On April 26, a « historic conference » for Syrian Kurdish unity was held in Qamishli. More than 400 representatives from all Kurdish political parties and civil society figures gathered to formulate a common Kurdish stance and deliberate on a shared vision for the future of Kurds in Syria and for restructuring the Syrian state after six decades of dictatorship. A delegation from the pro-Kurdish DEM party and a representative of Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani attended the conference.
The conference, titled « Unity of Kurdish Position and Ranks », aimed not to divide the country, as some have claimed, but rather to promote Syrian unity, said General Mazloum Abdi during the opening. « We want all Syrian components to gain their constitutional rights so that we can build a democratic, decentralized, and inclusive Syria », he added.
At the end of a full day of deliberation, the participants adopted a "common political vision project," offering a realistic approach to a just solution for the Kurdish question in Syria within a democratic and decentralized state.
According to Kurdish official Mohammed Ismail, quoted by AFP (April 26), the final declaration is "a founding charter for a unified, pluralistic, multiconfessional, and multicultural Syria, whose Constitution guarantees the national rights of the Kurdish people, protects the freedom and rights of women, and promotes active participation in all political, social, and military institutions."
The final statement of the conference calls for this shared vision to serve as the "basis for national dialogue" among Kurdish forces as well as with the new Damascus administration and all Syrian national forces. A representative Kurdish delegation will be tasked with engaging in dialogue with the relevant parties to achieve the conference’s goals. “United around these goals, the Kurds intend to play a leading role in Syria’s radical democratic transformation,” said Badran Ciya Kurd, an official of the Autonomous Kurdish Administration, in a message posted on X.
The Kurdish unity conference crowns a process of inter-Kurdish dialogue revived by the symbolic meeting between General Mazloum Abdi and historic Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani in March 2025 in Erbil. Barzani used all his influence with Syrian Kurdish parties opposed to the Autonomous Kurdish Administration to ensure they participate in the unity and reconciliation process at this critical time.
French diplomacy has also spared no effort in promoting unity among Syrian Kurdish ranks and dialogue with the Kurdistan Region. During his visit to Erbil on April 23–24, the French Foreign Minister held an extended meeting with General Mazloum Abdi, who arrived via military helicopter for the occasion. This was a strong political and diplomatic gesture, marking the first official meeting between the Syrian Kurdish leader and the foreign minister of a Western power.
The Syrian presidency responded to the Kurdish conference and its call to build a democratic and decentralized state by rejecting on April 27 “any attempt to partition the country.” “We clearly reject any attempt to impose a separatist reality or create separate entities under the guise of federalism without broad consensus,” said the presidency in a statement, condemning “recent activities and statements by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) calling for federalism.” “the unity of Syria’s, territory, and people is a red line,” the statement added.
The Turkish media echoed similar sentiments, devoting considerable coverage to the conference and "the threat of Syria’s partition," which they claim is not aligned with the March 11 agreement signed between the Syrian interim president and General Mazloum Abdi. However, reactions have remained “measured” amid the delicate regional context.
Weak and still unstable, the new Syrian regime is in no position to confront the Kurds. It faces opposition from the Alawites and has also confronted Druze dissidence. After a message deemed blasphemous toward Islam was posted on social media and attributed to a Druze, violent clashes erupted in the Jaramana suburb of Damascus, home to a large Druze community. Early reports indicate about a hundred deaths. Some Druze leaders denounced a "genocidal campaign," while others sought to ease tensions.
Positioning itself as a defender of the Druze, Israel bombed several Syrian army positions and threatened to expand its intervention. Turkish President Erdogan accused Israel of attempting to "derail the revolution in Syria." Meanwhile, after bloody raids by Islamist militias allied with the regime, many Alawites fled to Lebanon (Le Monde, April 14).
The Kurds, while asserting their demands and vision for Syria’s future, continue working toward stabilizing the country. On April 4, under an agreement with the new regime, Kurdish forces withdrew from the two Kurdish suburbs of Aleppo they had controlled for about ten years. On April 10, a new agreement was reached between Damascus and the Kurdish forces regarding the strategic Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates, which the Kurds had controlled since defeating ISIS. The dam’s security will now be managed by the Syrian army in cooperation with Kurdish forces. As a result, the intense fighting since last December between Kurdish forces and Turkish-backed militias, supported by Turkish airstrikes, has ceased (AFP, April 12; Rudaw, April 23).
However, the honeymoon period for the new regime has ended. Its image is deteriorating among religious minorities and in Sunni urban areas, which fear renewed sectarian violence and see the regime’s inability to revive a devastated economy. Assad’s dictatorship legacy still weighs heavily. Each week, new captagon drug production sites are discovered, intended for neighboring markets. Inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons claim there may be up to 100 chemical weapons sites in Syria. They seek to assess and secure the state of these production, research, and storage facilities (New York Times, April 6).
During a March visit to The Hague at the organization’s headquarters, the Syrian Foreign Minister pledged to destroy the sites. Yet inspectors have still not been allowed into Syria to conduct their investigations.
Power vacuums in certain provinces allow ISIS to regroup. Its activity has increased, even in territories under Kurdish administration. On April 18, Kurdish security forces launched a major operation to dismantle ISIS sleeper cells inside and around the Al-Hol camp. The operation led to the arrest of 20 jihadists and collaborators, along with the seizure of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment. A large-scale, coordinated escape attempt involving cells inside and outside the camp was foiled (Rudaw, April 23).
On April 29, in clashes with jihadists in the desert province of Deir ez-Zor, five Kurdish fighters were killed and several others wounded (AFP, April 29). In this vast, Arab-majority province bordering Iraq—where tribal leaders often shift allegiance—ISIS appears to be regaining strength.
The resurgence of ISIS activity may prompt the allied coalition to maintain its military presence in Rojava. Washington, which has not yet made a final decision on the matter, announced on April 18 that it would halve its troop presence in Syria. “The U.S. military presence in Syria will be reduced to fewer than 1,000 soldiers next month,” down from about 2,000 currently, said Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell in a statement (AFP, April 18).
The protests against the arrest of Istanbul's mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, have continued throughout Turkey. It is primarily the youth, especially university students, who are now the driving force behind this broad protest movement. Having only known the unmovable and authoritarian Erdogan as president, they say they are “exasperated,” deprived of a future, and have taken up the call for early elections launched by the leader of the CHP (Republican People's Party), Özgür Özel. This generation demonstrates firm convictions. According to a 2022 study cited by Le Monde on April 2, 90% of young people are dissatisfied with the democratic system, 84% demand gender equality and the protection of freedom of expression, 86% support women's rights, and 71% advocate for equality for LGBTQ+ people—positions largely at odds with the current government's practices.
Freedom of expression has deteriorated to the point where Turkey now ranks very low on Reporters Without Borders’ annual index: 158th out of 180, whereas just 15 years ago it was around the middle. This explains protest slogans like “Make Turkey shine again!” and “Don't be angry, oh great sultan, just be accountable.” Protesters denounce corruption and nepotism in the regime, which prevent them from finding jobs matching their qualifications, forcing them to work as delivery drivers or cashiers to survive, despite having university degrees.
The rebellion is now spreading to high schools. On April 8, news of the forced reassignment of several thousand teachers from the country's top-performing high schools sparked widespread anger among students. In Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Antalya, and most mid-sized cities, sit-ins and class boycotts joined the wave of protest sweeping the country since the March 13 arrest of Istanbul’s mayor. The movement, surprisingly large in scale, prompted the government to announce a “partial suspension” of the teacher reassignment plan on April 17, citing that those targeted were suspected of opposition sympathies (Le Monde, April 18).
One symbolic moment of youth protest was the boycott of brands associated with pro-government businesses. These conglomerates dominate media (which censor protest footage), construction giants monopolizing major infrastructure projects, and consumer goods chains. Young protesters denounce these oligarchs for thriving off an impoverished population and criticize the “Putinization” of the Turkish economy under Erdogan’s regime.
Since the start of the protests, Turkish authorities have already arrested over 2,000 people, according to the Ministry of the Interior (Challenges, April 11), including many close to the Istanbul mayor. With over 400,000 inmates, Turkey’s overcrowded prison system is reportedly considering an amnesty law for “victims of fate,” i.e., common criminals, to make room for new political prisoners.
In L’Opinion on April 2, analyst Yaroslav Trofimov questions why “Europe turns a blind eye to Turkey’s repression campaign.” In the past, such repression of democratic opposition would have drawn strong European reactions. But now, deteriorating transatlantic relations and growing concerns about Russia outweigh such issues. The fear of another wave of Syrian refugees heading to the EU also makes European leaders reluctant to provoke Erdogan. The EU is even paying billions to Turkey to prevent migrants from reaching Europe, where immigration has disrupted traditional political balances.
The New York Times also criticized the United States’ complicit silence. Its Editorial Board published a piece in the April 27 edition titled, “Turkey’s People Are Resisting Autocracy. They Deserve More Than Silence.” A deafening silence that is unlikely to be broken anytime soon by Western chancelleries, who remain passive in the face of their Turkish ally’s abuses. Sweden stood almost alone in condemning the arrest of a journalist from Dagens ETC covering the protests in Istanbul. Turkish authorities accuse the Swedish journalist, Joakim Medin, 40, of participating in a PKK protest in Stockholm in January 2023, during which an effigy of Erdogan was hung upside down. He denies the accusation and says he is eager to tell the judge, “Journalism shouldn’t be a crime—even in Turkey” (AFP, April 3). His trial began on April 30, and he faces up to 12 years in prison.
Meanwhile, the peace process aimed at ending the conflict with the PKK continued in April without major progress, apart from a meeting between the DEM Party delegation, made up of Ms. Pervin Buldan and Sirri Süreyya Önder, and President Erdogan on April 10 at the presidential palace in Ankara. In an official statement, the DEM Party described the meeting as “positive, constructive, productive, and promising for the future.” Both parties acknowledged the importance of the current phase and emphasized the vital need for a new era free of violence and conflict, focused on strengthening democratic and political pathways, according to the DEM statement. President Erdogan did not comment.
France has been one of the Western countries most affected by ISIS terrorist attacks. It was the Kurdish fighters of Iraq and Syria, often supported by those from the PKK, who played a decisive role in defeating ISIS and dismantling the Islamic State, at the cost of more than 18,000 deaths. This shared fight in defense of common values created a "brotherhood in arms" that, after being recognized by the military, is now being acknowledged by French political leaders.
French diplomacy now has a Kurdish policy and acts to uphold the rights of the Kurdish people and the security of its "brothers in arms."
The Kurds have become key political players in both Iraq and Syria, and France's most reliable allies in a complicated Middle East torn apart by regional power struggles.
It was in this context, and to deepen Franco-Kurdish dialogue, that President Macron received the President of the Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani, at the Élysée Palace on April 14. Topics discussed during the meeting and working lunch included Franco-Kurdish relations, the situation in Iraq, the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad, the situation in Syria, and broader regional issues. The organization of a new regional summit on Iraq was also mentioned.
The objective of this new summit, strongly desired by France, would be to strengthen Baghdad’s ties with regional Arab countries, as well as with France—and, through it, with the European Union—to counter the influence of Iran, which still dominates much of Iraq’s political class.
Iranian influence in Baghdad also has negative repercussions for Kurdistan: Iran's objective is to gradually erode Kurdish autonomy and make it financially dependent on Baghdad. Iraqi Sunnis also reject Iranian influence, as do an increasing number of Shiite nationalists. The political presence of the Kurds in Baghdad—where both the President of the Republic and the Foreign Minister are Kurdish—offers leverage for French diplomacy.
The Franco-Kurdish political dialogue, initiated by President Mitterrand, is now well established. Observers note that the President of Kurdistan is the only head of an autonomous region regularly received at the Élysée, almost as if he were a head of state. For comparison, neither the President of Bavaria nor the President of Catalonia has ever been officially received at the Élysée.
Following this visit, which was widely covered by Kurdish media, the French Foreign Minister visited Kurdistan on April 23, after a brief stop in Baghdad where he met with the Iraqi Prime Minister and his counterpart Fuad Hussein.
In Erbil, Jean-Noël Barrot met with key Kurdish leaders: President Nechirvan Barzani, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani, and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Bafel Talabani. A highlight of Mr. Barrot’s first visit to Kurdistan was his meeting with historic Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, former President of Kurdistan and head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The French minister expressed France's continued solidarity with the Kurdish people. The two leaders discussed the urgent need to form a new cabinet in the Kurdistan Region, the state of Erbil-Baghdad relations, and the broader regional dynamic. They emphasized the importance of Kurdish unity in Syria and welcomed recent efforts aimed at a peaceful resolution in Turkey.
Mr. Barrot praised the resilience of the Kurdish people and reiterated France’s commitment to supporting democratic institutions and ongoing reforms. He extended an official invitation to President Masoud Barzani to visit Paris for a ceremony honoring the sacrifices of the Peshmerga in the fight against terrorism and to inaugurate a "Peshmerga Alley" in a Parisian park.
Highlighting France’s regional engagement, Mr. Barrot also emphasized his country's "strong collaboration to support General Mazloum and the Kurdish political entities in Syria," noting that such efforts aim to promote Kurdish unity and "positively influence the sustainable transition process in the region."
On April 24, at the conclusion of his visit to Erbil, Minister Barrot met with General Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who traveled specifically for this meeting. According to a statement released by the SDF, Minister Barrot praised the SDF’s key role in the fight against ISIS and reiterated France’s commitment to providing all necessary support. The meeting also emphasized the need for inclusive political participation by Kurds and all Syrian communities to achieve lasting political, security, and economic stability in Syria and to pave the way for national reconstruction.
The French diplomatic chief’s visit coincided with the 4th World Congress of Kurdish Studies, held in Erbil on April 22–23, co-organized by the Kurdish Institute of Paris and the University of Kurdistan-Hewlêr. The event brought together over 140 speakers from 27 countries, including many French researchers. Kurdistan experienced a "French week" during which France was prominently honored.
Elsewhere in the news this month, despite new meetings, the two main Kurdish parties—the KDP and PUK—who claim to have agreed on a government coalition program, have still not formed a cabinet. Baghdad has yet to resume Kurdistan’s oil exports, despite announcements in March that resumption was “imminent.”
Amid the spring fervor, Kurdistan experienced emotional moments with the commemoration of the 37th anniversary of the Anfal genocidal campaign launched by Saddam Hussein’s regime, which resulted in the death of 182,000 Kurdish civilians and the destruction of 90% of Kurdish villages.
There were also joyful moments following the victory of Duhok SC football club, which won the Gulf Championship final with a 2-1 win against Kuwait’s Qadsia team. It is the first time a Kurdish team has become champion of the Gulf Football Tournament. This victory united and delighted Kurds of all ages across the region, offering a brief respite from current hardships.
Iran and the United States began indirect talks mediated by Oman on April 12 in the Sultanate. The discussions focused on Iran's nuclear program and the lifting of U.S. sanctions against Iran. According to the New York Times (April 13), both parties demonstrated pragmatism and seriousness in seeking common ground to prevent another war in the Middle East.
This initial meeting helped pave the way and set the parameters for future negotiations. Both sides described it as "constructive," and a follow-up session was held on April 19 in Rome. The White House referred to it as "a step forward toward a mutually satisfactory agreement." Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on state television that "neither Iran nor the United States wants fruitless and endless negotiations." He traveled to Moscow to brief Russian leaders on the developments.
Meanwhile, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited Iran on April 16 for a working trip. In an interview with Le Monde on April 16, he expressed a desire for the IAEA to be involved in the U.S.-Iran nuclear dialogue. He emphasized that Iran is close to possessing nuclear weapons and added, "Without us, any agreement on Iran is just a piece of paper."
Despite early positive signs, the chances of a negotiated solution remain highly uncertain. U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff is demanding the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, including the removal of uranium enrichment centrifuges. For Iran, uranium enrichment is non-negotiable (Le Monde, April 16), and Iran's military capabilities are considered "red lines" in the talks (AFP, April 15).
Are we heading toward an agreement similar to the 2015 deal between the UN Security Council's five permanent members plus Germany? That deal provided for increased oversight of Iran’s nuclear program and the transfer of enriched uranium stocks to another country, thereby postponing Iran’s potential nuclear armament for several years. The Trump administration withdrew from the agreement in 2018, imposing a series of harsh sanctions to exert "maximum pressure" on Iran.
Iran did not yield to the pressure and even accelerated its nuclear program. Israel, the U.S.’s main ally in the region, openly favors a military strike against a weakened Iran to destroy its nuclear facilities. According to the New York Times, Israel had planned such an attack but was stopped by President Trump, who wanted to give diplomacy a chance. U.S. support is crucial for the success of any such operation and for defending Israel from possible Iranian retaliation.
However, President Trump has given the peace talks a two-month deadline. If they fail, he threatens military action against Iran while claiming to be open to meeting Iranian leaders to strike a "deal" and avoid conflict (New York Times, April 25).
On April 26, a massive fire devastated the Iranian port of Shahid Rajaee, killing 46 people and injuring over a thousand. The explosion, heard dozens of kilometers away, occurred at this strategic port through which 85% of Iran’s goods pass. According to customs officials, the likely cause was a fire in a hazardous chemicals depot, reminiscent of the Beirut port blast (AFP, April 28).
In a country where conspiracy theories are rampant, the incident has been attributed to foreign sabotage—specifically Israel. On April 30, Iran announced the execution of a "high-ranking spy" linked to Israel. Officially, this execution was unrelated to the port fire. The condemned man was accused of "buying a motorcycle to surveil" IRGC Colonel Hassan Sayyed Khodaei, who was assassinated in Tehran on May 22, 2022.
The timing of the execution has raised suspicions, especially since many Iranians already attribute the helicopter crash that killed former President Raisi on his return from Azerbaijan to Mossad.
Iran is the global leader in executions. According to an Amnesty International report published on April 8, there were 1,518 executions worldwide in 2024—64% of them in Iran, with 972 people executed, 119 more than the previous year. This outpaces even Saudi Arabia, which executed 345 people (Le Monde, April 8).
This grim practice continues into 2025, especially in Kurdistan.
On April 20, 2025, Hamid Hoseinnezhad Heidaranlou, a 40-year-old Kurdish political prisoner and father of three from Chaldoran, was secretly executed at Urmia Central Prison. Arrested in April 2023 near the Chaldoran border, Heidaranlou endured nearly two years of brutal detention marked by isolation, torture, and denial of legal representation or family visits. Although his passport clearly showed he was outside Iran on the date of the alleged armed confrontation, he was sentenced to death for "armed rebellion against the state" (baghi) due to alleged ties to the PKK. According to the Hengaw human rights organization, the conviction was based solely on the presiding judge's "personal knowledge," in a trial lasting only a few minutes without credible evidence.
Iran’s Supreme Court also rejected a second appeal to reopen the trial of Pakhshan Azizi, a Kurdish journalist and political prisoner currently held in Evin Prison. Sentenced to death on June 14, 2024, for rebellion charges, she now faces imminent execution. Her lawyer, Maziar Tataei, revealed that the court dismissed the request without reviewing the case files, deeming the defense's arguments baseless. A prior appeal was rejected in February. In addition to the death sentence, authorities sentenced Ms. Azizi to six months in a separate case for allegedly "inciting unrest in prison." She was arrested on August 4, 2023, in Tehran and transferred to Evin in December.
In the ongoing crackdown on Kurdish cultural figures, Iranian authorities also imprisoned Serveh Pourmohammadi, 36, a Kurdish language teacher and member of the Nojin NGO. She was detained on April 19, 2025, in Senna and transferred to the women’s ward of Senna Central Prison to begin serving a five-year sentence. Initially sentenced to 10 years in November 2023 by Revolutionary Court Branch 1 for allegedly "forming a group to disrupt national security," her sentence was reduced on appeal, with the final verdict delivered in November 2024.
Shohreh Ghamar, a 32-year-old Kurdish actress from Bijar residing in Tehran, was sentenced to 56 months in prison for her political and social activism. On April 12, 2025, the Tehran Revolutionary Court gave her three years and six months for "supporting Israel" and 14 more months for "spreading misinformation in favor of the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ movement and inciting public opinion." She had already received a 15-month sentence for supporting the same movement. Her lawyer has appealed the ruling. Ghamar was arrested by the Ministry of Intelligence on August 5, 2023, for allegedly "offensive" social media posts.
Since 2006, the Kurdish Institute of Paris has been organizing World Congresses on Kurdish Studies in partnership with universities in Kurdistan.
The 4th of these congresses was held on April 22 and 23 in Erbil, at the University of Kurdistan-Hewlêr.
More than 140 researchers and academics from 27 countries presented papers on topics spanning the various fields of Kurdish studies. Many university students attended the presentations and the subsequent discussions with great interest and had the opportunity to meet scholars from abroad throughout these two rich and intense days.
These exchanges, which pave the way for future cooperation, are expected to have a significant impact on the future of Kurdish studies. Local media provided extensive coverage of the event and interviewed numerous participants.
The proceedings of the congress will be published online and in print at a later date.
Below is, for your information, the text of the welcome speech delivered by Kendal Nezan at the opening of this congress.
Welcome address by Kendal NEZAN
We are very pleased to welcome you to the 4th World Congress of Kurdish Studies, co-organized by the Kurdish Institute of Paris, the University of Kurdistan in Erbil, and the Ministry of Higher Education of Kurdistan.
The previous congresses, organized by the Kurdish Institute, were held in September 2006 at Salahaddin University in Erbil, in May 2011 at the University of Duhok, and in November 2019 in partnership with the Universities of Zakho and Koya.
The main objective of these congresses and conferences is to assess the state of research in various fields of knowledge about the Kurdish world, to discuss perspectives and—last but not least—to create links between researchers from Kurdistan and those from all over the world, to encourage exchanges and synergies, and to contribute together to a better understanding of the Kurdish people and society.
From one congress to the next, we are pleased to see the growing interest in Kurdish studies. Thus, in Erbil, nearly 20 years ago, we were able to gather around twenty Western academics whose presentations had to be translated into Kurdish for local students and researchers. Today, we have 140 participants from 27 countries presenting papers on around fifteen themes—classic ones such as language, literature, and history, but also more recent topics such as gender studies, genocide and memory studies, AI and Kurdish studies, peace building and reconciliation, global Kurdish diaspora, or regional and international dynamics of Kurdistan—a vast panorama of research domains related to the Kurdish world, its past, present, and future outlooks.
The richness and diversity of this program, the number and quality of its speakers, reflect the considerable progress achieved in recent years. But in the field of Kurdish studies, the journey has been long. Vast areas—from the archaeology of Kurdistan to the pre-Islamic history of the Kurds, to the study of oral literature and the "hypertrophied" Kurdish folklore, as described by the famous Russian ethnologist Vilchevsky, as well as Kurdish popular, classical, and religious music, and Kurdish artistic heritage—still remain largely unexplored.
Deprived of a state and institutions of their own for nearly two centuries, the Kurds have had little opportunity to study, understand, and value their culture and historical and artistic heritage. At the heart of a region that was one of the earliest cradles of human civilization, Kurdistan remained inaccessible to Western researchers for a long time. The region's history was written for a long time without them, or even against them, in the narratives of the states that divided Kurdistan. The Kurds were often regarded as "nonexistent" and rendered invisible.
In recent decades, through their struggle for freedom and their prominent role in regional and international dynamics, they have emerged from this « black hole » of history. From lamented victims of 20th century’s injustices, they have become the actors of their own history. The courage of their fighters—especially women—against Daesh jihadists has made the Kurdish people visible and appreciated by international public opinion. The young Kurdish student Jîna Mahsa AMINI has become a global icon of the struggle of women for freedom and equality.
The development of Kurdish studies is part of this new dynamic. Kurdology is no longer a modest niche for a few curious academics but a popular discipline. Today, manga about the Kurds are published in Japan; Chinese students are learning Kurdish; research is being conducted on Kurdish cinema in Mexico; and a Woody Allen character is enrolled in a Kurdish Studies program at Columbia University.
Dear researchers gathered here, be assured: you are very much in vogue! The Kurds are in the spotlight, and they may well remain so for a long time. We thus have much to do together. A better understanding of the Kurdish world will also shed new light on the comprehension of this entire part of the world.
On behalf of the Kurdish Institute, I warmly welcome you all. Welcome to those coming from distant countries, and also to the researchers from Bakur, Rojhelat, and Rojava. We are eager to listen to you and to learn with you and from you.
To conclude, I would like to express my warmest thanks to the University of Kurdistan, which is hosting this event. Its teams have spared no effort to ensure the success of this conference.
We are very happy and moved to be here today in this beautiful university, which was founded by one of our former vice-presidents, Dr. Abbas VALI, and built thanks to two distinguished members of our Institute—the late Ferda Cemil Pasha and Dana QASHANI, who is likely present in the room.
Many thanks as well to our partner, the Ministry of Higher Education of Kurdistan, which has notably covered part of the costs of this conference.
The French Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Higher Education, through the Kurdish Institute which they co-finance, as well as the French Embassy in Baghdad, have also supported this conference. We would like to warmly thank them for their support.
Thank you all for your participation, and have a wonderful conference!
To mark the 40th anniversary of its founding, the Kurdish Institute has launched the publication of a landmark reference work in French on the History of the Kurds, with the aim of assessing the current state of knowledge and ongoing research on a subject dear to the hearts of Kurds and their friends.
Professor Hamit Bozarslan, director of studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), kindly agreed to lead this collective volume, which is prefaced by Kendal Nezan. In addition to Hamit Bozarslan, who authored a long and scholarly introduction, contributors include Josef Wiesehöfer, professor at the University of Kiel (Germany); Boris James, lecturer at Paul-Valéry University in Montpellier; Metin Atmaca, professor at the University of Social Sciences in Ankara; and Cengiz Gunes, senior lecturer at The Open University (UK).
This 613-page volume is published by Éditions du Cerf, Paris.
Le Monde, in its April 28 issue, dedicated a full page to the publication, including an interview with Hamit Bozarslan — read the article.
The book is available at the Institute and in our online store .
