Publications


B u l l e t i n

c o m p l e t

Bulletin N° 499 | October 2026

 

 

TURKEY: THE LAST INDEPENDENT TELEVISION CHANNEL SILENCED

Turkey’s Islamist-nationalist regime is continuing its authoritarian drift. The last remaining spaces for independent expression are being banned, and the last independent media outlets, or those suspected of opposing the government, are being silenced. Following the closure, by order of an Istanbul criminal court, of the independent news portal T24, widely followed by intellectuals and students, it is now Halk TV (People’s Television), the country’s leading and last independent television channel, that has incurred the wrath of the authorities.

Following a procedure that has now become all too familiar, in the early hours of October 14, hundreds of police officers stormed the Halk TV building and offices on the European shore of the Bosphorus. The live broadcast was abruptly interrupted. All the surrounding streets were blocked off while police officers carrying shields searched the premises, as though they were raiding a dangerous terrorist hideout.

At the same time, an administrator appointed by the authorities arrived at the scene under heavy police escort to “manage” the channel, in other words, to take control of it and bring it into line. This heavy-handed operation, carried out at a rapid pace, took place on the day when the mayor of Istanbul, ousted and imprisoned by the authorities since March 2025, was due to begin presenting his defence in the trial targeting the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, which he had headed since 2019. The trial had reached its 98th hearing, which Halk TV had planned to cover live.

This was unacceptable to the Turkish authorities, who are determined at all costs to impose their own version of the campaign to bring Istanbul’s popular elected mayor, and President Erdoğan’s feared rival in the next elections, to heel. The Turkish judiciary, still under the orders of the Presidential Palace, as most observers maintain, had already ordered the seizure of his defence statement, which was published in book form this summer. The eloquent İmamoğlu’s defence, broadcast live on Halk TV, would have seriously undermined the regime’s propaganda.

What exactly is Halk TV accused of? The Istanbul Public Prosecutor’s Office has singled out the commercial activities of Halk TV’s owner and chairman of the board, Cafer Mimaroğlu. An investigation has been opened against him for “corruption,” “bid rigging” and “laundering money derived from criminal activities.” According to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, bribes totalling 14,464,000 Turkish liras, approximately 280,000 euros, were allegedly paid in connection with tenders issued by the İzmir Metropolitan Municipality, whose mayor, elected on the ticket of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), thought it wise to join the ruling AKP in order to avoid ending up behind bars himself.

In a state governed by the rule of law, these accusations would have been the subject of a judicial investigation followed by a proper trial respecting the rights of the defence. Any conviction at first instance would have been open to appeal, and it would only have been after confirmation by the Court of Cassation that the accused Mimaroğlu, like Istanbul’s elected mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, would have been imprisoned to serve their sentences. It would then have been up to Halk TV’s competent bodies to appoint his successor, while in the case of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, it would have been for the Municipal Council to elect a new mayor once İmamoğlu, who was elected by universal suffrage, had been definitively convicted.

But despite all its public assertions, Turkey is not a state governed by the rule of law that respects basic legal principles and its commitments to the European Court of Human Rights. This is why the enterprising and prosperous Turkish businessman Cafer Mimaroğlu became a criminal overnight, without trial. He was imprisoned along with seven members of his family, including his 70-year-old brother.

In a video posted on X, he rejects the “baseless” accusations made against him and declares: “Today is a dark day for Turkey. The public’s right to information is being violated for political reasons. Defending Halk TV means defending the struggle for democracy in Turkey” (Le Monde, October 15; RFI; France 24, October 15).

There were numerous reactions in Turkey and Europe to this takeover of Halk TV. The founder and leader of the New Party (Yeni Parti), who was removed by a court decision from the leadership of the old Republican People’s Party (CHP), then the main party of Turkey’s parliamentary opposition, reacted that same day by declaring: “Only dictators would act by storming a television channel at dawn and appointing an administrator (...). The nation will prevail, and those seeking to impose their will shall be defeated.” In the Turkish context, this was a bold statement that could well expose him to prosecution for “insulting the president.”

Founded in an Istanbul apartment in 2004, Halk TV became genuinely popular through its coverage of the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul. It had since been subjected to judicial harassment. Now silenced and run by an administrator appointed by the authorities, it is being brought into line before, in all likelihood, being shut down like another independent channel, Tele 1, which was silenced a year ago.

The Kurds are accustomed to the regular closure of their television channels and the banning of their newspapers for “separatist propaganda,” amid the indifference of Turkish public opinion and Turkey’s opposition parties. The latter are now discovering, in turn, the brutality and authoritarianism of their state.

This “Putinization” of the Turkish regime is driving it ever further away from the European Union. As the European Commission has noted, negotiations on accession to the European Union, launched in 2005, have been completely stalled for several years. “The repression directed in Turkey both against LGBTQ+ communities and against the political opposition and the media is pushing Ankara away from its plans for European integration,” European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos stated on October 9 during her official visit to the Turkish capital. “Our next enlargement report, which will be published on October 28, will reflect our serious concerns in these areas. Nor will I shy away from the obligation to state the facts publicly and clearly,” she added (Le Monde, October 9).

The agreement signed between Turkey and Libya on the delimitation of their maritime borders, ratified on October 20 by the “Parliament” of eastern Libya, is expected to further aggravate tensions between Turkey and the European Union. The latter, like Greece and Egypt, considers this agreement illegal under international maritime law and therefore “null and void.” In addition to the traditional bone of contention created by Turkey’s occupation of the northern part of the island of Cyprus, Turkey is now clearly encroaching upon Greek maritime space, arguing in particular that the Greek islands should not obstruct its access to maritime areas farther south. It justifies this claim by citing the length of its Mediterranean coastline, but the claim violates international maritime law.

At odds with the EU, Turkey is no longer much in favour in Moscow either. The friendship between Erdoğan and his role model Putin is not what it once was. In recent months, Turkish merchant ships sailing from Ukrainian ports have been bombed by the Russian navy or air force. There has been considerable damage and loss of life. But the Turkish president has refrained from any open criticism and merely called on Moscow and Kyiv not to target merchant ships and to guarantee the safety of maritime transport routes. His appeal fell on deaf ears, with Putin not even deigning to respond or express the slightest regret over the deaths of crew members aboard the Turkish ships that were sunk (Le Monde, October 16).

Relations are also strained between Turkey and its “sister nation,” Azerbaijan. Through news websites close to the government, such as Qafqazinfo, the latter has implicitly accused its overbearing Turkish neighbour of “interfering in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs, building a network of people loyal to Turkey, conducting intelligence operations and fuelling domestic unrest.”

The website singles out the harmful activities of the Turkish intelligence services (MIT) and some of its agencies, including the Cooperation Agency (TIKA) and the Islamist humanitarian organisation IHH.

The crisis originated with Azerbaijan’s adoption, on September 21, of new rules intended to reinforce secularism in schools and prohibit clothing “that disrupts the uniformity of the compulsory school attire or that is incompatible with the principle of secularism.”

The very next day, September 22, the Turkish president criticised the decision during his speech from the United Nations rostrum: “The headscarf bans introduced in schools in certain countries constitute an infringement of fundamental rights.”

Offended, President Aliyev banned some thirty Turkish figures from entering Azerbaijani territory on October 23. They included journalists, academics and Leyla Şahin, deputy chair of the AKP parliamentary group in the Turkish National Assembly and a symbol of the struggle for the right to wear the Islamic headscarf (Le Monde, October 22).

The two “brotherly” countries also have profound differences over Israel, which is Baku’s ally against the Islamic Republic of Iran and a vehement adversary of Turkish President Erdoğan.

The latter is increasingly playing the leadership card in the Sunni world. With this in mind, he signed agreements known as the “Mecca agreements” with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, promising mutual military assistance in the event of aggression by a third party. Battered by repeated attacks from Yemen’s Houthis, Saudi Arabia must have found convincing arguments, particularly financial ones, to secure the military commitment of these two Sunni Muslim countries with their substantial armed forces.

It is not yet known whether Ankara will send a Turkish expeditionary force to Saudi Arabia or Yemen, or whether it will persuade its Syrian allies to dispatch several contingents of seasoned and highly motivated former Arab jihadists to fight these Houthi “Shiite infidels.”

In domestic politics, the PKK disarmament process has made some progress. On October 12, the Turkish intelligence services confirmed that the PKK had evacuated four bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, in the districts of Metina and Baze. For its part, the PKK announced through the Kurdish Firat news agency that it had recently withdrawn all its fighters from Turkish territory, as well as from positions in northern Iraq, “so that the Turkish state does not perceive them as a threat” (RFI, October 12).

On October 25, the PKK held a press conference in a village in Iraqi Kurdistan not far from its stronghold on Mount Qandil. Approximately 25 fighters, including three commanders and eight women “returning from Turkey,” attended the press conference to announce that “in accordance with the decisions of the 12th Congress, we will withdraw all our forces from Turkey.” The PKK called on Ankara to take the political and legal measures required to move the peace process forward (Rûdaw, October 16).

This step, described as “major” by the Turkish press, did not lead to any progress in the “peace process” on the part of the Turkish government.

On October 15, Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş stated that the provisions of the framework law would not enter into force until the Turkish security services had confirmed the end of the PKK’s armed activities and the National Security Council had validated that conclusion. He also announced the forthcoming establishment of a parliamentary monitoring commission bringing together the parties represented in Parliament.

 

SYRIA: THE DIFFICULT RETURN OF DISPLACED KURDS

The 2019 Turkish invasion of the Kurdish cantons of Serê Kaniyê (Ras al-Ayn) and Girê Spî (Tell Abyad) caused a mass exodus of their Kurdish inhabitants towards the Kurdish areas of Rojava. The Arab militias serving as auxiliaries to the Turkish army implemented a genuine policy of ethnic cleansing there. They confiscated Kurdish property and allocated Kurdish homes, fields and businesses to their Arab followers.

Most of these displaced Kurds had been living, or surviving, in camps for seven years under extremely precarious conditions.

One of the main provisions of the Kurdish-Syrian agreement of January 29, 2026 provides for the gradual return of these displaced people to their homes and their ancestral lands. To this end, committees for the return of displaced people were established in both Serê Kaniyê and Girê Spî, and the return process began in July, particularly in the canton of Afrin, where it proceeded without major incident, although not without numerous disputes, which are still ongoing, with the Arab occupants of the properties.

In Girê Spî, the return of a first convoy of displaced people on October 26 triggered a wave of violence by Arab settlers, who attacked the convoy and set its vehicles on fire while shouting “Allahu Akbar!” and “The convoy of PKK pigs is not welcome!” According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), approximately 20 vehicles belonging to the displaced Kurds were set ablaze and destroyed, and shots were fired. The attackers were reportedly Syrian Arabs who had settled in Girê Spî, the NGO said. The displaced Kurds were forced to seek refuge in an administrative building belonging to the Girê Spî (Tell Abyad) subprefecture while awaiting the intervention of the authorities (Rûdaw, October 26).

In a press release dated October 26, the Girê Spî Displaced Persons Committee stated that it had worked to coordinate the return of Girê Spî’s inhabitants with the relevant authorities, but that these efforts had not yet produced tangible results. For its part, the Serê Kaniyê Displaced Persons Committee issued a statement that same day asserting that the attacks in Girê Spî “raise serious concerns about the safety and security of the return of displaced people and their right to return safely and with dignity to their region of origin.” Both committees called for urgent action to protect displaced families and prevent further attacks.

Last August, a convoy of displaced Kurds returning to their city of Serê Kaniyê was also subjected to violent attacks, forcing it to return to a camp in Hassakeh Province. The commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), General Mazloum Abdi, subsequently called for the creation of an independent commission of inquiry to identify and punish the perpetrators of the attacks.

The commission was never established, but the Syrian authorities introduced enhanced security measures to ensure the return of displaced Kurds to Serê Kaniyê. Since then, approximately 3,500 displaced families have been able to return home in several convoys. The sixth convoy, organised on October 21, alone included approximately 4,084 people from 642 families, most of them originally from displaced villages such as Sindê, Erîşê and Um Khere.

Those who were not included in this convoy organised a protest at the Washokani displaced persons camp in Hassakeh Province. They are demanding that the return process be accelerated so that they can leave the camps and reunite with their families before the arrival of winter (Rûdaw, October 21).

However, the return process is proving difficult in the city of Serê Kaniyê. According to Mahmoud Jamil, spokesperson for the Serê Kaniyê Displaced Persons Committee, Arab militias still occupy approximately 5,500 homes and are unwilling to return them to their rightful owners. Some militiamen are demanding “compensation” of $10,000 to vacate each occupied home. This is a considerable sum in relation to local purchasing power.

In addition to paying this ransom, the rightful owners must also bear substantial costs to repair and restore their homes after seven years of uncontrolled occupation.

Alerted by Kurdish officials, the Damascus authorities say they are actively working to resolve these “disputes.” In the meantime, more than 14,000 displaced people from Serê Kaniyê are still waiting to return home. In total, more than 13,000 displaced families remain in the camps of Hassakeh, Derik and Qamishlo, including many originally from Girê Spî.

Communal and political tensions are producing sporadic clashes and acts of violence. In early October, Arab demonstrators held several rallies in Hassakeh to demand that the Syrian government take full control of this predominantly Kurdish province.

On October 9, some demonstrators attempted to move towards Kurdish neighbourhoods, but internal security forces, acting on the orders of the city’s Kurdish governor, blocked their path using tear gas. Arab demonstrators damaged Kurdish symbols, including statues of Kurdish fighters. Three Kurdish brothers travelling in a vehicle displaying the Kurdistan flag were assaulted and wounded by gunfire. The city’s Kurdish residents subsequently organised a counterdemonstration to denounce the violence and calls for hatred against the Kurds and to demand that those responsible be prosecuted.

In early October, Hasan Keleş, a 56-year-old Kurdish teacher, was abducted in the Girkê Legê district by unidentified armed men. His vehicle was found abandoned. His family received a ransom demand for $300,000, accompanied by a photograph of him in captivity. The family filed a complaint, but the victim’s burned body was found a few days later.

Given Syria’s chaotic security situation, filing a complaint with the internal security forces, which consist mostly of former Islamist militiamen, in the hope of finding the perpetrators, themselves probably former militiamen well versed in extortion and other acts of banditry, is an admission of helplessness.

Syrian Kurdish political leaders, including General Mazloum Abdi, nevertheless express cautious optimism about the ongoing integration process, which is expected to be completed within a few months. The “bumps along the road” are blamed on “saboteurs” or former “Baathists,” as in Hassakeh.

They prefer to emphasise the “achievements of the Kurdish people”: the recognition of the Kurdish language and identity, and the integration of Rojava’s military and civilian institutions into those being established by the Syrian state.

They hope that Kurds will gain positions of responsibility at every level of this “common state,” including in ministries and embassies, for which names have been submitted to Damascus.

Diplomas issued by Kurdish schools, secondary schools and universities in Rojava have been recognised by Damascus. The Kurdish language is now taught for three hours a week in schools in Kurdish regions and cantons, as well as in schools in Syrian cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Deraa, which are home to large Kurdish communities.

In an interview with the Kurdish news channel Rûdaw, Ms Ilham Ahmed, former co-chair of the Rojava administration’s Department of International Relations, stated that, for the first time in Syria’s history, the Kurds are no longer objects of the Syrian state but recognised subjects and partners acting at the heart of that state.

“After the first stage of military and security integration, which has largely been completed, we are moving on to the next stage, that of constitutional guarantees for the achievements of the Kurdish people,” she added. She hopes that dialogue with the authorities will produce a satisfactory solution to the question of Kurdish-language education in schools in the Kurdish regions.

The issue of integrating Kurdish female fighters into the Syrian army has not yet been resolved either. While most of their male comrades have been “integrated” and are paid by the state, several thousand are still awaiting incorporation and, in the meantime, are being paid from what remains of the welfare funds of the former Rojava administration.

The same applies to teachers from Rojava’s schools who are awaiting integration. It should be noted that Qatar continues to pay the salaries of Syrian government officials and employees while awaiting the recovery of the Syrian economy.

The economic situation nevertheless remains extremely precarious. The vast majority of the population lives in destitution. This hardship is at its worst in the predominantly Kurdish province of Hassakeh, which also suffers from a severe lack of healthcare facilities (Rûdaw, October 22).

The situation is hardly any better in Afrin. Following a visit to this Kurdish canton in Aleppo Province, Paula Gaviria Betancur, the United Nations Special Rapporteur, stressed that returning Kurdish families still did not have “sufficient access to healthcare, roads, infrastructure and economic livelihoods.”

In security terms, the Islamic State continues to carry out sporadic operations. The Jordanian authorities have blamed it for a bloody attack on a Christian church in Karak, southern Jordan, which left nine people dead on October 23.

In retaliation, the Jordanian air force bombed ISIS camps in the Syrian regions of Deraa and Sweida on October 26, without informing Damascus. Amman subsequently announced that it had killed “20 terrorists.”

However, civilians were among the victims, including three children, prompting strong reactions in Damascus. Ultimately, the two neighbouring Arab countries chose de-escalation, and Jordan expressed its “regret” over the deaths of the civilians (Le Monde, October 28).

IRAQ: THE 2027 BUDGET HEADACHE

October was rich in political, economic and security developments in Kurdistan and throughout Iraq.

On the political front, on October 15, the Iraqi Parliament finally confirmed the appointment of nine new ministers to complete the cabinet of the Prime Minister who took office on May 14. Negotiations among the various Shiite blocs belonging to the ruling coalition over the distribution of the remaining ministerial posts were intense, including those of Deputy Prime Minister, which remained the subject of disputes among certain factions until the very last moment.

The Huquq (Rights) bloc, the political wing of the pro-Iranian Kataib Hezbollah militia, boycotted parliamentary sessions because it had not obtained one of the four Deputy Prime Minister posts it was demanding. The positions were ultimately awarded to Laith al-Khazali of the Sadiqoun Movement, the political wing of the Shiite Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia; Mohsen al-Mandalawi, leader of the Shiite Al-Assas bloc; Mohammed Tamim of the Sunni Arab Taqaddum Party; and Faris Sheikh Siddiq Brifkani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

To reassure opponents, Prime Minister al-Zaidi stated on October 13 that the four Deputy Prime Ministers would receive no salaries or allowances and that no new appointments would be made to their office staff. These would therefore be almost honorary positions, although they would still carry certain responsibilities.

The highly coveted post of Interior Minister was awarded to the candidate proposed by former Prime Minister Maliki’s Shiite State of Law bloc, which also obtained the portfolio of Higher Education and Scientific Research. As agreed, the Ministry of Defence was entrusted to a Sunni Arab, Nayef Shammar of the Hasm Coalition. Finally, KDP candidate Rebar Hamian became Minister of Construction and Housing.

The confirmation of these new ministers demonstrates that the culture of democracy, dialogue and compromise is making progress in Iraq. Factions that were still waging armed war against one another only a few years ago are now cooperating and, after months of negotiations reminiscent of political life in Belgium or the Netherlands, are managing to reach compromises. The endemic corruption and widespread patronage present throughout Iraq’s state institutions have yet to be tackled.

The first task of this now complete government is to prepare the 2027 budget in a country whose oil revenues have fallen by $60 billion following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the other consequences of the Iran-US war (Rûdaw, October 16).

But the worst appears to be over. Oil exports are returning to their pre-war level. In a statement to the official Iraqi News Agency on October 19, the Oil Minister said that “Iraq’s average volume of oil exports has exceeded 3.4 million barrels per day through the Strait of Hormuz, the Turkish port of Ceyhan and tankers transporting oil by road through Syria.”

The minister added that, thanks to his ministry’s relentless efforts, these exports had already reached 3 million barrels in September. “The aim of increasing export capacity is to enable the government to fulfil its responsibilities and provide the funds required to cover the state’s various expenditures,” he said (Rûdaw, October 19).

With this in mind, the Iraqi government has begun compensating international oil companies operating in Kurdistan by granting them additional oil entitlements. According to Jon Harris, an executive at the British company Gulf Keystone, “the commencement of these compensation payments is an important milestone for the company and for the Kurdistan oil industry” (Rûdaw, October 15).

However, because of frequent Iranian drone and missile attacks, oil production in Kurdistan has not yet reached the expected level of 400,000 barrels per day. But the Kurdistan oil pipeline, which carries oil from Kurdistan, including Kirkuk, to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, and the overland transport routes used by trucks travelling to Turkey through Kurdistan have become crucial to Iraq’s strategy of diversifying its oil export routes in order to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.

As part of this diversification strategy, Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi travelled to Damascus on October 26, where, among other matters of common interest, he discussed the project to build an oil pipeline transporting Iraqi oil to the Syrian Mediterranean port of Banias.

Baghdad and Damascus had signed a memorandum of understanding the previous July for the construction of this new pipeline, approximately 890 kilometres long, linking Haditha in Iraq’s al-Anbar Province to Banias.

A pipeline had already been built under the British Mandate to export oil from Kirkuk but, damaged by the wars in Iraq and Syria, it is now in a dilapidated condition. It needs to be renovated and expanded to enable Iraq to export up to 2 million barrels per day. To achieve this, Iraq must also build a domestic pipeline network connecting the southern oilfields to Haditha.

For his part, the Syrian president declared on this occasion: “Syria will serve as Iraq’s maritime gateway, regardless of whether we are one state or two.” The project is expected to take approximately three years to complete, but no financing plan was announced during the meeting between al-Zaidi and al-Sharaa.

It is against this difficult but promising medium and long-term backdrop that Iraq’s federal budget for the 2027 fiscal year, and the financial allocation for the Kurdistan Region, are being prepared and debated.

In view of the results of Iraq’s recent population census, this allocation should amount to 14.14% of the federal budget, corresponding to Kurdistan’s share of Iraq’s total population.

However, the draft budget prepared by Baghdad provides for approximately 12.7%. Moreover, no compensation mechanism has been envisaged for the years from 2014 to 2019, during which Kurdistan was deprived of any financial allocation. Furthermore, once mandatory federal expenditure on defence, foreign affairs, finance and other areas has been deducted, Kurdistan’s actual share of the federal budget falls below 9%.

Delegations from the Kurdistan Regional Government have been travelling to Baghdad since early October. A new round of negotiations was held on October 23, without producing any tangible results.

Erbil is urgently demanding that the salaries of Kurdistan’s civil servants, public-sector employees and pensioners be legally protected from potential political and financial disputes and that Peshmerga funding be treated in the same way as federal security expenditure.

The new Iraqi Prime Minister, al-Zaidi, is more receptive to Kurdish demands than his predecessors. As a sign of his goodwill towards Kurdistan, salaries are now being paid regularly.

On October 8, Baghdad transferred 855.553 billion dinars, approximately $535 million, to pay public-sector salaries. The approximately 1.016 million civil servants and pensioners were able to receive their salaries by bank card on October 11, while more than 100,000 beneficiaries, generally pensioners, continued to receive their monthly payments in cash.

Kurdistan’s economic situation is relatively stable and prosperous compared with that of neighbouring countries. Politically, however, the discord between the two main Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, persists. Two years after the parliamentary elections, they have still not managed to form a new coalition government. The former coalition, in which they are represented on an equal basis, continues to govern and manage the country’s affairs.

In response to this deadlock, Ali Hama Saleh, leader of the small opposition party Helwest, filed an application with the Federal Supreme Court in Baghdad seeking the dissolution of the Kurdistan Parliament. In a ruling issued on October 26, the Court rejected the application. This should nevertheless serve as a warning to the leaders of the two governing parties and prompt them to take urgent action.

On the security front, despite the departure of coalition forces, Iranian drone attacks against Kurdistan have continued. At least six drones struck sites housing Iranian Kurdish refugees or Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, particularly in Erbil Province, in three separate attacks. Tehran continues to demand the expulsion of these Kurdish parties and the handover of some of their political leaders, which the Kurdistan Regional Government categorically refuses.

In Baghdad, the trial of French jihadists who had long been held in Rojava and were transferred to Iraq last February began on October 5.

In two separate verdicts, the Iraqi Criminal Court first sentenced six French jihadists to life imprisonment and a seventh to 15 years in prison on October 25. On October 29, it sentenced three other jihadists to the same penalty of life imprisonment for membership of ISIS and active participation in its crimes.

In response, a spokesperson for the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs stated: “We note that the latest verdicts come two days after an Iraqi court sentenced six other French nationals to life imprisonment and one to 15 years in prison, under the Iraqi Criminal Code, for the crimes of which these French nationals are accused (...). We respect Iraq’s sovereignty and the independence of its judiciary” (Rûdaw, October 29).

Paris appears satisfied, even relieved, that French jihadists are being tried in the countries where they committed their crimes and are being imprisoned there.

The month’s other major security development was the integration of approximately 2,000 members of the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), a powerful armed militia organised by the PKK, into the Iraqi army during an elaborate military ceremony held on October 26.

A YBS commander told Rûdaw on that occasion that a further 3,000 to 4,000 fighters, all local residents, would be officially integrated during subsequent phases, in accordance with an agreement reached with the Iraqi government. The latter wants to establish full control over the predominantly Yazidi region of Shingal (Sinjar), even though it is one of the “disputed territories” whose status is supposed to be decided by referendum in accordance with Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution.

Unsurprisingly, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is therefore having its Yazidi fighters integrated into the Iraqi army and its Hashd al-Shaabi militias rather than into the Kurdish Peshmerga forces. It is withdrawing from this area towards its Mount Qandil stronghold, in accordance with the commitments made by its imprisoned leader to the Turkish authorities as part of the PKK disarmament process.

The Kurdistan Regional Government swiftly criticised Baghdad for presenting it with this fait accompli. Its Interior Minister, Rebar Ahmed, declared on October 27: “Unfortunately, what is happening in Shingal lies outside the framework of the Shingal Agreement between Baghdad and Erbil, and we have submitted our complaint to the federal government (...). We emphasise that anything taking place in Shingal without consultation and coordination with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will not produce good results and will have no positive impact on restoring peace and stability or ensuring the return of the victims,” referring to the vast camps for displaced Yazidis in Duhok (Rûdaw, October 27).

Approximately 80% of Shingal’s Yazidi population has been living in displaced persons camps for nearly ten years.

Despite these difficult times, the Yazidis of Iraqi Kurdistan began their annual Sheikh Adi festival on October 7 at their religious sanctuary of Lalish in Duhok Province. Their supreme religious leader, Baba Sheikh, and their temporal prince, Hazim Tahsin Beg, attended the week-long festival, which brings together thousands of believers.

Finally, a word about a major archaeological discovery in Kurdistan. The approximately 75,000-year-old Neanderthal discovered in Shanidar Cave, north of Erbil, is gradually revealing his secrets.

An archaeological team from the University of Cambridge reports in Scientific Reports that the individual bears traces of severe injuries, the last of which proved fatal.

His worn and fractured teeth suggest severe facial trauma, which he appears to have survived for at least several months. But an injury inflicted by a wooden spear or javelin that pierced one of his shoulder blades proved fatal.

“The good old days were not so idyllic,” concludes the French daily Le Monde (October 17), which devotes extensive coverage to the discovery in its Science & Medicine supplement.

IRAN: THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM?

The US-Iranian war entered a near-pause in October. A few oil tankers were bombed here and there in the Strait of Hormuz for using a shipping lane other than the one the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are seeking to impose. In retaliation, the US air force carried out proportionate and measured strikes against several Iranian drone and missile bases along the coast and on Qeshm Island.

These intermittent clashes did not prevent a growing volume of oil and gas exports from transiting under US escort through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran claims to control. By the end of October, these exports had returned to their level before the outbreak of war on February 28, 2026.

However, the naval blockade imposed by the formidable US armada on all vessels travelling to or from Iranian ports is proving increasingly devastating for the Iranian economy. Tehran is still managing to sell small quantities of oil to China in exchange for electronic components and materials needed to manufacture its drones and missiles. Trade with Russia, increasingly routed through ports on the Caspian Sea, is experiencing unprecedented growth, enabling Iran to remain afloat with regard to certain basic commodities and to rebuild, at least partially, its military arsenal, which has been severely depleted by the war.

In the midst of an election campaign in which the price of petrol at the pump has a strong impact on US voters, President Trump stated on October 8 that he ruled out attacking Iran before the November 3 midterm elections and wanted to give diplomacy another chance.

Through Qatar, his Vice President, J. D. Vance, sent a letter to Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s principal decision-making body, proposing a meeting to explore the possibility of a diplomatic settlement. According to the New York Times, which revealed the information, subsequently confirmed by Iranian leaders, Mr Vance wants the Iranian nuclear programme to be at the heart of the negotiations.

Iranian leaders reject such a condition and have set out their own conditions in return, namely an end to hostilities on all fronts, including in Lebanon, the release of frozen Iranian assets, the lifting of the US naval blockade on Iranian oil exports, an end to attacks against Iranian territory and an end to US interference in the country’s internal affairs.

Alongside these public positions, which the Americans consider maximalist and unacceptable, diplomatic efforts are continuing behind the scenes. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi summarised this position in a message posted on X on October 28: “While our courageous armed forces are fully prepared to defend the homeland, Iran continues to give diplomacy a chance.” He added that Tehran remained in close and permanent contact with Qatari and Pakistani mediators to examine proposals that could enable the implementation of a peace plan.

That same day, Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian called on the country’s executive bodies to maintain a permanent state of readiness “to deal with the country’s changing conditions” and urged his government to make managing and reducing expenditure a priority ([illegible source], October 29).

A few days earlier, the Iranian president had declared: “In our society, many people are struggling to feed themselves because of the war and the living conditions associated with it.” Iran “must emerge from this situation, which is neither war nor peace,” he added, without explaining how (RFI, October 26).

Iran is preparing for a resumption of hostilities, the duration and intensity of which remain unpredictable. It is threatening to respond on a broader scale, including by targeting US bases in Europe, particularly in Germany (WirtschaftsWoche, October 8). It is also threatening to sever the undersea cables that pass through the Strait of Hormuz and carry telecommunications traffic for the Gulf countries.

For their part, the Americans are maintaining their military presence in the Gulf. A third aircraft carrier is reportedly on its way to reinforce that presence. Washington is said to have warned its Gulf allies of a likely military escalation after the November 3 elections. They oppose such an escalation, but the Israeli Prime Minister, who lost his majority in the October 27 parliamentary elections, is urging the US president to “finish the job.”

The scenario being considered would involve intensive strikes against selected Iranian military sites and missile and drone depots for a limited period of a few days. This would be a godsend for the regime’s most radical elements, who want to seize such an opportunity to “regionalise the war,” “teach US imperialism a memorable and definitive lesson” and avenge the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei.

The resumption of the war appears to be scheduled for the end of the year and, according to the October 21 edition of the New York Times, the Americans and Israelis are jointly preparing plans for such a resumption. The final decision rests with Donald Trump, who is well known for his changeable moods and unpredictable nature and who also appears increasingly wary of his friend Netanyahu. The latter hopes to revive his fortunes through a new confrontation with his “existential enemy,” the regime of Iran’s mullahs.

American public opinion’s hostility to this war, which, according to the Pentagon, has already cost $47.1 billion, must also be taken into account (New York Times, October 27). A growing number of voices within Republican ranks are speaking out against the war and calling for the current status quo to be maintained, with Gulf oil once again flowing freely and the US naval blockade severely damaging the Iranian economy.

While awaiting this possible confrontation, which does not appear inevitable, the Iranian regime is playing the nationalism and homeland-in-danger card to the fullest. The morality police have virtually disappeared from the streets of the major cities, where increasing numbers of women can be seen without the Islamic headscarf. But the repression of dissidents continues unabated.

On October 8 and 9, three Baloch activists were killed and around ten others wounded in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, on the border with Pakistan. Clashes also took place in Kerman Province (Rûdaw, October 9).

In Iranian Kurdistan, a few clashes took place between Iranian Revolutionary Guards and fighters from the Kurdish PJAK party. However, the main Iranian Kurdish political organisation, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), announced on October 12 that it would not send Peshmergas to fight in Kurdistan (Rûdaw). At a time of intense polarisation, with the regime fully exploiting the theme of Iranian patriotism, the Kurdish political parties prefer to pause their military activities (Rûdaw, October 12).

This obviously does not prevent the regime from continuing its relentless repression in Kurdistan. The following is an incomplete assessment of the repression in Kurdistan compiled by Kurdish human rights NGOs, including Hengaw and the Washington Kurdish Institute.

At least two Kurdish prisoners were executed in Kurdistan during October. Mostafa Sharifi, a 45-year-old father of three from Piranshahr, was executed at Urmia Central Prison on October 3 after five years in detention. His execution was not announced by Iranian state media.

On October 15, the authorities executed Reza Rajabian, a 23-year-old Kurdish prisoner, at Shirvan Prison following a murder conviction connected to an altercation that occurred when he was approximately 18 years old. His cousin had already been executed in connection with the same case, while another member of his family remains under sentence of death.

Nationwide, the pace of executions also remained high. The organisation Iran Human Rights had recorded 604 executions as of September 30 and reported at least 652 by around October 20, representing approximately 48 additional executions throughout the country during the first three weeks of October. As of October 10, at least 43 Kurdish prisoners had been executed in Iran since the beginning of 2026.

The pressure associated with the death penalty intensified sharply in October. On October 1, a revolutionary court in Tehran sentenced three Kurdish men from Kermanshah to death: Khosrow Mohammadnia, Masoud Toushmalani and Sirwan Shabani. All three had been arrested during the January 9 protests and convicted of moharebeh, an offence generally translated as “waging war against God.” According to Hengaw, they had spent several months in solitary confinement and had been subjected to forced confessions. Borzou Rezaei, a Kurdish detainee arrested during the protests, received another death sentence on October 6.

The month’s most prominent political case involved Verisheh Moradi, a Kurdish political prisoner who was sentenced to death for a second time on October 14. Iran’s Supreme Court had overturned her first death sentence in December 2025 because of serious shortcomings in the investigation and procedural irregularities. Her lawyers stated that the new trial had failed to address the problems identified by the Supreme Court.

Other Kurdish defendants received lengthy prison sentences during the month. Psychiatrist and writer Nasser Hemmati began serving a sentence of three years and six months. Mohammad Lotfifar, from Mahabad, was transferred to prison to serve a sentence of five years and five months. English teacher Mona Dabbagh was also transferred to the women’s prison in Senna to begin serving a three-and-a-half-year sentence.

Detention conditions were another major source of concern in October. On October 5, twelve Kurdish political and religious prisoners at Boukan Prison began a hunger strike to protest restrictions imposed by the security services on temporary leave, work-release arrangements and access to semi-open prison conditions. They included Ardalan Mineh, Behrouz Barakhas, Esmail Atash-Mard, Kaveh Rahimi and Hamed Maroufi. The authorities subsequently transferred the group to the quarantine section and suspended telephone calls and family visits.

Security operations were reported in Saqqez, Baneh, Mahabad, Bukan, Shinno, Kamyaran, Dehgolan, Senna, Kermanshah, Ilam and other localities. A review of the individually documented cases recorded by several organisations identified approximately 45 arrests or detentions during October. In addition, 11 people were reportedly detained in the town of Malekshahi alone without their identities being disclosed. After accounting for possible duplication among the sources, the documented total since the beginning of the month stands at approximately 50 people or more.

One of the most significant coordinated operations took place in Saqqez on October 8. Forces from the Ministry of Intelligence conducted simultaneous searches and arrested seven members of two independent mountaineering groups: Mohammad Saleh Hosseini, Abdollah Amini, Rahim Haghparast, Mohammad Hakimpour, Mostafa Ghaderi, Khaled Rahimi and Hossein Abdollahi. Two were released after questioning, while the other five remained unable to contact their families or obtain access to a lawyer for several days.

Baneh was also the scene of repeated arrests. Hassan Mostafaei, a well-known philanthropist, Khosrow Karampouri, Mohieddin Banehrizi and Shirzad Chawshini were among those arrested in separate operations. Hassan Mostafaei was arrested while taking his child to hospital. He was eventually released on bail set at five billion tomans. Later in the month, 17-year-old Saro Sadeghzadeh was arrested, followed by 18-year-old Mohammad Faraji and 17-year-old Jiyar Rasouli. The latter two were arrested by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intelligence services on October 20 while travelling from Armardeh to Baneh.

The wave of arrests also affected athletes and cultural figures. Kurdish MMA fighter Rozhan Ebrahimi and swimming coach Aida Ghaderi were arrested in Saqqez. Karate coach Yadollah Mataei, an experienced figure in the sport, was arrested in Dehgolan. Footballer and coach Mohsen Mowloudpour was detained in Shinno, while bodybuilding coach Sina Parvizi was summoned and questioned in Kamyaran. Kurdish singer Shoresh Aboubakri was arrested after reporting to the Sardasht Public Prosecutor’s Office, while Zhina Ahmadi, founder of the Zhilemo House of Music, remained imprisoned at the women’s prison in Senna.

Several minors were among those arrested in October. Fifteen-year-old Mohammad Ebadi was arrested in Takab. Sixteen-year-old Alireza Rashidi was detained in connection with the January protests. Saro Sadeghzadeh and Jiyar Rasouli, both aged 17, were arrested in Baneh. Diyari Abdi, a final-year secondary school student, was also detained near Mardukh Bridge in Senna on October 19 and taken to an undisclosed detention facility.

The repression also extended to Shinno. Environmental activist Soleiman Rasouli was arrested without a warrant on October 19 and denied all contact with his family. In addition, 19-year-old Ahad Mihan-Khah was transferred to Naqadeh Central Prison to serve a five-year sentence for alleged collaboration with the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI).

Ilam Province remained another major centre of repression connected with the January 2026 protests. On October 17, the Ministry of Intelligence announced the arrest of 11 people in Malekshahi, accusing them of playing a leading role in the protests and alleging links to the United States and Israel. Their identities and places of detention were not made public. Kurdish human rights organisations expressed concern, recalling that in similar cases previously reported in Ilam, detainees had been held without access to a lawyer or contact with their families before appearing in televised confessions.

October was also marked by one of the largest recent military deployments in Rojhelat. In mid-October, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) used artillery and one-way attack drones against the Shaho Mountains, the Kalatarzan region near Senna and the mountainous areas surrounding Marivan. Strikes around Niyava and Barqo caused forest fires. Further bombardments were reported around Sarvabad and Paveh.

By October 22, the IRGC had deployed large military convoys and heavy weapons to Senna, Kamyaran, Sarvabad, Marivan and Baneh. According to available sources, hundreds of special forces personnel were present around villages near the Shaho Mountains. Reconnaissance units had been transferred from Urmia, and artillery pieces had been deployed around the Surin Mountains near Baneh.

CULTURE: Sinam Khan Bedirkhan’s Reflections on Her Visit to the Erbil International Book Fair

Books, Culture and the Dream of an Independent Kurdistan

I have left the Erbil International Book Fair, but the emotions and memories of this wonderful visit continue to resonate deep within my heart.

For me, it was not simply a walk among book stands and publishing houses. These were moments filled with joy, pride and hope, which touched my soul deeply, brought peace to my heart and renewed my confidence in the future of our youth and our beloved Kurdistan.

At a time when social media, smartphones and new technologies occupy an ever greater place in our daily lives, when screens constantly compete for our time and attention, I have often asked myself this question: does the book still retain the magic that once captivated us? When turning its pages, do the new generations still experience the pleasure of discovery, the thirst for learning and the incomparable joy brought by thought and knowledge?

My visit to the Book Fair provided me with the most beautiful answer.

I was deeply delighted to see the remarkable number of visitors of every age and background walking through the Fair’s aisles with curiosity and enthusiasm.

But what moved me most, what truly filled my heart with happiness, was the presence of so many young women and men leafing through books, discovering new titles, exchanging ideas and expressing a sincere desire to read, learn and enrich their knowledge.

As I looked at their faces, I felt a profound joy, as though I could see the outlines of a brighter future for our homeland taking shape before me.

In the hands of every young person holding a book, I glimpsed a glimmer of hope. And in the eyes of every young woman in search of knowledge, I read the promise of better days ahead for Kurdistan.

I then understood that books had lost none of their value, that the flame of knowledge was still alive and that the generations upon whom our hopes rest continued, despite all the temptations of the modern world, to recognise reading, knowledge and culture as the true keys to the progress and flourishing of societies.

I have always regarded books as one of humanity’s most precious treasures.

A book is not merely pages to be read or words to be memorised. It is a window open onto the world, one mind engaged in dialogue with another, a human experience that crosses the boundaries of time and space.

Reading enlightens our thinking, broadens our horizons and develops our ability to question and understand the world. It teaches us independence of mind, freedom of thought and respect for the diversity of ideas.

But for us Kurds, the book has an even deeper meaning.

It is not merely a means of acquiring knowledge. It is also the memory of a people, the guardian of a language, the witness to a history and one of the essential instruments for preserving our national identity in the face of oblivion and erasure.

We are the heirs of an ancient people, the bearers of a history rich in experiences and sacrifices, a magnificent language, a remarkable literary tradition, and a cultural and folkloric heritage of inestimable value.

The features of our identity live on in our poems, songs, folktales, customs and collective memories.

They tell the story of the generations that succeeded one another on this land, bore their suffering, hopes and dreams, and passed this legacy on to us as a treasure to be preserved.

This cultural wealth cannot be regarded merely as a heritage in which we may take pride or as a collection of memories belonging to the past.

It is a sacred trust placed in our care, a moral and historical duty requiring us to protect it, enrich it and pass it on to our children and grandchildren, alive, radiant and forever open to the future.

This conviction holds a very special place in my heart.

It did not arise from this visit. It is part of my family history, my life and the experiences that have marked my journey.

I belong to the Bedirkhan family, several generations of which played a pioneering role in defending the Kurdish language, developing literature and culture, fostering the emergence of the Kurdish press and awakening the national and cultural consciousness of our people.

Long before our time, the pioneers of this family understood that preserving a nation’s identity required more than convictions and speeches. It also demanded the power of the written word, the circulation of books and newspapers, the transmission of knowledge and the protection of the language that carries within it the soul and memory of a people.

The birth of the historic newspaper Kurdistan was one of the shining milestones in the Kurdish intellectual and cultural renaissance.

Other literary, linguistic and intellectual initiatives followed, leaving a lasting mark on the history of our people.

This undertaking was far from easy.

During particularly difficult periods of our history, preserving a language and safeguarding a cultural identity required profound faith, unwavering determination and immense sacrifices.

When I recall these chapters in my family’s history, I feel far more than pride.

I also become conscious of the weight of responsibility represented by such a legacy and of the need to keep it alive in the memory and consciousness of future generations.

For this legacy must not remain merely a story that is told. It must remain a message that is perpetuated, a mission that is continued and a source of inspiration for those who will come after us.

However, my attachment to books, language and culture is not limited to the heritage of the family into which I was born.

It was also nourished by a human and intellectual experience that is profoundly dear to my heart, the experience I shared with my life companion, my late husband, Salah Saadallah.

Salah was a man driven by a deep belief in the value of science, knowledge and culture.

For him, reading, studying, writing, researching and translating were not merely intellectual pursuits. They were essential dimensions of his existence.

Although he pursued his professional career in engineering, his passion for language, literature and culture never left him.

He devoted a considerable share of his time and energy to intellectual and literary work.

Through his writings and translations, he sought to enrich the Kurdish library and open new windows for Kurdish readers onto world literature and the vast horizons of knowledge.

But among his achievements, one of the most important, and certainly one of the dearest to my heart, remains his English-Kurdish dictionary, a monumental work to which he devoted many years of meticulous research, patience, rigour and perseverance.

For him, this dictionary represented far more than a linguistic project or a work destined to take its place on library shelves.

It was a true scientific and cultural mission, a sincere contribution to the development of the Kurdish language and a means of facilitating access to learning and knowledge for future generations.

For a dictionary is not simply a collection of words accompanied by their equivalents in another language.

It is a bridge between languages, cultures and civilisations.

It is a tool that opens the doors of knowledge, a valuable reference for students, teachers, researchers, writers and translators.

It is also a legacy that can spare future generations years of research and effort.

And how much more significant such a contribution becomes when it is dedicated to a language that has had to confront so many obstacles throughout its history, yet has remained alive thanks to the determination of its children and the dedication of its scholars, writers and intellectuals.

I had the privilege of witnessing Salah’s immense labour, his patience, his perseverance and the sincerity of his commitment.

I knew how deeply he cared about his work and how far his ambition extended beyond the mere desire to see his name printed on the cover of a book.

What he truly wanted was to leave behind useful knowledge, a lasting reference and a tool capable of serving those who would come after him.

For perhaps the most beautiful legacy a human being can leave after their departure is not what they accumulated for themselves, but what they gave to others: the knowledge they transmitted, the learning they shared and the seeds they planted, which will continue to bear fruit long after they are gone.

Thus, when I think of the cultural heritage of the Bedirkhan family and the intellectual and literary contributions of my late husband, Salah Saadallah, I see two paths converging around the same profound conviction:

To serve language, culture and knowledge is, fundamentally, to serve one’s people, one’s homeland and the generations to come.

This is precisely why the emotions I felt while walking through the aisles of the Erbil International Book Fair were so special.

I did not feel like an ordinary visitor who had come to discover new publications.

I felt like a woman whose life had always been intimately connected to the world of books and words.

A woman who is heir to a family that contributed to the Kurdish cultural awakening and who shared with her husband a long experience of dedication to knowledge, writing and language.

As I looked at the young people around me, I could not help thinking of all the generations that had preceded us, of all those who had devoted their lives to writing, translating, publishing, documenting our history and safeguarding our cultural heritage.

I thought of the efforts of my ancestors.

I thought of my late husband and the countless hours he had spent surrounded by books, manuscripts, dictionaries and sheets of paper covered with notes.

Then my gaze returned to those young women and men who filled the aisles of the Fair with life, curiosity and hope.

And I felt, with profound emotion, that so much effort and sacrifice had not been in vain. The seeds planted by previous generations were continuing to germinate in the minds of our children and blossom through their love of reading, culture and knowledge.

Could there be any finer reward for those who devoted their lives to culture than to see the new generations embrace it enthusiastically and continue along the path they opened?

I am deeply convinced that Kurdistan’s future does not depend solely on political decisions and that national aspirations, however profound and legitimate they may be, are not sufficient on their own to build a strong and prosperous nation.

Strong nations are built first and foremost through educated citizens who are conscious of their responsibilities, reliable institutions and a society that respects knowledge, values culture, preserves its history, and places work and responsibility at the heart of its development.

The dream of a free and independent Kurdistan cannot rest solely on patriotic sentiment. It requires cultured, educated and competent generations who are conscious of their history and capable of understanding that independence is not merely a political aspiration, but also an immense responsibility: that of building a modern, prosperous and just state that respects human dignity.

For our dream is not limited to possessing a country with a name, a flag and borders.

We dream of a homeland where knowledge and justice can flourish, where institutions operate with integrity, where freedoms are protected, where diversity is respected and where our daughters and sons have equal opportunities to learn, create, work and contribute to the future of their society.

Such a future cannot come into being without genuine investment in human beings.

We must educate generations capable of taking pride in their roots while remaining open to the world, of preserving their identity while participating in the scientific, technological and cultural advances of our time.

We must teach our children their language and history and introduce them to their literature, folklore and heritage.

But we must also open the doors of universal knowledge to them, encourage them to learn other languages, master modern sciences, engage in dialogue, respect differences and exercise their freedom of thought with discernment and responsibility.

A nation with profound confidence in its identity does not fear openness to the world. On the contrary, it draws from its roots the strength it needs to engage in dialogue with other peoples and contribute to the progress of human civilisation.

It is in this spirit that I regard book fairs, libraries, cultural gatherings, and literary and artistic events as being of vital importance.

They are not merely opportunities to display or sell books.

They are spaces where minds meet, ideas circulate, talents emerge, and the seeds of awareness, creativity and attachment to our heritage are sown.

I sincerely hope that parents and grandparents will make a habit of taking their children to these events, introducing them from an early age to the wonderful world of books and cultivating within them the pleasure of reading, intellectual curiosity, and pride in their language, history and culture.

For a child who grows up surrounded by books grows up surrounded by possibilities.

A young person armed with knowledge develops the ability to understand the world in which they live and to act to transform it.

And a society that places education and culture among its priorities lays the true foundations of a more promising future.

When I left the Book Fair, I carried with me an emotion so beautiful that I find it difficult to express fully in words.

I felt profound gratitude towards everyone who had contributed to organising this cultural event.

I felt admiration for every writer, translator, researcher and publisher who devotes time and effort to the service of knowledge.

Above all, my heart overflowed with happiness at the sight of these young people reaching for books, refusing to settle for the fleeting information offered to them by screens.

At this stage of my life, few things can bring me greater serenity and hope than seeing the new generations take up the torch of knowledge and culture and prepare to continue the work begun by their parents and ancestors.

The true tribute we can pay to the intellectuals, writers, poets, translators and scholars who preceded us does not consist merely in celebrating their names and achievements. It consists in preserving what they bequeathed to us, enriching it, developing it and passing it on to future generations with even greater value.

In my eyes, this is the deepest meaning of fidelity to our heritage.

This is what gives human effort its true dimension and allows a work to continue living beyond the lifetime of its creator.

My greatest wish is to see a Kurdistan where science and knowledge flourish, where books occupy a place of honour, where our language remains alive and dynamic, where our cultural and folkloric heritage is safeguarded, and where our history is transmitted with truth, dignity and pride.

A Kurdistan where our children grow up with a love of knowledge, respect for freedom and a sense of responsibility.

I sincerely hope that our youth will continue to carry this historical legacy, conscious that the road to freedom, independence and prosperity begins first and foremost with education and the development of human beings.

For those who read learn to understand.

Those who understand acquire the ability to choose.

And those who possess the necessary knowledge and awareness can participate fully in building the future of their homeland.

A nation that reads is a nation that thinks, learns and rises.

A nation that protects its language and preserves the memory of its history is a nation that knows its roots and identity.

And a nation that invests in the intelligence and education of its children is a nation that builds the solid foundations of its freedom, independence and future.

As I leave this wonderful experience behind, I retain in my heart immense hope and a renewed conviction: Kurdistan’s future will be brighter for as long as its daughters and sons continue to love books, seek knowledge, cherish their language and culture, and carry within them the dream of a free, dignified and prosperous homeland.

Through books, we preserve our memory.

Through culture, we protect our identity.

Through knowledge, we educate enlightened human beings.

And through enlightened generations, we build nations.

How wonderful it would be to see the dreams of the generations that preceded us one day become the lived reality of those who will follow us!

A free, prosperous and independent Kurdistan, proud of its history and capable of building its future through the intelligence, labour and dedication of its children.

Sinam Khan Bedirkhan