranian people.”
Kurdish political parties blamed the Iranian regime for the war, accusing it of squandering the country’s resources on ruinous nuclear and missile programs and on funding militias that threaten and destabilize the region.
They argue that there will be no peace or regional stability as long as the Islamic Republic monopolizes power in Tehran.
Experts remain divided on the Iranian nuclear threat.
According to the IAEA, Israeli and American bombings inflicted extensive damage on Iran’s known nuclear sites. But the whereabouts of over 400 kg of 60%-enriched uranium remains unknown—it may have been relocated.
If that’s the case, the war may have delayed Iran’s nuclear program by only “six months.”
Preliminary assessments by U.S. intelligence agencies point in the same direction.
However, President Trump claimed that Iran’s nuclear facilities, including Fordow, were “permanently destroyed” and that Iran will “never get the bomb.”
Israel, for its part, claimed it had set back Iran’s nuclear program by “several years” and largely destroyed its ballistic missile infrastructure.
“Even if the enriched uranium stockpile was preserved, the scientists and engineers who could make bombs have been eliminated,” said a senior Israeli official.
Within the Iranian regime, pragmatists around President Massoud Pezeshkian reportedly support de-escalating the nuclear program—seen as the source of so much suffering—in exchange for the gradual lifting of sanctions severely impacting Iran’s economy.
However, the hardline faction, led by Ayatollah Khamenei and Revolutionary Guard chiefs, rejects any deal that would curb uranium enrichment, which—beyond a 3.5% threshold—serves only military purposes.
As this silent internal power struggle unfolds, the regime is intensifying its crackdown on perceived or real opponents, accusing them of being Israeli agents.
According to a New York Times investigation (June 28), this internal purge has already led to the arrest of several hundred people.
Unable to identify those who helped Israeli services gather missiles and thousands of mini-drones in and around Tehran, the regime is targeting undocumented Afghan refugees and Kurdish and Baluchi civilians.
In recent weeks, more than 400,000 Afghans have been forcibly expelled to Afghanistan.
On June 25, three Kurdish prisoners—Idris Ali, Azad Shojai from Sardasht, and Rasoul Ahmad from Sulaymaniyah—were secretly executed in Urmia prison. They had been detained since July 2023 on charges of espionage for Israel.
Even before the twelve-day war, in May 2025 alone, the Iranian regime executed 163 people, including 26 Kurds, according to NGO Hengaw.
Among the executed were five women, three children, and three writers.
As of June 29, Hengaw reported that over 300 Kurds were arrested in June by Iranian security forces.
Among them, one person died under torture, one child and one man were killed, and three Kurdish prisoners were executed.
Among those arrested were 18 girls under the age of 18 in Mahabad and six women in Qasr-e Shirin.
Kurdistan is now heavily militarized and under tight control.
Mass repression is also taking place in Tehran, where more than a thousand people were arrested in June.
The Republican People's Party (CHP), founded by Atatürk in 1923 and known for its nationalist and secular stance, has now become the primary adversary—if not the enemy to be neutralized—by the Turkish government. All tools of a politically subservient judiciary are being mobilized to destabilize, discredit, and decapitate this main opposition force, which poses a serious threat to the longevity of President Erdoğan’s rule. With the support of the pro-Kurdish DEM party, the CHP won municipal elections in March 2024 in major Turkish cities including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana, dealing a harsh blow to the ruling AKP-MHP coalition. It was a humiliation for the Turkish president, who has since launched a campaign of judicial and political revenge.
On the judicial front, a former AKP Deputy Minister of Justice, now appointed as Istanbul’s Chief Prosecutor, has—under dubious pretexts—ordered the arrest of the widely popular elected mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with around a hundred municipal officials. Based on the testimony of “secret witnesses,” they stand accused of corruption and were imprisoned even before any trial began. In any genuine democracy, a police investigation would precede a trial, with substantial evidence required to bring charges. A verdict from a first-instance court would then be subject to appeal and, if necessary, reviewed by the Court of Cassation. Only after a final ruling could defendants be imprisoned and stripped of office. But in Turkey, people—including elected officials, MPs, journalists, and lawyers—are arrested first, imprisoned, and left to await verdicts after trials that may last for years.
Such is the case for Selahattin Demirtaş, former co-chair of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (recently renamed DEM), who twice ran for president against Erdoğan. Arrested in 2016, his trials continue to this day. He has already been sentenced to 42 years in prison for his speeches and writings. Despite several rulings from the European Court of Human Rights calling for his immediate release, he remains behind bars—alongside Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala, sentenced to life in prison for supporting the 2013 protests to protect Istanbul’s Gezi Park from Erdoğan’s real estate projects.
İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, who is facing about ten different trials, appeared before a court on June 16 inside the massive Silivri prison complex, the largest in Europe. He declared that he was not undergoing a trial but rather “a judicial punishment” (Le Monde, June 16). His own lawyer, who contested the legality of a trial based solely on secret witnesses, was arrested four days later. On June 21, Fatih Altaylı, a well-known former TV host close to the CHP, was arrested for “lying about the president” after posting a YouTube video citing a poll that claimed 70% of Turks opposed a lifetime presidency for Erdoğan—an unforgivable act of lèse-majesté. A day earlier, a prosecutor had called for a sentence against journalist Furkan Karabay, detained since May 15, over three tweets accused of “exceeding the bounds of free speech,” reported Le Monde. On the same day, journalist Barış Pehlivan faced his fifth hearing over charges of “public insult of an official.” A 69-year-old French-Kurdish journalist and comic book author, Kudret Günes, was arrested upon arriving in Istanbul on May 27 and has since been placed under house arrest. She is due to appear in court on July 8.
In his investigative article “In Turkey, the impossible chronicle of a weaponized justice system”, published in Le Monde on June 26, Nicolas Bourcier noted the frequent use of vaguely defined laws such as “insulting the president” or “membership in a terrorist organization.” Turkey holds the world record for terrorism-related prosecutions. He also pointed out “the judiciary’s opacity (trials often behind closed doors, censorship, excessive reliance on secret witnesses), widespread criminalization of journalism (charges of defamation, terrorism, crimes against the state), and the lack of press freedom protections.”
This all-out crackdown, targeting activists, writers, lawyers, artists, members of the LGBT community, and Kurds across the board, has lately focused its fire on the CHP. The party is now facing a legal case challenging the legitimacy of its latest congress—again based on complaints from “secret witnesses.” If the court invalidates the congress and the leadership it elected, the government could appoint a trustee to run the party and secure a conviction against current party leader Özgür Özel, Erdoğan’s chief political rival. Özel is also facing numerous lawsuits for “insulting the president,” “undermining the judiciary,” and “defaming the chief prosecutor.” Neutralizing the CHP would clear the path for Erdoğan to secure easier re-election—if he can also ensure the neutrality of the pro-Kurdish DEM party. Without the explicit or tacit support of DEM, the CHP cannot win either municipal or general elections.
President Erdoğan, who has consistently forged tactical alliances—sometimes with liberal Turks opposed to military dominance, sometimes with Fethullah Gülen’s Islamists (later his arch-enemies), sometimes with the ultranationalist MHP—is now courting the pro-Kurdish DEM party by dangling the prospect of concessions within a vague peace process. Certain reforms—details unknown—are reportedly being offered in exchange for the possible self-dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), taking advantage of its current armed truce. On June 26, a DEM spokesperson announced that the process between Ankara and the PKK had reached “an important stage.” A DEM delegation continues to meet with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan—imprisoned on Imrali Island for 26 years—and with various Turkish political parties. A group of PKK fighters may lay down their arms in July at an undisclosed location in Iraqi Kurdistan as a goodwill gesture. A parliamentary committee to monitor the process may also be established in July.
While this process—which could last months—keeps DEM occupied with dialogue with the government, Erdoğan will have a free hand to focus on destabilizing and dismantling a politically isolated CHP. The party continues to call for early elections in hopes of achieving victory at the polls and breaking the judicial stranglehold that threatens to suffocate it.
The Israeli-Iranian war had a limited impact on Iraqi Kurdistan. The airspace was closed for two weeks and flights were suspended. At the start of the conflict, the Kurdistan government called for dialogue, and President Barzani assured Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghtchi that Kurdish territory would not be used as a base for attacks against Iran.
On their side, the pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite militias, fearing massive American retaliation, launched no drones or missiles against targets in Kurdistan or against American bases in Iraq. Travelers stranded due to the flight suspensions were able to continue their journeys by traveling overland to Turkey, where air travel continued as normal.
The economic impact of the war was relatively significant due to the closure of borders with Iran and the halting of trade for several weeks. However, the primary cause of the new financial crisis was the federal government's failure to pay the salaries and pensions of Kurdish public servants, employees, and retirees.
Despite agreements reached during the formation of the current Iraqi governing coalition and constitutional provisions allocating approximately 12.5% of the federal budget to Kurdistan, the Baghdad government is once again failing to uphold its commitments and is withholding budgetary resources from the region. On June 2, the Central Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) stated in a communiqué that “some leaders of post-2003 Iraq possess a mentality that is far removed from federalism and are showing tendencies toward restoring centralized state control.” The statement accused them of using the withholding of salaries and budget allocations to the Kurdistan Region as leverage against Erbil.
In a letter dated May 28 to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the Iraqi Ministry of Finance notified that the government had decided to stop all budget transfers to the KRG, including the salaries of more than one million public sector employees. According to Minister Taif Sami Mohammed, Erbil had already received its 12.67% share of the federal budget—13.547 trillion Iraqi dinars (approximately $10.34 billion).
This version is disputed by Kurdish leaders, who called on the federal government to pay the overdue salaries before Eid al-Adha, on June 6. A group of Kurdish civil servants filed a petition with the Federal Supreme Court to compel the federal government to pay their salaries. In a February 2023 ruling, the court explicitly stated that disputes over oil and non-oil revenues between Baghdad and Erbil must not be used as a basis for withholding monthly salaries guaranteed by the Constitution (Rudaw, June 2). KDP leader and former President Massoud Barzani reiterated that post-Saddam Iraq was founded on the principles of balance, compromise, and partnership within the framework of the Constitution. The only way to resolve Iraq’s issues, he said, is for all parties to commit to these principles (Rudaw, June 2).
On June 16, the Kurdistan Prime Minister sent a letter to the Federal Supreme Court arguing the “illegality and unconstitutionality of the Federal Ministry of Finance’s decision to suspend the salaries and financial allocations of the Kurdistan Region.” He expressed hope that the court would issue “a positive ruling in favor of the people of Kurdistan,” adding that his government had fulfilled “all of its constitutional obligations and requirements.”
Meanwhile, the President of Iraq, Abdul Latif Rashid, met on June 16 in Baghdad with the head of the Federal Supreme Court, Jassim al-Umairi, to stress the importance of resolving the issue of public sector salaries in Kurdistan. According to presidential spokesperson Hawre Tofiq (Rudaw, June 16), the court president agreed that the case should be reviewed as soon as possible.
In the meantime, Kurdistan’s economy is stagnating, and although dialogue among Kurdish political parties is intensifying in the context of this crisis, the formation of a new coalition government is still pending.
After months of hesitation, Washington has given its approval for the integration of thousands of former foreign jihadists into the Syrian army. The announcement was made on June 3 by the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, Thomas Barrack, who also serves as ambassador in Ankara, to the British news agency Reuters (Le Monde, June 3). Arguing that it is better to keep these fighters within a state structure rather than risk them dispersing into the wild, Ambassador Barrack also stated that many of these foreigners are “very loyal” to the new Syrian administration.
According to Le Monde, these ex-jihadists number “several thousand,” including a few dozen French nationals. Their largest contingent comes from the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a group of Uyghur jihadists from China founded in 1997 in Pakistan, which developed close ties with al-Qaeda before joining the ranks of the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, led by current Syrian president al-Charaa.
There are also many jihadists from Russia (Chechnya, Dagestan), Egypt, Iran, and North Africa (New York Times, June 8). A true jihadist international now officially forms, alongside its allies in the HTC led by President al-Charaa—himself a former jihadist—the core structure of the new Syrian army. Six of their commanders were promoted to brigadier general as early as December 2024.
It is this Islamist army that Washington and its Arab and Turkish allies are relying on to restore “transparent” order. Yet, as with the massacre of Alawites last March, which claimed 1,700 lives, their hatred for anyone who is not a Sunni Arab Muslim drives them to cold-bloodedly execute Alawite or Druze civilians.
Despite President al-Charaa’s pledge to create a commission of inquiry to identify and punish the perpetrators of these massacres, no one has been held accountable so far. The abuses have become routine. On June 4, eight Alawites were shot dead at a security checkpoint in Hama province, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). Le Monde highlights that the Alawite minority, from which former president Bashar al-Assad hails, has been subjected to violence since the coalition led by Ahmed al-Charaa took power (Le Monde, June 4).
Among these abuses are the abductions of Alawite women, which, according to an investigation published in Le Figaro on June 25, are increasing and being used in trafficking by Islamists.
Despite repeated promises by the new regime, the country’s Christian minority remains extremely vulnerable. A suicide bombing at a church in Damascus on June 22 killed 25 people and injured dozens. Authorities blamed the Islamic State for the attack, while on June 24, a little-known jihadist group, Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, claimed responsibility for this “jihadist act against infidels.”
The Ministry of Interior stated that the group was likely affiliated with the Islamic State and that the perpetrator was probably a jihadist from the al-Hol camp, without providing any evidence.
At the funeral for nine of the victims held at the Church of the Holy Elia in Damascus, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch and All the East, Yohanna X, condemned the “unacceptable massacre” and criticized the authorities, calling on them to “take responsibility.”
“The heinous crime that occurred at the Church of the Holy Cross is the first massacre in Syria since the events of 1860,” he declared, referring to the massacre of Christians in Damascus under the Ottoman Empire (Le Monde, June 24).
Eager to withdraw in time from the looming Syrian chaos, Washington is pressuring Kurdish forces to “integrate” into the institutions of this authoritarian and centralized Islamic state, which rejects any idea of decentralization or recognition of even minimal autonomy for the country’s diverse mosaic of communities.
In a statement to Turkish news channel NTV on June 4, the U.S. envoy for Syria announced the progressive withdrawal of U.S. military forces from northeastern Syria. “The reduction of our Inherent Resolve mission is underway. We will go from eight to five bases and three bases. We will end with one.”
U.S. authorities believe they have successfully fought the Islamic State, although jihadist cells remain active in Syria’s politically unstable territory (Le Figaro, June 8).
On June 8, all Kurdish political parties in Syria formed a joint delegation to negotiate with Damascus the Kurdish demands set out at the April Kurdish National Congress.
The delegation, which met in the presence of General Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), includes members of the Kurdish Unity Party (PYD) and the opposition coalition Kurdish National Council. It is co-chaired by Perwin Yousef, co-president of the PYD, and Mohammed Ismaël, president of the Kurdish National Council. The delegation is scheduled to travel to Damascus “as soon as possible.”
The decisions made during the March meeting between Mazloum Abdi and interim president al-Charaa have been slow to materialize, particularly concerning the return of displaced Kurds to areas occupied by pro-Turkish militias.
In its June 18 edition, Le Monde published a lengthy report on “the difficult return of Kurds living under the law of militias financed by Turkey.”
“We are still living under occupation, still facing extortion and intimidation by militias,” said residents of Afrin interviewed by Le Monde.
The new regime is trying to appease its powerful Turkish ally, an occupying force, the journalist notes, reporting on the persistent control of these territories by militias of the Syrian National Army (SNA), which includes some 15,000 armed men funded by Turkey.
Elsewhere in Arab Syria, more than two million displaced people have returned home since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, according to the UN (RF, June 19).
