The negotiation process between the Turkish government and the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, saw major developments during the month.
On July 9, for the first time in 25 years, Öcalan was able to send a video message to his supporters, confirming that the armed insurgency against the Turkish state was over and that it was now time to lay down arms and shift to a peaceful political struggle. “This is a voluntary transition from the phase of armed struggle to the phase of democratic and legal politics. This should not be seen as a loss but as a historic gain,” he added (New York Times, July 9).
Two days later, on July 11, in a carefully staged ceremony, around thirty PKK guerrilla fighters, including four commanders, came down from the historic Jassana cave, about 50 km from Sulaymaniyah, to lay down their weapons in a large basin and burn them.
“We hope this move brings peace and freedom. Our people now more than ever need a peaceful, free, fair, and democratic life,” declared commander Bessê Hozat in front of around 300 guests from Kurdistan and Turkey, including MPs from the DEM party and representatives of Kurdish political parties and the Kurdistan Regional Government. During this roughly 30-minute ceremony, where Hozat spoke in Kurdish and her colleague in Turkish for the Turkish audience, the Kurdish fighters returned to the nearby mountains. No political amnesty or reintegration plans into civilian life appear to have been considered. The Turkish army, despite the ongoing process, continues to bomb PKK hideouts and has carried out raids on suspected strongholds.
On July 7, during one of these operations in a cave that allegedly served as a hospital for PKK fighters, 12 Turkish soldiers died from methane poisoning (AFP, July 7).
The symbolic start of the PKK's disarmament received wide media coverage in Turkey, in Kurdistan, and internationally. Ankara hailed it as “an irreversible turning point towards a Turkey free from terrorism.”
President Barzani of Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraqi Prime Minister al-Sudani also welcomed the development as a step toward peace in the region and the start of a "new phase." Speaking on July 12 before members of his party, President Erdoğan struck a reassuring tone: “Turkey has won; 86 million citizens have won.” However, he announced nothing concrete other than the creation of a parliamentary commission to oversee the ongoing process.
He also outlined an informal new alliance between the ruling bloc—composed of his AKP party and the ultranationalist MHP—and the legal pro-Kurdish DEM party, saying: “We—the AKP, MHP, and DEM—have decided to move forward together. We will walk step by step toward each other. God willing, hand in hand, we will build the century of Turkey together.” If successful, this new strategy could allow Erdoğan to remain in power by marginalizing the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), depriving it of vital support from the DEM party—support that allowed it to win in the latest municipal elections in Turkey’s largest cities, including Istanbul and Ankara. The CHP has become the enemy to eliminate—or at least discredit and weaken—for the current Turkish government.
On July 1, the mayor of Izmir, Turkey’s third-largest city and a CHP stronghold, along with 109 municipal officials from the CHP, were arrested on corruption and misconduct charges, which the party denies. A total of 157 arrest warrants were issued, according to Turkish media. Murat Bakan, CHP vice-president, said these early-morning arrests were “clearly political.” “We are facing a similar process to what happened in Istanbul,” where, on March 19, at dawn, Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and several dozen city council members were arrested and jailed. On July 5, three more CHP mayors—in Adana (Turkey’s fourth-largest city), Antalya, and Adiyaman—were also arrested and jailed. An increasing number of investigations are targeting CHP officials, who are under mounting pressure from the current government (Le Monde, July 5).
The crackdown also targets journalists and media outlets deemed oppositional. Le Monde reported on July 1 that a controversial cartoon led to the arrest of its creator and an editor of the satirical magazine Leman. The cartoon allegedly depicted the Prophet Muhammad. Dozens of angry protesters tried to storm the offices of Leman, clashing with police. In its July 7 edition, Le Monde published an in-depth report by its correspondent Nicolas Boursier titled "In Turkey, the Endless Repression of the Main Opposition Media." “CHP mayors, journalists, dissenting voices—waves of arrests are multiplying to silence all opposition to AKP rule,” the journalist wrote. In its July 15 issue, the French daily raised the alarm about “the skyrocketing prison population in Turkey, which reflects the regime’s growing authoritarianism.” It noted that “the number of people imprisoned rose from 55,000 in 2001, before the AKP came to power, to more than 410,000 today,” with arrests accelerating in recent months.
Despite these heavy-handed tactics, some citizens still publicly contest the government’s arbitrary decisions. Environmental activists, for instance, have denounced the adoption of the “super pillaging” law on July 19, which aims to speed up mining and energy projects for Turkish oligarchs. Passed by the ruling coalition’s parliamentary majority, the law removes most environmental regulations for exploiting underground resources. It opens agricultural lands—including olive groves and forest—to mining and eliminates the environmental impact assessments previously required (Le Monde, July 21).
There is also the brave and talented writer Ahmet Altan, 75, who continues to write despite having spent five years in Turkish prisons under the absurd accusation of sending "subliminal messages" during a TV broadcast. “Being a writer in Turkey is dangerous,” he told Le Figaro on July 22.
The increasingly authoritarian and repressive nature of the Turkish regime does not appear to trouble its Western allies. No one dares criticize it publicly—let alone impose sanctions. On July 24, Germany lifted its veto on the sale of Eurofighter jets to Turkey. The deal includes the delivery of 40 fighter jets produced by a consortium of Germany, the UK, Italy, and Spain. Berlin hopes to arm Ankara to help defend NATO’s southeastern flank—allegedly against Russia (Le Monde, July 24). Even though Turkey refuses to apply Western sanctions against Russia and maintains a flourishing trade with it, while also being accused of helping circumvent those sanctions, Western leaders still seem to believe—by sheer inertia—that in the event of a conflict between NATO and Russia, Turkey will side with them.
Since early July, armed groups officially labeled as “unidentified” — but almost certainly affiliated with the pro-Iranian Shiite militias Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF) — have been launching near-daily armed drone attacks against the Kurdistan Region's oil fields.
On July 15 and 16, drones struck the Tawke, Peshkhabour, and Ain Sifni oil fields, following earlier attacks on Khurmala and Sarsang production sites.
These strikes caused significant material damage and forced oil companies to halt operations. According to the Kurdistan Ministry of Natural Resources, oil production has dropped by half, falling to just 140,000–150,000 barrels per day. Foreign companies such as DNO and Gulf Keystone evacuated their personnel as a precaution.
Kurdish authorities, who traced the drones back to the Dibis area in Kirkuk province (controlled by the federal government), blamed the attacks on elements of the Hashd al-Shaabi. Though these Shiite militias are officially integrated into the Iraqi army and paid by the state, they are effectively controlled by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
On July 16, the Kurdistan Ministry of Natural Resources issued a statement urging the Iraqi federal government and the international community to act swiftly to protect civilian workers, ensure energy security, and prevent further attacks on the Kurdistan Region’s energy sector (Rudaw, July 16).
Following the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) condemnation, the Iraqi Parliament and the Office of the President also denounced these “incidents,” calling them a blatant assault on national security and stability.
However, Baghdad rejected the accusations against the Hashd al-Shaabi as “unacceptable.” While the Iraqi army launched a large-scale inspection campaign in the Nineveh and Salahaddin provinces neighboring Kurdistan, no such operation took place in Kirkuk, where the drones were reportedly launched.
The United States and the United Kingdom condemned the attacks, warning that they threaten Iraq’s economic stability. Both countries called on Baghdad to protect energy infrastructure and foreign investors.
On July 22, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio contacted Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani, urging him to:
- Take responsibility for the drone attacks,
- Ensure regular salary payments to the Kurdistan Region,
- Reopen the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline,
- Resolve the Kurdistan budget crisis,
- And reconsider the controversial draft law that would institutionalize the Hashd al-Shaabi as a permanent body — a move that Rubio warned could turn Iraq into an Iranian protectorate.
The drone attacks came in the wake of new deals between the KRG and American companies for the expansion of oil and gas production in the region. These major agreements, hailed as “historic” by Kurdish officials, were contested by Baghdad but upheld by the Federal Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of the KRG.
Iran, displeased with this outcome, appears to have mobilized its proxy militias to destabilize the Kurdish economy and drive out Western (particularly American) investors, who in turn are pressing their governments for protection.
As a result, the issue has escalated into an international conflict, adding another point of tension between Washington and Tehran and potentially straining U.S.-Iraq relations.
KRG-Baghdad Negotiations
Amidst this turmoil, negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil continued regarding oil revenues and the Kurdistan Region’s budget.
On July 22, Iraq’s Council of Ministers approved a new agreement to resume salary payments to public sector employees in Kurdistan, following nearly three months of suspension.
The KRG stated on July 23 that it had met all its obligations:
- Transferred non-oil revenues to Baghdad,
- Submitted payroll lists,
- Cooperated with SOMO, the state oil marketing company, for exports.
The KRG again urged Baghdad to honor its commitments, emphasizing that salary payments are a legal and constitutional right of public employees (Rudaw, July 23).
On July 24, the federal government transferred 975 billion Iraqi dinars (approx. $737 million USD) to Erbil to cover May salaries. The payments for June and July remain uncertain.
Kurdish Political Divide
Despite presenting a united front in budget talks with Baghdad, the two main Kurdish parties — the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) — have yet to agree on forming a new regional government.
On July 14, KDP leader Massoud Barzani hosted PUK chief Bafel Talabani in Erbil for high-level power-sharing negotiations. Though the two parties already govern together, no final agreement was reached.
The PUK, weakened by the October 2024 parliamentary elections, rejects proportional power-sharing based on electoral results. It is demanding “influential ministries” like the Ministry of Interior and leadership of the Kurdistan Security Council. The KDP will retain the Presidency and Prime Ministership, with vice-presidential roles going to the PUK.
In the meantime, the current caretaker government continues to oversee:
- Regional security,
- Cooperation with the international coalition against ISIS (Daesh),
- Infrastructure development.
The Peshmerga unification process, backed by international allies, has reportedly entered a critical phase and is expected to be completed by the end of 2025 (Rudaw, July 1).
Despite economic and security uncertainty, some development projects are progressing.
According to AFP (July 9), one-third of the Kurdistan Region now has 24-hour electricity — a luxury in Iraq. In 2024, the KRG launched the “Ronaki (Light) Project” to provide round-the-clock power across the region. The first phase has been completed.
In July, the Kurdistan Region also commemorated the 42nd anniversary of the Barzani Anfal genocide, when around 8,000 men and teenage boys from the Barzan Valley were arrested, deported, and executed by Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Kurdistan is also preparing to commemorate the 12th anniversary of the Yazidi genocide by ISIS in early August.
More than seven months after the fall of the al-Assad dynasty, Syria remains a fractured country where tensions between minorities and the new Sunni Islamist regime are still running high. This new regime, backed by Turkey and endorsed by the Sunni Gulf petromonarchies, seeks to assert itself by force, establishing a centralized, authoritarian, and Islamist Syrian Arab Republic, ignoring the country's religious, linguistic, ethnic, and cultural diversity.
This logic of force over dialogue and compromise in crafting a genuine social contract led, last March, to violent clashes in the Alawite region, leaving over 1,700 dead. Traumatized, discriminated against, and persecuted, the Alawite community harbors a deep sense of rejection toward the new regime.
In this Syrian powder keg, even minor incidents can quickly escalate into intercommunal violence. That’s what happened in Druze territory, where on July 13, clashes erupted between Sunni Arab Bedouins seeking to carry out raids and local Druze self-defense militias in the predominantly Druze city of Souweida, in southwestern Syria. Within two days, the violence had left 37 dead, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).
The government in Damascus dispatched "security forces" to the scene, composed mostly of Sunni Islamist or even jihadist militias who consider Druze—like Alawites and Yazidis—as heretics or infidels. Unsurprisingly, these forces sided with the Sunni Bedouin tribes, and together they began massacring Druze civilians. The death toll quickly rose to several hundred, mostly Druze civilians, including many women and children.
On July 15, Israel, which has a significant Druze population, positioned itself as a protector of the Druze and launched airstrikes on Syrian military targets. That evening, the Syrian government declared a "total ceasefire", having reportedly reached an "agreement with city notables."
According to Le Monde, Druze spiritual leaders had agreed to allow government forces into Souweida, urging Druze militias not to resist and to hand over their weapons. However, influential Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri later issued a separate statement calling to "resist the barbaric campaign," accusing Damascus of reneging on its commitments by continuing to bomb the city (Le Monde, July 15).
The fighting resumed with greater intensity. On July 16, the Israeli air force bombed military targets in Damascus—including near the Presidential Palace—as well as in Souweida "to protect the Druze." The Israeli Defense Minister warned Syria of further "painful blows."
This warning, combined with the bombing of the Syrian army's general headquarters, quickly had an effect: the government agreed to transfer control of Souweida to Druze "factions." Interim President al-Charaa justified the decision as necessary "to avoid an open war with the Israeli entity" (Le Monde, July 17).
U.S. diplomacy worked to prevent the conflict from escalating, and eventually, after a week of bloody clashes, a ceasefire declared on July 17 came into effect on July 20, brokered by Washington.
The U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, Ambassador Thomas Barrack, who played a key role in this mediation, called on all armed groups involved—including Druze militias and Bedouin tribes—to "lay down their arms." Meanwhile, Interim President al-Charaa expressed relief over the return of calm in the region, “despite difficult circumstances” (The New York Times, July 20).
According to a provisional count by the SOHR published on July 19, the week of violence left over 1,200 dead, the vast majority being Druze. Though fighting has temporarily ceased, calm has not returned to people’s minds. In a report published on July 25, Le Monde noted that after the “Druze massacres,” Souweida remains “entrenched in its rejection of Syrian authority.” Reporter Hélène Sallon wrote that “many civilians were executed” in what she called “a bloodbath that fuels separatist temptations among the Druze minority.”
During the massacre of the Alawites, the Syrian regime had promised to investigate and bring the perpetrators of atrocities and summary executions to justice. A commission of inquiry, in a report made public on July 22, confirmed the deaths of, 1426 people, mostly civilians, including 90 women and 238 members of the security forces. The commission identified 298 suspects involved in the atrocities against the Alawite community—but none have yet been prosecuted. According to SOHR, government forces and paramilitary groups committed massacres and summary executions, killing nearly 1,700 Alawite civilians. NGOs reported sectarian massacres in which entire families were wiped out, including women, children, and the elderly.
Some fighters filmed themselves executing civilians at close range, after beating and mutilating them, according to Le Monde, July 22.
This near-civil war situation is shattering any trust in the Syrian regime's promises and commitments. The oft-repeated pledge by the interim president to “protect all Syrian minorities” rings hollow and appears to be a rhetorical device aimed at reassuring Western nations. After the painful events of recent months, neither Alawites, nor Druze, nor Christians believe this rhetoric. The Kurds, encouraged by the Americans, are reluctantly engaging in dialogue with Damascus, in the absence of genuine negotiations on building a decentralized, secular, and democratic Syria that includes all elements of society.
On the evening of July 13, at the onset of the Druze clashes, the Kurdish administration issued a statement once again calling for a “pluralist democratic system, social justice, gender equality, and a constitution guaranteeing the rights of all societal components.” They stated:
"Syrians have suffered for decades under a centralized system that monopolizes power and wealth, represses local will, and has plunged the country into successive crises. Today, we aspire to be full partners in building a new, decentralized Syria that welcomes all its citizens and guarantees their rights equally."
This innovative and experience-based proposal, however, finds little resonance among Western countries, who are rushing to normalize relations with Syria’s new rulers.
Indeed, the U.S. President, by executive order on July 1, ended sanctions against Syria—some dating back to 1979—retaining only those targeting Bashar al-Assad. Washington cited “positive measures” by the new Syrian authorities and even revoked the terrorist designation of the HTC, the Islamist militia founded and led by al-Charaa.
Austria has gone further, now recognizing Syria as a safe and stable country, and has begun deporting Syrian refugees (Le Monde, July 3).
France, for its part, is trying to play a role by proposing to mediate between Damascus and the Kurds. At President Macron's initiative, a meeting was scheduled in Paris between Kurdish General Mazloum Abdi and Interim President al-Charaa. But under pressure from Erdogan, who opposes French involvement in Syria, al-Charaa canceled the trip.
Instead, his Foreign Minister Assad al-Chabani was received on July 24 at the French Foreign Ministry, along with U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack, by French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot. Following the meeting, it was agreed that Paris would soon host a new round of consultations between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces regarding the full implementation of the March 10 agreement (France 24, July 25).
On July 26, President Macron spoke by phone with the Syrian president, stating:
“I spoke with the Syrian president about the urgency of finding a political solution with local actors, within a national framework of governance and security.”
The French President stressed it is "imperative to prevent further episodes of violence in Syria" and called for the prosecution of those responsible for recent atrocities.
"The recent violence in Syria highlights the extreme fragility of the transition. Civilian populations must be protected," Macron posted on X (formerly Twitter), calling for “calm local dialogue” to achieve “Syrian unity with respect for the rights of all citizens” (Le Figaro, July 26).
However, with the European Union having followed the U.S. in lifting all sanctions against Syria without conditions, France has few levers to influence events or steer the political process in Syria, according to Syrian policy observers.
One dictatorship seems to be replacing another. According to a Reuters investigation published July 25, the brother of President al-Charaa is now secretly restructuring the Syrian economy to benefit his own clan, much like the al-Assad family once did for decades.
According to the United Nations Human Rights Office, six hundred and twelve men and women were hanged during the first half of 2025, which is twice as many as during the same period in 2024. The UN states that judicial procedures often take place behind closed doors and do not meet the standards of a fair trial.
“The reports indicating several hundred executions in Iran since the beginning of the year highlight how deeply troubling the situation has become, as well as the urgent need for an immediate moratorium on the application of the death penalty in the country,” said Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, on July 28 in Geneva.
For him, “it is alarming to see reports indicating that at least 48 individuals are currently on death row, 12 of whom are believed to be at imminent risk of execution.” While over 40% of those executed this year were convicted of drug-related offenses, the rest — meaning the majority — were sentenced based on vague charges such as “enmity against God” and “corruption on Earth,” which authorities often use to silence dissent. “Instead of accelerating executions, I urge Iran to join the global movement to abolish the death penalty, starting with a moratorium on all executions,” emphasized the UN commissioner.
He also pointed out that the Iranian regime is reviewing a draft espionage law that would redefine “collaboration with ‘hostile’ states” (punishable by death), expanding it to include acts such as online communication, collaboration with foreign media, and “ideological alignment.” “This bill dangerously broadens the scope of capital punishment for espionage, and I call for its cancellation,” said Volker Türk (Le Monde, July 28).
Responding to these UN statements, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told the press that “the death penalty is provided for under Iranian law for a range of the most serious crimes.” Iran, he added confidently, “strives to limit its use to only the most severe offenses.”
The UN High Commissioner's call came shortly after the death of two Iranian political prisoners, Mehdi Hassani, 48, and Behrouz Ehsani, 69, hanged on July 25. Arrested in 2022, they were accused of “armed rebellion,” “enmity against God,” and “corruption on Earth” due to their alleged membership in the People's Mojahedin Organization. In January, after a trial lasting five minutes in which they were denied the right to defend themselves and had no access to a lawyer, they were sentenced to death (Le Monde,July 30).
Even this rushed form of “justice” seems unnecessary to the regime’s radical wing. Close to the Revolutionary Guards, the Fars News agency called in a June 9 editorial for the mass execution of political prisoners labeled as “enemies of the state,” invoking the precedent of the 1988 massacres of political opponents that followed a fatwa issued by then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini. “In today's conditions, Iranian mercenaries and foreign nationals have enabled the murder of hundreds of citizens — women, children, and civilians — by transmitting intelligence to the Zionist enemy and smuggling weapons into the country. They deserve to be executed just like in 1988.” These fanatics consider that year a “glorious chapter in the history of the Islamic Republic’s fight against terrorism,” referring to the summary execution of between 2,800 and 5,000 leftists, monarchists, or People's Mojahedin supporters within less than three weeks.
Weakened by the 12-day war, discredited and humiliated, the Iranian regime is still trying to present a moderate image to the outside world while launching a massive and brutal crackdown against “internal enemies” to terrorize the population (New York Times, July 4).
On the diplomatic front, on July 2, Iran suspended its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose inspectors had to leave the country by July 4. Tehran no longer wants oversight and verification of its nuclear sites by the IAEA. In an interview with FOX News on July 21, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated, “Iran will not give up uranium enrichment — it’s a matter of national pride.” He added that the program is temporarily halted due to “serious and significant” damage caused by Israeli-American bombings.
Iran will reject any negotiations with Washington if the Americans demand the abandonment of its uranium enrichment program, warned the special advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, Ali Akbar Velayati, on July 14 (cited by Irna, Le Figaro, July 14).
On July 23, in a rare press encounter in New York, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said that Iran might withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty if European countries reinstate sanctions (New York Times). Two days later, on July 25, an Iranian delegation met with French, German, and British envoys in Istanbul. The several-hour-long meeting at the Iranian consulate was described as a “frank and in-depth discussion” by the Iranian side. The Europeans urged Iran to fulfill its 2015 agreement obligations and to allow IAEA inspectors back. In the absence of a negotiated solution, Europeans may trigger the sanctions reinstatement mechanism (Le Monde, NYT, July 25).
These renewed contacts risk being just another diplomatic formality pending potential negotiations between Washington and Tehran.
Meanwhile, the Iranian regime continues its policy of taking Western nationals hostage who made the mistake of traveling to Iran. Le Monde, July 2, reports “a new wave of arrests of European nationals” accused of cooperating with Israel. The most recent alleged “spy” is an 18-year-old Frenchman, Lennart Monterios, arrested while on a bike tour. Two other French nationals, Cécile Kohler, a 40-year-old literature teacher, and her partner Jacques Paris, 72, arrested on May 7, 2022, during a tourist trip to Iran, have been held for more than three years in Tehran’s notorious Evin prison and face the death penalty. Franco-German Monterios had been preparing since late 2023 for “a year-long bike trip to discover the world, through Europe and Asia” after graduating high school and before starting university. A passionate cyclist and climber, he had crowdfunded his journey. “I love reading and traveling through books, and now I want to travel through the world on my bike.” A youthful dream shattered by the harsh reality of the Iranian theocracy (Le Monde, July 6).
Other foreign nationals suspected of espionage include unfortunate Afghan refugees who fled Taliban rule and were barely surviving in Iranian slums.
Since June 1, nearly 450,000 of them have been forcibly expelled to Afghanistan. At the end of May, Tehran gave the “4 million undocumented Afghans” until July 6 to leave the country. According to the International Organization for Migration, between June 1 and July 5, 449,218 Afghans left Iran for their homeland. The total for 2025 so far is 906,326. The UN warned that this mass displacement could further destabilize Afghanistan, already plagued by poverty and high unemployment (Le Monde, July 7).
Kurdish Region Crackdown: Summary of Atrocities
According to data from the Kurdish human rights NGO Hengaw and the Kurdish Institute of Washington, Iranian authorities intensified a brutal crackdown on the Kurdish population in July 2025. Security forces and courts targeted Kurds with secret executions, mass arrests, harsh sentences, and lethal force, under the pretext of national security following the Iran-Israel ceasefire.
Since July 1, dozens of Kurdish activists, cultural figures, and ordinary citizens have been arrested or killed, accused of “espionage” or armed rebellion. On July 7, the Revolutionary Court in Urmia sentenced five Kurds from Bokan to a shocking total of 11 death sentences (some received two or three each) along with long prison terms. The judge, Reza Najafzadeh, listed multiple capital charges, including “armed insurrection” and “enmity against God,” linking them to banned Kurdish parties (Komala, PDK) and even “espionage for Israel.” The verdict cited satellite equipment and alleged Mossad ties as evidence. Rights groups say the trial ignored clear signs of torture and coerced confessions.
Over 330 Kurdish civilians and activists were arrested post-war by IRGC and Intelligence Ministry agents across Western Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Ilam, Tehran, and even North Khorasan. Most were taken without warrants or formal charges and held incommunicado in secret locations.
Authorities also targeted relatives of exiled Kurdish dissidents. On July 10, intelligence agents raided a house in Mahabad and arrested Khedr Rasouli, 69, and his daughter Klara — father and sister of exiled PDKI leader Karo Rasouli. They were reportedly tortured and forced into video confessions.
Civic and environmental activists were also repressed. On July 21, five Kurds, including village head Latif Moradi and lawyer Mozaffar Moradi, were arrested in Saqqez for protesting a destructive gold mining project.
Kurdish cultural and language activists are under pressure. In Shirvan (North Khorasan), Mostafa Rahnama, a 47-year-old athlete and cultural figure, was arrested without a warrant on July 21. His fate remains unknown. Artist Amin Karimi, arrested at the Sarv border post on July 1, disappeared afterward.
Lethal force is used indiscriminately. On July 23, police shot and killed two young Kurds, Arman Beyglari and Pezhman Badri, after a minor dispute in a park in Ilam province.
Kolbars, semi-legal Kurdish porters, are now openly treated as a security threat. At least three were shot dead in July:
- Siwan Abdullahzadeh (20) – June 28,
- Baneh Khaled Mohammadi (23) – July 8, Baneh
- Payam Ahmadi – July 15, Sarvabad
Others were seriously injured. Rezgar Mohammadi suffered severe kidney damage on July 4. Ata, a 23-year-old kolbar, was shot and beaten on July 23. On July 1, MP Hossein-Ali Haji Deligani called kolbars a “security breach” and demanded urgent action.
By mid-2025, at least 10 kolbars have been killed and 12 wounded by state forces. Rights observers say the Iranian government weaponizes security rhetoric to justify the extrajudicial execution of unarmed Kurdish workers, portraying them falsely as “smugglers” or spies.
