At the call of their imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) convened its 12th Congress in the remote regions of Iraqi Kurdistan from May 5 to 7, with the participation of 232 delegates. The Congress decided to dissolve “the organizational structure of the PKK” and to bring an end to the armed struggle carried out since 1984. This Kurdish insurgency—the longest in the history of the Turkish Republic—has resulted in the deaths of between 40,000 and 100,000 people, according to estimates, the figure of 100,000 being recently cited by former Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç during a conference in Erbil. Over 90% of the victims were Kurds, mostly civilians, including thousands of intellectuals, trade unionists, students, doctors and lawyers killed by JITEM death squads of the Turkish gendarmerie during the “dirty war” of 1992–1996 in what the New York Times called the “Kurdish killing fields” and local NGOs referred to as “murders perpetrated by unkown killers” (faili meçhul cinayetler). This human toll must be added to the devastation of Kurdish areas, with 3,400 villages destroyed and the traditional agro-pastoral economy dismantled, and the forced displacement of 2 to 3 million Kurdish peasants to deprive the guerrilla of any local support. The financial cost to the Turkish state was recently estimated at over $2 trillion by the Turkish President and his Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek.
The PKK, which in the years following the extremely repressive Turkish military coup of September 1980 mobilised its militants to form a united and socialist Kurdistan, has over time radically altered its goals as its ideology evolved. Since Öcalan’s arrest in 1999, and at his urging, the PKK now demands only a vague degree of “democratic autonomy”, with imprecise definition. In recent years, even the term “autonomy” has been replaced by calls for a “democratic Turkey,” without any specific demand for the 26 million Kurds in the country. According to the final press release of the Congress, the time has now come for peace, fraternity, and the pursuit of democratic rights through peaceful struggle, requiring the abandonment of armed conflict.
This historic shift, as media described it, was hailed by the Turkish president as “an important decision for maintaining peace and fraternity.” “We are confidently moving toward our goal of a terror-free future, overcoming obstacles, breaking prejudices and thwarting the traps of discord.” The PKK’s decision to self-dissolve was also welcomed by Western diplomatic circles and by the authorities of the Kurdistan Regional Government.
In exchange for announcing the end of the armed struggle, the PKK received no public commitment from the Turkish government—not even a promise of amnesty—although Ankara hinted at the possibility of “gestures” in the future after disarmament. The pro-Kurdish party DEM delegation, which shuttles between Imrali prison (where Öcalan is held) and Turkish political parties, continues its efforts to prepare Turkish and Kurdish public opinion by imagining wishes of reconciliation and “fraternity,” without concrete substance. The death of one of the delegation’s figures, Sırrı Süreyya Önder—a deputy of Istanbul of Turkish origin and one of Turkey’s parliamentary vice-presidents—on May 3 prompted a moment of communal gathering around him, bringing together most Kurdish and Turkish political leaders in Istanbul (AFP, May 3). His funeral was broadcast live by some local TV channels.
On May 8, the European Parliament meeting in Strasbourg approved, by 367 votes in favor, 74 against and 188 abstentions, the Report on Turkey by Spanish MEP Nacho Sánchez Amor, which asserts that “given the ongoing democratic regression in Turkey, the EU accession process cannot be relaunched.” MEPs prefer to develop « strategic partnerships » with Ankara (Euronews, May 8).
For information, below is anEnglish translation of the full text of the final declaration of the 12th PKK Congress, based on the original text released by the PKK-affiliated ANF agency on May 12.
FINAL DECLARATION OF THE 12TH PKK CONGRESS
“The process initiated by the declaration of leader Abdullah Öcalan on February 27 concluded successfully at our 12th Party Congress, held from May 5 to 7, in the wake of multiple initiatives he led and various perspectives he provided.
Despite challenging conditions—continued clashes, ground and air attacks, the siege of our areas and the PDK’s embargo—our congress was held securely. For security reasons, it was organised simultaneously in two different zones. Convened with the participation of 232 delegates, the 12th PKK Congress debated the following topics: Leadership, Martyrs, the Wounded, the Organizational Existence of the PKK and Armed Struggle, as well as the Construction of a Democratic Society. It adopted historic decisions opening a new phase for our Freedom Movement.
Activities conducted under the PKK name are concluded
The 12th extraordinary PKK Congress determined that the PKK’s struggle had shattered the policy of denial and annihilation against our people, and enabled approaching a solution to the Kurdish issue through democratic political means, thus fulfilling its historic mission. Based on this, the 12th PKK Congress decided, under Öcalan’s leadership, to dissolve the organizational structure of the PKK and end the armed struggle, thereby halting the activities conducted under the PKK name.
Our Party, the PKK, emerged historically as a freedom movement for our people, responding to the policy of denial and genocide targeting Kurds, rooted in the Treaty of Lausanne and the 1924 Constitution. Inspired at its inception by real socialism, it adopted armed struggle based on the right of peoples to self-determination. Founded in a context marked by rigid denial of Kurdish existence, genocide and assimilation policies, from 1978 its fight for freedom forced recognition of Kurdish existence and established the Kurdish issue as a fundamental reality of Turkey. Through its successful struggle, it became a symbol of hope for freedom and a dignified life for the region’s peoples.
During the 1990s, our resurrection revolution brought great progress for our people. Turkish President Turgut Özal attempted to resolve the Kurdish question politically. Öcalan responded to this initiative with a truce announced on March 17, 1993, initiating a new process. But the heavy influence of real socialism, mafia currents imposed on our war line, and the elimination by the deep state of Turgut Özal and his circle, led to the failure of this phase, while the policy of denial and annihilation intensified. Thousands of villages were burned, millions of Kurds displaced, tens of thousands imprisoned under torture, and thousands assassinated extra-judicially. In response, the Freedom Movement strengthened quantitatively and qualitatively; guerrilla warfare spread across Kurdistan and Turkey. Under the impact of this war, the Kurdish people rose. Thus, war became the main option for both sides. Mutual escalation of the conflict could never be overcome. Öcalan’s efforts to peacefully resolve the Kurdish question failed.
A reorganisation of Kurdish–Turkish relations is inevitable
With the international conspiracy of February 15, 1999, the process entered a new stage. This conspiracy particularly aimed to trigger a Kurdish–Turkish war, but it was prevented thanks to Öcalan’s sacrifices and efforts. Although held in the torture-genocide system of Imrali, he maintained his insistence on a democratic and peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue. For 27 years in absolute isolation, Öcalan has fought against the genocide system of Imrali and thus thwarted the international conspiracy. In this struggle he developed a societal democratic, ecological and women’s liberation paradigm, analysing the patriarchal, state and authoritarian system. He realised a freedom alternative for our people, women and oppressed humanity.
Referring to the period before the Treaty of Lausanne and the 1924 Constitution, a time of rupture in Kurdish–Turkish relations, Öcalan adopted the perspective of a Democratic Republic of Turkey founded on a Common Homeland and a Democratic Nation, recognising Kurdish and Turkish peoples as founding elements. Kurdish revolts, the thousand-year historical bond between Kurds and Turks, and Öcalan’s 52 years of struggle show that the only viable solution passes through the Common Homeland and Equal Citizenship. Recent Middle East developments within the Third World War framework make the reorganisation of Kurdish–Turkish relations inevitable.
Our people will understand PKK’s dissolution and the end of armed struggle better than anyone
For 52 years, by joining the Leader and the PKK’s march at great sacrifice, our dignified people, who resisted denial, annihilation, genocide and assimilation policies, will embrace the peace and democratic society process with greater awareness and organisation. We are confident that our people will understand better than anyone the decision to dissolve the PKK and end the armed struggle, and will assume the duties of the democratic struggle era to build a democratic society. It is vital that our people, led by women and youth, create their own structures in all life domains, organise based on self-sufficiency with their language, identity and culture, defend themselves against attacks, and build a communal democratic society in a spirit of mobilisation. Within this framework, we believe that Kurdish political parties, democratic organisations, opinion leaders will assume their responsibilities to develop Kurdish democracy and the Kurdish democratic nation.
Our legacy of freedom forged through struggle and resistance will grow stronger via democratic politics, in accordance with the decisions of the 12th PKK Congress, and our people’s future will advance on foundations of freedom and equality. Our poor labouring people, all belief groups, women, youth, workers, peasants, and all excluded groups will develop coexisting life in a democratic and just environment defending their rights.
We call on everyone to participate in the peace and democratic society process
The decision taken by our congress to dissolve the PKK and end the armed struggle forms a firm foundation for a sustainable peace and democratic solution. Implementing these decisions requires Öcalan’s leadership and management of the process, recognition of the right to democratic political action, and a strong coherent legal guarantee. At this stage, it is crucial that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey assume its historic responsibility. Likewise, we call on all political parties represented in Parliament, particularly the government and principal opposition, civil society organisations, faith communities, democratic media, opinion leaders, intellectuals, academics, artists, labour and peasants’ unions, women and youth organisations, and environmental movements to take their responsibilities and join the peace and democratic society process.
Empowerment of left-socialist forces in Turkey, revolutionary structures, organisations, and committed figures will give a new dimension to the peoples’, women’s and oppressed’s struggle. It will fulfil the goals of great revolutionaries whose last words were: “Long live Turkish and Kurdish people’s fraternity and fully independent Turkey!”
Socialism of democratic society, representing a new stage of the peace process, democratic society and struggle for socialism, will advance the global democratic movement towards a just and equal world. Within this framework, we call on our friends—especially those who led the Global Campaign for Freedom—along with democratic international opinion to strengthen international solidarity within the democratic modernity theory.
We call on international powers to recognise their responsibility in century-long genocide policies against our people, not to obstruct a democratic solution, and to contribute constructively.
We announce the deaths of comrades Ali Haydar Kaytan and Riza Altun
At our 12th PKK Congress, convened at our Leader’s request, we announced the deaths of two party cadres: Fuat‑Ali Haydar Kaytan, martyred on July 3, 2018, and Riza Altun, martyred on September 25, 2019. On this basis, comrade and founding PKK member Fuat‑Ali Haydar Kaytan was recognised as the symbol of “Loyalty to the Leader, Truth and Sacred Life,” while Riza Altun, an early Öcalan companion, was recognised as the symbol of “Brotherhood of Freedom.” We dedicate our 12th Party Congress to these two great martyr comrades who have guided us relentlessly since our Freedom Movement began. We renew, in their name and in the name of all martyrs of the struggle, our promise of success, and affirm our commitment to realise the dreams of the Martyr of Peace and Democracy, comrade Sırrı Süreyya Önder.
Statist-national socialism has lost; Socialism of Democratic Society leads to victory!
Insistence on humanity is insistence on socialism!
Bijî Serok Apo!
The new Syrian regime, backed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, has achieved a remarkable diplomatic breakthrough in its quest for international legitimacy.
On May 7, interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa was received at the Élysée Palace by President Emmanuel Macron. This first visit by the Syrian interim president to a Western capital was hailed as a major success for a former jihadist leader whose head was still on a U.S. wanted list just months earlier.
During the visit, the French President pledged to advocate with the European Union for the lifting of sanctions targeting Syria. He requested that the ongoing transition process include all components of Syrian society, respecting their identities and diversity. France is particularly committed to ensuring the proper integration of its Kurdish allies into the institutions of the new Syria.
On May 14, U.S. President Donald Trump, on an official visit to Saudi Arabia, agreed—at the request of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—to meet “briefly” with al-Sharaa in Riyadh. The meeting, which was also attended by the Crown Prince and, via videoconference, Turkish President Erdogan, ultimately lasted nearly 30 minutes, according to the presidency.
Donald Trump announced the lifting of all U.S. sanctions on Syria and called on the country to join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel. He urged the new Syrian regime to expel “Palestinian terrorist factions” long hosted in Syria and to “take responsibility for the detention centers” currently under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) where members of the Islamic State (ISIS) are held. Such a transfer of control would pave the way for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Rojava.
The U.S. president’s decision to legitimize the new Syrian administration and lift sanctions was hailed as a historic “turning point,” prompting celebratory demonstrations in the streets of Damascus. It was followed a few days later, on May 21, by the European Union’s announcement that all economic sanctions against Syria would be lifted.
“We want to help the Syrian people rebuild a new, inclusive, and peaceful Syria,” said EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas after a meeting of the EU’s foreign ministers.
The measure primarily affects the Syrian banking system, previously barred from international capital markets. It also includes the unfreezing of the Syrian central bank's assets. The EU reserves the right to reinstate the sanctions depending on how the Syrian transitional regime evolves. (Le Monde, May 21)
According to Syria’s foreign minister, Assad Hassan al-Chibani, “The lifting of sanctions reflects the regional and international will to support Syria. The Syrian people now have a historic and very important opportunity to rebuild their country.”
The lifting of international sanctions, imposed on Syria since 1979 and strengthened after Bashar al-Assad's crackdown on pro-democracy protests in 2011, will allow Damascus to secure the funds needed to revive the economy and launch reconstruction projects with the support of Gulf petro-monarchies.
Domestically, the new regime still faces enormous economic and security challenges. Clashes between Druze militias and regime forces have left around one hundred dead, and the agreement signed on May 1st with Druze community leaders and the government remains fragile.
Israel, which hosts a small Druze community, has positioned itself as their defender. On May 2, it bombed the vicinity of the Syrian Presidential Palace to signal to the new regime that it must end its repression of the Druze population (New York Times, May 2).
Relations with the large Alawite community remain tense and conflicted; those responsible for massacres of Alawites have not been brought to justice. Some of them, including former foreign jihadist leaders accused of serious crimes and murders, have even been promoted and flaunt themselves on social media to the dismay of victims.
This tense and conflict-ridden atmosphere has led the UN to warn of the risk of another civil war. Speaking before the Security Council, UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen warned that “the dangers of renewed conflict and fragmentation of the country remain real” despite the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime.
The previous day, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had also expressed concern, warning that Syria might be on the brink of a new “full-scale civil war” (Le Monde, May 21).
The Kurds, who control and administer the northeastern third of the country, continue to seek resolution through dialogue and negotiation with the Islamist regime in Damascus on fundamental issues such as the Constitutional Declaration (which currently serves as a provisional constitution), the organization of power and its institutions on a decentralized and democratic basis, including all components of Syria’s mosaic and recognizing their demand for local autonomy.
In an op-ed titled “Syrian Freedom is Dangerously Incomplete” published in the New York Times on May 28, Ms. Ilham Ahmed, the representative for foreign relations of the Kurdish administration in Rojava, laid out the core differences between the Kurdish vision and that of the Islamist regime in Damascus. She urged Western allies to support the democratic and decentralized vision advocated by the Kurds to prevent Syria from falling back into a centralized dictatorship that could ignite new sectarian conflicts.
Kurdish-Syrian negotiations continue under the 8-point agreement signed in March between General Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and interim Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa.
On May 27, both sides agreed to evacuate Syrian citizens from the al-Hol camp, located in the desert and home to approximately 37,000 people with alleged links to ISIS—many of them wives and children of jihadist fighters. The parties did not address whether Damascus would take future control of the camp (AFP, Euronews).
The United States is pressuring the central government to assume control of the Rojava prisons, where around 9,000 former ISIS fighters are currently detained.
Given that the interim president and his circle are former members of ISIS and al-Qaida, it is not difficult to imagine the fate awaiting their former “brothers-in-arms.”
Back in February, the Kurdish administration, in coordination with the UN, had announced plans to empty the northeastern displacement camps—including those holding presumed jihadist family members—by the end of 2025.
In Aleppo, implementation of the Kurdish-Syrian agreement to place the Kurdish districts of Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud—home to over 500,000 Kurds—under central government control is progressing gradually. Of the seven checkpoints surrounding the Kurdish neighborhoods, control is now jointly managed.
According to local Kurdish forces coordinator Mohammed Khalil: “So far, everything is going well; we are doing our duty together. Thanks to this, our neighborhoods are much safer than before.” Autonomous institutions are being maintained, along with some specific local practices. However, some negotiation points remain blocked, such as the prisoner exchange. The new government is supposed to release all Kurdish detainees, but most are currently imprisoned in Turkey. “The Syrian authorities can’t do anything. They are too weak and cannot defy Ankara’s orders,” explains Nouri Cheikho, co-president of the local council, quoted by RFI (May 30).
Meanwhile, the low-intensity war against ISIS continues.
On May 15, the SDF arrested 10 individuals suspected of ISIS affiliation.
On May 16, during clashes with sleeper cells near the town of al-Hamam, 45 km from the Iraqi border, one Kurdish fighter was killed and three others wounded.
On May 29, for the first time since the fall of the al-Assad regime, a military patrol of the new Syrian government was hit by a remote-controlled landmine in the southern province of Sweida.
Casualties: 1 dead and 3 injured (AFP, May 29).
Taking advantage of the power vacuum and prevailing chaos, ISIS is trying to reorganize.
Its war is far from over.
During his visit to the United States, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, Masrour Barzani, met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio as well as numerous U.S. senators and congressmen to brief them on political developments in Kurdistan, Iraq, and the broader region.
This official visit also had a strong economic focus, including meetings with executives from American companies interested in investing in Kurdistan, particularly in the oil and gas sector.
As part of this effort, Barzani signed two significant agreements on May 1. The first, with Western Zagros, concerns the development of the Topkhana block, which—together with the neighboring Kurdamir block—contains an estimated 5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 900 million barrels of crude oil, with projected revenues of $70 billion over the project’s lifespan.
The second agreement, signed with HKN Energy, involves the Miran gas field and its 8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, estimated to be worth $40 billion in the long term.
These contracts are fully compliant with the Iraqi Constitution adopted by referendum in 2005, which stipulates that the exploration and exploitation of new natural resources—that is, those discovered after the adoption of the Constitution—fall under the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In contrast, resources developed prior to the Constitution are to be jointly managed by the federal government in Baghdad and the KRG.
However, as with other matters—such as the Kurdish budget allocation and the referendum on the fate of the so-called “disputed” territories with a Kurdish majority—the Baghdad government does not respect either the Constitution or the federalist spirit it embodies. Instead, it seeks to impose a centralized authority on the Kurds, in line with authoritarian traditions inherited from previous dictatorships.
In this vein, immediately following the announcement of these two major contracts with U.S. companies, the Iraqi government filed a lawsuit against the KRG in a commercial court in Baghdad, challenging the legality of the agreements (AFP, May 27).
A U.S. State Department spokesperson, however, made it clear that the agreements signed with the two American companies are entirely in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution. According to Kurdish authorities, both American companies are already among the “main producers in Kurdistan.” Therefore, there is no legal basis for contesting the agreements (Le Figaro, May 27).
It is worth noting that Iraq's Ministry of Oil filed the lawsuit in a commercial court, rather than the Federal Supreme Court, whose rulings are final and cannot be appealed. In the current turbulent geopolitical context, Iraq is not in a position to openly challenge Washington. Nonetheless, the ongoing disputes between Baghdad and Erbil continue to negatively affect the lives of citizens in the Kurdistan Region.
Despite constitutional provisions guaranteeing the Kurdistan Region’s financial allocation, despite the coalition agreement signed between Kurdish parties and the current Prime Minister, and despite the budget law passed by Parliament, the Baghdad government still fails to make regular salary payments to public employees, civil servants, and retirees in Kurdistan.
Frustrated by these petty and obstructive tactics, KDP President Massoud Barzani declared on May 15 that Baghdad’s treatment of Kurdistan’s public servants is “unacceptable.”
“Baghdad must deal with Erbil in a federal manner, in line with the Constitution,” he said. “If federalism no longer exists, then they need to say so, because the way the Kurdistan Region is being treated right now is not a federal relationship. It feels like Kurds are foreigners in this country,” he added (Rudaw, May 15).
In its quarterly report on Iran’s nuclear program, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raised alarms over the acceleration of uranium enrichment.
The quantity of uranium enriched to 60% increased from 605 pounds in February 2025 to 900 pounds—around 410 kilograms—by the end of May. This significant amount could, within a matter of days, be enriched to 90%, sufficient to serve as fuel for the production of 10 nuclear bombs, according to experts cited by The New York Times on May 31.
These experts estimate that “weaponization”—the process of miniaturizing a bomb to make it into a nuclear warhead deliverable by ballistic missile—could take anywhere from six months to a year. Iran has thus become a “threshold state,” capable of swiftly transitioning into a nuclear power.
In the report released at the end of May, IAEA Director General Rafael M. Grossi wrote that “Iran’s significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium, being the only non-nuclear-weapon state to produce such material, is a serious concern.” He added: “We need to reach a diplomatic solution and establish a very robust IAEA inspection system.” He also noted that in recent years, “Iran has disconnected many IAEA cameras and sensors at key sites but has allowed inspectors to visit the country and measure its growing stockpile of enriched uranium” (New York Times, May 31).
The prospect of Iran soon becoming capable of producing a nuclear bomb has alarmed countries in the region, foremost among them Israel. On May 30, the Israeli Prime Minister stated that “all nations of the world must act now to stop Iran.” He urged President Donald Trump to join Israel in launching military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. According to him, Iran’s uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Fordow are now more vulnerable than ever due to Israel’s October strikes on Iran’s air defense systems. However, the American president currently appears to favor continued negotiations with Iran, though the fourth round has yet to yield the progress Washington had hoped for.
On May 31, U.S. Special Envoy Steven Witkof delivered a draft agreement to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
The proposal offers the dismantling of uranium enrichment facilities in exchange for the gradual lifting of U.S. and Western sanctions—an offer that is unlikely to be accepted by Ayatollah Khamenei. For the Islamic Republic’s leaders, who have spent billions on these facilities, the right to enrich uranium is a non-negotiable “red line.”
Speaking on NBC, a senior advisor to Khamenei, Ali Shamkhani, stated that “Iran is ready to accept a deal with the United States on its nuclear program in exchange for the immediate lifting of sanctions,” adding that Iran would commit to never developing nuclear weapons.
But what purpose would 60% enriched uranium serve, given that nuclear reactor fuel requires uranium enriched to less than 5%, and even nuclear submarine propulsion uses only 20% enriched uranium?
Likely, it is intended to preserve the capability to later produce a few nuclear bombs—possibly with the covert assistance of countries like North Korea or Russia—to “sanctuarize” the Islamic Republic regime.
Alongside its nuclear program, Iran is also actively advancing its ballistic missile arsenal, which continues to raise concerns in the West. According to Le Monde (May 10), Iran now possesses several types of missiles capable of reaching Eastern Europe. Experts report that three or four types of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) developed by Iran—with ranges between 1,700 and 3,000 kilometers—could reach areas from the northern Italian Alps to eastern France, Denmark, and even Sweden.
In late March, the U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom), which oversees nuclear deterrence, stated that Iran could soon develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) through its space program, with a range exceeding 5,500 kilometers.
However, despite their declared range, Iranian missiles are currently unlikely to carry out precision strikes in Europe due to the lack of continuous and terminal guidance systems.
The convergence of these alarming developments—the nuclear program’s acceleration and the growing missile arsenal—may be intended to prepare Western public opinion for a potential military confrontation aimed at eliminating, or at least reducing, the Iranian threat.
President Trump has reportedly set a deadline of “a few weeks; two months at most” for progress in negotiations. Should talks stall or fail, he may opt to significantly increase sanctions targeting Iran and the countries buying its oil.
As for Israel, it appears determined to act on its exceptional “window of opportunity” to strike the Iranian regime and weaken its ballistic and nuclear capabilities—as soon as it obtains U.S. approval.
Meanwhile, the regime continues its war against internal opponents and enemies.
In May alone, at least 165 people were executed in Iranian prisons—a 143% increase compared to the same period in 2024, when 67 executions were recorded by the human rights NGO Hengaw.
Among those executed were 26 Kurds, 21 Lors, and 20 Baluchis. Five women were among the victims.
Official media and Islamic judiciary-affiliated websites reported only 6 of the 165 documented executions.
Also in May, 132 dissidents were arrested, including 54 Kurds and 29 Baluchis.
Those arrested include 9 women—among them 5 Kurdish activists, 3 Baha’i women—7 teachers and university professors, and 3 writers.
For the names of those executed and the arrested dissidents, see the NGO Hengaw’s website: https://hengaw.net/en/reports-and-statistics-1/2025/06/article-2-1.
