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THE EUROPEAN UNION ONCE AGAIN POINTS THE FINGER AT TURKEY'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

THE European Union's annual report for 2001, on "*Progress achieved by Turkey along the road to membership*" was made public on 13 November by the European Commission.

The report first of all notes that "*the alteration to the Constitution adopted by the Turkish Parliament on 3 October constitute an appreciable progress towards the strengthening of guarantees in the areas of Human*

Rights and fundamental liberties and towards the abolition of the death sentence". However, it points out that "*despite these changes, basic freedom remains subject to a certain number of restrictions*" and that "*the improvement that individuals will really enjoy in the exercise of their fundamental liberties will depend on the way they are translated into legislation and applied in practice*".

The Commission also stresses that

the Constitutional amendments to Articles 26 and 28 "*could open the way to the use of other languages than Turkish*", is a positive point for Kurdish, but that the still remaining restrictive regulations and practices must also be altered in order for this Constitutional amendment to really work. It also notes that there was "*no improvement in the possibility of members of ethnic groups having a cultural identity and shared traditions expressing their linguistic and cultural identity*".

With regard to torture and ill treatment, the report notes that

these are used "in particular in the South-East, especially in cases of 'detention in secret' mainly used in the four provinces under State of Emergency and in cases connected with state security. According to the Turkish authorities, in 2000 and 2001 there were 1472 legal proceedings started against members of the security forces for ill treatment and 159 for torture. Of these, 36 people were sentenced to imprisonment while 50 others lost their jobs." It is to be feared that sentences are still too lenient or often converted to fines or suspended "the report observes. In the area of civil and political rights, the Commission points out that "in the period covered by the report 17 people were sentenced to death in 2000 and 10 others between January and August 2001". The report also stresses, in the chapter "democracy and the primacy of law" that last year courts martial "handled 22 cases concerning 38 civilians sued in violation of their right to freedom of expression" and that "the real independence of the judiciary remains a source of concern". As for the National Security Council (MGK), the Commission notes the alteration in the role and composition of the Council and stresses that "it will be necessary to check extent these alterations to the Constitution will, in fact, improve civilian control of military affairs".

Regarding the workings of the judicial machinery, "measures must be embodied into Turkish legislation that allow the remedying of the consequences of sentences that the European Human Rights Court has judged to be contrary to the European Convention on

Human Rights" specifies the report that rises here the problem of the direct effect of the European Court's rulings by stressing the ruling of 17 July 2001 which found Turkey guilty, amongst other things, of "an unfair trial" in the case of the Kurdish Members of Parliament imprisoned in Turkey.

The report concludes by pointing out that "considerable efforts are still necessary to satisfy the short-term priorities of the 'partnership for membership' (adopted in March 2001) to be achieved". On 19 November, the Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, declared that the report of the European Union was "objective". "Nevertheless, the European Union

should not stipulate supplementary specific conditions for Turkey. We will achieve the criteria required of other candidate countries" he added. The Deputy Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, had declared, on 3 November, that he agreed with the European criticisms of Turkey regarding democracy and Human Rights. Devlet Bahçeli, another partner in the coalition government and leader of the National Action Party (MHP - neo-fascist) however, qualified Mesut Yilmaz's remarks by stressing, on 15 November, that "to justify the European report was to call to question the National Programme eight months after it had been drawn up by a consensus of all the parties of the three-Party coalition".

Mr. NECHIRVAN BARZANI CALLS FOR A SPECIFIC IDENTITY CARD FOR THE INHABITANTS OF IRAQI KURDISTAN

ACCORDING to the Kurdish daily Brayati in its 11 November issue, the head of the Irbil based regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan, Mr. Nechirvan Barzani has called for the establishment of a specific, internationally recognised, Identity card for the citizens of the region of Iraqi Kurdistan that has been under Kurdish control since 1991.

In the course of a London banquet in his honour organised by Lady Olga Maitland, President of the Defence and Security Forum, Mr. Barzani stated that emigration from Kurdistan would last "so long as the region's political future remains uncertain".

The forging of Iraqi passports and identity cards by the illegal immigration networks is considered one of the obstacles to immigration control. A large number of Iraqi Kurds have emigrated illegally to Europe or other developed countries in recent years. Despite the regions stability and relative economic development, uncertainty about the future political status of Iraqi Kurdistan and the persistent threat of the return of the Iraqi Army and paramilitary forces, despite the Anglo-American air protection, are perceived as the principle factors behind the mass emigration of Iraqi Kurds..

Mr. Nechirvan Barzani arrived in

London after visiting Sweden, where he was received by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and Belgium, where he met senior Civil

Servants. (Source: *Iraqi Kurdistan Despatch*, Weekly Information Bulletin, 18 Nov. 2001, www.ikurd.info)

SADDAM HISSEIN MASSES TROOPS IN KURDISTAN AND CALLS FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THE KURDISH LEADERS

MAJOR Iraqi troop concentrations along the line dividing the Baghdad-controlled and autonomous regions of Kurdistan have been reported by the media in the last few days. According to the London-based Arabic paper, Al-Zaman of 13 November, units of the Iraqi Army, including a great number of tanks, heavy artillery and ground-air missiles have been massed South of Dohuk while Republican Guard units have been deployed around Kirkuk.

There have also been troop concentrations in the North-West of the country. Iraqi paramilitaries, like the "Saddam Fedayeen" and the "Jerusalem Army", created early in 2001 to "join the Palestinian Intifada" have taken up positions near the Mossul dam. Troops have also been sent to the South and South-West of Irbil, the Regional capital Iraqi Kurdistan while very rigorous security measures have been taken on the roads leading to Kurdistan.

The Arabic language services of Inited Press International, that interviewed travellers arriving from Kirkuk to the autonomous region reported, on 11 November, that the Iraqi authorities are meticulously checking all travellers going there. It

reports that the Iraqi soldiers "do not allow anyone not resident in the region to travel there and that the roads are closed after 7.00 pm".

Al-Zaman considers that this military build up might have the object of "controlling the roads linking Iraq to Turkey and Syria (which are at present under Kurdish control) against the eventuality of an open confrontation".

A senior official of the Kurdish administration, who confirmed the Iraqi troop concentrations, declared, off the record, to the Iraqi Kurdistan Despatch "that they seemed to have a defensive aim in preparation for an eventual American attack on Iraq after the war in Afghanistan". He added that "Iraq fears the intervention of the Turkish Army, as an ally of the United States".

Furthermore, according to the official Iraqi press agency INA, and the London-based Arabic language papers, the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, declared to a delegation of pro-Baghdad Kurds that "it was possible to settle the Kurdish problem by direct negotiation". He stressed the fact that Iraq was capable of regaining control of the Kurdish autonomous region by force and that "the sword of Iraq will cut out the tongues of those who refuse to negotiate".

The independent Kurdish paper Hawlati, published in the Kurdish autonomous region, revealed on 12 November that the Iraqi President had sent that Mr. Mukarrem Talabani, former Iraqi Minister and Kurdish public figure to meet Messrs Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani, the leaders of the two main Kurdish political organisations. The aim was to sound their intentions in the event of an American attack on Iraq. According to some observers, Iraq believes that a joint attack by the Americans and the Iraqi opposition could come from the North of the country, aiming at destabilising the regime in power. (Source: *Iraqi Kurdistan Despatch*, Weekly Inf. Bul., 18 Nov. 2001, www.ikurd.info)

COLIN POWELL VISITS TURKEY

THE US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, arrived at Ankara on 4 December to discuss Turkish support of the coalition against international terrorism after the military campaign in Afghanistan. Turkey has made known its profound

anxiety, fearing that, after Afghanistan, Washington will turn on Iraq, its neighbour to the South-East. Washington is worried by Iraqi aspirations to produce weapons of mass destruction and accuses Baghdad of being one of the States that support terrorism.

The hard liners in the Bush Administration want a large scale operation against Baghdad and the President himself, last month, made threatening remarks directed at the Iraqi leaders. Colin Powell stated, on 5 December, that President Bush had not yet decided whether the next phase of the struggle against terrorism should cover Iraq. *"This continues to be one of our preoccupations but the President has not yet made any decision regarding the next phase of our campaign against terrorism"* declared Colin Powell.

Turkey, the first Moslem country to commit troops to Afghanistan, is opposed to the United States

extending the campaign it is waging against terrorism to Iraq. *"We do not want an American operation against Iraq"* President Ahmet Necdet Sezer declared on 4 December.

However Faruk Logoglu, Turkish Ambassador to Washington, followed by Sabahattin Çakmakoglu, Turkish Minister of Defence (Editor's Note: coming straight from a meeting of the National Security Council) had, last week, given the impression of a more flexible Turkish policy on Iraq by declaring that Ankara would have no objection to an American military attack if *"circumstances changed"*

programme headed "The Kurdish Question", the existence of a Kurdish nation "assimilated", "under pressure", that had its own "ethnic identity". Under pressure from its all-powerful Turkish Army, Turkey has, over the last few years, banned several pro-Kurdish parties, including the Party for Democracy (DEP), four of whose MPs, including Leyla Zana, have remained in jail since 1994, as well as marxist and islamist parties. At the end of July 2001, the European Human Rights Court had, by a narrow margin, found in favour of Ankara over the banning of the Prosperity Party (Refah), arguing, contrary to Mr. Sezer, that a State *"can reasonably prevent the realisation of a political project incompatible with the standards of the European Convention before it has been put into practice by concrete actions"*.

THE TURKISH PRESIDENT CRITICISES BANNING OF PRO-KURDISH PARTY, CONSIDERING THAT IT IS SIMPLY BASED ON "HYPOTHESES"

ACCORDING to the Turkish press of 23 November, the Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, denounced the closing down of a pro-Kurdish party by the Constitutional Court, considering it was simply based on "hypotheses". Mr. Sezer was commenting on the decision of the Court, taken in 1999 (when he still presided the Court) and published in the Official Gazette.

He regretted that the Democratic Party of the Masses (DKP) had been banned without any proven crimes or offences. *"That verdict should have been different"* he considered as quoted by the Turkish daily Radikal. A former

judge, noted for his democratic commitments, the president observed that, on the contrary, *"the programme (of the DKP) advanced the idea of the equality of ethnic and religious groups and, instead of being opposed to the unity of the nation it distanced itself from separatist ideas"*. *"The opinions expressed by the DKP and its members were not translated into actions, it is unsuitable for the law to close down a party by basing itself on the hypothesis that it might commit reprehensible actions"*. Mr. Sezer explained, as quoted by the Turkish paper Sabah.

The DKP was closed down in February 1999 for having mentioned, in the section of its

The principle pro-Kurdish organisation in Turkey, the People's Democratic Party (HADEP) is also threatened with being banned for *"organic links"* with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

AS WELL AS ...

• FOLLOWING ON THE AVAILABILITY OF MOBILE PHONES, PERSONAL INTERNET WILL SOON BE AVAILABLE IN KURDISTAN.

According to the 14 November issue of the London Arabic paper Al-Zaman, the Transport and Communications Minister of the Irbil-based regional government told them that the inhabitants of Iraqi Kurdistan could soon have unlimited

access to Internet from their homes.

Up to now, the the CyberCafes alone allowed the population to have access to Internet. The Minister specified that a foreign company, commissioned by the Government, was already working on the project, which would enable people to be connected either from their homes or offices nad that the project should reach fruition by January 2002.

This project was started after the regional government had completed another project, last Februarym of replacing the old telephone networks by a digital system. Telecommunications, in Iraqi Kurdistan, have enjoyed substantial development since the introduction of this network of digital and mobile phones, in Irbil and Suleimaniah, which has enabled the region to be more easily connected to the rest of the world. The Iraqi authorities had cut the telephone lines between the Kurdish region and the rest of Iraq and the world since the greater part of Kurdistan passed under Kurdish control in 1991.

• **THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COURT: TURKEY ACCEPTS OUT OF COURT COMPENSATION FOR FOUR KURDISH FAMILIES FOR THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THEIR RELATIVES.** On 6 November, the European Human Rights Court made it known that the Turkish Government had acknowledged its faults and agreed to compensate, out of court, four families for the

disappearance of relatives during a police operation in 1994.

The four families, one of which had lost a brother, the others a son or husband, all from the village of Kirkagac, will each receive the sum of £ 34,000 sterling in damages.

The European Court, to which the families complaints had been referred, decided to remove the case from its rolls following the out of court settlement which includes a declaration by the Turkish Government deploring "*the disappearance of certain close relatives of the petitioners and the pain caused to their families*".

Ankara "*recognises that unregistered deprivation of freedom and the insufficiency of the investigations carried out into alleged cases of disappearance constituted violations of Articles 2 (right to life) 5 and 13 (right of effective legal recourse) of the European Convention of Human Rights*".

"*The (Turkish) Government commits itself to decreeing suitable instructions and adopting all necessary measures to ensure, in future, a complete and detailed record by the authorities of all deprivations of freedom and the carrying out of effective investigations on all allegations of disappearance, in conformity with its obligations under, and in virtue of, the said Convention*".

Moreover, according to official Turkish data, 3,964 complaints against Turkey - 735 of which were declared admissible last year - have been filed with the European

Human Rights Court. Hikmet Sami Turk, Minister of Justice, declared, on 14 November that, to date, Turkey had been found guilty in 115 cases and that the fines paid by the Turkish authorities were \$13,557, FF 6,200,000 and £866,230.

Furthermore, the Minister specified that Turkey had also opted for out of court settlement in 343 cases and paid TL 489 billion. Turkey has not yet settled the sum of £ 4,663,668, \$ 2,841,470, and FF 5,203,567 of damages and legal costs arising from these cases.

• **A RAID BY TURKISH POLICE ON TWO HOUSES IN ISTANBUL TO PUT AN END TO THE HUNGER STRIKE MOVEMENT RESULTS IN FOUR DEATHS.** On 5 November, four activists of the Communist Revolutionary People's Front-Party (DHKP-C) who were supporting the prisoners' movement against their conditions of detention set themselves on fire when the police moved into two houses in Istanbul to dislodge the protesters.

According to the prisoner's support movement, *Ozgur Tayad*, one of the victims, Arzu Guler, had been fasting for five months. The three others, Baris Kas, Sultan Yildiz, Bülent Durgaç were sympathisers of the hunger strikers. According to the Turkish authorities, the four activists died of their burns or of carbon monoxide poisoning and 14 people were injured during the police raid and sent to hospital.

Three other activists of the protest

movement set themselves alight in their cell to protest against the police action. Eyup Samur died as a result of their injuries while two of their comrades, Kemal Aydin and Nail Çavus are in hospital in a serious condition.

The delegation from the Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD), which went to the scene, declared that *"the deaths and injuries are the consequences of the extreme violence deployed in the course of the police operation"*.

Furthermore, the Turkish Ministry of Justice has put before Parliament a Bill proposing sentences of up to 20 years imprisonment for the organisers and instigators of hunger strikes.

A 30 year old detainee, Muharrem Cetinkaya, who set himself alight a week earlier, in protest at a police raid in which four of his companions were killed, died from his injuries on 12 November. According to the police and the first results of the enquiry, these four detainees died from fire, but their relatives state that they were killed.

Tulay Korkmaz, who died on 19 November following 193 days of hunger strike, is the latest victim of a protest movement launched by Turkish detainees a year ago. These prisoners, mostly activists of Left-wing movements, are protesting against the new type of high security jails where they are isolated and hence more exposed to being subjected to ill-treatment, as against older style of the large dormitory blocks containing up to

100 prisoners. 43 prisoners and their supporters have died as a result of their hunger strikes since the beginning of this movement.

• **THE LATE PRESIDENT OZAL'S WIDOW STATES THAT HER HUSBAND'S DEATH WAS "A POLITICAL MATTER"**. The latest statements of former Turkish President Turgut Ozal's widow come to confirm the mystery surrounding the circumstances of his death. Questioned on 4 November by the Turkish daily, *Hurriyet*, Semra Ozal replied to the question "Do you still have suspicions about Turgut Ozal's death?" by saying: *"My suspicions are even greater. For the moment I have not completed collecting all the evidence to prove it. I have had information from outside and I am examining it now. One of your journalists has reported the remarks of Husamettin Cindoruk (Editors Note: former adviser to Suleyman Demirel, now a Member of Parliament) who had stated "Ozal will die within three months". He was asked at the time where he had heard that and he had retorted "It was Mr. Suleyman who told me". But of course that could have been just a coincidence"*.

Mrs. Ozal continued by saying: *"It is not a matter of suspecting him (i.e., Demirel). He could well have had this news from someone else. But why was there never an autopsy? It is said that he has been exhumed — it's just not true. If he had been poisoned before hand there should have waited for his hair to grow to prove it. After his death blood samples were taken. My suspicions grew. Ahmet (N.B. Ozal's*

son) went to the Hacettepe Hospital and claimed the blood samples. The laboratory assistant told him "We have the blood. As it was so interesting we kept it". But when he returned the next day he was told that the flasks had been broken. These samples had been guarded all those years— why did they break just that day, after five years?

I think that it's a political matter whose source is foreign" maintained Mrs. Ozal. She continued by saying that the late President has written five letters before leaving, of which *"one was for his grandchildren, one to me and one to his party. They were confided to the Director General of the Post Office, but all have vanished. Is it by chance? We have complained — I think all this is connected with his death"*.

On the question of who might have profited by the death of Turgut Ozal, his widow stated that *"If he had remained alive the map of the world today would have been changed. He had prepared it all and locked it in his head"*.

• **UK FIRM ABANDONS ILLISU DAM PROJECT ON HUMANITARIAN, ENVIRONMENTAL GROUNDS.**

The British Building and Civil Engineering Group, Balfour Beatty, announced, on 13 November that it was pulling out of the very controversial project to build a dam in the Kurdish region of Turkey. The group decided to end its participation in the consortium to carry out the project because the humanitarian and environmental questions involved have not been

settled, it stated in a communiqué. *"As there is little likelihood of their being resolved soon the management considers that it is not in our shareholders' interest to continue to participate"* Balfour Beatty specified.

The Illisu dam is strongly criticised by a number of NGOs for its negative impact on the environment and the upheaval its construction would create for the Kurdish population living in the region. The Friends of the Earth immediately reacted by welcoming this decision. This dam is "disastrous from an environmental, political and social point of view " the NGO declared, estimating that 30,000 people would be made homeless by the construction of this dam.

However, Charles Secrett, Director of Friends of the Earth regretted that the group's decision also saves the British Government from having to take a clear stand on the issue. According to him, the granting of Export Credit Guarantees should be out of the question for cases which include *"such a destruction of the environment and such violation of Human Rights"*...

• **44th EXTENSION OF STATE OF EMERGENCY IN FOUR KURDISH PROVINCES.** On 27 November, the Turkish Parliament renewed the State of Emergency for the 44th time in the four Kurdish provinces of Tunceli, Diyarbakir, Hakkari and Sirnak, which have been suffering from this regime for the last 14 years. Prior to 1987 they had been under martial law which the Turkish authorities then

"softened" to a "civilian" State of Emergency.

Rustu Kazim Yucelen, Turkish Minister of the Interior, declared that "in 2000, terrorist incidents had dropped by 83% compared with 1999 " and that this drop had continued in 2001 "with a 26% drop compared with the year before ". He also stated that the government was taking "steps for the return of villagers who had been evacuated during the terrorist campaign " with a 5.65 trillion TL project (about \$4 million) and that, between 2000 and 2001, 35,227 villagers had been allowed to return and live in 393 villages and hamlets.

The Turkish Parliament decides every four months whether or not to maintain this extra-ordinary regime. Its lifting is amongst the political measures demanded by the European Union as a precondition for opening negotiations for membership.

• IRAQ USES GAS CHAMBERS TO EXECUTE PRISONERS.

According to the Iraqi Communist Party's Human Rights Information Bureau, published in the November 2001 issue of the Party's paper Tariq al-Shaab, The Iraqi authorities executed 15 prisoners on 10 August last, after collecting them in a room together and opening the valves of a deadly gas, installed for that purpose.

This execution is said to have been filmed and the cassette sent to Qusay, Saddam Hussein's younger son, who is the country's head of security.

The paper indicates that the gas chamber had been build last year on Qusat's orders " *in the context of the infamous prison cleaning campaign, which began at the end of 1998 and has, to date, resulted in the execution of 3,500 detainees* ". The paper publishes the names of three people who carried out the execution:

1. Sarmad Saleh al-Rawi, Chemical engineer, nephew of Hamid al-Rawi, Deputy Vice-President of the Iraqi National Assembly;
2. Muhammad Nasir Hussein al-Nasiri, research worker
3. Lieutenant-Colonel Abd-al-Wahab Abd-al-Razzaq, of the special security forces.

The paper also published the names of five of the victims:

1. Karim Karkush Al-Anbaki, from Diyala
2. Ali Abd-al-Kadhim Al-Ka'bi, from Al-Amara
3. Hashim Humaydan Al-Musawi, from Al-Kut
4. Haydar Raheem, from Baghdad
5. Ali Jasm Abbadi from Baghdad.

50% INCREASE IN CASES OF TORTURE. In a report published on 22 November, the Turkish Association for Human Rights (IHD) denounced the 50% increases of cases of torture and a spectacular multiplication of obstacles to freedom of expression in the first 9 months of this year, as compared with the year before.

For the period January to September, the Association recorded "at least" 762 cases of

torture in this country, that is applying for membership of the European Union, as against 508 for the same period in 2000, that in an increase of one half again. IHD recalls that, in 1999, the records showed 472 cases for the same period - 7% less than in 2000.

Moreover, the Association deplores the fact of a virtually eight-fold increase in the number of peoples facing charges because of their opinions in the first three-quarters of this year compared with 2000. Thus there were 1,921 people charged for "crimes of opinion" against 254 the year before, to be precise. The total of sentences passed have increased by 350% - 3,758 years imprisonment this year as against 1,098 the year before.

It is the Human Rights situation in Turkey that is the principle obstacle to Turkey's entry into the enlarged European Union, as is remarked in the report on the progress of the candidate countries, published on 13 November, which states that "the present situation and its repercussions on individuals needs to progress". IHD, in commenting on its report, deplores the fact that the 12 other candidate countries had managed to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria in "between one and a half and two years" whereas Turkey, in two years, has only been able to "modify 34 articles of the Constitution". Unlike the other 12 candidate countries, Turkey has not yet been able to even start negotiations for membership. In the opinion of Husnu Ondul, President of IHD,

this is mainly due to the "lack of determination" of the politicians and bureaucrats in applying democratic reforms. "Legal, administrative, judicial and educational measures must be taken urgently" he considered. Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, responsible for negotiations with the European Union, has recognised that his country had not succeeded in meeting the criteria set by the Fifteen particularly with regard to progress towards democracy, despite the 34 amendments passed in October 2001.

IHD, the principle organisation for the defence of Human Rights in Turkey and founded in 1986, points out that all its figures are based on written or verbal complaints received by its various regional branches - many of which have been closed down by the authorities.

• NATIONAL ACTION PARTY'S (MHP) N°2 DECLARES ANKARA NOT READY TO GRANT CULTURAL RIGHTS TO KURDS, TORTURE "EMBEDDED IN PEOPLE'S SPIRITS". On 26 November, Sevkett Bülent Yahnici, Vice-President of the National Action Party (MHP), one of the three parties in the government coalition, stated that Turkey was "not ready" to grant cultural rights to the Kurds as this could "divide" the country. "Certainly it would divide (the country). Turkey is not ready at the present time for this kind of thing. It is not a country where the atmosphere is favourable to these

arrangements" declared Sevkett Bülent Yahnici to the daily paper *Radikal*.

Mr. Yahnici stated that "Turkey is not rushing to join the European Union". According to him "in any case the Fifteen has the same attitude" to the membership problem, he declared.

Regarding Turkey's negative record on Human Rights, Mr. Yahnici deplored the existence of torture in the country but stressed that even if it respected all the (Copenhagen) criteria in this respect, this practice would continue because it is "embedded in people's spirits".

Moreover Mr. Yahnici accused the E.U. of "ill will" on the subject of Cyprus, stressing that a solution to this problem lies with UNO. Cyprus is divided since 1974, following an invasion by the Turkish Army in response to an ultra-nationalist Greek Cypriot coup d'état aiming at uniting the island with Greece. Turkey has recently threatened to annex the Northern (Turkish occupied) part of Cyprus if South (essentially Greek) Cyprus joined the European Union with the first wave of its enlargement in 2004.

On 13 November the European Commission published its annual report on Turkey where it recognised that Ankara had made a step forward by adopting amendments to liberalise its Constitution but judged them insufficient for opening negotiations for membership. The E.U. demands more cultural rights for the Kurdish

population, in particular teaching and Television in the Kurdish language.

• **GERMAN DAILY BILD: THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AUTHORISED EXPORT OF 400 TANK CANNONS TO TURKEY.** According to the 23 November issue of the German daily BILD, the German Government has authorised the export to Turkey of 400 cannons for tanks. This revelation risks provoking fresh discord in the government coalition between the Greens and the Social-Democrats. The sale of these canons, of joint German-South Korean manufacture, was authorised during a meeting of the Government's Security Council, BILD continues. Questioned on the ARD television channel, the under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ludger Volmer, refused to deny or confirm the news. According to him, it had been put about "with the aim of disrupting the Greens' Congress " which was being held in Rostock the following week-end. A government spokesman refused to comment on this news, stressing the confidential nature of all Security Council decisions (Editor's Note: The Security Council is a body that brings together, round Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, the Interior, Justice as well as of Cooperation and of the Economy).

The delivery of a Leopard II tank to Turkey in 1999, for testing

purposes, had aroused a sharp controversy within the SPD-Green coalition, many Human Rights defenders arguing the danger of seeing the Turkish Army using it for the repression of the Kurdish minority. The Security Council, which also takes Human Rights criteria into account, has often opposed the sale of arms to Turkey, in the past, on the initiative of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

In August, a similar affair had shaken Germany, when the press revealed that, under pressure of arms manufacturing firm, the Security Council had decided to lift the opposition it had maintained for the last year, to the sale of detonators to Turkey. Too late, however, the company having let it be known that it lost the contract. The German government had then insisted that its policy of arms sales to Turkey was "unchanged".

Moreover, according to the Turkish daily *Hurriyet* of 23 November, the Turkish Army has launched another series of arms contracts, despite the economic crisis. Thus, in collaboration with the Germans, it plans to modernise 162 Leopard I tanks for a sum of \$130 million. Moreover, \$190 million will be devoted to fitting 80 type F-16 fighter planes with ALQ-178V (5) electronic jamming equipment made by Mikes.

For its part, the Turkish daily *Milliyet* of 23 November announces that the fresh credits granted by the IMF will primarily save Israeli

firms since Turkey is preparing to conclude the biggest ever agreement between the two countries, for a sum of \$700 million, for modernising 170 tanks. As Ankara had stated that the amount could not exceed \$500 million, the agreement had, up to now, been suspended :

• **"THE CRISIS, AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEIZE": THE ARMY'S HOLDING COMPANY, OYAK, MARKS UP A RECORD PROFIT OF \$430 MILLION FOR 2001.** The economic crisis ravaging Turkey is decidedly profitable to the Turkish Army. Thus the report of the Army's cooperative organisation (OYAK), one of the most prosperous companies in Turkey, published on 22 November, for the first time since its creation 40 years ago, shows that it enjoyed, during the crisis, a growth of 50% on a dollar basis and 250% to 300% on a Turkish lire basis.

Coskun Ulusoy, the General Manager of OYAK stated that they had reached about \$430 million profits adding: "If there is a crisis, there are also opportunities, and if we did not take advantage of these opportunities we would be unfair to ourselves, for a company that reached 600 trillion TL (\$430 million) in profits. Where there is a crisis there are also opportunities to be seized, there will even be other windfalls of the crisis is not ended. We have seen and we have seized." Mr. Ulusoy added: "Our profits are greater than the investment

opportunities in Turkey so we must open out abroad".

Created in 1961, OYAK is made up of 26 companies covering the areas of vehicles accessories, finance, cement, food, chemicals and services; it employs 12,572 people and has 180,000 members, officers in the Armed forces. Its Board of Directors is solely composed of regular Army officers, and its General Manager, the only civilian there stresses that his father was a regular Army officer.

On the same day as OYAK published its report, the Turkish economic crisis, that some unhesitatingly call "the most serious ever experienced to date" entered its first anniversary. According to the latest forecasts, the Turkish national income has dropped from \$ 201 billion in the year 2000 to \$130 billion in 2001, losing \$ 71 billion. The per capita income has dropped from \$3,060 to \$2,200 - \$860 less per capita. The foreign debt has risen to \$112 billion. According to the Turkish Trade Union Federation, TURK-IS the poverty for a family of four living in Ankara is about \$ 574 for the month of November. The minimum amount needed by such a family has increased by 64.2% in the last year.

• **REFORM OF CIVIL CODE: OFFICIAL END OF MALE SUPREMACY.** On 22 November the Turkish Members of Parliament passed an important reform to the Civil code that, in particular, ends male supremacy in marriage. The

new Code suppresses the clause that states: "the man is the head of the matrimonial union".

Another significant change - all goods accumulated during marriage will be the common property of the couple whereas hitherto they had belonged to the person in whose name they had been registered. Women will no longer need their husband's authorisation to take up paid employment - on condition that it does not harm "the harmony of their alliance". They can also retain their maiden name, adding to it their husband's surname. The latter can drop his own surname and adopt that of his wife. The legal age for marriage will be raised to 18 for all, as against 15 for women and 17 for men as at present. In the event of divorce, either partner can claim maintenance.

The Code, furthermore, eases the legal procedures for adoption and protects the rights of children born outside marriage. Couples already having children will also have the right to adopt.

The new Civil Code will come into force next year, once it has been endorsed by the President of the Republic.

The Minister of Justice, Hikmet Sami Turk, has who fiercely defended the project and been debating its clauses with various Parliamentary Commissions for two years, welcomed the vote in Parliament. "The great legal revolution of 1926 has been renewed in this 21st Century" he told journalists. The Turkish Civil

Code was adopted in 1926, three years after the proclamation of the Republic by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on the ruins of the theocratic regime of the Ottoman Empire.

Although women have been enjoying considerable rights in Turkey for several decades, particularly in the major cities, where they are to be found, though in small numbers, at all levels of social and government life, these rights are still often flouted in the rural areas.

• **KURDISH FORMER MP MAHMUT ALINAK FACES SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR HAVING "DESPISED MORAL PERSONALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT".** Charged on the basis of Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code for "*having insulted and despised the moral personality of the government*", Mahmut Alinak, former independent M.P. for Sirnak, tried and sentenced in 1994 on the same charges as the M.P.s of the Party for Democracy (DEP - since banned) faces six years jail.

According to the Turkish daily Hurriyet of 4 December, the "*social, economic and moral*" enquiry carried out by the Kars police, on the instructions of the Public Prosecutor, Sinan Tur, can be summed up as follows: the subject person "*is still practicing as a barrister and has no economic difficulties although having no regular income*". "*he consumes alcoholic drinks without, for all that, being an alcoholic*", "*he doesn't keep his promises*" and

he is "immoral". The prosecution brief looks a bit thin

• POLICE CLAIM TO CAPTURE MURDERER OF MEHMET SINCAR

The Turkish authorities state (Hurriyet 6/12/2001) that the assassin of Mehmet Sincar (Kurdish M.P. for Mardin, member of the Party for Democracy (DEP - since banned), killed on 4 September 1993 at Batman) has been arrested in the course of police operations between Yalova and Istanbul, which were aimed at arresting the assassins of three Turkish police officers in October 2001, at Sefakoy (Istanbul).

Rifat Demir, described as the military chief of Ilim, one of the branches of the Hizbullah (God's Party) organisation and a cousin of Huseyin Velioğlu (Editor's Note: Head of Hizbullah, killed a short while ago in a clash with the Turkish police) is said to have confessed to the murder, saying: *"The man we were really aiming at was Nizamettin Tokuç, M.P. for Siirt. We learnt later that the one we'd executed was Sincar and not Tokuç".*

R. Tokuç was arrested, along with a dozen of his comrades, for possession of arms and false identity papers.

Moreover, in the course of an operation against the Hizbullah at Idil, in Sirnak province, many of the weapons found, including 20 Kalashnikovs and three rocket launchers were revealed as belonging to the Turkish Army. A check on the registration numbers inconveniently disclosed the fact

that these weapons had been registered as belonging to the Turkish Army. The assistant commander of the Sirnak gendarmerie, Albay Nevzat Alyanak, simply wrote to the Diyarbakir N° 3 State Security Court to demand that these weapons be returned: *"These identified, numbered and inventoried weapons, seized following an operation carried out by the Sirnak command of the gendarmerie and lent for the period of the enquiry, belong to the Army. Please, therefore, restore these arms, originally registered by the Sirnak gendarmerie command, so that they can be returned to N° 173 Army accounts department".*

This event confirms the long standing suspicion that The Turkish government has, for a long time, supported the Hizbullah and used its activists as hired hands in the death squads that have assassinated over 4,500 non-violent Kurdish public figures and political activists.

• SCANDAL OVER WORD "KURDISTAN" IN FILM FESTIVAL BROCHURE

The English language version of a brochure describing a film festival in Ankara attracted the thunderbolts of wrath of the nationalists when they noticed that the Kurdish region was described as Kurdistan instead of the official term of "South-East Anatolia". In the face of these attacks, particularly by Emin Çölaslan, influential columnist of the daily Hurriyet and close to the Army, Cetin Oner, President of the festival, hastened to beg for

absolution *"Following on your remarks, we have acted rapidly by stopping distribution of the brochure. We thank you for your warning"*

• IN A SINGLE WEEK OVER A THOUSAND KURDS

ILLEGALLY TRANSPORTED TO THE GREEK COASTS

On 5 November the Greek coastguards towed into the port of the Greek island of Zante a boat flying the Turkish flag, which was adrift with over 1,000 illegal immigrants on board, following a fire in the engine room.

All these illegal immigrants, mostly Kurds, remained on board the 150ft boat, what had been seen drifting about thirty Kms South-west of Zante. Furthermore, several women and children are being treated in the island's local hospital for minor injuries.

Elsewhere, the Greek port police, on 1st November 2001, found and boarded a small Turkish trawler in the North East Aegean, piloted by two Turks and a Romanian, which they suspected of having unloaded 138 illegal immigrants from Iraqi Kurdistan, including seven women and five children. This boat, the "Baba Yusuf" was finally located off the island of Psaras, not far off the Turkish coast. It was taken to the nearby Island of Chios and impounded.

According to the Greek authorities, the coast and port police have arrested 5,242 illegal immigrants,

105 smugglers and impounded 83 boats.

• **THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER TALKS OF ANNEXING NORTHERN CYPRUS.**

In the course of an interview on 4 November granted to Fikret Bila, a journalist on the Turkish daily *Milliyet*, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit declared that *"if the Greek Cypriots were admitted into the European Union, Turkey would have only two options: complete annexation or a special status"*. Bülent Ecevit, who was himself responsible for the Turkish Army's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 continued: *"Southern Cyprus's joining the E.U. would mean the North would have to capitulate to Southern Cyprus. In the face of such an eventuality, the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (KKTC) could decide to join Turkey. As for the special status, it could allow it to be independent in domestic affairs and linked to Turkey for Foreign Affairs and Defence. Moreover I have already put a model of this sort on the agenda"*.

The Prime Minister's remarks echo those of his Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem, who had declared regarding the Cyprus question: *"We will do whatever in necessary even if we have to pay a heavy price"*. Deputy Premier Devlet Bahçeli (MHP) put in his overbid by thundering *"Turkey will sacrifice everything for Cyprus"*.

Cyprus is one of the best placed of the candidate countries for membership of the European Union. The Turkish Army, that risks losing its privileges and power

to intervene in civil life if Turkey were to join the E.U. is not too keen on democratisation. Which leads one to suppose that the shadow of the Turkish Generals has influenced the Prime Minister's latest sally.

READ IN THE TURKISH PRESS:

IS HADEP'S STRENGTH SUCH A SURPRISE? İlnur Çevik, editorial writer on the English language paper Turkish Daily News, in his column of 27 November returns to the situation in Kurdistan through the development of the pro-Kurdish party, HADEP, whose strength worries the Turkish Army which demands the search for means of reducing its impact on the politico-media scene. In his editorial entitled "Is HADEP's strength such a surprise?" the journalist describes the real and much under-estimated strength of HADEP and, alongside it, the incompetence of the Turkish authorities in the region. Here are extensive extracts from the article:

"According to the banner headline in mass circulation daily Milliyet, the National Security Council (MGK) will convene today and may take up the fact that while the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HADEP) preserves its strength in southeastern Turkey, all the other parties lack any muscle in the region..."

HADEP, or the views it represents, have received strong backing in the region for a very long time. HADEP has tried to enter Parliament several

times but has failed because it could not pass the 10 percent threshold required to be able to win seats. However, HADEP has won huge votes in many southeastern provinces, many more than any of its rivals. That is why the party swept all the mayoral seats in the local elections in the Southeast and proved its strength.

If the HADEP deputies had run in the parliamentary elections on independent tickets they too would have easily won seats, irrespective of the regional thresholds, simply because they won much more votes than the regional thresholds. HADEP won a respectable 4.3 percent of the vote but could not pass 10 percent...

The people of the region feel the party caters for their needs and represents their aspirations. The only other party that made any impact in the region was the banned pro-Islamic Welfare Party (RP) of Necmettin Erbakan, but that party too could only win so many southeastern seats because HADEP could not enter Parliament. Now that the establishment has closed down RP and its successor the Virtue Party (FP), it seems HADEP enjoys more support than before.

So the authorities are concerned. They feel in the next elections HADEP deputies may find a way to enter Parliament, and they simply don't like this idea.

But what option has the establishment left for the local people? They could vote for Justice and Development Party (AKP), but even that party is threatened. No one wants to vote for the parties that have proven to be so

nationalistic and have always looked upon the people of southeastern Turkey with suspicion...

Once the struggle against the separatist terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) died down, the authorities simply forgot southeastern Turkey. The economic crisis that has hit Turkey in general has had an even tougher impact on the already impoverished southeastern people

That is what the military is so concerned about. Those running Turkey have completely abandoned the people of the region, and will pay the price in the next elections. So it is inevitable that HADEP wins and the other loses.

The MGK may discuss this, but words will be empty so long as Turkey does not have a viable administration which is prepared to take on challenges and

really boost the welfare of southeastern Turkey through animal husbandry and allowing the locals to do meaningful border trade with little or no bureaucratic obstructions.

Just like in any place in Turkey, you have to make the people realize that you really care for them and their problems, and that you do not treat them as third class citizens but as 'one of us'."

With Turkey's Pledge, U.S. Coalition Gets Its First Muslim Troops

By Douglas Frantz
New York Times Service

ANKARA — Turkey said Thursday that it would deploy 90 special forces troops to Afghanistan, making it the first Muslim nation to join the U.S.-led attacks on the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.

Turkish officials said the elite soldiers would be sent to northern Afghanistan primarily to help train anti-Taliban fighters and to support humanitarian aid operations. But they acknowledged that Turkish soldiers also may engage in combat.

"We foresee a framework to keep this risk at a minimum," Foreign Minister Ismail Cem said in an interview. "But our soldiers are well-prepared."

Western diplomats in Ankara described the Turkish commitment as a major step in efforts to convince people, especially Muslims, that the war is not against the Afghan people or Islam — a tough challenge, particularly in the face of rising civilian casualties and the prospect of a long and messy conflict.

"This is the best news the war on terrorism has had in the last 10 days," a Western diplomat said.

The conflict in Afghanistan and the prospect that it may spread to other countries, particularly neighboring Iraq, has underscored Turkey's position as a country on the cusp. It is caught between its geography and religion — although it has a secular government — and its long alliance with the United States and orientation toward Europe. Turkey is the only Muslim member of NATO and the only NATO nation among the 50 members of the Organization of Islamic Countries.

Ankara's decision to dispatch troops to Afghanistan will be seen in many quarters as tilting too far toward the West and it is likely to contribute to the queasiness of many Turks, who have expressed worries about a sustained war against fellow Muslims.

Turkey has not experienced the large, violent anti-American protests that have jolted some other Muslim countries like Indonesia and Pakistan since the bombing started on Oct. 7. But public opinion polls find that more than 80 percent of Turks oppose using the Turkish military in Afghanistan.

"Turkey had more than its military power to offer," Omer Vehbi Hatiboglu, a leader of Saadet, the pro-Islamic opposition party, said. "A more effective weapon was our Muslim identity to explain U.S. policies to the Muslim world, but now we have become a pact member and lost our mediating status."

Condemning the attacks of Sept. 11 was easy for Turkey's leaders, like those in most other Muslim countries. But Ankara signaled a willingness to take bolder steps on Oct. 10 when the Parliament, over objections from the pro-Islamic opposition, authorized the government to send troops to Afghanistan and to open its airspace and bases to U.S.-led troops.

Turkey's Incirlik air base is being used as a transport hub for strikes on Afghanistan as well as a staging point for U.S. and British air patrols above northern Iraq. A second Turkish base is also being used, but officials have declined to identify it.

Last Friday, the United States asked Turkey to provide the special troops, which are experienced in guerrilla warfare in mountainous terrain after fighting

Kurdish rebels for more than 15 years in southeast Turkey. They are expected to join soldiers from the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia, preparing for what is expected to be a sustained campaign of surprise raids by small, elite units.

The cabinet approved the deployment Thursday, with what officials said was the backing of the country's powerful military. Details are being coordinated with the American military, although officials said the troops were expected to leave within a week from Incirlik.

Clearly sensitive to how the decision would be seen in the Muslim world, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said Turkey's action was not intended to harm Islam and that Ankara would work to establish a broad-based government for post-Taliban Afghanistan.

"Those who portray this campaign as an action against Islam are contradicting the high values of Islam, which is a religion of peace," he said.

Mr. Ecevit rejected a pause in the bombing for Ramadan, the Muslim holy month which begins later this month. "Terrorism has no Ramadan, no flags, no feasts," Mr. Ecevit said at a news conference.

Some bankers and financial analysts speculated that Turkey's participation in the U.S.-led war against terrorism could win additional concessions for its struggling economy from the International Monetary Fund and the United States.

The Fund said Thursday that a team would visit Turkey soon to discuss how to bridge the \$13 billion finance gap that it will face next year as a result of its year-long economic troubles and the plunge in tourism since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

A Lesson for America From an Israeli Attack on Saddam

By George F. Will

WASHINGTON — When Israel's foreign minister, Shimon Peres, accompanied by Ambassador David Ivry, recently visited the Oval Office, President George W. Bush remarked that Israel certainly has the right ambassador for the moment. He said this because Mr. Ivry has shown that he understands how preventive action is pertinent to the problem of weapons of mass destruction in dangerous hands. Mr. Bush's remark revealed that the president as well as the vice president remembers and admires a bold Israeli action for which Israel was roundly condemned 20 years ago.

On the afternoon of June 7, 1981, Jordan's King Hussein, yachting in the Gulf of Aqaba, saw eight low-flying Israeli F-16s roar eastward. He called military headquarters in Amman for information, but got none. The aircraft had flown below Jordanian radar. So far, so good for Mr. Ivry's mission, code-named Opera.

Mr. Ivry, a short, balding figure with a gray mustache, was then commander of Israel's air force, which had acquired some of the 75 F-16s ordered by Iran from the United States but not delivered because of the 1979

revolution that toppled the shah. The F-16s were to be tested to their limits when Israel learned that Iraq was about to receive a shipment of enriched uranium for its reactor near Baghdad — enough to build four or five Hiroshima-size bombs.

The reactor was 600 miles (960 kilometers) from Israel. Ensuring that the F-16s could return to base required the dangerous expedient of topping off the fuel tanks on the runway, with engines running. Measures were taken to reduce the air drag of the planes' communications pods and munitions racks.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin ordered the attack to occur before the uranium arrived and the reactor went "hot," at which point bombing would have scattered radioactive waste over Baghdad. The raid was scheduled for a Sunday, to minimize casualties. It was executed perfectly. Aren't we glad. Now.

The U.S. State Department said Israel's destruction of the reactor jeopardized the "peace process" of the day, said relations with Israel were being "reassessed," canceled meetings with Israeli officials and suspended deliveries of military equipment, including F-16s, pending a decision about wheth-

er Israel had violated the restriction that weapons obtained from America could be used only for defensive purposes. The New York Times said Israel had embraced "the code of terror" and that the raid was "inexcusable and short-sighted aggression." The Times added this remarkable thought:

"Even assuming that Iraq was hell-bent to divert enriched uranium for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, it would have been working toward a capacity that Israel itself acquired long ago. Contrary to its official assertion, therefore, Israel was not in 'mortal danger' of being out-

gunned. It faced a potential danger of losing its Middle East nuclear monopoly, of being deterred one day from the use of atomic weapons in war."

The Times was sarcastic about fear of Saddam Hussein and sanguine about his acquiring nuclear weapons that would deter Israel from using such weapons. But 10 years later Americans had reason to be thankful for Israel's muscular unilateralism in 1981.

Today on Mr. Ivry's embassy office wall is a large black-and-white photograph taken by satellite 10 years after the raid, at the time of the Gulf War. It

shows the wreckage of the reactor complex, which is still surrounded by a high, thick wall that was supposed to protect it. Trees are growing where the reactor dome had been.

The picture has this handwritten inscription. "For Gen. David Ivry, with thanks and appreciation for the outstanding job he did on the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981—which made our job much easier in Desert Storm." The author of the inscription signed it: "Dick Cheney, Sec. of Defense 1989-93."

Were it not for Israel's raid, Iraq probably would have had

nuclear weapons in 1991 and there would have been no Desert Storm. The fact that Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney are keenly appreciative of what Mr. Ivry and Israel's air force accomplished is welcome evidence of two things:

In spite of the secretary of state's coalition fetish, the administration understands the role of robust unilateralism. And neither lawyers citing "international law" nor diplomats invoking "world opinion" will prevent America from acting as Israel did, preemptively in self-defense.

The Washington Post.



ORGANISATION MONDIALE CONTRE LA TORTURE
WORLD ORGANIZATION AGAINST TORTURE
ORGANIZACION MUNDIAL CONTRA LA TORTURA
WEITORGANISATION GEGEN DIE FOLTER
Director Eric Sollos

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Case TUR 021101 Death in detention/Torture

The International Secretariat of OMCT requests your URGENT intervention in the following situation in Turkey.

Brief description of the situation

The International Secretariat of OMCT has been informed by a reliable source of the suspect death of Mr. Yunus Güzel on October 23rd, 2001 while in detention at police headquarters in Istanbul, Turkey.

According to the information received, Mr. Güzel, a 32 year old member of the Revolutionary People's Liberation Front, was reportedly taken into custody on October, 16th, 2001 by the Istanbul Security Directorate under allegations that he was preparing a suicide attack on behalf of the Revolutionary People's Liberation Front (DHKP/C). On October 23rd, 2001, Mr. Güzel was found dead in his detention cell located in the Anti-Terror branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate. The authorities stated that Mr. Güzel's committed suicide, claiming that he used his bed sheets to hang himself from his bunk bed, which he had allegedly moved into an up-right position. According to our sources, the authorities' suicide explanation is questionable, as it is known that within these detention facilities, the beds are bolted to the floor and detainees are not given bed sheets.

According to the information received, fellow detainees Mahmut Polat, Esra Üçgüzel and Perihan Demirkıran - who were also under detention with Mr. Yunus Güzel - stated that Mr. Güzel was repeatedly interrogated and forced to give statements under torture. A photograph also published on October 30th, 2001 in local paper "Evrensel," reportedly shows bruises and other torture marks on Mr. Güzel's body.

According to the information received, on October 25, 2001, the Human Rights Association (IHD) and Research Foundation for Social Jurisprudence (TOHAV) requested that an investigation be launched by the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office in Istanbul into the circumstances of Mr. Güzel's death. To date, there is no information indicating that progress has been made in this investigation.

The International Secretariat of OMCT is gravely concerned Mr. Güzel's death in detention, as well as the alleged use of torture by Istanbul Security Directorate officials.

Moreover, OMCT is gravely concerned about Turkey's continuing use of torture, and the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of these acts.

Action requested

Please write to the authorities in Turkey urging them to:

- i. guarantee an immediate investigation into the alleged torture and death in detention of Mr. Yunus Güzel, including an autopsy to identify the causes of his death, identify those responsible, bring them to trial and apply the penal, civil and/or administrative sanctions as provided by law;
- ii. guarantee adequate reparation to Mr. Güzel's family;
- iii. guarantee the respect of human rights and the fundamental freedoms throughout the country in accordance with national laws and international human rights standards.

Addresses

- Minister of Interior, Mr Saadettin Tantan, İçişleri Bakanlığı, 06644 Ankara, Turkey. Fax: + 90 312 418 17 95.
- Minister of Justice, Prof Hikmet Sami Türk, Ministry of Justice, Adalet Bakanlığı, 06659 Ankara, Turkey. Fax: + 90 312 417 3954 / 418 5667
- State Minister with responsibility for Human Rights, Mr Rüstü Kazım Yücelen, Office of the Prime Minister, Başbakanlık, 06573 Ankara, Turkey. Fax: + 90 312 417 0476

Please also write to the embassies of Turkey in your respective country.

Geneva, November 2nd, 2001

Kindly inform us of any action undertaken quoting the code of this appeal in your reply.

NOVEMBER 01 2001 The Times (London)

The pitfalls of an attack on Iraq

FROM SIR ANDREW GREEN

(Ambassador to Syria, 1991-94; Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 1996-2000)

Sir, Daniel Finkelstein (Times 2, October 29) calls for Saddam to be removed, but your leading article (October 25) is absolutely right to point out the pitfalls of an attack on Iraq. Not only would the coalition dissolve but the entire Arab, and much of the Muslim, world would be infuriated. Our evidence, necessarily based on intelligence, would fail to convince the many who feel that the Iraqis have suffered enough at Western hands. The contrast with the West's toleration of Israel's behaviour towards the Palestinians would be even starker. Widespread public demonstrations would be inevitable and the Saudis would certainly refuse the use of their territory as a base from which to launch an attack.

Beyond that, it is hard to see a clear achievable military objective. The 1998 air offensive Desert Fox demonstrated the futility of bombing for political ends. Attempts to stir up internal opposition failed dismally in 1996 and would fail again. The opposition is divided, discredited and penetrated. The removal of Saddam or his weapons of mass destruction would involve the invasion and occupation of Iraq, requiring an army of several hundred thousand men. In the unlikely event of that being achieved, knocking out the Sunni-led army would lead, as in 1991, to a Shia uprising in the South and to Kurdish unrest in the North. Neighbours would be strongly tempted to interfere with arms and money. Turkey, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia would all have a vital interest in the outcome. The result would be a civil war that would make Lebanon's troubles seem like a vicarage tea party and would be a fatal blow to our central policy objective stability in the region. The American approach is often "can do". The British is usually "think it through". The latter is essential if we are to avoid a situation even worse than Afghanistan.

* * * * *

Saddam and the people

KurdishMedia.com

By Lise Storm Grundon

01 November 2001

Is it the sanctions against Iraq or the policy and administration of Saddam Hussein that is the primary cause of the Iraqi population starving and living in misery, the question of this chronicle.

Tuesday 9 January 2001, the Danish TV-channel DR2 in the programme "From Without" showed a fairly old documentary by the Australian journalist John Pilger. The documentary, which concerns the sufferings of the Iraqi population under the sanctions against the country, has previously been shown - among others - in the CNN programme "Insight" 29 February 2000. Unfortunately the journalist of the DR2 programme chose to be absolutely uncritical of the documentary, while our new Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Mogens Lykketoft more accurately described the documentary as "extremely manipulative".

As shown in the documentary the Iraqi population has been suffering from international sanctions imposed on the Iraqi regime to stop its programme of weapons of mass-destruction. Under these sanctions the infant mortality rate has risen, more and more children suffer from general malnutrition and stunting, some die of hunger, and diseases such as leukemia and other forms of cancer have become common diseases. These facts have in recent years led to criticism of the sanctions against Iraq, criticism both from the Iraqi regime itself but also from several Western and Non-Western countries, even the United Nations personnel in Iraq have criticized the sanctions. In 1998 the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq - Denis Halliday - withdrew, in February 2000 his successor Hans von Sponeck withdrew, and only a few days later the leader of the World Food Programme in Iraq followed - all three naming the continued existence of the sanctions and the inhuman consequences of these as the reasons for their withdrawal.

At more or less the same point in time as these high-ranking UN personnel withdrew from their posts in Iraq, the international media got access to Iraq - the media was invited by the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to inspect hospitals and schools in Baghdad and the Southern port of Basra (among other areas) some of the areas in worst condition. What these journalists - among them Danish journalists - reported was certainly true.

People were not able to get the right medical treatment in the hospitals, there was no medicine, the schools were in a miserable condition, and the majority of the Iraqi population was living in extreme poverty. At the return several journalists even argued for the lifting of sanctions against the country.

However, what the journalists did not do was to take a critical look at the situation. Why did they suddenly get access to Iraq? Why had the Iraqi regime in advance planned what the journalists were about to see? Could this be a hidden agenda by the Iraqi regime to get the sanctions lifted? And what will the implications be for the Iraqi population if the sanctions are lifted? These questions were hardly touched upon by the international media - nor by the Danish media.

I will not deny that the Iraqi population is in a terrible situation without access to food, medicine, education and other necessities. What I will do is to question if this terrible situation is a consequence of the sanctions against Iraq. Like many experts in the field I am of the opinion that this situation is caused by the horrible nature of the Iraqi regime, by the total indifference of the Iraqi regime to its own population.

The first reason why many question if this catastrophic situation is caused by the international sanctions against Iraq, is that Iraq under the so-called "Oil-for-Food" agreement adopted in 1996 has the right to sell oil in order to buy food and medicine under the supervision of the UN. On 17 December, 2001 The "Oil for Food" agreement was succeeded by a much improved version of the agreement, the resolution 1284. The old "Oil for Food" agreement had primarily been criticized for setting a limit on the amount of oil that the Iraqi regime was entitled to sell. Secondly, the agreement was criticized for making it possible to block and delay Iraqi import of food and medicine. With the adoption of resolution 1284 the limit on the Iraqi oil sale was abolished, and the new resolution recommend that whenever possible the money from the oil sale should be used for buying locally produced goods instead of importing goods. Moreover, with the adoption of resolution 1284 a so-called "short-list" of humanitarian goods including food, medicine, basic or standard medical and agricultural equipment, and basic or standard educational equipment, was established. The import of these goods would no longer be subject to the inspection of the UN Sanctions Committee that has to approve of all goods imported by the Iraqi regime.

With the adoption of resolution 1284 it is in other words possible for the Iraqi regime to buy as much food, medi-

cine and additional humanitarian goods as the regime wishes to. Moreover, the regime is be able to get these goods delivered within a quite short time-limit because of the humanitarian "short-list".

But neither the Iraqi population nor the international community have experienced any rise in the import of these necessities even though the Iraqi regime has claimed that it would like to supply these goods but had not been able to because of the sanctions.

Today the situation is that Iraq is able to buy more than sufficient amounts of food and medicine no Iraqis need starve or suffer under the lack of medicine and medical equipment, and the schools would be able to offer good facilities for the Iraqi children and youngsters. The problem is that the Iraqi regime does not want to!

To put these claims more into perspective one need not look further than to the Kurdish areas of self-rule in the Northern part of Iraq. At the end of the Persian Gulf War the Iraqi Kurds established their own Parliament and Government, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), after democratic elections held under international supervision in 1992. In reality the KRG today controls the areas mainly populated by Kurds in the Northern Iraq. According to resolution 1302 the Iraqi Kurds are entitled to 13 per cent of the Iraqi income from the oil sale under the "Oil for Food" agreement. In contradiction to the Iraqi regime the KRG has chosen to cooperate with the personnel of the UN, and with the various international organizations present in the area. The results of this cooperation are among others that the infant mortality rate is much lower than in the remaining parts of Iraq, almost nobody starves, the schools are in a much better condition, there is not the same lack of medicine as in the remaining parts of Iraq the list is infinite. As our new Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in the end of the DR2 programme, an honest regime suffering from international sanctions will be more than able to avoid the catastrophes one sees in Iraq today.

The question is now if one can justify lifting the international sanctions against Iraq because of the documented high infant mortality rate, the malnutrition and so forth, when these catastrophes most likely are not caused by the sanctions regime. What will the consequences of lifting the sanctions be? Will the infant mortality rate decline? Will medicine be more available? Will the Iraqi population no longer starve? And what will happen to the Kurdish population in the Northern Iraq and the Shii population in the Southern Iraq if sanctions and the no-fly zones are lifted?

The answer to the first question is that there is no reason to believe that the Iraqi population will be better off if sanctions are lifted. This can be predicted from the previous spending-pattern of Saddam Hussein. Already before the Persian Gulf War and the introduction of the sanctions the Iraqi population lived in poverty. Because of the eight year-long war against Iran there was not enough money to support both Saddam Hussein's great passion for development and import of weapons, and at the same time ensure the Iraqi population a reasonable standard of living. The Iraqi dictator chose to put weapon before the well-being of his population. Moreover, during the first years under the sanctions Saddam Hussein preferred to see his population starve and suffer under the lack of medicine to sign the "Oil for Food" agreement. When the Iraqi dictator finally signed in 1996 he chose not to use all the money from the oil sale to buy food and medicine. In many cases the money was just left on the established account. As stated above the Iraqi dictator also chose not to increase the import of food, medicine, medical equipment, agricultural equipment etc. after the limit of the oil sale was removed, a fact that means that the living standard has not improved even after the adoption of resolution 1284.

What would be the incentive to buy food, medicine, educational-, medical-, and agricultural equipment to support the Iraqi population in the case sanctions were lifted? If sanctions are lifted the state of Iraq will be even poorer than at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and at that time, as stated above, the Iraqi dictator chose to spend the money and weapons, does everything not point in the direction that he will do the same again? Under the sanctions the Iraqi population is at least assured a minimum of food and medicine because the Iraqi dictator is not able to buy anything that is not approved of by the Sanctions Committee, and weapons are certainly not one of the items. In other words, the likeliness that the Iraqi population is better off under the existing sanctions than in a situation where sanctions were lifted is significant.

One can then remark if not one ought to give the Iraqi population the benefit of the doubt. Ought one not lift the sanctions if it is "only" the above that is the problem? Maybe. But the problem is much bigger. If the sanctions against Iraq are lifted the no fly-zones, which at the moment protects the Shii and Kurdish populations in respectively South and North Iraq against encroachment and assault from the Iraqi regime, will also disappear, and at the moment that happens the two population-groups will be at great risk. Especially the Iraqi Kurds.

During the years the Iraqi regime has committed crimes against its Kurdish population several times, the worst case was in 1988 when the two Kurdish towns of Halabja and Khormal were attacked with nerve gas, attacks that wiped

out almost the entire population in the two areas, attacks that means that the children born in these areas are severely deformed even today. At the moment crimes against the Iraqi Kurds are still committed in the areas outside the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Kurds are arrested without reason, Kurds "disappear", and in the name of the so-called "Arabization" campaign Kurds are deported in order to give room for Arabs so that the areas eventually can be declared one hundred per cent Arabic. Moreover, the Iraqi regime has on several occasions tried to violate the no fly-zones, and in December Iraqi troops succeeded in entering the Kurdish areas of self-rule in the Northern no fly-zone.

If the sanctions against Iraq are lifted there is every reason to fear that the Iraqi dictator will punish the Kurdish population for having cooperated with the West and for having established their own popular elected Parliament and Government. Can one justify lifting the sanctions against the Iraq when one of the consequences will be crime against humanity in Iraqi Kurdistan, exactly as one has seen in Kosova? Can one justify to lift the sanctions against Iraq because the sanctions violate international conventions and the sovereignty of the authoritarian state of Iraq when lifting the sanctions means that a democratic experiment in the Kurdish areas of self-rule will come to an end, a democratic experiment so unique for the entire Middle East? One has to bear in mind that the Iraqi Kurds do not want an independent Kurdish state, what they want is a federal Iraq in which they are secured a high degree of autonomy.

From the above it is clear that I do not think that the sanctions against Iraq should be lifted.

However, this does not mean that I think that they should keep their existing form. I think, that the solution to the problem of sanctions is to lift them conditionally, an option that has been discussed in diplomatic circles in recent years. The United Nations should lift the sanctions against Iraq gradually, but the United Nations should still protect the Iraqi Kurds against attacks from the Iraqi regime, this could be done, as is currently done in Kosova, by international protection established under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, the Iraqi Kurds must be secured financially, either by the 13 per cent that they receive from the Iraqi oil sale at the moment or by a higher amount corresponding to the size of the Kurdish population out of the entire Iraqi population.

If sanctions are lifted there is every reason to believe that the Iraqi Kurds will continue to suffer from the Iraqi boycott as they have the past 10 years. Under the 10 year-long sanctions regime the Iraqi Kurds have suffered from a double embargo: the international embargo against Iraq and an Iraqi embargo against the Iraqi Kurds alone. Moreover, the Iraqi regime has several times withheld food and medicine supplies for the Iraqi Kurds under the existence of the international sanctions, and accordingly there is every reason to fear that the Iraqi Kurds will loose their economic basis for existence if the sanctions against Iraq are lifted.

A conditional lifting of the sanctions against Iraq is not something that can be done quickly. Therefore, the international community ought to get together and form and adopt a common policy regarding a conditional lifting of the sanctions. It is too late to form and adopt such a policy when the sanctions have already been lifted, it has to be done in advance. The importance of the making and adoption of such a policy has been realized in Sweden which at the moment is chairman of the European Union. In the Swedish Riksdag a policy has been adopted with the support of almost all the parties in the Riksdag, a policy that concerns a conditional lifting of the sanctions against Iraq, including a plan of how to assure the rights of the Iraqi Kurds, and the survival of the democratic experiment in the areas of self-rule. Ought not the Danish parliamentarians follow the example of our Swedish brothers and do something equivalent?

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Rotten eggs unbroken: Turkey's campaign against corruption in high places seems to be faltering

Nov 1st 2001 The Economist by Amberin Zaman

IF IT is to join the European Union, Turkey needs to tackle corruption and clean up its security service and police. It says it is trying. Recent events raise some doubts.

An appeals court last week quashed the convictions of a senior police officer, an intelligence man and 12 others for membership of a gang that trafficked in heroin and arms, laundering the proceeds in casinos in northern Cyprus. The two senior men had each been sentenced in February to six years in prison, and the case had been seen as a test of Turkish resolve to punish members of the security forces and other senior officials and politicians tainted by large-

scale corruption or linked to the killings of Kurdish dissidents by death-squads. But the appeal judge said the investigation had not been thorough enough, and demanded a re-trial.

Some Turks keen to root out corruption in high places say this would be welcome, if it led the accused to reveal the names of higher-ranking figures involved. Others fear that the case will get buried as the time in law allowed for it runs out. The case springs from a car crash in Susurluk, a small provincial town, five years ago, when an armoured Mercedes ran into a truck. In the car were Huseyin Kocadag, a prominent police chief, Abdullah Catli, an extreme-nationalist hitman previously convicted of heroin trafficking, and his girlfriend, a former beauty queen and drugs courier. All three died. The car's boot proved to be crammed with weapons. The one survivor, Sedat Bucak, a Kurdish MP whose private militia had helped the army fight Kurdish separatists, later claimed to have lost his memory. But investigation exposed a cat's-cradle of ties between politicians, officials and organised crime.

Adnan Keskin, a journalist who has courageously covered the Susurluk scandal for a liberal newspaper, Radikal, says he was rung up last week and warned to stop or "be prepared to face the consequences". The Susurluk gang has already killed several nosy journalists. The caller, says Mr Keskin, was Mehmet Agar, an ultra-nationalist former interior minister who lost that post in 1996 after it emerged that he personally had issued the hitman, Catli, with a special passport carried by senior officials. Mr Agar was also stripped of his parliamentary immunity. But he was re-elected as an independent MP two years ago. So was Mr Bucak and MPs have dilly-dallied over the prosecutor's request to lift the two men's immunity so that they can be questioned about the affair.

In notable contrast, MPs have sounded keener to lift the immunity of Sema Piskinsut, a left-wing deputy who has fearlessly campaigned against torture and who sat on a parliamentary commission of inquiry into the Susurluk affair. The chief prosecutor in Ankara has accused her of abetting torture, because she would not name the thousands of prisoners she interviewed for a parliamentary report on abuse in jails, nor yet their alleged torturers. She lost the chairmanship of parliament's committee on torture last winter, after it said that members of the military police were involved in drug-trafficking and extortion rackets in the south-east.

Earlier this year her son was beaten up, and she was prevented from addressing a convention of the ruling Democratic Left party at a time when she was trying to challenge Bulent Ecevit, the prime minister, for the party's leadership. Mrs Piskinsut resigned from the party and is trying to set up a new one specifically to tackle corruption and, among other things, to get to the bottom of the Susurluk case.

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INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2001

Turkish Police Raid Houses of Hunger Strikers

Reuters

ISTANBUL — Police used armored cars, tear gas and batons Monday to break into three homes in Istanbul where leftists have been on a hunger strike to protest changes in prison organization.

The afternoon raids were the latest attempt to deal with a protest that has left more than 40 dead of starvation and sparked a series of lethal bomb explosions.

Witnesses in the Kucuk Armutlu district of Istanbul saw police break into homes and drag out protesters. Some of the detained were apparently weakened by months of fasting and were taken to hospitals in ambulances.

At least three protesters were injured by gunfire and a fourth person set himself on fire, the state-run Anatolian news agency said.

Tear gas swirled around the low houses and mixed with the fog and smoke from fires set by the protesters. The raids followed newspaper reports accusing the police of having no sway in the neighborhood.

The hunger strikers have been taking minimal nutrition since late last year to protest the introduction of cell-based jails to replace large dormitory wards. The death toll from the hunger strikes has reached 42.

Last December, authorities stormed jails across the country in an attempt to end the strikes and force the transfer of inmates to the new high-security jails. Two soldiers and 30 prisoners died in those raids.

Officials say the new jails with their smaller cells are needed to break the influence of radical political groups over some prison dormitories.

■ UN Urges Cyprus Settlement

The United Nations responded Monday to a threat from Turkey to "annex" the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state by urging Ankara

to reach a settlement before the island's Greek Cypriot government joins the European Union, Reuters reported from Ankara.

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said during the weekend that Turkey could annex the territory if Cyprus joined the bloc before a settlement was reached.

The European Commission president, Romano Prodi, "made very clear on the island there is a strong preference and a strong desire by the European Union there should be a settlement on Cyprus before that matter comes to a decision," the UN's special envoy to Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, said after meeting the Turkish foreign minister, Ismail Cem.

"So let's concentrate on the matter at hand, which is getting a settlement," he told reporters.

Cyprus, expected to join the EU by 2004, has been partitioned since 1974, when Turkish soldiers invaded the island to thwart a short-lived coup by Greek Cypriot militants aimed at uniting with Athens.

IRAN Des dizaines de milliers de supporters dans la rue

Nouveaux troubles après un match de foot

Téhéran :
de notre correspondant
Serge Michel

« Restez à la maison ! » A la mi-temps de leur match retour contre les Emirats arabes unis, les joueurs de l'équipe iranienne de football ont supplié leurs supporters de ne pas répéter les troubles qui ont suivi les rencontres précédentes contre l'Irak et Bahreïn. Les recommandations des joueurs n'ont pas vraiment été suivies : des dizaines de milliers de personnes sont descendues dans les rues de Téhéran dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi. Mais peu de violences et d'arrestations ont été signalées, car la police et les bassidji (volontaires islamiques) ont laissé la

foule célébrer la victoire (3 à 0) contre l'équipe émiratie.

Le Guide suprême, Ali Khamenei, dans son discours du mardi 30 octobre à Ispahan, avait laissé entendre un changement de stratégie : « Nous avons demandé à notre jeunesse dévouée (les bassidji) de s'abstenir d'affronter ces gens (les manifestants), sinon notre jeunesse dynamique aurait résolument réglé la question de cette minorité. » La soirée de mercredi coïncidait aussi avec l'anniversaire de Mehdi, le 12^e imam des chiites, qui aurait disparu dans son jeune âge il y a douze siècles et dont les chiites attendent le retour pour sauver le monde. Pour cette cérémonie heureuse (la plupart des fêtes religieuses chiites sont liées au deuil), les bassidji

ont distribué des bonbons. Sur l'immense place Azadi, ils ont même préparé un gâteau de deux tonnes.

Une heure après le match, quelque 5 000 personnes étaient massées autour de la place Sharak-e Qods, à l'ouest de la capitale. Des bombes artisanales ont été lancées en direction des forces de l'ordre, provoquant à chaque fois des cris de joie chez les jeunes les plus excités. « Ce mouvement n'a pas de leader et n'est pas organisé. Il va disparaître comme il est venu, affirme un étudiant. Mais la colère va rester, parce que ce sont des changements politiques profonds que nous voulons. » La chaîne NITV, animée par des

Iraniens en exil et proche des milieux monarchistes, a tenté d'ex-

ploiter ces troubles, mais ne suscite guère de sympathie parmi les jeunes de Sharak-e Ghods. A la place Narmak aussi, où les affrontements furent très importants lors des derniers matches, les forces anti-émeutes sont restées dans les rues adjacentes. Des jeunes interrogés ignoraient que mercredi était également l'anniversaire de Reza-Cyrus Pahlavi, prince héritier d'Iran en exil. « Nous ne voulons ni un retour à la monarchie ni une démocratie islamique, a déclaré l'un d'eux, étudiant. Nous voulons une démocratie tout court. »

Le ministre des Renseignements, Ali Yunessi, a estimé que « les forces contre-révolutionnaires ne peuvent pas être à l'origine des récents troubles de rues ». Pour lui, il ne s'agit pas d'une crise de sécurité nationale, mais d'un signe de « vulnérabilité sociale » du système. Le ministère de l'Intérieur a indiqué que 90 % des personnes arrêtées après les matches précédents ont entre 12 et 23 ans, ce qui exclut le chômage comme cause principale des troubles.

Une unité d'élite turque en Afghanistan

Istanbul : Éric Biegala

La réponse a fusé quelques heures à peine après l'annonce, hier, par la Turquie de l'envoi de 90 membres des Forces spéciales en Afghanistan. « Les soldats de pays musulmans qui s'allient avec les Américains sont nos ennemis », a averti Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, l'ambassadeur du régime taliban au Pakistan.

La décision turque « a pour but de développer l'entraînement et la préparation de l'Alliance du Nord, de répondre aux besoins humanitaires et de contribuer au développement d'une administration à laquelle participeraient tous les groupes ethniques afghans », explique un communiqué du gouvernement de Bülent Ecevit.

Ankara a mis un peu moins d'une semaine pour répondre aux demandes américaines, soupesant soigneusement les possibles conséquences. Hier, le cabinet du premier ministre

s'empressait d'ailleurs d'ajouter que « ceux qui veulent présenter cette opération comme dirigée contre l'islam vont à l'encontre des valeurs sublimes de (cette) religion de paix ».

Musulmane à 95 %, mais officiellement laïque, la Turquie est également membre de l'Otan et le principal allié des États-Unis au Moyen-Orient avec Israël. Dès le début de la campagne, Ankara s'est très clairement rangée aux côtés de Washington, autorisant les appareils américains à utiliser son espace aérien. Début octobre, le Parlement autorisait l'envoi de troupes turques à l'étranger mais, dans le même temps, un sondage indiquait que 77,6 % de la population étaient opposés aux frappes américaines et 86 % à l'envoi de soldats en Afghanistan.

Depuis des années, la Turquie soutient financièrement et logistiquement les forces ouzbeks turcophones du général Rachid Dostom qui se bat pour reprendre Mazar-e Charif, la principale ville du nord de l'Afghanistan. Selon le quotidien *Turkish Daily News*,

Washington a demandé à la Turquie de contribuer à un « renforcement de la coordination entre les troupes au sol et l'aviation américaine de manière à éviter les erreurs telles que le bombardement des entrepôts de la Croix-Rouge ».

Les forces spéciales turques pourraient ainsi jouer un rôle de « forward air controllers » pour l'US Air force (littéralement : « aiguilleurs du ciel avancés »). C'est là l'une de leurs qualifications : il s'agit de guider les bombardiers par radio en étant positionné au plus près des cibles.

Cette entrée de plain-pied dans l'offensive américaine risque de sonner le glas des velléités turques en matière d'interposition. Il y a une semaine encore, Ankara se disait prête à prendre la tête d'une force d'interposition « musulmane » chargée de policer l'après-taliban, notamment à Kaboul. Quant à l'organisation d'un « conseil des 120 » qui devait se tenir dans la capitale turque le week-end dernier et réunir l'essentiel des opposants au régime taliban, elle

semble aujourd'hui dans les limbes.

Cette prise de position, clairement pro-américaine, ne sera pas sans retour, espère-t-on à Ankara. La Turquie espère monnayer son aide, notamment « en obtenant de l'Otan une modification de la définition du terrorisme », indique une source proche de l'état-major. Il s'agirait d'obtenir des pays européens une attitude plus ferme vis-à-vis des mouvements kurdes ou turcs opposés au régime d'Ankara. L'Allemagne annonçait par exemple mercredi qu'elle pourrait extradier vers la Turquie l'islamiste Metin Kaplan qui purge une peine de quatre ans pour « incitation au meurtre ». La Turquie accuse les « kaplanistes » d'avoir voulu lancer un avion de tourisme sur le mausolée d'Atatürk en 1998. Sorte de « saint des saints » du régime kémaliste, le tombeau du fondateur de la Turquie moderne est le premier bâtiment officiel qu'on a pensé à protéger contre une éventuelle attaque après les attentats du 11 septembre.

IRAN Téhéran célébrait hier le 22^e anniversaire de la prise d'otages à l'ambassade des Etats-Unis

L'Amérique divise les ayatollahs

Téhéran :
Serge Michel

L'effigie de George W. Bush en flammes, une masse noire de tchadors qui hurle « mort à l'Amérique ! », un ayatollah qui prédit que la vengeance divine va s'abattre sur le « Grand Satan » : c'était hier à Téhéran l'anniversaire de la prise d'otages en 1979 à l'ambassade américaine, qui devait durer 444 jours pour 52 diplomates.

Le rituel immuable connaît cette année quelques innovations. Pour la première fois, le bâtiment de l'ambassade est ouvert au public avec une exposi-

tion sur les « crimes américains ». On peut aussi s'y défouler en assommant un Oncle Sam sur un appareil de foire : selon la puissance de la frappe, une colonne de petites lumières grimpe jusqu'à mille.

Le ministère de la Justice a également ouvert dans l'ambassade un bureau pour que des particuliers puissent déposer des plaintes individuelles contre les Etats-Unis. Une mesure qui fait écho à une démarche similaire entreprise par Washington.

Mais la foule d'écoliers amenés de bonne heure de leur province natale par une noria d'autobus ne suffit pas à masquer une absence de taille : celle des « étudiants de la ligne de

l'Imam » qui, il y a vingt-deux ans, passaient le mur – aujourd'hui renforcé – pour s'emparer de l'ambassade. C'est qu'à l'instar d'Abbas Abdi, leur leader de l'époque qui parle désormais de « grand malentendu », ils se trouvent du côté réformateur et expriment des regrets voilés. Du coup, les héros dont on célèbre le geste ne sont plus invités par les conservateurs, qui ont proprement récupéré l'affaire.

Et surtout pas cette année, où les relations diplomatiques avec les Etats-Unis, rompues en 1980 dans la foulée de la prise d'otages, sont devenues l'enjeu principal de la bataille que se livrent l'aile réformatrice et l'aile conservatrice du régime.

Les premiers ont beaucoup espéré des lendemains du 11 septembre. Sur tous les tons, les politiciens réformateurs ont appelé leur pays à ne pas rater cette occasion historique de se rabibocher avec Washington. La campagne antiterroriste que mène George W. Bush a en effet placé l'Iran et les Etats-Unis du même côté, antitalibans. Mais le rapport des forces a empêché les partisans du président de passer aux actes.

Les seconds craignent que la politique étrangère ne leur échappe. Les conservateurs se sont donc efforcés de fixer des règles du jeu de plus en plus restrictives. Le 26 septembre, le guide suprême Ali Khamenei a exclu toute forme de coopération avec les Etats-Unis. Une semaine plus tard, il les accusait de chercher à s'implanter durablement en Asie centrale. Et mardi dernier, dans un discours à Ispahan, il excluait jusqu'à la possibilité de parler aux Américains.

Mais la parole du guide, qui faisait jusqu'à peu autorité absolue dans le pays, semble ne plus suffire à freiner l'enthousiasme pro-américain des réformateurs. Du coup, le ministre de la Justice, l'ayatollah Shahroudi, a dû annoncer que tout politicien prônant en public le rétablissement des relations avec les Etats-Unis serait désormais passible de poursuites pénales.

En vérité, les contacts se sont bel et bien intensifiés après le 11 septembre, et pas seulement par le biais des messages qu'achemine dans les deux sens l'ambassade de Suisse à Téhéran, qui représente les intérêts américains en Iran depuis vingt-deux ans. Parmi les canaux les plus directs, il y a les réunions du groupe « 6 + 2 », constitué des six voisins de l'Afghanistan, les Etats-Unis et la Russie. Une réunion doit justement avoir lieu le 12 novembre à New York et le ministre iranien des Affaires étrangères, Kamal Kharazi, a tenu à préciser qu'une rencontre en tête à tête avec son homologue américain Colin Powell n'était pas au programme.

Plus inédit : on a vu à la mi-octobre l'ambassadeur iranien auprès des Nations unies à New York, Hadi Nejad Hosseini, se rendre à Washington pour un « dîner privé » avec des membres du Sénat et du Congrès, dont le républicain juif Arlen Specter, fervent partisan



Le 12 novembre 1979, des étudiants iraniens brûlaient le drapeau américain sur un des murs de l'ambassade des Etats-Unis à Téhéran, où 52 diplomates avaient été pris en otage. (P. note AP.)

du soutien à l'Etat d'Israël.

C'est que les deux pays ont des choses à se dire, et pas seulement sur le futur gouvernement afghan pour lequel les vues américaines et iraniennes s'accordent à conférer un large rôle aux Nations unies. Le représentant spécial de l'ONU pour l'Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, sera justement à Téhéran ces jours-ci pour évoquer le sujet.

Ainsi, plusieurs éléments indiquent que les Etats-Unis ont bien fait une demande de renseignements sur les talibans et Ben Laden. Officiellement, l'Iran a refusé de coopérer, mais les deux pays ont une longue tradition de relations secrètes, ce qui n'exclut pas que la réalité ait été différente. En 1980, par exemple, le candidat Ronald Reagan a négocié avec Téhéran

afin de pouvoir utiliser la prise d'otages dans sa campagne électorale. C'est aussi sous son administration républicaine qu'ont été fournies des armes à l'Iran, via Israël, avant que n'éclate le scandale de l'Irangate, par la faute d'un extrémiste iranien sincèrement anti-américain qui sera du reste exécuté.

D'autre part, les Américains ont obtenu de pouvoir envoyer de l'aide aux Afghans en passant par l'Iran : 165 000 tonnes de blé américain devaient ainsi être déchargées dans le port de Bandar Abbas pour être acheminées vers l'Afghanistan.

De plus, la Maison-Blanche a présenté comme un succès majeur une garantie qu'elle aurait reçue de Téhéran : les éventuels GI mis en difficulté par les talibans près de la frontière pourraient trouver refuge sur territoire iranien. L'Iran n'a pas démenti cette fuite publiée par le *New York Times*, mais a tenté d'en réduire la portée, déclarant qu'il se contenterait d'appliquer les conventions internationales qui prévoient (Convention de La Haye, 1907) l'internement et le désarmement de soldats sur le territoire d'un Etat neutre.

« C'est étrange, relève un observateur à Téhéran, les Etats-Unis se montrent de plus en plus satisfaits de la position iranienne alors que celle-ci, officiellement, ne cesse de se durcir. »

Drôle de décalage, en effet. Il

s'explique en partie par les deux discours tenus en parallèle à Téhéran : les positions du guide sont de légitimité religieuse et idéologique et s'adressent au public iranien ainsi qu'aux pays musulmans, alors que celles des Affaires étrangères, beaucoup plus prudentes, visent avec un certain succès les chancelleries occidentales.

Du coup, pour notre observateur, les deux pays seraient sur le point de franchir un pas important pour améliorer leurs relations officielles. « Les Etats-Unis ont envie de faire un geste sérieux, dit-il. Ils en cherchent un qui ne les ridiculise pas si, de leur côté, les Iraniens ne réagissent pas du tout. »

Durant les deux dernières années de son mandat, l'ancien président Bill Clinton a lui aussi essayé : levant partiellement les sanctions ou exprimant des excuses historiques pour l'ingérence américaine dans les affaires iraniennes, notamment avec le coup d'Etat contre Mosaddegh en 1953. Or, les Iraniens, qui réclamaient justement des excuses de ce genre, se sont montrés incapables de réagir, empêtrés qu'ils étaient dans les luttes entre factions rivales.

Un vieux contentieux

**Téhéran :
de notre correspondant**

Que veulent exactement Américains et Iraniens pour se rabibocher ? Après 20 ans d'amères disputes, les conditions précises se sont peu à peu diluées dans le discours dogmatique. Néanmoins, chacun tient une liste et attend bien sûr que l'autre fasse le premier pas. Du côté américain, les trois conditions sont : 1. L'abandon d'un programme d'armement nucléaire dont Téhéran est accusé être en train de se doter, ce que les intéressés démentent fermement. 2. L'abandon du soutien aux groupes tels que le Hezbollah libanais, le Hamas et le Djihad islamique en Palestine. Les Européens tenteraient de convaincre Washington que le Hezbollah, création dont l'Iran est très fier, est un mouvement de libération plutôt qu'un groupe terroriste.

3. Le ralliement au processus de paix (même si ce dernier est moribond) et si possible la reconnaissance d'Israël. Téhéran de son côté demande plus globalement l'abandon de l'attitude hostile des Etats-Unis à son égard. Une hostilité incarnée par le soutien systématique aux rivaux de l'Iran autour de la Caspienne et le refus de considérer la voie iranienne pour le passage des pipelines. De plus, L'Iran demande la levée immédiate et inconditionnelle des différentes sanctions américaines, ainsi que la restitution de biens gelés aux Etats-Unis. Après les accords d'Alger (décembre 1980) et d'interminables procédures devant une cour internationale d'arbitrage à La Haye, une grande partie de ces biens ont été restitués. Il resterait surtout 3,2 milliards de dollars que l'Iran avait déposés aux Etats-Unis pour de l'armement qui n'a jamais été livré.

S. M.

Iraqi Kurds Get New Assurances From Washington

- Americans urge Barzani to mend fences with Ankara, raise question marks about contacts with Iran

Ilnur Cevik

The Iraqi Kurds, who felt that Saddam Hussein's administration may try to exploit the current international situation to move into northern Iraq and restore its own administration, have received new assurances from Washington that the United States will not hesitate to use all of its resources to prevent such an outcome.

The assurances were given to both Kurdistan Democracy Party (KDP) top official Necirvan Barzani and Barham Saleh of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) during their successive visits to Washington recently.

Barzani came to Ankara and had "very frank" discussions where Turkish officials voiced serious concerns about the conduct of the KDP, which has been seen to be moving away from Turkey in recent months. Later he went off to Europe and the United States where he held intensive high level contacts. Barzani was in Washington this week and American officials reportedly raised concerns about the recent visits of KDP officials to Tehran while the party has started to distance itself from Ankara. Barzani was urged to revive closer ties with Ankara.

Turkish officials said Barzani had time to "reflect" on the relatively cooler relations with Ankara and the issue would be taken up with him when he returns here soon on his way back to northern Iraq. Barzani has travelled twice to Iran recently. He was there just before he came to Ankara about two weeks ago and spent a whole week there. Meanwhile,

there are also unconfirmed reports that the KDP has had some important contacts with Baghdad directly in recent weeks. It is claimed that the Russians mediated these contacts.

In Washington, Barzani was given assurances at the highest level that the United States would not allow Saddam's forces to enter northern Iraq. Similar assurances were given to Saleh of the PUK when he was in Washington a week earlier.

Iraqi Kurdish sources said their impression was that while Washington would not allow Saddam to touch the north the Americans are undecided on whether Iraq should be a target in the worldwide fight against terrorism.

Some Washington sources apparently say an intervention against Iraq is on the cards and it is only a matter of "when and how" while others feel only strong proof that Iraq is a part of the current international terrorist offensive will push Washington to act.

Saddam Hussein's latest statements "advising" the United States to halt attacks in Afghanistan and continuing an anti-American rhetoric has angered American officials who feel that the United States simply cannot live with the current administration in Baghdad. Ankara has already advised Baghdad not to antagonize the Americans while it also opposes Western military intervention against Saddam which will further complicate the delicate balances in region.

Meanwhile, Barham Saleh arrived in Ankara last week and held a second round of intensive talks with the Turkish military and Foreign Ministry officials. His first round of talks in Ankara was held a few weeks ago when Saleh stopped over in Ankara for two days on his way to Washington. He later returned to northern Iraq to meet PUK leader Jalal Talabani and assess the outcome of his contacts in Ankara and Washington. Meanwhile, a high-powered Turkish military delegation met with Talabani earlier this week.

The PUK administration has reportedly received assurances that Ankara will extend every possible help to Talabani.

The Turkey Card

By WILLIAM SAFIRE

November 5, 2001

— THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Reached by cell phone in purgatory, where he is expiating his sin of imposing wage and price controls, Richard Nixon agreed to an interview with his former speechwriter.

Q: How do you think the war in Afghanistan is going?

Nixon: You call that a war? Light bombing of a bunch of crazies with beards, based on a policy of Afghanistanization before you even get started? That's strictly reactive and purely tactical.

Q: Would you send in a couple of divisions of American ground troops?

Nixon: No. The Bush people are employing the right tactics in their "phase I" — suppressing terrorist operations, helping the opposition make trouble, playing for breaks with payoffs and assassinations. What they fail to see is the global picture. They need to develop a grand strategy.

Q: Which is —

Nixon: Know your real enemy. It's not just bin Laden and his terrorist cells. It's the movement threatening to take over the Islamic world. Those beards and their even more dangerous state sponsors want the Saudi and Kuwaiti oil. That would give them the money to build or buy the nuclear and germ weapons to eliminate the reasonable Muslims and all the Christian and Jewish infidels.

Q: How would you stop them?

Nixon: Split 'em, the way we split the Communist monolith by playing the China card against the Soviets. Your generation's card is Turkey, the secular Muslim nation with the strongest army.

Q: The Turks have already volunteered a hundred commandos — you mean we should ask for more?

Nixon: Get out of that celebrity-terrorist Afghan mindset. With the world dazed and everything in flux, seize the moment. I'd make a deal with Ankara right now to move across Turkey's border and annex the northern third of Iraq. Most of it is in Kurdish hands already, in our no-flight zone — but the land to make part of Turkey is the oil field around Kirkuk that produces nearly half of Saddam Hussein's oil.

Q: Doesn't that mean war?

Nixon: Quick war, justified by Saddam's threat of germs and nukes and terrorist connections. We'd provide air cover and U.N. Security Council support in return for the Turks' setting up a friendly government in Baghdad. The freed Iraqis would start pumping their southern oil like mad and help us bust up OPEC for good.

Q: What's in it for the Turks?

Nixon: First, big money — northern Iraq could be good for nearly two million barrels a day, and the European Union would fall all over itself welcoming in the Turks. Next, Turkey would solve its internal Kurd problem by making its slice of Iraq an autonomous region called Kurdistan.

Q: But that would mean new borders, and don't Arab states worry about dismemberment?

Nixon: Turks are Muslims but not Arabs. When Syria was the base for terrorist operations against Turkey, the Turks massed troops on the border and Damascus caved, kicking the terrorist boss out of the country and he's now in a Turkish jail. And what's the big deal about new borders? Iraq was a 20th-century British concoction. Only 50 years ago, Israel became a state, and soon there'll be a Palestinian state. New times, new borders.

Q: Speaking of Israel —

Nixon: Let me say this about that. I'd tell Sharon to annex the Jordan valley, to protect Jordan, but then to hand over the rest of the West Bank or he's down the tubes. I know you disagree, Bill, but we're going for the grand strategic enchilada. Then I'd tell the Saudis and other rich Arabs to build good housing and plants in Palestine or accept a million Palestinian immigrants. With Iraq's threat neutralized and Iran coming around, the sheiks will ante up in a hurry.

Q: But what about punishing bin Laden in Afghanistan —

Nixon: Change the flow of money and power in the Middle East and bin Laden and his boys will fall into our hands like rotten fruit. Just use this crisis to reshuffle the deck and break out of the trap. Leapfrog "phase I" and there'll be no heavy allied casualties, no parades to stop the bombing, no Taliban, no germ scares. I have to go expiate now. Call me soon about Russia. How do you turn this damn new phone off?

■ GLOBAL AGENDA ■

By Michael Elliott

Thinking About Saddam

Whatever Iraq's role in terrorism may be, shackling him won't be easy

IT IS THE SUSPICION THAT DARE NOT SPEAK ITS NAME. We know that Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, has reason to harbor a burning hatred for the U.S. and anyone whose second name is Bush. We know that Iraq has the will and the technical capacity to "weaponize" anthrax. We know that in 1988 Saddam used chemical weapons against his own people. We know that for seven years his officials lied to, cheated and frustrated the United Nations-imposed regime designed to eliminate his capacity to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. We know there has been no inspection of Iraq's weapons facilities for almost three years. We know that Mohamed Atta, thought to be the ringleader of the Sept. 11 terrorists, met in Prague with an Iraqi spy. With all that data, it's hardly surprising that some have made the obvious connection and wondered, ever since the first plane crashed into the World Trade Center. Suppose it is Saddam. What then?

For now, nobody paid to do so has to answer that question. After an internal debate immediately following the atrocities, all members of the Administration have lined up behind a strategy of "Afghanistan first." A second wave, if it comes, may not involve Iraq. Last week law-enforcement sources tended to think the anthrax attacks were the work of a homegrown maniac, not a foreign terrorist. So far, little evidence suggests that the Sept. 11 atrocities were hatched in Baghdad. Sources say the British have insisted loudly that they see no intelligence to link the hijackings to Iraq. That is significant. The British (unlike, say, the French) are not squeamish about Iraq; they have been helping the U.S. bomb it for a decade. Tony Blair's government has nothing to gain from sucking up to Saddam; he's always going to hate the British.

But the old suspicion is still there, like a jagged tooth you can't stop playing with. Some seasoned observers, like R. James Woolsey, former head of the CIA, have been convinced from the start that the case for Iraqi involvement had to be taken seriously. Imagine that incontrovertible evidence connected the anthrax attacks, or Sept. 11, to the murderous panoply of Saddam's state. What would happen?

The easy answer is: another Gulf War. But like most easy answers, that one just begs more questions. Most military ana-

lysts assume that to be sure of success, a second Gulf War would have to be fought like the first. That is, the U.S. (and any allies it might rope in) would spend months assembling, say, 500,000 troops on the ground, launch massive air strikes, and then march on Baghdad. But that strategy—so successful in 1991—would be more tricky a second time. For one thing, Iraq would not give the U.S. the luxury of a leisurely build up. But much more important, Saddam knows that the objective of any new war would not be the removal of his forces from Kuwait,

as in 1991, but the removal of him from this mortal coil. He would thus have no incentive to do anything other than to fight with every weapon at his disposal, however villainous—and would have the time to do so. The U.S. would have to reply with some massive display of force. So a second Gulf War fought like the first could escalate to the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Is there another, quicker way of defeating Saddam? In 1998 a committee of conservative foreign-policy analysts—many of them now in the Bush Administration—wrote to President Clinton proposing the recognition of an alternative government of Iraq and the establishment of safe havens from which local forces could attack Saddam. Richard Perle, the sharpest taloned hawk in Washington, who co-authored the 1998 letter, insists that Saddam's power is overrated: "He is in my view highly vulnerable." Perle might be right; histories of the Gulf War conclude

that the Iraqis were not much of a fighting force. But few if any allies would rally to the American side in such a proxy war. A senior European official, well disposed to the Bush Administration, calls the plan "incoherent." That means the U.S. would have no cover from a coalition if the operation went wrong.

That risk may not be determinative. If Washington really wants to go to war alone, it can. The real worry is this: even a "quick" proxy war against Saddam would take weeks to plan and win—more than enough time for him to use the weapons he has assuredly been preparing since the U.N. inspectors were kicked out. So the choice between a slow or fast war against Iraq is one of equal evils. Either could end with horrors of a sort the world has not witnessed since Nagasaki.

—With reporting by

Massimo Calabresi/Washington



Saddam Hussein fires a rifle to greet troops during a military parade in Baghdad on the final day of 2000

Iraqi Defectors Detail Secret School for Terrorists

'We Were Training These People to Attack Installations Important to the United States'

By Chris Hedges
New York Times Service

Two defectors from Iraqi intelligence said Wednesday they had worked for several years at a secret Iraqi government camp that trained Islamic terrorists in rotations of five or six months since 1995. They said that the training in the camp, south of Baghdad, was aimed at carrying out attacks against neighboring states and possibly Europe and the United States.

The defectors, one of whom was a lieutenant general and once one of the most senior officers in Iraqi intelligence, the Mukhabarat, said they did not know if the Islamic militants being trained at the camp, known as Salman Pak, were linked to Osama bin Laden.

They also said they had no knowledge of specific attacks carried out by the Islamic radicals trained in the camp. But they insisted that those being trained as recently as last year were Islamic radicals from

throughout the Middle East, noting that they had special prayer times, were usually bearded, wore traditional Islamic dress and spoke with distinctive foreign accents.

The men said they also had knowledge of a highly guarded compound within the camp where Iraqi scientists, led by a German, produced biological agents.

"There is a lot we do not know," the general, who asked that his name not be printed, said in an interview with The New York Times as part of an ongoing reporting project with "Frontline," a PBS program. "We were forbidden to speak about our activities among each other, even off duty."

"But over the years you see and hear things. These Islamic radicals were a scruffy lot. They needed a lot of training, especially physical training."

"But from speaking with them it was clear they came from a variety of countries, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco. We were training these people to attack installations important to the United States. The Gulf War never ended for Saddam Hussein. He is at war with the United States. We were repeatedly told this."

The reports mesh with statements by Sabah Khalifa Khodada Alami, a captain in the Iraqi Army who emigrated to Texas in May after working as an instructor for eight years at Salman Pak, which is located at a bend in the Tigris River.

United Nations arms inspectors suspected that such activities, including simulated hijackings carried out on a Boeing 707 fuselage set up in the camp, were going on at Salman Pak before they were expelled from Iraq in 1998. But this is the first look at the workings of the camp from those who participated in its administration.

The former lieutenant general, who admitted his involvement in some of the worst excesses of the Iraqi regime, including direct involvement in the execution of thousands of Shiite rebels after the uprising after the Gulf War in 1991, spent three days in Ankara being interviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

But he said that the decision by the CIA to include Turkish intelligence officials in the interview led him to fear for his own security. He has since fled Turkey, where he had sought asylum, and

was interviewed in another Middle Eastern country that they asked not be identified.

The assertions of terrorism training by the Iraqi defectors will most likely fuel one side of an intense debate in Washington over whether to extend the war against Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan to include Iraq.

The Iraqi National Congress, an opposition group headed by Ahmed Chalabi in London, facilitated the meeting and interview with the men. The group was involved in an abortive CIA attempt to build an alliance in northern Iraq to oust Mr. Saddam. The collapse of the effort soured relations between the Iraqi National Congress and some senior officials in the State Department and the CIA.

American officials, however, confirmed that they had met with the former general in Turkey but said they had not learned all that much from him. They said it was unlikely that the training on the fuselage was linked to the hijackings of Sept. 11.

The camp is overseen by the highest levels of Iraqi intelligence and those that worked there were compartmentalized into distinct sections. On one side of the camp, these men said, young Iraqis who were members of Fedayeen Saddam (Saddam's Fighters), were trained in espionage, assassination techniques and sabotage. The other side of the camp, separated by a small lake, trees and barbed wire, was where the militants were trained. The militants spent a lot of time training, usually in groups of five or six, around the fuselage of the 707. There were rarely more than 40 or 50 Islamic radicals in the camp at one time.

"We could see them practice taking over the plane," said one of the defectors, a former Iraqi sergeant in the intelligence service who spent nearly five years at the camp.

The general, wearing a black suit and sporting a gold ring on each index finger, said that the terrorist teams were trained to take over a plane without using weapons. They were also trained in the use of booby-trapped explosive devices and were taught how to kill with their hands.

Although the Islamic militants were carefully segregated from the Iraqi units there was haphazard contact, he said. "One day after work, my car broke down as I was leaving the camp, and a Toyota van filled with these Islamic fighters came out behind me," the general said.

He added: "The driver was a man I knew and he got out to help push the car. There were various nationalities on the van, including an Egyptian who, unlike the rest was clean shaven. Six of them came out to help."

The general gave a wry smile and answered what he knew would be the next question.

"No," he said of the Egyptian, "he was not Mohamed Atta." Mr. Atta is thought to have been the leader of the Sept. 11 hijackers.

The report of Iraqi ties with Islamic radicals comes on the heels of an announcement by the Czech Interior Ministry that Mr. Atta met last April with Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir Ani, an Iraqi diplomat identified by Prague as an intelligence officer. There are unexplained gaps, some as long as 15 months, during Mr. Atta's stay in Hamburg, Germany, suggesting that he may have been training abroad.

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2001

Kurdish Prime Minister On a Visit To The United Kingdom

Press Release KRG-UK Representation 7th November 2001.

Mr Nechirvan Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and accompanying delegation, Mr Sami Abdurahman, deputy Prime Minister, Dr Shafiq Qazzaz Minister for Humanitarian Aid & Co-operation and Mr Siamand Banaa KRG Representative in UK, was received by Mr Ben Bradshaw, Minister of state at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office This Morning at 10.00 am,

A review of the situation, and the latest developments in the region was discussed, both sides where in agreement on the major issues, and needs. The process of evolution of the safe haven into a thriving, democratic and pluralistic society was emphasised.

Mr Barzani thanked the British Government and people for the positive contribution they make through their hard working NGOs, and their continuous support and protection for the region, He reiterated: That a new and emancipated generation has grown up since the uprising of 1991, that is used to freedom, liberty and justice. It would be impossible for them to accept oppressive dictatorship and loss of their civil and human rights, we have to ensure that no regression should be allowed, only progress. The meeting ended at 11.00am.

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The Kurdistan Regional Government diplomatic answerphone

KurdishMedia.com By Dr Fereydun Hilmi 08 November 2001

Both Kurdish administrations have what they call "Representations" in a number of countries around the world. Both spend considerable resources on these representations. Of these representations surely the London-based one comes second only to that in Washington and therefore is of extreme importance for Kurdistan. Yet we do not find it coming anywhere up to standard. The reason is: We Need A Functional Representation

It would be reasonable to expect these representations (embassies if Kurdistan were a recognized state) to fulfill most if not all of the following services among others:

- Diplomatically Represent Kurdish Government Policy vis-à-vis the Government of the country hosting them
- Provide services for its own citizens as well as the host country regarding Kurdistan covering: - Educational matters
- Trade, commercial and transport relations with the host country
- Travel information and facilitation
- Kurdish community ties with the motherland and her government
- General matters relating to all aspects of life in Kurdistan
- Providing and facilitating travel to and from Kurdistan of visiting dignitaries and VIPs
- Cultural matters such as exhibitions, seminars and the like to introduce Kurdistan to the people of the hosting state.
- Deal with the problems of Kurdish citizens requiring the Representation's intervention
- Allow and facilitate Press access (especially to Kurdish media organs) to visiting Kurdish VIPs
- Organise social evenings and parties on National Days, making sure that all citizens are aware of them and have the right to participate in them

The usual excuses of "we are not recognized" or "we do not have the resources" do not hold water. The above activities are all legal and allowed provided they are carried out within the confines of the law. As for funds and resources there are plenty of them and that is no longer denied by anyone.

The "embassy" should have a place to work from. A few personnel manning it at all office hours and treat all Kurdish citizens equally and without prejudice. It should not be down to any special friendly relationship between the representative and a member of the public to facilitate any of the services listed above. Every caller should be treated with respect and equal courtesy no matter what political affiliation he happens to have or the personal relationship is between him and the Representative who should be professional and above holding grudges, political or otherwise.

Thus when one calls for information or help it is the absolute duty of the "embassy" to respond in the most professional way to his/her call.

To enable the mission to carry out the above functions, a good telephone service is required which should be adequately manned during office hours.

The embassy should have good information technology for filing, communication and access to the public for acquiring the right information in reasonably fast time. Every inquiry should be responded to no matter how negative the result may be.

We are fortunate to have today a Government that is enjoying more and more recognition. The fact that Britain is allowing a representation is very significant. But it is not sufficient to simply have a room and an answerphone and call it "The Kurdistan Regional Government Representation", where you call and never receive an answer if you happened to be someone the Representative does not see eye to eye with.

When You Are Given a Right You Have Been Crying Out For Grab It With Both Hands and Use It!

It is important that when you ask for a right that you exercise it when you are given it. Since so many countries have granted the KRG permission to have representatives in them it is of the utmost importance that these representations and representatives present the most civilized and modern face of Kurdistan possible. If we go on presenting a Café mentality where Government operatives pay greater attention to the kind of coffee or tea you want to drink to chat for hours over them, we will always be treated as nomadic tribesmen who have just started coming down to the cities from their mountains and therefore must always be controlled rather than be put in control of our destiny.

At present the KRG Prime Minister is visiting the UK but he is being surrounded by KDP apparatchiks completely isolating him from the general Kurdish public. Try to call the Mission and what you get most of the time is the answerphone. Leaving a message does not mean you will receive an answer. I therefore suggest that the message should say: "This is the Kurdistan Regional Government Answerphone. Please do not leave any messages unless you are a good friend of the Representative and have had no disagreements with him ever!"

Let Us Have Access to our Prime Minister

We therefore have no way of getting our views to our own Prime Minister notwithstanding the fact that he is most keen to get his government on course for the running of the country along modern and effective ways. We therefore have no option but to try and catch his eye via the media in the hope that he will hear and read about our concerns. We ask that he opens his eyes and ears to the Kurdish intellectuals who are as keen as he is to serve Kurdistan. A little less bureaucracy is needed to achieve this aim.

Imagine A Different Situation

Imagine how it would be if we started providing the above functions and services. Imagine how respectable and effective our mission would be. The lesson we should have learnt by now is: Only by behaving as a Free and Confident Men will others ever afford us their respect and appreciation. Present a low and ineffective image and people will continue treating you with contempt like you do not matter an iota.

Although I have mainly addressed the KDP, both administrations behave in strikingly 50:50 way even outside the Homeland.

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PKK: We will not leave Iraqi Kurdistan

November 8, 2001 Iraq Press

Sulaimaniya - The Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK has said it has not intention of abandoning its strongholds in Iraqi Kurdistan.

However, Ali Mohammed, a senior PKK leader, said his group was ready to negotiate with the Kurdish parties administering a semi-independent enclave in northern Iraq.

PKK insurgents, fighting for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey, have sought refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan's inaccessible mountains following mounting military pressure by Turkish army. Their presence has been a source of instability for the region. Both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani have occasionally used force to drive the rebels from their areas.

But Mohammed's remarks point to a shift in PKK policy whose influence and military prowess have weakened since the Turkish authorities captured and imprisoned its leader Abdullah Ocalan who is now facing a death sentence.

PKK has for long been on the U.S. list of groups sponsoring terrorism. It is not clear what prompted PKK to call for a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues with both KDP and PUK.

Mohammed said his group would preferably hold talks with Talabani's PUK which many see as more sympathetic PKK than its rival the KDP.

Mohammed said he foresaw an improvement in conditions for the 3.5 million Kurds in the enclave. He said Iraq was a possible target after the current war in Afghanistan and PUK "needs to utilize the situation and start talking to PKK."

* * * * *

13 November, 2001

Dam decision takes Turkey by surprise

BBC By Tabitha Morgan in Istanbul

The decision by UK construction firm Balfour Beatty to pull out of the controversial Ilisu dam project has caused as much surprise in Turkey as it has in Britain.

The move comes at a time when the UK was widely expected to approve export credits for the \$1.5bn deal, as a gesture of good will to shore up relations with Nato's only Islamic member state. The Turkish Government has made no secret of the fact that it hopes its involvement in the coalition against terrorism may lead to much-needed foreign investment in the economy. Turkey recently committed 90 special forces troops to the ground war in Afghanistan, and its airbases in the south of the country would play a vital role if the war was to expand to include Iraq.

So this announcement by Balfour Beatty will certainly be regarded as a setback by the Turkish authorities.

Balfour Beatty was part of a consortium made up of two other European firms and three Turkish construction companies which together hoped to secure the contract for the dam - Turkey's biggest-ever infrastructure project.

Another of the two European companies pulled out at the same time Balfour Beatty. The Turkish Government claims that the proposed 1,200-megawatt dam, which would stem the River Tigris less than 40 miles from the border with Syria, would provide irrigation and hydro-electric power to the impoverished south-east of the country. Britain's involvement in the scheme has long been the subject of considerable controversy.

Kurdish concerns

Opponents claimed its construction would have disastrous environmental and social consequences and would involve the displacement of 36,000 Kurds from the region.

They argue that as many as 25,000 people would be made homeless and a further 11,000 Kurds would be forced from their lands.

Last month a report on the dam's environmental impact commissioned by Balfour Beatty was attacked by a number of leading development agencies. They claimed the report failed to address key issues surrounding the resettlement of local people and criticised the Turkish Government for making minimal efforts to consult local inhabitants.

Balfour Beatty's withdrawal from the project will be viewed with some relief by Syria and Iraq.

Both countries, which rely on the Tigris and Euphrates for their water supplies, had been growing increasingly uneasy about the expansion of Turkish control over the rivers. Now that Balfour Beatty has withdrawn from the project, Turkey is likely to look for other partners to build the Ilisu dam - part of a much wider \$32bn scheme to bring water to the arid south-east.

* * * * *

Clashes Continue Between PUK and Rebels Against Mullah Umar

Al-Hayat November 8, 2001 by Zuhayr Qusaybati

"Abu-Abdallah al-Shafi'i" is a new name now circulating in the search for the networks and cells of Usama Bin Ladin's Al-Qa'ida Organization. Iraqi oppositionists assert that it was Bin Ladin who nominated Abu-Abdallah to lead the "Jund al-Islam" groups in northern Iraq. But others also from the Iraqi opposition insist on recalling the information released by the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (led by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim) after the bombing of the two US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1996. SCIRI reported then "that Bin Ladin's right hand man Ayman al-Zawahiri visited Iraq and held two meetings with Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan."

SCIRI circles say "Al-Zawahiri visited camps in Al-Nasiriyah between 28 June 1998 and 2 July 1998. Baghdad proposed that Bin Ladin move to Iraq after the two embassies' bombing and offered to provide him with camps to train his groups while he prepares to strike at US installations and interests."

While the Kurds in the north, specifically the "Talabanis" of Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan are complaining about what they describe as the "barbaric behavior" of the Jund al-Islam elements and clashes are continuing on the Al-Sulaymaniyah province flank, SCIRI circles are talking about what they call "cooperation between Bin Ladin and the Iranian opposition Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization." They say the latter's aim from this cooperation "is to facilitate its infiltration of Iran territories through the common border with Afghanistan so as to carry out strikes on Iranian installations and foment sectarian sedition between the Sunnis and Shiites in Iran's eastern areas."

The circles warn "of a new phenomenon that is represented by the Jund al-Islam's recruitment of non-Kurdish Iraqi elements from Mosul and Al-Ramadi. The dispute between these dissidents from Mullah Umar Abd-al-Aziz (Islamic Movement) and the Talabanis is over an area in Al-Sulaymaniyah province on the border with Iran. Kurds had in the past accused Jund al-Islam, or what they now call the "Bin Ladin group", of committing "atrocities" and creating an atmosphere of terror by following the example of Taliban in Afghanistan: Banning music, making beards compulsory, and forcing women to wear the veil."

Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite opposition sources agree that there are more than 200 Arab Afghans in the Jund al-Islam ranks and have with them Afghans who are overseeing the training tasks. Informed sources say they entered Iraq through Iran under the cover of belonging to Mullah Abd-al-Aziz's movement, which has good relations with Tehran. But the movement suffered splits this year, most noticeably the one that Abu-Abdallah al-Shafi'i is leading.

The same sources assert that the PUK's security organs are still interrogating detained supporters of Al-Shafi'i, real name Riya Arbili, and some of them "have admitted there is a relationship with Al-Qa'ida." They point out that 6,000 PUK fighters are besieging Jund al-Islam's stronghold in the Hurman area.

The latest round of fighting between the two sides took place on Sunday-Monday night "in which dozens were killed, including two leading members of Al-Shafi'i group", which Jalal Talabani accuses of butchering civilians last September. PUK sources say "Jund al-Islam is a coalition of extremism" that was formed by three hard-line groups: Islamic Hamas Organization, Islamic Unification Movement, and Force 2 Suran which split from the Islamic Unification Movement in August. They also talk about the "Al-Nasr Regiment" that Jund al-Islam has formed and which includes only the Arab elements and about an "Afghan hospital" in the Halabjah area.

* * * * *

Kurds Intensify Contacts Amid Rising Tension

Press November 7, 2001

Arbil - Rival Kurdish parties have intensified their contacts recently as tension mounts along the borders of their semi-independent enclave in northern Iraq.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have also reiterated their commitment to the peace process to end years of internal strife.

KDP's leader Massoud Barzani and PUK's Jalal Talabani have been sharing power in the region comprising the pro-

vinces of Dahouk, Arbil and Sulaimaniya. They wrest control of the enclave shortly after the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire and a U.S. and British air umbrella has so far prevented President Saddam Hussein's armed forces from entering the area.

But the two countries are now preoccupied with the war in Afghanistan and the Kurds fear that Saddam might utilize the situation and invade their region again.

Both Barzani and Talabani have stepped up contacts with foreign countries in a bid to obtain international guarantees to safeguard their enclave.

Saddam has redeployed troops in areas close to the Kurdish enclave among them units from the elite force of the Republican Guards as well as missile launchers, armor and tanks.

The buildup has caused great concern for the 3.5 million Kurds in the region. In their latest contacts, Barzani and Talabani are trying to coordinate on how to defend the enclave in case of a military push by Saddam.

Early this week Talabani sent an envoy to see Barzani. Sources close to both sides told Iraq Press that the letter dealt with the current developments and the normalization of the political situation in the enclave.

The KDP-PUK rapprochement has reflected positively on the Kurdish street as many feared Saddam might attack again.

The Kurds are closely watching the movement of Iraqi troops as well as the situation in the international arena since the United States has not ruled out military strikes against Iraq at a later stage of its current war on international terrorism.

* * * * *

Kurds facing acute fuel shortages

Iraq Press November 7, 2001

Arbil, Iraq Press, Nov. 7 - Fuel is in short supply in Iraqi Kurdistan following a government decision to boost oil exports to neighboring Syria.

Informed Iraqi sources told Iraq Press that the Iraqi government has slashed the amount of fuel allocated for the region's 3.5 million inhabitants from 7 million liters a day to around 400,000.

The drastic cut could not have come at a worst time for the region's 3.5 million inhabitants who are preparing themselves for a harsh winter this year.

The sources said the sharp decline in fuel supplies for the Kurds has been met with a surge of illegal oil by-products exports to Syria.

They said at least 12 million liters of diesel fuel now go to Syria via a fleet of truck tankers. Iraq is trying to boost its trade with neighboring countries particularly outside the scope of the U.N.-supervised oil-for-food program, which regulates its trade with the outside world.

Iraq supplies Jordan with all its oil and last week it agreed to boost exports of crude oil and products to 5.2 million tons a year from 4.8 million. Iraq is also believed to be pumping up to 150,000 barrels a day to Syria via a joint pipeline. The cut in fuel supplies and the latest buildup of troops by the Iraqi government have raised fears in the enclave, which the Kurds administer away from the control of the central government in Baghdad.

Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein is said to have tightened security along the enclave in a bid to crack down on smuggling particularly of fuel supplies.

The Kurdish region relies on the Iraqi government for all its energy needs.

* * * * *

Orhan Pamuk, le trublion

Admiré par les uns, critiqué – voire blâmé – par d'autres, le romancier turc aime à se plonger dans l'histoire de son pays, s'approprier un monde du passé dans lequel, en miroir, se reflète le présent

MON NOM EST ROUGE

(Benim Adım Kırmızı)

d'Orhan Pamuk.

Traduit du turc

par Gilles Authier,

Gallimard « Du monde entier »,

572 p., 26,95 € (176,78 F).

Dans son pays, la Turquie, toutes sortes de gens s'intéressent à Orhan Pamuk : une véritable pluie de discours, de commentaires et de regards déferle sur lui, où se côtoient la critique et l'admiration. D'un côté, certains journaux titrent « Un renégat parmi nous » ; de l'autre, des milliers de lecteurs se précipitent sur ses livres. *La Vie nouvelle* (1), le précédent ouvrage paru en France, avait ainsi trouvé près de deux cent mille acquéreurs dans sa langue d'origine. Présenté comme la figure de proue du roman turc, notamment depuis la parution de son célèbre *Livre noir* (2), cet auteur de quarante-neuf ans n'est pas uniquement un écrivain talentueux, au style original et à l'érudition remarquable.

C'est aussi un agitateur, au sens noble du terme – comme la plupart des écrivains dignes de ce nom. Pas seulement sur le plan politique (bien que sa condamnation des positions gouvernementales sur le problème kurde lui ait valu de très franches inimitiés), mais également dans le domaine littéraire. Très imprégné de littérature moderne, Orhan Pamuk s'est aussi tourné vers la tradition de son pays, son histoire et sa langue, parvenant à l'exploit d'être « à la fois traditionnel et d'avant-garde », comme il l'explique lui-même. L'appropriation du passé, fût-ce par la fiction – et peut-être surtout par elle –, n'a pas laissé de marbre ses contempteurs. Ni ses plaisanteries sur Atatürk, un personnage qu'il dit pourtant respecter, ni sa façon de brasser des personnages et des idées qui font sortir l'histoire des enclos officiels, quels



LIONEL CHARRIER

qu'ils soient. « Dans cette société assez fermée, on m'a accusé de tout, dit-il : d'être cosmopolite, juif, religieux, irréligieux, tout. Moi, je suis un occidentaliste à la recherche d'une certaine authenticité. Je viens d'une culture où la modernité n'a touché que les élites et je voudrais représenter la nation tout entière. »

La multiplicité des attaques le laisse de marbre, visiblement. Cet homme de haute taille, distingué, le visage sérieux et souvent même vaguement anxieux, semble pouvoir

accepter les tracas auxquels l'expose sa notoriété, tant que son activité d'écrivain n'est pas mise en cause. Or, explique-t-il, « en Turquie, on n'est pas en Egypte ou en Iran. Il y a moins de violence et il reste toujours un espace pour le travail ». Dans son prochain ouvrage, à paraître en décembre, le romancier va même renouer avec ses premières tentatives littéraires. Au tout début des années 1980, Pamuk avait écrit un livre où il était question d'un jeune marxiste jetant une bombe sous les

pieds d'un ministre. Circonstances politiques et autocensure empêchant, le livre n'avait pas été publié. Cette fois, le récit sera « directement politique », affirme l'écrivain, mettant en scène des intégristes islamiques, des nationalistes kurdes et des amateurs de coups d'Etat militaires.

Même quand il prend le passé pour décor, Orhan Pamuk veut « parler d'aujourd'hui ». Et s'il choisit des temps anciens, ce n'est nullement pour faire œuvre d'historien – bien qu'il respecte scrupuleusement les détails historiques –, mais pour mieux s'approprier un monde. « Le passé, dit-il, est plus plastique que le présent. C'est un endroit vide, où plus personne ne vit et où on est libre de manipuler la réalité. Seuls les morts pourraient se plaindre. Et puis j'ai un esprit romantique et j'aime l'imagerie du passé, les objets, les mots, les couleurs et les connotations des verbes qui possèdent une aura de pureté que je ne trouve pas dans le monde actuel. » Dans *Mon nom est Rouge*, c'est à la fin du XVI^e siècle que Pamuk a élu domicile. Et, plus précisément, parmi les ruelles couvertes de neige d'un Istanbul mythique, où évoluaient déjà les personnages de ses précédents livres. Comme dans *La Vie nouvelle*, l'auteur a construit son récit selon les règles d'un roman à énigmes, conduisant le lecteur à la recherche d'un assassin. Qui est le meurtrier de Monsieur Délicat ? Ce fameux miniaturiste, qui travaillait pour le compte du sultan à l'illustration d'un livre selon les manières italiennes, a été jeté au fond d'un puits. A travers cette intrigue, Pamuk pose la question de la représentation, du style et de la tradition picturale, en donnant la parole à divers personnages ou objets et en affinant avec brio les thèmes, qui lui sont chers, du labyrinthe, du double, des ténèbres et de la mort.

Raphaëlle Rérolle

(1) Gallimard, 1999.

(2) Gallimard, 1995.

En France, des intellectuels se mobilisent en faveur d'opposants syriens

Dix personnes ont été arrêtées à la fin de l'été

DEPUIS fin août-début septembre, dix opposants ont été arrêtés en Syrie, et les procès de deux d'entre eux, les députés Maamoun Homsî et Riyad Seif, se sont ouverts respectivement les 30 et 31 octobre. Ils sont accusés de vouloir changer la Constitution par des moyens illégaux, ce dont ils se défendent. Ils sont en réalité « coupables » d'avoir organisé ou participé à des débats publics au cours desquels ils ont dénoncé la gestion gouvernementale et réclamé des réformes. Huit autres opposants, Riyad

Turk, figure de proue du mouvement démocratique, l'économiste Aref Dalila, les médecins Walid Bounni et Kamal Labwani, l'avocat Habib Issa et trois membres du Forum démocratique, Hassan Saadoun, Habib Saleh et Fawwaz Tello, sont en prison pour les mêmes raisons.

A l'heure où l'affaire afghane monopolise l'actualité, en France, plusieurs intellectuels viennent rappeler leur affaire en « exigeant » des autorités syriennes la « libération immédiate » de Riyad Turk et de « tous les prisonniers d'opinion en

Syrie ». Etienne Balibar, Pierre Bourdieu, Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Mgr Jacques Caillot, Mohamed Harbi, Alain Joxe, Benjamin Stora, Jean Lacouture, Marcel Francis Kahn, Eric Rouleau et Heidi Toelle, entre autres, rappellent, dans un communiqué publié à Paris, que M. Turk, est âgé de soixante et onze ans, qu'il a déjà été emprisonné « dans des conditions atroces pendant plus de dix-sept ans, de 1980 à 1988 » et qu'il n'a cessé, « depuis sa libération, de militer pour le rétablissement des libertés publiques et la réconciliation nationale ».

« Il est à craindre, disent les signataires, que la répression s'étende, dans les jours à venir, à d'autres intellectuels, hommes politiques et membres des professions libérales qui réclament la fin de l'état de siège en vigueur depuis plus de trente ans et le respect des droits de l'homme et du citoyen. » Ils exhortent toutes les organisations de défense des droits de l'homme et « tous les amis du peuple syrien et du monde arabe » à agir dans le même sens qu'eux.

M. Na.



ORGANISATION MONDIALE CONTRE LA TORTURE
WORLD ORGANIZATION AGAINST TORTURE
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Case TUR 061101

Excessive use of force by Turkish police force

The International Secretariat of OMCT requests your **URGENT INTERVENTION** in the following situation in Turkey.

Brief description of the situation

The International Secretariat of OMCT is gravely concerned by the excessive and disproportionate use of force by the Turkish security forces and special police teams in Kuçukarmatlu, a small Istanbul neighbourhood.

According to information received, at about 3 p.m. on Tuesday 6th November 2001, approximately one thousand members of the special police force carried out an operation against hunger strikers on a «death fast», who were either on the verge of death or in an advanced state of mental and physical deterioration in the «death fast houses» in Kucukarmatlu, having been on prolonged hunger strikes in protest against Turkey's new isolation cells. According to reliable sources, four people were killed (Ms Arzu Güler, Mrs. Sultan Yildiz, Mr. Bülent Durgaç and Mr. Baris Tas) and other ten people seriously injured during the raid on hospitals. In addition, a large number of demonstrators were arrested and taken into custody.

The police reportedly attacked hunger strikers in the district, using armoured cars and bulldozers to break down barricades and houses, threw gas bombs and nerve and tear gas into the houses, brandished automatic weapons and batons to enter private death-fast houses and pulled out protesters already seriously weakened by months of hunger strike. Indeed the hunger strikers affected were either former political prisoners released for health reasons, or relatives of prisoners.

According to reliable sources, while entering into one of the death-fast houses, the police reportedly killed one of the hunger strikers, Sultan Yildiz shooting her point blank in the head. Reports and

witnesses in Kucukarmatlu district further indicate that sporadic gunshots were heard and bullet marks found on the front doors of several houses.

Background information

The project to create F-type prisons was first started by the Turkish authorities in 1991. In the ensuing decade, prisoners have continued to engage in major protests and hunger strikes to denounce the conditions of their detention that range from the torturing of prisoners in solitary confinement to intimidation of individual prisoners in large dormitories. These protests have systematically resulted in violent interventions by State security forces in which dozens of prisoners have been killed and wounded since 1995. Turkey has repeatedly failed to investigate instances of alleged use of excessive force, torture and ill-treatment of prisoners.

OMCT recalls that on June 2001, an official Turkish forensic expert's report – published following the «Operation Return to life» military action against death fasting prisoners on 19 December 2000, in which 28 prisoners were killed by Turkish troops - confirmed prisoners' allegations that chemical gas had been used and traces of inflammable solvents were discovered on the skin and clothes of the dead female prisoners held in Bayrampasa prison in Istanbul, thus contradicting a Turkish official's allegations that the prisoners had set fire to themselves.

Turkey has invoked European and international prison practices to legitimise a system that currently amounts to solitary confinement. However, OMCT recalls that the climate of impunity combined with the widespread use of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners seriously calls into question the use of F-type prisons in Turkey.

Action requested

Please write to the authorities in Turkey urging them to:

- i. guarantee the physical and psychological integrity of all individuals in Turkey;
- ii. carry out a full, impartial and effective investigation into these incidents;
- iii. guarantee the respect of human rights and the fundamental freedoms throughout the country in accordance with national laws and international human rights standards;
- iv. undertake in concrete programmes of action and prevention, and condemn the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in Turkey.

Addresses

President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Office of the President, Cumhurbaşkanlığı, 06100 Ankara
Fax : + 90 312 427 13 30

Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Office of the Prime Minister, Başbakanlık, 06573 Ankara
Fax : + 90 312 417 0476

Professor Hikmet Sami Türk, Ministry of Justice, Minister of Justice, Adalet Bakanlığı, 06659, Ankara
Fax : (+ 90 312) 417 39 54 or 418 56 67

Mr Mehmet Ali İrtemcelik, State Minister with responsibility for Human Rights, Devlet Bakanı, Office of the Prime Minister, Başbakanlık, 06573 Ankara
Fax : + 90 312 417 0476

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dışişleri Bakanlığı 06100 Ankara
Fax : + 90 312 419 15 47

The diplomatic representatives of Turkey in your country.

Geneva, 7 November 2001.

Kindly inform us of any action undertaken quoting the code of this appeal in your reply.

Téhéran entend profiter de la crise pour sortir de son isolement et peser sur une future solution politique à Kaboul

L'AFFAIRE AFGHANE aura fourni à l'Iran l'occasion de jouer ce rôle régional capital auquel la République islamique aspire du fait de sa position géostratégique ;

ANALYSE

La crise actuelle offre à l'Iran la possibilité de jouer pleinement son rôle régional

l'occasion aussi de se démarquer du terrorisme dont l'accusent les Etats-Unis notamment, de dénoncer la voie choisie par ces derniers pour résoudre le problème afghan et d'énoncer sa propre vision d'un règlement durable pour un pays avec lequel elle partage 900 kilomètres de frontière et dont les turbulences ont constamment été un sujet d'inquiétude.

Ce n'est pas parce que les Etats-Unis sont aujourd'hui les ennemis du régime taliban qu'ils sont – automatiquement et sans conditions – des amis de la République islamique d'Iran, a décidé l'ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Guide de la République islamique d'Iran, seul et unique maître en dernière instance de la politique étrangère du pays.

« Cette prise de position n'est pas fondée sur des préjugés, mais sur une analyse approfondie et l'expérience d'autres pays. Nous sommes arrivés à la conclusion que non seulement des relations, mais également toute négociation avec l'Amérique va à l'encontre des intérêts du pays », a dit le numéro un de la République islamique, écartant ainsi une proposition de certains députés réformateurs qui suggéraient de saisir l'occasion de la crise afghane pour engager des négociations avec les Etats-Unis.

M. Khamenei juge donc que l'heure n'est pas encore venue de brader l'anti-américanisme qui fut l'un des fondements de la République islamique et qui est aujourd'hui l'un des derniers arguments idéologiques de l'aile conservatrice du régime contre les partisans de l'ouverture. Non que ces derniers veuillent passer l'éponge sur le lourd contentieux irano-américain, mais ils souhaitent tenter d'en amorcer le règlement par le biais de pourparlers sur une question régionale : l'affaire afghane.

Le « dialogue entre les deux peuples » américain et iranien et le « dialogue entre les civilisations » prônés par le président réformateur Mohammad Khatami – et agréés par le Guide – sont certes

une bonne chose, estiment-ils, mais ils ne peuvent porter de fruits qu'à long terme.

PREMIER PAS

L'affaire afghane offre une chance d'accélérer les choses, d'autant que l'Iran, qui a soutenu les moudjahidins afghans de tous bords lors de la lutte contre l'armée soviétique et qui a apporté son appui à différentes formations de l'Alliance du Nord, – notamment le Hezb-i-Islami de l'ancien premier ministre Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – doit avoir son mot à dire dans la reconfiguration du pouvoir politique afghan.

Paradoxalement, le même argument permet à M. Khamenei et au camp conservateur d'attendre que Washington fasse le premier pas, car ce sont les Américains qui se sont rapprochés des thèses iraniennes quant à la manière de rétablir la paix en Afghanistan et non l'inverse. Téhéran, toutes tendances confondues, a de fait toujours plaidé pour un gouvernement de coalition en Afghanistan, estimant qu'aucune faction ne peut gouverner seule ce pays. Aujourd'hui, ce sont les Etats-Unis et l'ensemble des pays qui se penchent sur l'avenir de l'Afghanistan qui prônent l'installation à Kaboul d'un gouvernement le plus représentatif possible de la mosaïque afghane.

Téhéran ne souscrit cependant pas à tout ce qui se concocte aujourd'hui dans les coulisses pour une solution politique en Afghanistan. Le projet – certes encore exploratoire, mais qui a des relents de restauration de la monarchie –, de remettre en selle l'ancien roi Zaher Chah, n'est pas du goût des autorités iraniennes. Celles-ci jugent par ailleurs indispensable d'associer les Pachtounes au futur pouvoir afghan, mais ne partagent pas l'idée de mettre en place en Afghanistan un gouvernement qui inclurait des talibans.

Par ailleurs, malgré l'affaire afghane, rien ne garantit que les Etats-Unis ont renoncé à ce que l'Iran perçoit comme une volonté de l'isoler régionalement, isolement dont les instruments ont été jusqu'à maintenant, outre une certaine tolérance vis-à-vis du régime taliban, la présence militaire américaine dans la région du Golfe, l'influence grandissante des Etats-Unis dans certaines au moins des républiques d'Asie centrale, l'exclusion de l'Iran des projets pétroliers de la mer Caspienne et l'amitié américano-turque.

UNE BELLE OCCASION

Dans l'immédiat en tout cas, il n'est pas question pour l'Iran, toutes tendances confondues, de participer à une guerre dont la principale victime, aux yeux du pouvoir iranien est le peuple musulman afghan. « Les Américains veulent impliquer l'Iran dans le conflit afghan et en faire un partenaire

dans le massacre de gens innocents. Ils veulent aussi montrer au monde entier que la République islamique a renoncé à ses idéaux révolutionnaires », a encore répété le Guide. A l'heure où la quasi-totalité des pays musulmans critiquent de plus en plus fort les bombardements américains en Afghanistan, l'Iran, qui se veut l'un des pôles de l'islam et qui présidait il y a moins de deux ans encore l'Organisation de la conférence islamique (OCI), ne peut, en toute logique, ne pas être à la hauteur.

L'occasion est enfin trop belle pour signifier aux Etats-Unis qu'il n'y a pas un seul Iranien dans l'état-major du réseau Al-Qaïda, aujourd'hui considéré comme l'ennemi public numéro un et dont les circuits financiers ne passent pas par l'Iran – jusqu'à preuve du contraire.

Le terrorisme est précisément l'un des chapitres du contentieux irano-américain, qui inclut l'attitude à l'égard d'Israël, le gel des avoirs iraniens aux Etats-Unis, et les sanctions unilatérales et transnationales américaines qui pénalisent le développement économique de l'Iran...

Le secrétaire d'Etat Colin Powell et le ministre iranien des affaires étrangères, Kamal Kharazi n'en devraient pas moins s'asseoir à la même table, à New York, lors d'une réunion du groupe dit « 6+2 », c'est-à-dire les Etats voisins de l'Afghanistan, plus les Etats-Unis et la Russie. Leurs prédécesseurs, Madeleine Albright et Ali Akbar Velayati, avaient eu l'occasion de le faire dans le cadre de réunions sur l'Afghanistan et de rencontres entre les Groupes de contact occidental et de l'OCI sur la Bosnie, en 1995.

Mouna Naïm

Le Monde

9 NOVEMBRE 2001

Fundamentalist Power Is Fading in Iran

By William Pfaff

PARIS — Demonstrations demanding liberalization of Iran's Islamic fundamentalist government have spontaneously erupted at recent World Cup soccer qualification matches in that country. They add to the evidence that the power of fundamentalism in Iran is fading.

This happens at the moment when Saudi Arabian fundamentalists, and militants under their sway, have taken their war against the United States to a new intensity of terrorism, while the American riposte is an attack on the fundamentalist Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Soccer match disorders, and demonstrations producing pro-American slogans and protests against Iran's religious oligarchy, remain for the moment an inchoate youth reaction against the intellectual stultification of Iranian society. The ruling clerics have thus far been successful in resisting efforts at democratization and reform.

It is interesting, however, that one influence on events in Iran has been the satellite television broadcasts of the former shah of Iran's 42-year-old son, Reza Pahlavi. His message is nonviolent resistance and secular democracy, and he holds out the prospect of Iran's becoming a European-style society.

The vast majority of his listeners have no real notion of what that means, nor any direct experience or memory of the realities of his father's government, which fell because it pushed breakneck Westerniz-

ation and neglected Iran's Islamic legacy.

The leader of Iran's 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had the same ambition that Osama bin Laden's Qaida organization proclaims today: to achieve the utopian goal of a society with perfect justice, based on the Koran and traditional Islamic law.

Qaida is also a nationalist movement, in that it wants to expel foreigners and foreign ideas from the Islamic world. The Taliban movement itself was forged in Afghanistan's struggle against Russian invasion and a Russian-controlled Afghan Communist party. Now the Pashtuns of the quasi-autonomous tribal areas of Afghanistan's neighboring Pakistan are joining the Pashtun Taliban to drive out the United States and its allies.

However, dramatic as all this seems at the moment, Iran is not the only place where there is evidence that the fundamentalist movement is losing influence. It's true in Algeria, Egypt, elsewhere in the Middle East and even in Europe's Muslim ghettos. The Taliban themselves were beginning to lose part of their original support. Their control remained strong in the cities, but not in the countryside, as travelers in the country last spring discovered.

This was foreseeable and indeed predicted. The events of Sept. 11 and after have quite possibly done net damage to

the movement, because they have brought out the essential nihilism of what it has become. They demonstrate its futility.

The attempts to create a utopian religious society in Iran and Afghanistan, and the violence between fundamentalists and army that has torn Algeria apart in recent years, have alienated ordinary people. The movement's original appeal was to elites, resisting the cultural challenges of Westernization. Today, the leading members of the bin Laden organization have proved to be well-educated, semi-Westernized young men, caught between the crisis of their own civilization and a Western society whose integration they resist.

Fundamentalist activists in Europe have nearly all been second-generation members of Europe's immigrant ghettos, often unemployed and poorly integrated. They went back to their parents' countries of origin — or to war in Bosnia or Afghanistan — in order to establish identities of their own. They resemble those partly integrated children of earlier Western ethnic immigrations who proved vulnerable to the revolutionary appeal of Stalinism and Trotskyism.

In the countries where fundamentalism has been tried, it has proved to have no real solutions to Islamic society's problems. This is why its days are numbered in Iran, and even in Afghanistan. It survives in Saudi Arabia and those other countries where it is still only a dream.

*International Herald Tribune.
Los Angeles Times Syndicate.*

Turkey's Warning on Cyprus Vexes Western Allies

By Joseph Fitchett
International Herald Tribune

PARIS — Turkey has angered and dismayed Washington and European capitals by publicly threatening this week to annex Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus if the divided island moves to join the European Union — a step expected by next summer.

The abrupt escalation in Turkish rhetoric came as a surprise to Western officials, prompting speculation that Ankara was seeking to extract concessions on Cyprus in exchange for Turkey's cooperation in military operations in Afghanistan.

If so, the new bluntness in Ankara seems likely to backfire by putting a fresh edge on deep-seated European reluctance to envisage Turkey as a member of the EU. The new tone

over Cyprus, U.S. and European officials said, may come from the Turkish armed forces, which fear losing their political clout in Turkey if the country moves significantly toward European integration, including closer ties with Greece.

"Ankara's move will have extraordinarily negative consequences for the interests of everyone involved," according to a Dutch official.

While damaging Turkey's prospects of being seen as part of Europe, a stark challenge to international law by Ankara will also deepen Turkey's current estrangement from the European allies inside NATO, he said.

Bush administration officials said that they shared this sense of alarm about what seemed to be a new, bullying tone in Turkish attitude

over Cyprus. They refused to be quoted while awaiting clarification about the unfolding Turkish view, but a U.S. diplomat said that a confrontation between Ankara and the EU would be "poisonously divisive and damaging" at a time when the United States was trying to solidify a united front in Afghanistan.

Turkey, as a secular Muslim nation, occupies a pivotal position in the anti-terrorist coalition — particularly as a prime source of troops for a UN peacekeeping force to back up any successor government that might emerge in the wake of the Taliban authorities.

The new importance of Turkey in U.S. strategy since the Sept. 11 attacks may have emboldened Ankara to challenge the planned EU move while hoping to induce Washington to intervene on the Turkish side,

French and British officials said.

A showdown between Ankara and the EU on the Cyprus issue would be deeply embarrassing for the United States, which is Turkey's closest ally.

Part of the damage, NATO officials said, would be a deadlock between Turkey and other allied governments on proposals for the alliance to lend warplanes and other military assets to each other in crises. Turkey's objections to this plan would probably become a permanent veto if political strains hardened between Ankara and EU governments, which want the arms-sharing deal as a step toward European defense cooperation.

"Technically, we could work around a Turkish veto with bilateral arrangements," said an official at alliance headquarters in Brussels, "but it would damage institutional cooperation between NATO and the EU."

Ultimately, in an overall diplomatic confrontation over Cyprus, a U.S. official said that Washington would have to back the European approach. Already, he said, the EU had made a major concession in announcing that it would bend its normal accession procedures to accommodate any UN-brokered accord on Cyprus.

International negotiators had been hopeful of working out a settlement in the coming months between the Greek Cypriots, the ethnic majority that controls the island's recognized government, and the Turkish minority in the northern part of the country. A deal in the coming months would fit the broader timetable that foresees a favorable EU decision on Cyprus' membership next year, probably by midsummer.

There had been no political hint — certainly not in Washington — that Turkey was preparing to ramp up its support for the Turkish Cyp-

riots' resistance to UN mediation over a loose federal government for Cyprus.

Hours before UN negotiators were due to start fresh talks this week, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit of Turkey publicly issued the annexation challenge in an interview published Sunday in the newspaper *Milliyet*.

If the EU proceeded to extend membership to Cyprus without an overall settlement on the island's internal political future, he said, "a decision for annexation may be taken" with regard to Turkish Cyprus.

While similar language has been used in the past by hard-liners in Turkey's Parliament, it was the first time that the threat of annexation had been brandished publicly by a Turkish leader of the stature of Mr. Ecevit, the man who ordered the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 after a coup there by Greek Cypriots.

Devant l'ONU, le président de la République islamique condamne la « secte de fanatiques » de Kaboul

L'Iranien Khatami fait les yeux doux aux Américains

New York :
de notre envoyé spécial
Luc de Barochez

Dans la redistribution des cartes diplomatiques en cours dans le monde depuis les attentats du 11 septembre, le dégel entre l'Iran et les Etats-Unis est l'une des évolutions les plus frappantes.

Le président de la République islamique iranienne Mohammad Khatami en a témoigné ce week-end à New York, où il était venu participer à l'assemblée générale des Nations unies.

Khatami a été particulièrement chaleureux avec les Américains. « Aujourd'hui, d'autres nations marchent main dans la main avec la nation américaine », s'est-il réjoui à la tribune de l'ONU. De tous les orateurs, c'est lui qui a eu les mots les plus durs pour les terroristes du 11 septembre : « une secte de fanatiques qui se sont eux-mêmes coupé les oreilles et la langue et ne peuvent plus communiquer qu'à travers le carnage et la dévastation avec

ceux qu'ils prennent pour leurs ennemis ».

Le président iranien, un partisan convaincu du « dialogue des civilisations », a pris l'initiative en proposant un sommet mondial contre le terrorisme, sous l'égide de l'ONU. « La République islamique d'Iran est un partenaire actif dans la coalition et n'épargne aucun effort pour que la communauté internationale réussisse à éradiquer le terrorisme par des mesures durables, justes et non discriminatoires », a-t-il expliqué.

Autre geste remarqué de Khatami : dans une interview publiée samedi par le *New York Times*, la première accordée à un média américain depuis son élection en 1997, le président iranien a laissé entendre que Téhéran pourrait reconnaître Israël, si les Palestiniens réussissaient à obtenir leur propre Etat.

« Si les Palestiniens acceptent (Israël), et bien que, d'un point de vue moral, nous pensions qu'un gouvernement oppresseur ne peut pas être considéré comme acceptable, nous respecterions les souhaits de la

nation palestinienne », a-t-il dit. C'est la première fois depuis la révolution islamique de 1979 qu'un dirigeant iranien va aussi loin en direction d'une reconnaissance de l'Etat juif. A l'époque du shah, l'Iran et Israël étaient très liés mais la révolution a bouleversé la donne.

L'Iran, dont la ligne officielle consiste à dénoncer comme incarnations du mal le « grand Satan » américain et le « petit Satan » israélien, est encore aujourd'hui considéré par les Etats-Unis comme l'un des principaux soutiens du terrorisme mondial. Toutefois, la crise afghane a placé Téhéran et Washington dans le même camp. Elle a permis de confirmer un dégel déjà amorcé avant le 11 septembre, sous le mandat du président Bill Clinton. Cette évolution est freinée par les difficultés de Khatami à imposer sa ligne réformatrice à Téhéran face aux conservateurs, regroupés autour de l'influent Guide de la révolution, Ali Khamenei.

Sur l'échiquier afghan, Téhéran et Washington soutiennent tous deux les rebelles de l'Alliance du Nord face au régime

de Kaboul. L'Iran chiite considère l'islam des talibans sunnites comme une perversion. Le secrétaire d'Etat américain Colin Powell et son homologue iranien Kamal Kharazi doivent se rencontrer aujourd'hui à New York, lors d'une réunion sur l'Afghanistan impliquant les six voisins de l'Iran, les Etats-Unis et la Russie. Mais la nouvelle coopération a ses limites. Les Iraniens craignent que les Américains ne profitent de la crise pour s'installer durablement en Asie centrale, ce dont ils ne veulent à aucun prix. Khatami a réclamé un arrêt « dès que possible » des frappes américaines. « Les opérations militaires en cours en Afghanistan ne permettent pas de s'attaquer à la racine du terrorisme imposé au peuple sans défense d'Afghanistan », a-t-il déclaré. Pour lui, le monde doit s'attaquer aux véritables causes du terrorisme qui sont « la mentalité de violence, la logique de puissance, la pratique de l'injustice et de la discrimination ». Un langage que ne renieraient pas la plupart des intervenants à l'assemblée générale.

LE FIGARO LUNDI 12 NOVEMBRE 2001

The Prague Connection: Saddam and bin Laden

By William Safire

SAN DIEGO—The undisputed fact connecting Iraq's Saddam Hussein to the Sept. 11 attacks is this: Mohammed Atta, who died at the controls of an airliner-missile, flew from Florida to Prague to meet on April 8 of this year with Ahmed Ani, the Iraqi consul.

Mr. Ani was known to the BIS, the Czech counterintelligence service, as a "case officer" of Iraqi intelligence working under diplomatic cover. "A case officer is not merely an agent," notes Edward Jay Epstein, the espionage analyst. "An agent executes assignments, but a case officer serves as the intermediary between an agent and the state intelligence service controlling that agent."

Saddam has long been infuriated by the ability of Radio Free Europe to foment dissent inside Iraq. Wiretaps of Saddam's Prague consulate led the BIS to suspect Mr. Ani of enlisting agents to blow up RFE's Prague headquarters.

Mr. Ani usually met agents at his consular office, where he could plausibly appear to be issuing them visas. But in Mr. Atta's case, the case officer took pains to avoid showing any direct link to Iraq. Why did the case officer meet Mr. Atta away from the Iraqi consulate? Surely the Iraqi, under round-the-clock surveillance, knew the BIS would follow him.

Mr. Epstein has a "false flag" theory: "A location in Prague, not connected to Iraq, would allow Mr. Ani to misidentify himself to Mr. Atta. Such an alias, or false flag, could both aid the recruitment by appealing to Mr. Atta's ideological interest and conceal Iraq's involvement. False flags are a common tool of recruitment by intelligence services."

Perhaps Saddam, hardly a devout Muslim, did not want to show his hand to Osama bin Laden's mid-level religious fanatics. The BIS followed Mr. Ani to a clandestine meeting at a hotel with Mr.

Atta, who had just come to the city. After that meeting, the Czechs shadowed Mr. Atta to the airport for his flight to the United States.

Why didn't the BIS inform the United States about Mr. Atta at that time? Here was a suspected plot against a large U.S.-financed facility; within two weeks, the Czechs declared his case officer, Mr. Ani, persona non grata and shipped him back to Baghdad. Were the CIA and FBI kept in the dark about his agent flying back and forth to America under his own name of Mr. Atta, or were U.S. counterespies informed but did nothing?

Last week, the Czech prime minister, Milos Zeman, confirmed to CNN that Mr. Ani and Mr. Atta met in Prague. But Mr. Zeman was eager to dissociate that meeting from planning to destroy New York's twin towers: "Atta contacted some Iraq agent ... to prepare a terrorist attack on just the building of Radio Free Europe."

Really? How does the Czech prime minister know what the Iraqi spymaster and Mr. Atta discussed? He could know only if the meeting were bugged or if Mr. Ani talked before being thrown out of Prague. Was the CIA or FBI informed about the U.S. interest in why Mr. Ani was ejected, and what travelers to America had recently been in secret contact with him?

After all, Mr. Atta had flown from Virginia Beach, Florida, the day before and returned the following day. That shows urgency: One does not back and forth across the Atlantic within 72 hours to meet secretly with a known Iraqi intelligence officer for no reason.

We since have learned that Mr. Atta returned to the United States to open a bank account at the Sun Bank in Florida and received \$100,000 to finance his mission through an Arab emirate money changer. But before that money to finance his Sept. 11 attack could pass, Mr. Atta apparently needed to stop in Prague first, where Iraq's Mr. Ani was running agents.

The Prague connection links Saddam and bin Laden at the agent level. Now here is an unpublished report that suggests Saddam helps the terrorist leader on a personal level:

In mid-May, two of Saddam's secret service agents arrived at the clinic of Dr. Mohammed Khayal, Baghdad's leading kidney specialist.

The doctor hurriedly packed a bag and was escorted to a government car. Three days later, he was returned, and the building was soon abuzz with the word that Saddam's Dr. Khayal had been to Afghanistan where his patient was Osama bin Laden.

The New York Times.

EU formula for Turkey: Path still unclear

Turkish Daily News November 15, 2001 by Lale Sariibrahimoglu

"We wished that the EU has set a clear destiny for Turkey. But it fell short of setting a clear guidance towards full membership negotiations. It is true that Turkey has failed to do its homework, but there is also a prejudice on the part the union," says a senior Turkish diplomat, in his assessment of the Progress Report as well as the Strategy Document released by the European Union on November 13, concerning the state of the candidate member countries including Turkey. NATO ally Turkey, is the only Muslim candidate nation of the EU. The Helsinki summit of the EU in 1999 has given Turkey candidate member status.

As a sign of a discriminative policy towards Turkey as opposed to the other candidate member countries, the EU has fallen short of starting the screening process with Turkey. This is a detailed process before the accession negotiations could start with the candidate member countries.

For this process to start, the EU should also provide the candidate member country the detailed version of its Acquis communautaire, the legal principles of the union required for adoption by the candidates.

Ambassador Volkan Vural, head of the EU General Secretariat speaking to the press, has stressed that the EU has not supplied Turkey with a list of EU rules and regulations for adoption to the national acquis.

"Thus if the EU seeks Turkey to make necessary changes to meet acquis it has to start a serious screening process with Turkey. But the EU regards acceptance of the screening process with Turkey as a political issue, associating it with full membership negotiations, instead of a technical issue. For us a new formula developed for Turkey cannot be the same as the screening process," stresses Vural, during an interview with the Turkish news channel NTV on November 14.

The Progress Report on Turkey hailed the amendments made on the military dictated 1982 constitution while saying that Ankara has failed to meet the Copenhagen criteria.

The Strategy Document released in parallel with the Progress Report which has been outlining the methods to be pursued on enlargement strategy suggested, instead of starting the screening process, a detailed scrutiny of Turkey's legislation and its timetable for alignment with the acquis as a new phase for Turkey's pre-accession strategy.

A Turkish diplomat described this formula as beating about the bush.

The EU has started full membership negotiations with candidate member countries almost 4-5 months after it started the screening process.

EU sees a decision to start accession negotiations a political one. EU fears that it has to make a similar decision -- starting full membership negotiations soon -- for Turkey in the case it accepts Turkish demands to start the screening process..

Cyprus and ESDP on Turkey's court

The 2001 Progress Report marks the first report which has been prepared with a reference to Turkey's National Programme released in March this year. The National Programme is a 1000-page report, outlining the Turkish timetable to abide by the EU's Copenhagen criteria set forth in the Accession Partnership Document released last November by the EU. The Progress Report urged Turkey, among other things, to enable the constitutional amendments to be felt on the ground while calling on Turkey to be forthcoming in working towards a solution on the Cyprus problem as well as on the differences on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz of the tri-party coalition government's center right Motherland Party (ANAP) has declared that he agreed with EU criticisms directed against Turkey over the shortcomings on democracy and human rights.

But he called on the EU not to expect from Turkey alone solutions on the divided Cyprus, a contentious issue with Greece as well as on ESDP.

EU's resolve to admit the Greek Cypriot section of the island prior to a solution by 2003 did not seem to have changed. In the meantime, Turkey which has been warning the EU of possible dangerous repercussions of such an EU decision in the Eastern Mediterranean, has been put under pressure by both the EU and the U.S. to help the settlement of the dispute.

The Progress Report, meanwhile, hails improved dialogue between Turkey and Greece of whose foreign ministers have recently signed an agreement for confidence building measures among the militaries of both countries though there has been no development yet achieved on the core sovereignty disputes in the Aegean Sea.

Turkey has been suggesting Greece to look for a solution to their disputes under U.N. Article 33 concerning resolution of conflicts.

EU has set the year 2004 as a deadline for Turkey to end its border dispute i.e. Aegean with Greece.

The year 2004 is crucial for Turkey to start the accession talks or depart from the EU train that it has hardly reserved a seat.

Time narrows for Ankara to do its homework

Next year the EU will decide its enlargement strategy with the 10 candidates that it has come to the verge of completion of the full membership negotiations. During its December 2002 summit, the EU will decide on the full membership status of candidate countries. EU's full membership decision has to be approved by the national parliaments. Those countries will become full members of the union by 2005 at the latest. 2005 will also be significant for the EU to formally complete its peaceful reunion where the groundwork was laid during the 1999 Luxembourg summit with Eastern European countries.

The Strategy Paper released on November 13, together with the Progress Reports of all 13 candidate member nations, said that the EU aims to complete negotiations with 10 candidates in 2002. Those 10 candidates are Greek Cypriot Administration, Malta, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The remaining candidate nations are Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania.

In order not to miss the EU train forever Turkey seeks to start accession talks in the year 2004 before the EU has completed its enlargement, closing the doors definitely.

By March 2002, only four months remain and Turkey should fulfill its 11 short term criteria both in the political as well as in the economic field to open the doors for pre-accession talks with the EU.

Vural says Turkey has got only 4 months ahead to quickly put into force the short term criteria. During that period the laws should be harmonized with the constitutional amendments, while steps for new amendments on the constitution, as well as on the independence of the judiciary, and the adoption of the new Turkish criminal law should be taken. The controversial state tender law should also be passed by Parliament by March next year.

The Progress Report has stressed the inadequate measures taken to stop corruption in this country and it sees a transparent state tender law to prevent this widespread corruption phenomenon in the country.

* * * * *

Iraq moves forces to the north, Kurds alarmed

Turkish Daily News November 14, 2001 by Ilnur Cevik

Baghdad has amassed its forces in the areas bordering Northern Iraq, and the Kurds who are running Northern Iraq are concerned that Saddam Hussein may be planning a new offensive to restore his rule in the region.

Kurdish sources said Baghdad had moved troops to the south of Erbil, Suleymaniye and Dohouk, as well as around Kirkuk and Mousol. They have also moved missiles so much so that the weapons are in open sight of the public. "The missiles are displayed out in the open as if to serve a clear warning to the Kurds," a source returning from the region told the Turkish Daily News.

Kurdish sources said this display of open defiance has alarmed the administrations of Jalal Talabani who leads the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Masoud Barzani who heads the Kurdistan Democracy Party (KDP) which are running Northern Iraq. Both American and Turkish sources confirmed the troop movements and said Washington has served notice on Baghdad that it will not allow Iraq to enter the Kurdish areas. Washington has also assured the Kurds that it remains committed to protecting the north from Saddam's wrath.

The Kurds have told the TDN that the Americans have not been attacking radar and missile installations of Iraq near the northern no-fly zone for quite some time. As a matter of fact, American and British air patrols over Northern Iraq have been considerably reduced. There was only one patrol mission last week, American sources told the TDN.

Analysts said American inactivity does not mean any laxness. "The Americans are allowing Saddam's war machine to come out into the open. If the Iraqis step out of line they will be open targets for American and British air strikes," they said.

The KDP and the PUK, have administered mountainous northern Iraq since 1992, protected by U.S. and British warplanes that patrol the no-fly zone over the area set up after the Gulf War.

There was speculation that Saddam, fearing an American assault on Iraq's oil assets, was moving his troops to the north to protect the oil fields and installations, especially in the Kirkuk and Mousol area. Analysts have said Iraq has been concerned since the start of the American offensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan that it may be next in line for a U.S. assault and also feels an attack could come from the north from the Kurdish areas.

Speculations increased that the United States would hit Iraq after New York Times columnist William Safire proposed Turkey should annex Northern Iraq and get hold of the Kirkuk and Mousol oil fields.

British officials have said Iraq is not a target in the fight against terrorism but American administration officials were more cautious. Even U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell who is regarded as a dove on this issue has not ruled out an attack on Iraq.

Turkey has said it does not want such an assault against Iraq but analysts say Ankara may be obliged to join in an offensive and stress there is a growing belief that an attack against Iraq has passed the stage of "if" and what is being discussed now is "when" and "how."

Saddam meets Kurds

Meanwhile, Reuters reported from Baghdad that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein met members of Barzani's KDP.

Quoting Iraqi state-run television Reuters said Saddam renewed an offer of dialogue with the KDP, one of two Kurdish groups that run northern mountainous parts of Iraq that are beyond Baghdad's control.

In July, the party rejected his first offer.

It was not clear who the KDP members were, or whether they had traveled to Baghdad from the north. The party has vowed to topple Saddam's rule. "Countries cannot be divided...and if there is a lack in rights here or there we have to solve that through direct contact and dialogue," the television quoted Saddam as saying during a reception for the KDP members. "Now is the time of dialogue."

The KDP and PUK have aligned themselves with other Iraqi opposition groups.

* * * * *

Saddam Hussein Threatens Kurds With Use of Force

BAGHDAD, Nov 13 (AFP) - President Saddam Hussein Tuesday warned Kurds living in areas of northern Iraq outside the control of Baghdad that he may resort to force if they refused dialogue.

"Wisdom must be the foundation of any dialogue to resolve problems between people," Saddam said, quoted by the Ath-Thawra daily.

"But if wisdom is unable to achieve dialogue ... the Iraqi sword should be used to recover rights," he warned.

"We are not incapable of using arms, even in the presence of the Americans and British in the north and south of the country," Saddam noted, referring to daily aerial surveillance designed partly to protect the Kurds.

Saddam was taking aim at Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), for refusing Baghdad's recent overtures to open dialogue. "Why have you published a communique rejecting any dialogue with the government?" he asked without naming Talabani. "One day we will cut out the tongue of he who pronounced these words," Saddam said in the ruling Baath party newspaper. "If you want to talk to the Americans and the Zionists, we want to talk to our Kurdish people."

Saddam said he "could visit the provinces of Kurdistan. I suppose no one can stop me, but I do not go for psychological reasons," he said without further explanations. The Iraqi strongman renewed on July 15 his call for dialogue with the Kurdish factions. Iraqi Kurdistan rose up against the regime in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war over Kuwait, leaving the three provinces of Arbil, Suleimaniyeh and Dahuk outside Baghdad's reach. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masoud Barzani today controls an area along the Turkish border, while the rival PUK administers an area close to the Iranian border.

On July 15, Saddam Hussein called for the Kurdish factions, which the United States has tried to bring together, to engage in dialogue to find an equitable solution to the Kurdish problem.

* * * * *

L'opinion turque de plus en plus divisée

A l'ombre de la mosquée, autour d'un stand de fruits et légumes, la discussion est animée. « Moi, je suis musulman mais je pense que les attaques du 11 étaient contraires à l'islam. Ce Ben Laden, je le pendrais tout de suite », affirme Suleyman, vitrier. « Les Américains ont raison d'attaquer l'Afghanistan. Ces gens-là sont des barbares, ils soutiennent les terroristes. » « Je ne suis pas d'accord », réplique Bekir le maraîcher, qui, en aparté, indique qu'il est kurde. « D'abord, je ne crois pas que ces attentats aient pu être organisés par des gens vivant dans les montagnes d'Afghanistan. Cette guerre est un prétexte, les Américains veulent mettre la main sur les richesses énergétiques de la région. Des civils innocents meurent par centaines sous les bombes. La Turquie va s'attirer des ennuis en s'impliquant dans cette histoire. » « Au contraire, c'est dans notre intérêt », affirme Mehmet, qui s'est joint au groupe. « La Turquie est un pays important. Si les Américains attaquent l'Irak, c'est très simple. Nous entrerons aussi en Irak et nous prendrons Mossoul et Kirkouk. Et l'Union européenne va être obligée de nous accepter. »

L'opinion publique turque, pays musulman à 99 % et officiellement laïque, est donc très divisée sur le conflit en Afghanistan. Les sondages indiquent pourtant que 70 % à 80 % de la population de ce membre de l'OTAN, candidat à l'Union européenne, n'approuvent pas la décision du gouvernement d'envoyer une force d'élite de quatre-vingt-dix hommes en Afghanistan. « Cette perception, affirme Cengiz Candar, éditorialiste au quotidien *Yeni Safak*, est due à l'absence de directives et au manque d'information émanant du gouvernement. Nos dirigeants n'ont pas su expliquer le pourquoi et le comment de la position turque. Mais l'opinion publique compte peu en Turquie et elle ne va pas dissuader les autorités. »

Candar estime qu'Ankara doit clairement définir sa position en faveur du camp occidental. « La Turquie est située sur la faille géopolitique et géoculturelle qui est devenue apparente après le 11 septembre. L'envoi des unités spéciales ne va pas changer le paysage militaire en Afghanistan, mais c'est une déclaration d'intention importante. La Turquie utilise son identité musulmane pour contrer la propagande qui affirme que c'est un conflit contre

l'islam. » Selon Soli Ozel, professeur de relations internationales à l'université Bilgi d'Istanbul, la position de l'Etat turc est parfaitement « logique ». « Si la Turquie veut avoir un droit de regard sur les équilibres politiques en Asie centrale, elle doit participer. La Russie est impliquée également. »

Jusqu'à présent, seules quelques manifestations de petite envergure ont été signalées. Les Turcs ne descendent pas volontiers dans la rue. Les islamistes expriment néanmoins publiquement leur opposition à la politique du gouvernement. « La Turquie envoie des soldats non pas parce qu'elle le veut, mais parce qu'elle le doit », déclare Abdurrahman Dilipak, éditorialiste principal du quotidien islamiste *Akit*, qui estime que la situation économique du pays a influencé la décision du gouvernement. Dilipak est convaincu que les Etats-Unis dissimulent la vérité sur les attaques du 11 septembre et utilisent Ben Laden et les talibans, avec lesquels ils avaient collaboré par le passé, comme prétexte. « Derrière Ben Laden, ils devraient d'abord chercher le Mossad », affirme-t-il.

Ahmet Tasgetiren, commentateur du quotidien islamiste modé-

ré *Yeni Safak*, estime « possible d'être à la fois contre les talibans et contre les bombardements américains en Afghanistan ». Selon lui, une sympathie pour les pauvres et les opprimés alimente les réticences d'une partie importante de la population turque. « Le pays le plus fort attaque le plus faible. Et malheureusement, plus ils bombardent la population civile afghane, plus la colère va monter dans le monde musulman. Ce n'est peut-être pas une réaction rationnelle, mais elle est due au sentiment d'injustice. »

La gauche, traditionnellement soupçonneuse à l'égard des Américains, est également contre le conflit. « Il ne s'agit plus seulement d'une opération punitive contre Oussama Ben Laden et les talibans. Maintenant, il s'agit d'une opération visant à redessiner la région pour les besoins de l'impérialisme. En plus, la possibilité augmente que le conflit s'étende jusqu'au Moyen-Orient », déclarait récemment Ufuk Uras, dirigeant du Parti de la liberté et de la solidarité, exhortant les autorités à ne pas envoyer de soldats turcs. Hadep, le parti pro-kurde, s'inquiète également d'un élargissement possible des combats. « La Turquie s'engage dans une situation qui échappe à son contrôle sans savoir où cela va mener, notamment au Moyen-Orient. Nous pensons que cela risque d'augmenter la tension dans la

région et de causer de nouveaux événements sanglants », explique Naci Kutlay, vice-président du parti.

Plus d'une centaine de députés, conservateurs ou religieux, ont demandé à la Cour constitutionnelle de bloquer l'envoi des soldats turcs, affirmant que l'autorisation préalable de déployer des forces à l'étranger octroyée au gouvernement n'est pas légale car elle ne fournissait aucun détail sur les opérations prévues.

En définitive, le pragmatisme semble prendre le dessus. Les difficultés économiques de la Turquie, ses besoins de financement ont pesé dans la balance. Depuis l'annonce de l'envoi des troupes, la Bourse et la monnaie nationale sont à la hausse, preuve que les marchés financiers voient une relation directe entre l'attitude du gouvernement et l'octroi attendu de nouveaux crédits. « On peut être contre les opérations en Afghanistan pour des raisons morales ou humanitaires, mais il faut regarder les choses du point de vue politique, affirme Soli Ozel. Il n'y a pas de doute que les Etats-Unis ont rehaussé le profil de la Turquie. En définitive, la Turquie va recevoir l'argent dont elle a besoin. Notre participation va nous donner un regain de vie, du point de vue économique et diplomatique. »

Nicole Pope



FOUAD ELKOURY/RAPHO

■ **EDIRNE**, (nord-ouest d'Istanbul), 1999. L'opinion publique turque, pays musulman à 99 % et officiellement laïque, désapprouve l'envoi d'une troupe d'élite auprès de l'armée américaine.

HISTOIRE SOCIALE

par Jean-Louis Robert

Islam et socialisme en Iran

Après de difficiles négociations, le 31 août 1907, l'empire russe et le Royaume-Uni signaient une convention dont les points essentiels concernaient la Perse, ou l'Iran, comme on commençait de plus en plus souvent à l'appeler. Cet Etat était divisé en zones d'influence : le Sud était ouvert à la pénétration britannique, le Nord à la pénétration russe et la partie médiane aux deux. Si la signature de cette convention tenait aux nouvelles relations internationales qui configuraient les futures alliances du conflit mondial à venir et si elle réglait, à l'avantage des Britanniques, la répartition de la manne pétrolière attendue (c'est en 1908 qu'est fondée l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company, qui obtient une concession pétrolière de soixante ans, c'est en 1909 que s'ouvre à Abadan la première raffinerie pétrolière), l'accord venait aussi de la volonté commune des deux puissances impérialistes de répondre à la menace que constituait le développement de la révolution nationale et sociale en Iran depuis 1906.

Cette année-là avait en effet éclaté, en grande partie en résonance avec la révolution russe de 1905, une révolution qui avait contraint le chah à accorder une Constitution établissant un régime parlementaire dans le pays. Cette révolution « jeune-perse » associait de manière complexe un mouvement de réaction nationaliste, opposé à l'impérialisme occidental, et un mouvement modernisateur et libéral.

Mais l'apparition dans cette période d'un important Parti socialiste iranien est un fait beaucoup moins connu, et pourtant largement significatif des tensions entre tradition et modernité dans les pays du Moyen et du Proche-Orient. Le mouvement socialiste iranien est né dans de petits groupes d'immigrés iraniens en territoire russe, et plus précisément dans les colonies russes d'Asie et de Transcaucasie. Là s'étaient développés des mouvements nationalistes et populistes fortement influencés tant par le panislamisme que par le socialisme, en particulier à Bakou, la seule ville qui comptait une forte classe ouvrière et où coexistaient le Parti social-démocrate russe et un parti social-démocrate musulman, Hümmet, où se retrouvèrent de nombreux iraniens immigrés.

Le Parti social-démocrate iranien, fondé pendant la révolution de 1906, a des traits qui relèvent de ces deux influences. Il a un nom officiel, Parti social-démocrate, qui le situe dans la mouvance de la II^e Internationale, il se dote de statuts sur le modèle du Parti russe : un comité central, des cartes d'adhérents, des cotisations. Mais il s'appelle aussi couramment Parti moudjahid (parti

des soldats de la guerre sainte). Ses statuts commencent par un préambule qui rend grâce à la gloire de Dieu, Seigneur des moudjahidins. Ses orientations relèvent de la même apparente confusion. Le parti défend la libération des paysans dans un pays où les terres sont encore largement soumises à l'oppression féodale, il soutient la dimension libérale de la nouvelle Constitution, mais il défend également la religion musulmane et sa place comme religion officielle dans la Constitution (l'islam chiite avait été reconnu religion d'Etat, les ministres devaient être musulmans, des oulémas vérifiaient que les lois étaient conformes au Coran). Enfin, il accepte le principe du terrorisme individuel comme mode d'action sous le contrôle du Comité central. Soulignons d'emblée, pour éviter tout anachronisme grave, que ce dernier point renvoyait surtout à l'influence de la tradition socialiste révolutionnaire russe du XIX^e siècle, où le geste terroriste individuel ou de petits groupes était admis, tradition encore inégalement présente dans la social-démocratie russe au XX^e siècle. Dans sa pratique, on voit le parti diffuser la première traduction persane du *Manifeste du parti communiste* de Karl Marx et des textes religieux qui rappellent la tradition millénariste et égalitaire de l'islam.

Ce Parti socialiste iranien connut une brutale flambée d'adhésions avec plusieurs dizaines de milliers de membres dès 1907. Dans un pays où n'existait aucune – ou presque – classe ouvrière, se retrouvaient dans le Parti moudjahid à la fois des intellectuels – étudiants, enseignants, journalistes, médecins, écrivains –, mais aussi de très nombreux mollahs qui entraînaient avec eux une partie de la paysannerie pauvre et du petit peuple urbain de Téhéran, Ispahan ou Tabriz. Le Parti socialiste prit une part très active à l'insurrection de la ville de Tabriz, dans le nord de l'Iran, en 1908, en réponse à la dissolution par le chah du Parlement et à l'intervention des troupes russes et britanniques sur le sol iranien. C'est un socialiste d'origine arménienne, Ephrem Khan, qui anime la résistance de la ville avec ses « fedayin ».

Cette action du Parti social-démocrate iranien moudjahid attirera l'attention du Parti bolchevik, et en particulier de Lénine, qui y verra les prémices du possible développement d'un mouvement communiste anti-impérialiste dans les pays colonisés ou dominés par les puissances occidentales. C'est Lénine qui transmet au Bureau socialiste international de Bruxelles l'« appel des sociaux-démocrates défenseurs de l'islam », qui conduira la II^e Internationale à organiser une campagne de solidarité avec les Iraniens contre l'intervention britannique et russe. Dans les principaux pays de l'Europe occidentale, les Partis socialistes développent par la presse et par des meetings une propagande de soutien à la révolution iranienne.

Le Parti socialiste iranien sera gravement affecté par la répression à partir de 1910, mais il connaîtra, particulièrement après la seconde guerre mondiale, de nombreux héritiers où se retrouvera constamment cette tension entre modernité et tradition. Le modèle social du nationalisme iranien des années 1950 autour du gouvernement de Mossadegh en a été aussi profondément marqué. Dans une certaine mesure, le modèle social de l'Iran contemporain également.

Jean-Louis Robert est titulaire de la chaire d'histoire sociale du XX^e siècle à l'université Paris-I-Panthéon-Sorbonne.

Saddam Hussein menace de recourir à la force au Kurdistan



BAGDAD, 13 nov (AFP) - 12h28 - Saddam Hussein a menacé mardi de recourir à la force au Kurdistan irakien qui échappe au contrôle du pouvoir central s'il s'avérait impossible d'établir un dialogue entre Bagdad et les factions kurdes.

"La sagesse doit être la base de tout dialogue pour résoudre les problèmes des peuples. Mais si la sagesse s'avère incapable de le faire (...), l'épée des Irakiens devrait être utilisée pour récupérer les droits", a déclaré le chef d'Etat irakien, cité par le quotidien officiel As-Saoura.

"Nous ne sommes pas incapables de recourir aux armes, même en la présence des Américains et des Britanniques dans le nord et le sud du pays", a poursuivi M. Saddam Hussein, en allusion aux survols ou raids américano-britanniques dans les zones d'exclusion aérienne.

Le président irakien faisait référence notamment à Jalal Talabani, chef de l'Union Patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK), qui, selon lui, avait récemment refusé d'établir un dialogue avec Bagdad pour résoudre le problème kurde, en suspens depuis la guerre du Golfe en 1991.

Le président Saddam Hussein a critiqué M. Talabani, sans le nommer, en le blâmant d'avoir rejeté tout dialogue avec Bagdad: "Pourquoi as-tu publié un communiqué rejetant tout dialogue avec le pouvoir?", a-t-il dit.

"Nous allons un jour couper la langue à celui qui a prononcé ces paroles", a-t-il menacé.

"Si tu veux dialoguer avec les Américains et les sionistes, nous, nous voudrions avoir un dialogue avec notre peuple kurde", a-t-il dit.

Il a enfin affirmé qu'il "pouvait visiter les provinces du Kurdistan". "Je suppose que personne ne peut m'en empêcher, mais je n'y vais pas pour des raisons psychologiques".

En juillet dernier, Saddam Hussein avait renouvelé son appel au dialogue avec les faction kurdes.

Le Kurdistan irakien s'était soulevé contre le régime au pouvoir à Bagdad dans la foulée de sa défaite dans la guerre du Golfe en 1991. Depuis, cette région est disputée par les deux principales factions kurdes rivales.

La partie est du Kurdistan d'Irak frontalière de l'Iran est contrôlée par l'UPK, de Jalal Talabani, et le secteur proche de la Turquie est contrôlée par le Parti Démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK), de Massoud Barzani.

Le président irakien appelle périodiquement les Kurdes à "chasser de la région d'autonomie kurde (les provinces de Souleimaniya, d'Erbil et de Dohuk) toute présence étrangère".

Le pouvoir central a plusieurs fois accusé les deux factions kurdes rivales d'être soumises aux pressions américano-britanniques, qui entravent tout accord avec Bagdad.

Un groupe britannique se retire du consortium pour le barrage de Ilisu



LONDRES, 13 nov (AFP) - 17h48 - Le groupe britannique de construction et travaux publics Balfour Beatty a annoncé mardi qu'il se retirait du projet très controversé de construction d'un barrage dans la région kurde de la Turquie.

Le groupe a décidé de retirer sa participation au consortium chargé du projet car les questions humaines et environnementales n'ont pas été réglées, a-t-il indiqué dans un communiqué.

"Comme il est peu vraisemblable qu'elles seront résolues sous peu, la direction estime qu'il n'est pas dans l'intérêt des actionnaires" de continuer à y participer, a précisé Balfour Beatty.

Le barrage de Ilisu est très critiqué par plusieurs organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) pour son impact sur l'environnement et les bouleversements que sa construction entraînerait au sein des populations kurdes vivant dans la région.

Les Amis de la Terre ont aussitôt réagi en se félicitant de cette décision. Ce barrage est "désastreux d'un point de vue environnemental, politique et social", a déclaré l'ONG, qui estime à 30.000 le nombre de personnes laissées sans abri par la construction de ce barrage.

Mais la décision du groupe évite également au gouvernement britannique de se prononcer clairement sur ce sujet, a regretté Charles Secrett, directeur des Amis de la Terre.

"L'histoire du barrage de Ilisu souligne le besoin d'avoir des lois qui obligent les groupes britanniques à adopter des critères éthiques et environnementaux à l'étranger comme en Grande-Bretagne", a ajouté M. Secrett.

Selon lui, l'octroi de crédit à l'exportation devrait être exclu dans les cas qui comprennent "une telle destruction de l'environnement et un tel abus des droits de l'Homme".

Deux membres du parti pro-kurde HADEP blessés lors d'agressions à Istanbul



ISTANBUL, 14 nov (AFP) - 15h40 - Deux membres du parti pro-Kurde de la Démocratie du Peuple (HADEP), ont été blessés mercredi à Istanbul par un ou deux individus affirmant vouloir venger la mort d'un frère tué en combattant la rébellion kurde, a indiqué à l'AFP un responsable du parti.

Le secrétaire général de la branche d'Istanbul du HADEP Dogan Erbas a précisé que les deux incidents avaient eu lieu immédiatement à la suite l'un de l'autre, sans pouvoir dire s'ils étaient liés.

Selon l'agence Anatolie, la police pense que l'agresseur dans les deux cas est un même individu, qu'elle a identifié.

L'assaillant est entré dans les locaux du HADEP, dans le quartier de Sisli dans la partie européenne d'Istanbul, et a hurlé, armé d'un couteau: "Mon frère a été tué dans le sud-est et je vais le venger!" a raconté M. Erbas.

L'homme a alors saisi un membre du parti, l'a renversé à terre et lui a enfoncé son couteau dans la jambe.

Il s'est ensuite enfui en laissant derrière lui un sac en plastique, affirmant qu'il contenait une bombe. L'examen du contenu du sac par la police a cependant révélé qu'il n'y avait pas d'engin explosif, a indiqué M. Erbas.

Le second incident a eu lieu dans un autre bâtiment occupé par le HADEP, proche du premier.

L'assaillant a proféré le même genre de menaces vengeresses et fait feu à une seule reprise contre un représentant du parti pro-kurde, le blessant à la jambe avant de s'enfuir, selon Dogan Erbas.

Les autorités turques accusent le HADEP d'être lié au Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK, illégal), qui a mené 15 ans durant une guerre pour l'indépendance du sud-est de la Turquie, à majorité kurde.

Quelque 36.500 personnes ont été tuées dans ce conflit, dont une majorité de rebelles kurdes et de civils habitant le sud-est.

Le HADEP, qui réclame une solution pacifique à la question kurde, nie ces accusations, mais risque néanmoins une possible décision de justice d'interdiction pour "liens organiques" avec le PKK.

Les combats dans le sud-est ont largement diminué depuis septembre 1999, quand le PKK a annoncé l'abandon de la lutte armée pour opter pour un combat politique, suivant les appels de son chef Abdullah Ocalan, condamné à mort en Turquie pour trahison et séparatisme en juin 1999.

ÉLARGISSEMENT Dix pays apporteront à l'Union 75 millions de nouveaux citoyens

L'Europe à vingt-cinq, c'est pour 2004

Bruxelles : Pierre Bocev

Le « big bang » est bientôt là. Sans oser encore le crier haut et fort, la Commission européenne reconnaît que dix pays candidats entreront sans doute dans l'Union dans trois ans. Officiellement, le rapport annuel sur l'avancement des négociations, qui a été publié hier, reste prudent. Il est trop tôt pour faire des recommandations sur qui accèdera en premier. Chaque pays sera jugé sur ses « propres mérites ».

Mais, souligne ce texte, « si les candidats poursuivent leurs efforts, les négociations devraient être conclues à la fin de 2002 pour les pays qui satisfont aux critères d'adhésion. Ces pays seraient alors prêts à devenir membres de l'UE en 2004 », une fois achevées les ratifications. « Le but reste ambitieux », explique Günter Verheugen, le commissaire chargé du dossier. Mais ce n'est pas une utopie.

Il s'agit du scénario sur lequel les Quinze s'étaient engagés aux sommets de Nice et de Göteborg, en décembre 2000 et en juin dernier. Il apparaît acquis, dorénavant, que ce plan de marche s'appliquera à dix des douze pays qui négocient avec Bruxelles. Seules la Roumanie et la Bulgarie ne feront pas partie de cette « première vague » qui augmentera le nombre de « ressortissants européens » de 75 millions.

Les dix « nouveaux » seront donc quatre pays de feu le pacte de Varsovie (Pologne, Hongrie, République tchèque, Slovaquie), les trois Etats baltes ex-soviétiques (Estonie, Lettonie, Litua-

nie), deux îlots méditerranéens (Chypre, Malte) et la Slovénie, issue de l'ex-Yougoslavie.

La Commission donne clairement à entendre que « les Dix » sont dans le même bateau. Ils répondent tous peu ou prou au volet politique des « critères de Copenhague » fixés par l'Europe en 1993 : la nécessité d'« institutions stables garantissant la démocratie, la primauté du droit, les droits de l'homme, le respect des minorités et leur protection ».

C'était déjà le cas dans le rapport précédent. Mais, en un an, l'analyse des critères économiques a évolué : là où, en 2000, Bruxelles faisait de subtiles distinctions entre les postulants est-européens, il y a maintenant le même constat pour tous les dix. Partout, il y a « existence d'une économie de marché viable ». Partout, il y a « dans un

proche avenir » la perspective de pouvoir « affronter la pression concurrentielle et les forces du marché de l'Union ».

Les chiffres, pourtant, témoignent du chemin qui reste à faire. En moyenne, le revenu par tête d'habitant ne dépasse pas 35 % de celui des Quinze, le déficit budgétaire est en hausse à 3,5 %, tout comme l'inflation (15 %) et le chômage (12,5 %). Tous les candidats ont fait des progrès dans la transposition de l'« acquis communautaire », les 80 000 pages de la législation européenne.

Mais, pour ce qui est de l'appliquer, donc de disposer d'une administration digne de ce nom, « beaucoup reste à faire », que ce soit pour combattre la corruption, assurer un système judiciaire moderne, ou tout simplement mettre en place un système de contrôle vétérinaire.

Situation contrastée

Les pays candidats à l'élargissement	PIB/habitant par rapport à la moyenne européenne (=100)	Part des exportations vers l'Union européenne (en %)
Bulgarie	24	51,2
Chypre	83	47,7
Rép. Tchèque	60	68,6
Estonie	38	76,5
Hongrie	52	75,1
Lettonie	29	64,6
Lituanie	29	47,9
Malte	53	33,5
Pologne	39	69,9
Roumanie	27	63,8
Slovaquie	48	59,1
Slovénie	72	63,8
Turquie	29	52,3

La Commission, du reste, se propose de lancer en 2002 un « plan d'action » dans ce domaine. Mais elle prévoit dès maintenant qu'il faudra en « prolonger les efforts » pendant « au moins trois autres années » après 2003 : autrement dit, ces pays adhéreront en 2004 avec des administrations bancalées.

L'élargissement se fera tout de même : c'est une nécessité politique. On ne peut « pas imaginer » qu'il ait lieu sans la Pologne, vient de déclarer Joschka Fischer, le chef de la diplomatie allemande. Même si elle accuse du retard, ce que d'ailleurs le commissaire Verheugen nie, au mépris de l'évidence.

Alors ? Alors, un responsable diplomatique de premier plan prévoit que les choix ultimes se feront en tenant compte d'une « dimension d'arbitraire poli-

tique ». On « arrondira, dit-il, certains angles ». La décision de fermer les yeux ou non incombera aux Quinze, et à eux seuls. Sauf à propos de Chypre, un dossier qui risque de les confronter à un casse-tête bien plus grand encore, et sur lequel ils n'ont pas de levier.

Günter Verheugen se veut enfin rassurant quant au coût d'un élargissement aussi massif. Les fonds agréés au sommet de Berlin en 1999 sont une « base suffisante » pour l'accession d'« un maximum de dix nouveaux Etats membres en 2004 », assure-t-il. Une analyse que met en doute Jean-Luc Dehaene, l'ancien premier ministre belge qui, les affaires quittées, est libre de sa parole. « Il y a une tendance flagrante à mettre la tête dans le sable », avertit-il. Je crains que le réveil ne soit assez brutal. »

Delegation that met Saddam was Baghdad's KDP not Barzani's

Turkish Daily News November 15, 2001 by Ilnur Cevik

A delegation that met Saddam Hussein was representing the Kurdistan Democracy Party (KDP) set up by the Baghdad administration in 1974 and had nothing to do with Masoud Barzani's KDP that is running northern Iraq, a Kurdish representative told the Turkish Daily News.

Speaking to the TDN, KDP Ankara representative Safeen Dizaye said no Kurdish delegation from northern Iraq has met Saddam Hussein in Baghdad.

Both the Associated Press and Reuters wire services reported on Monday and Tuesday that a KDP delegation had met Saddam. The wire services quoted the Iraqi state TV as saying Saddam had told the KDP delegation that Iraq's government will not hesitate to restore its authority over the Kurdish zone of northern Iraq, but it prefers dialogue for now.

"Iraq has been one nation for thousands of years and no one is allowed to divide it within 10 years," Saddam said, according to a report in the state-run Al-Iraq newspaper. Saddam called for dialogue among the Kurdish factions in northern Iraq and the Baghdad government and made clear he wanted to restore his authority over the three northern provinces.

"There should be nobody who has any illusions that when we have a right to be restored, we will be hesitant to restore it. But we think that disputes can be solved by wisdom. However, if wisdom fails, we can use swords to restore our right," Saddam said. On Tuesday it became apparent that Saddam had met with the delegation from the KDP which was founded by Baghdad in 1974. The Kurds reached an autonomy agreement with Baghdad in 1970. According to the agreement Kurds were to be given wide ranging autonomy in northern Iraq but in 1974 Saddam decided on lesser autonomy which angered the Kurds who withdrew their support for the agreement.

So as an alternative to Masoud Barzani's KDP Baghdad set up its own KDP and continued the limited autonomy process with the alternative party...

The delegation that met Saddam was from Baghdad's own KDP and had nothing to do with Barzani.

Quoting Iraqi state-run television Reuters said Saddam renewed an offer of dialogue with the KDP, one of two Kurdish groups that run northern mountainous parts of Iraq that are beyond Baghdad's control. The other group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), is led by Jalal Talabani.

In July, the KDP partly rejected his first offer.

Saddam said his forces would continue to confront the U.S. and British warplanes that patrol the sky over the Kurdish zone and over southern Iraq. U.S. and British planes flying out of Turkey have been patrolling no-fly zones over Iraq since 1991. The zones were set up to protect Kurdish rebels in the north and Shiite Muslim insurgents in the south.

Iraq does not recognize the zones and its air defenses have been challenging western warplanes since 1998, provoking air-strikes. Saddam has massed troops and moved missiles to the areas bordering northern Iraq

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Kurds wary of Saddam's threats

Iraq Press November 18, 2001

Arbil - Kurds living in areas of northern Iraq are worried over latest threatening remarks by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Early this week Saddam warned Kurdish leaders administering a semi-independent enclave in northern Iraq that he may resort to force if they refused dialogue.

Last month Saddam issued a veiled call for negotiations to solve the Kurdish issue which Kurdish leaders swiftly turned down.

The snub seems to have angered the Iraqi strongman and in a meeting with pro-government Kurdish factions in Baghdad he threatened military action to reoccupy Kurdish areas outside his control.

Saddam warned if Kurdish leaders refused to talk then "the Iraqi sword should be used to recover rights", adding that the presence of aerial surveillance by U.S. and British troops over the region will not deter him if he decided to do so.

Saddam's warnings come amid reports of massive redeployment of Iraqi troops along areas close to the Kurdish enclave. The troops are said to be equipped with tanks, armored personnel carriers and rocket launchers.

The remarks have caused concern in Iraqi Kurdistan. Saddam's threats were repeatedly broadcast on state-run radio and television and seen by Kurds across the region.

State-run newspapers carrying the remarks were snapped up from news stands in the Kurdish region. Government newspapers are sold freely in Iraqi Kurdistan while the region's publications are banned in government-held areas.

Some Kurdish analysts said the remarks were "extremely dangerous" while others said they were an indication of weakness. Meantime, the Kurdish newspaper Hawalati revealed that Saddam himself had sent an envoy to Iraqi Kurdistan to meet leaders of the main Kurdish parties in search of a possible solution only days before he made the threats.

Mukaram Talabani, a respected Kurdish figure and former minister, was reported to have met both Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

Mukaram Talabani has been mediating between the two sides since shortly after the 1991 Gulf War over Kuwait but his efforts have so far come to nothing. Hawalati said that Saddam sent his envoy to Iraqi Kurdistan amid growing signs that the United States may launch a military strike against Iraq as part of its campaign against international terrorism.

It said Saddam wanted to know what action the two Kurdish leaders would take if such an attack took place.

Iraqi Kurdistan rose up against the regime in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, leaving the three provinces of Arbil, Sulaimaniyeh and Dahouk outside Baghdad's reach. Massoud's KDP today controls an area along the Turkish border while its rival, Talabani's PUK, administers an area close to the Iranian border.

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France wants U.N. to monitor Iraqi weapons

Iraq Press November 15, 2001

Paris - France has expressed its indignation at the failure of the international community to resume the monitoring of Iraqi weapons programs. France's Foreign Ministry spokesman Francois Rivasseau says that Paris is now worried about Iraqi weapons in the absence of international arms monitors.

U.N. weapons inspectors withdrew from Iraq shortly before the United States and Britain mounted massive air and missile strikes to punish the government for its failure to cooperate with them.

France is now spear heading a diplomatic offensive to resurrect the inspections "in line with international legitimacy and for the sake of reinstating stability in the region."

Rivasseau has also expressed concern over the stalemate in the Iraqi issue, which currently does not let the international community "to understand what is going on with regard to reviving Iraqi weapons capabilities."

The spokesman said France would not like to relate its Iraq policy to reports linking Baghdad with international terrorism "and the presence of camps to train terrorists in Iraqi territories."

"Such reports need to be verified by neutral bodies," he said. Iraq had for long viewed France as a country supportive of its fight against U.N. trade sanctions. The Iraqi government granted French firms preferential treatment under its U.N.-approved oil-for-food program. France's oil firms have also been given exclusive rights to develop giant Iraqi oil fields.

But relations worsened last summer when France backed a British-U.S. draft resolution to revamp the sanctions on Iraq.

Rivasseau said France urges a quick return of the inspectors "so that we will understand what is going on the ground.

"We do not know whether Iraq still constitutes a threat to its neighbors and the region's stability," he said, adding a resumption of U.N. weapons inspections was necessary to know the truth.

He said France supports moves to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people. The remarks add further ambiguity to France's Iraq policy. Rivasseau had earlier said France saw no positive changes in its relations with Iraq "so long as Baghdad keeps the tempo of its current ties with the United Nations."

Rivasseau's remarks assume added significance as they coincide with President Jacques Chirac's tour of a number of Arab countries. A French diplomat, speaking on customary condition of anonymity, told Iraq Press that Iraq would be high on the agenda of Chirac's talks with the Arab leaders he meets during the trip.

Informed Gulf sources also told Iraq Press that Chirac carries a number of "scenarios" regarding Iraq. These, they said, were meant to bring about some changes in the status quo without undermining the balance of power in the region. Iraq's future, both politically and geographically, will be reviewed during Chirac's visit in a manner that is not to hamper "the balance of relations in the Arabian Gulf region."

Chirac's visit is said to focus on the war in Afghanistan and peace in the Middle East but the situation in Iraq is certain to be discussed at length.

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Neutralize Hussein by succeeding in Afghanistan

Christian Science Monitor November 19, 2001 By Richard C. Hottelet

WILTON, CONN. - Astonishingly, some serious people in Washington are advocating American military action to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. They urge that this be done soon, before "the window of opportunity" to rid the world of a clear and present danger closes.

This is not idle chatter. The Bush administration has left the option open. When the US and the United Kingdom informed the UN Security Council that they were at war in self-defense against Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization and the Taliban government, the American letter went much beyond the British one. In a sentence reportedly inserted by the White House, it reserved the right also to take "further actions with respect to other organizations and other states." In the present circumstances, that could only mean Iraq.

But the argument behind the call is a specious mixture of fact and ideology. Some of the fact is not in dispute. Mr. Hussein is a world-class war criminal. He launched a war of conquest against Iran in 1980 that cost hundreds of thousands of lives. He bombed Iran with poison gas and gassed thousands of Kurds.

President Hussein started the Gulf War in 1990 by invading Kuwait and annexing it as the "19th governate" of Iraq. Hundreds of Kuwaitis taken prisoner are still missing. He has still not returned the Kuwaiti national archives or recognized Kuwait's independence, and obviously intends to renew his claim at a favorable moment.

Driven out of Kuwait by Desert Storm, Hussein set fire to Kuwait's oil fields, and caused an ecological catastrophe. He is also, quite clearly, obsessed with having weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical, and probably nuclear. He sees them as essential to Iraq's domination of the Arabian Peninsula and to his status as a figure of historical importance. One could add to the indictment the butchering of all reachable dissent in Iraq, especially the Shiite majority in the south and the Kurds of the north. Terrorism is one of his techniques, and he would certainly turn it against the US when he could. In short, he deserves to be removed. But that is much easier said than done.

Those who now want American forces to drive him out contend that the West foolishly missed the opportunity in 1991 by not going on to Baghdad. In theory, that could have been done, but, in fact, it was politically impossible. The administration of the first President Bush had no mandate from the UN or Congress to take so serious a step. And public opinion insisted on bringing the soldiers home.

To go north would have made the US an occupying army for the indefinite future, responsible for law and order, feeding the people, and forming a new regime. It would have met resistance from Hussein in hiding and pro-Hussein elements. Recall the effort it took to capture Manuel Noriega in 1989 in postage-stamp Panama City, where we knew every alley.

None of the allies of Desert Storm would have gone along, leaving the US on its own. The Saudis feared the Iraqi Shiites would break off as a separate, hostile state or join Iran, either of which would destabilize the region. Turkey felt the same way about the Kurdish north. Unilateral US action would have made Washington responsible for the disorderly consequences and ruled out, 10 years later, mounting the international response to the present crisis. Today, in the uncertainty of the war on terrorism, all we need is another war whose first effect would be to rupture the present coalition. The best way to neutralize Hussein, to lay the foundation for peace in Afghanistan, and to bolster Pakistan is to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Nothing succeeds like success when it comes to persuading the many fence-sitters calculating their prospects - in Afghanistan and the region - to jump down on the right side.

It's reasonable to assume that Hussein has been working hand in glove with bin Laden and the Taliban. Without them, he would be quite alone.

• Richard C. Hottelet was a long-time correspondent for CBS.

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Kurds hesitant to claim new rights

Reuters November 19, 2001 by Osman Senkul

You can buy it from stalls in cities across Turkey. It blasts from loudspeakers in shops throughout the southeast. The constitution now allows it on radio and television.

But getting even the tamest of Kurdish pop music accepted into the mainstream of Turkish media will be an uphill task, its advocates say, and one likely to involve battles in local and possibly European courts, as well as police raids. For local TV and radio station owner Nevzat Bingol, feeding the huge demand for Kurdish music in Diyarbakir cost him a studio full of equipment.

This month police raided his premises in the city, closed down his Gun Radyo station and carted off his expensive kit.

"It was totally to do with our broadcasting Kurdish music," he says, rejecting charges that his station interfered with police frequencies.

Constitutional reforms passed in September as part of Turkey's efforts to meet EU membership standards lifted legal curbs on TV and radio for the country's Kurdish citizens in their own tongue.

The EU said in a progress report issued last week that the constitutional changes contained many "positive elements" but called for practical action to reinforce the reform. "Existing restrictive legislation and practices will need to be modified in order to implement this constitutional reform, as the Turkish authorities have recognized. There has been no improvement in the real enjoyment of cultural rights for all Turks, irrespective of ethnic origin," it said.

Bingol agrees.

"We will fight a legal battle for our constitutional right," he said, pledging to take his case to Europe if need be.

But few in Diyarbakir think that will be enough to change the habits of authorities running the city at the heart of a region under emergency rule imposed to curb an armed separatist Kurdish insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s.

The demands of Turkey's EU membership hopes led parliament to legalize broadcasts in a variety of Kurdish dialects. The reforms, however, stopped at allowing schools to teach Kurdish. Official Turkey has long seen the free use of the language as the thin end of a wedge that could eventually divide the country and encourage armed separatist uprising.

"On one side there are constitutional changes. On the other, thinking that Kurdish broadcasts will increase in the region, they want to intimidate (broadcasters)," Bingol says.

Dancing in the streets

On the streets of Diyarbakir, Kurdish music is everywhere.

Mournful folk songs of longing and melancholy, pop love songs with the arabesque rhythms of the Middle East, even the occasional militant protest song in praise of the clandestine Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorists, all echo from car windows and cafes. "Use of Kurdish, limited so far to music broadcasts on radio and TV, will spread now to programs, news and interviews because the demand is there," says Diyarbakir's Mayor Feridun Celik.

Kurdish language broadcasting in Turkey has so far been restricted to satellite broadcasts from Europe and northern Iraq.

Official Turkey has fought legal and diplomatic battles across Europe to end the broadcasts of European-based Medya TV, which it says is a mouthpiece for the PKK gang it has fought for 16 years at a cost of more than 30,000 lives.

The popularity of Medya TV only added to official concern.

"Even in the poorest villages 80-90 percent of houses have satellite dishes. This is a sizeable demand and someone will definitely meet it," says Celik. While most Kurdish men speak both Kurdish and Turkish, many women, who have little schooling in the socially conservative southeast, have never learned Turkish.

Portuguese no longer

Broadcasters have for years flirted with prison by sprinkling their playlists with Kurdish songs, something Bingol says he pioneered when he was at Can TV in the 1990s.

Then a brief broadcast in Kurdish was followed by an apology for a "technical error". The channel escaped censure.

"Later sometimes we would say, 'And now a song in Portuguese', and play something in Kurdish or (the dialect) Zaza. Sometimes we were punished, sometimes it wasn't noticed," he says. Now the constitution, in theory, allows news, debate and documentaries in Kurdish.

But before going live with that kind of programming, Bingol would like a few more guarantees for his company, particularly changes in broadcasting laws to reflect the constitutional amendments and strengthen his position in the face of the emergency-rule authorities.

"If the radio and television law is not changed by Ankara then, like it or not, there will be pressure at a local level, that is an inescapable fact," he says. Celik, whose HADEP party faces possible closure for alleged ties to the clandestine PKK, does not expect Turkish officialdom to readily accept a wave of Kurdish in the media.

"There will be pressure because the banning mentality has not been broken. Solving the problem of that mentality will take time," says Celik.

Watch it, talk it, don't learn it

For local human rights activists, constitutional change is just the first step in a long process of legal reform.

"The constitution has changed but a lot of legal obstacles remain, particularly the radio and television law. And the emergency rule in place in the region is the other problem," says Fikret Saracoglu, secretary of the Human Rights

Association (IHD) branch in Diyarbakir. He points out that the amendments did not go so far as to lift bans on Kurdish language education in Turkey.

"Without Kurdish education, how will Kurds read their books or understand their news programs?" he asks.

For Bingol the broadcaster, gentle progress is best.

"Kurdish broadcasting is a very sensitive subject. Thirty thousand people died because of this. For us when we broadcast Kurdish music we make it clear that it is not something people should die for."

* * * * *

Preparing for Iraq: Is the State Department interested in taking on Saddam?

UPI November 20, 2001 by Eli J. Lake

IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS, the Bush administration has publicly signaled that a tougher Iraq policy may be on the horizon. For example, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said on November 8: "There is plenty of reason to watch Iraq, there is plenty of reason to make very clear to the Iraqis that the United States does not intend to let the Iraqis threaten their own people, threaten their neighbors, or threaten our interests by acquiring weapons of mass destruction."

But behind the scenes, the building blocks may also be falling into place for a more aggressive approach on Iraq. In the last month, the State Department and the National Security Council have quietly increased their contact with a variety of exiled Iraqi military commanders and encouraged them to work together to form a loose network.

The purpose of such a network varies depending on who is talking. State Department officials insist this is purely a political movement, similar in mission to the Iraqi National Congress. The exiled Iraqi generals say the group could serve as a viable catalyst for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, some administration hawks worry that the entire proposition is an effort to undermine the Iraqi National Congress's driving force, Ahmad Chalabi.

"The State Department is not in the business of developing a military network in exile," one Foggy Bottom official said in an interview last Thursday. "I'm not saying we're not encouraging it, but we are not in the business of doing military work." This official stresses there is "no military option" at this point.

But don't tell that to the Iraqi generals. General Fawzi al-Shamari, a former Iraqi commander who rose to the rank of general during the Iran-Iraq war, says the opposition network he envisions could provide U.S. war planners with "all kinds of information about the makeup of the army." Not only does the general, who defected to the United States in 1986, promise information on troops, potential targets, and general conditions in the military he once helped lead; he says he has networks of potential defectors inside the ruling Baath party, the intelligence services, and the Republican Guard. General Najib al-Salhi, a former chief of staff for Iraq's first mechanized division in the fifth corps, explained the criteria his organization is employing for the network. "Officers have to have a record of working against Saddam," he said. He stressed he would only be interested in high-ranking officers who have a track record of cooperating with the opposition.

Al-Salhi himself claims to have worked in secret against Saddam from 1979 until he left Iraq in 1995, soon after the Iraqi secret police sent him a videotape of a family member being raped. In an interview last week, he spoke in some detail about plans to launch an offensive in the south and the north simultaneously, relying in large part on disloyal officers he has known since he graduated from the Iraqi Military College.

Al-Salhi and al-Shamari both attended a workshop on November 1 and 2 in Washington at the Middle East Institute, the Arab-leaning think tank led by Edward Walker, a former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs. The session was titled "The future of the Iraqi Armed Forces after Saddam Hussein," and included about a dozen high-ranking former Iraqi military figures, including General Faris Hussein, a former Baath party military adviser who now lives in Saudi Arabia, and former Lt. Colonel Adil Jubori, also from Saudi Arabia. All told, four expatriates from Iraqi Kurdistan, another three from the Middle East, and two from Western Europe attended the private meetings. Also in attendance was Kenneth Pollack, the former National Security Council Iraq expert for President Clinton, and Michael Eisenstadt, who is now a consultant for U.S. Central Command in Florida, the

theater of operations that includes Afghanistan and Iraq. The workshop's organizer, David Mack, who worked closely at State with opposition figures in Iraq right after the Gulf War, said he was surprised the State Department processed the visas for the exiled Iraqis in light of the tight restrictions on foreign visits after September 11. Mack said he wanted the group to focus on the relationship between the armed forces and civilian authorities and the size of a post-Saddam armed forces, particularly looking at what arms an Iraqi army would need for defensive purposes.

All of this sounds like the Bush administration is getting serious about Iraq, but that is not the opinion of Chalabi loyalists. "This sounds like more of the same from those who have been proven so wrong in the past," says Randy Scheunemann, an on-and-off consultant on Iraqi opposition activities for the Pentagon and former national security adviser to Senator Trent Lott. While on Lott's staff, Scheunemann authored the Iraq Liberation Act, which promised close to \$100 million in military training for Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress. The only problem is that neither President Clinton nor President Bush has moved to fully implement the legislation. In fact, the diplomats have stalled even a modest plan to send INC information-collection teams into Iraq from neighboring Iran, doling out a bare-minimum budget for the group in five-month increments. A November 8 letter to the INC leadership in London from Ryan Crocker, the deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, says specifically that "the Department of State is not prepared to fund INC activities inside Iraq at this time."

Indeed, many in the CIA as well as the State Department have long doubted that Chalabi and the INC are the ones to help eliminate Saddam. Whitley Bruner, a former CIA Middle East operations officer who has worked unofficially as a go-between with the Iraqi generals and the government, said last Tuesday that "the general thrust is to expand the circle and to develop the kinds of contacts the INC does not have: Baath, Sunni tribes, military, and security."

That perception is what worries Scheunemann. "This sounds like yet another destined-to-fail effort to cobble together yet another Iraqi opposition to avoid dealing with the INC," he says. Or is it a sign of a real determination to take on Saddam on the part of the Bush administration?

Eli J. Lake is State Department correspondent for United Press International.

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New York Post

ON TO BAGHDAD!

by Dick Morris November 20, 2001

TERROR is like cancer. If we do not destroy it everywhere, we have not really destroyed it anywhere.

Now comes the most difficult moment in the war on terror. President Bush must decide whether or not to repeat the error of his father - to leave Saddam Hussein in power. Having scored an amazing triumph against the Taliban, Bush must now decide whether to go ahead and take on Saddam.

We need a full-scale effort to invade Iraq - taking Baghdad, and toppling and killing or arresting Saddam Hussein. Nothing else and nothing less will suffice.

If it takes the mobilization and deployment of another 500,000 troops, so be it. If it takes expansion of our military manpower or even a return to the draft, let it happen.

America is ready for war against terror and an invasion to topple Saddam. What we are not ready for is any flinching at this obvious task when it stares us in the face.

Bush must realize that if he leaves Saddam in control of Iraq, he has only defeated a branch office of terrorism, not its international corporate headquarters. He has killed a tentacle, not the head. With Saddam in charge in Baghdad, terror will grow back in some other part of the world.

If Bush moves to crush Saddam, it will send a sobering message throughout the Middle East. Lebanon, Libya, Sudan and Syria will clean up their acts, realizing that they will be next on the hit list if they don't. Iran will continue its pro-Western drift. The Palestinians will realize that the United States is a power with which to reckon in their own backyard and the Israelis will come to believe they can count on America to back them up should the risks of peace backfire.

The result will be to hamper terror and catalyze the prospects for peace. Look at how our action in Afghanistan has moved Iran closer to America and our global action against terror stimulated the long delayed de-commissioning of weapons by the IRA.

More importantly, if we attack Iraq, it will show that the war against terror is more than just a revenge killing for the Trade Center and the Pentagon. It will be what Bush has always said it is: a war against international terror wherever we find it.

Do we have proof that Saddam was behind the 9/11 attack or the anthrax letters? Don't even go down that road. We have ample proof of Saddam's commitment to the development of weapons of mass destruction, his use of terror (and gas) against his own people and his fomenting of terror against us throughout the world.

Nobody will claim that Saddam does not deserve to be toppled. Otherwise, why are we still enforcing sanctions which, thanks to Saddam, leave people in Iraq starving?

Just demanding that Saddam permit arms inspections is a cop-out. It is an invitation to play the same game of hide and seek, cat and mouse, in which Saddam has ensnared us for 10 years now.

Will the international coalition stay with us as we move against Saddam? Part of it will. Part of it won't. But enough will so that we will have bases from which to operate against Iraq.

Who cares if France or Russia stay in? The United States has the right and moral obligation to act unilaterally, if need be, to defeat terror.

Let's hope that Secretary of State Colin Powell does not repeat his mistake of 1991 and let the maintenance of an international coalition against terror become his end rather than the means to the end of defeating terrorism everywhere.

The United States let the war in Bosnia rage on for years because it was hamstrung by multilateralism and had relegated the "trigger" for our bombing missions to the United Nations. It was only when President Clinton took the trigger back in 1995 and vested it in NATO that we were able to end the human slaughter in Bosnia.

We must not let any squeamishness on the part of our allies deter us now from the inevitable and vital next step in the war on terror.

Some have urged that we tackle Lebanon first. But we should not hit another branch office of terror - go for the jugular. That's in Baghdad. His name is Saddam Hussein.

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Perquisitions dans les locaux de l'Union des travailleurs kurdes à Francfort

BERLIN, 21 nov (AFP) - 12h24 - Des perquisitions ont été menées mercredi à Francfort (ouest) dans les locaux de l'Union des employeurs kurdes, soupçonnée par la justice allemande de financer le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), a annoncé le ministère de l'Intérieur dans un communiqué.

Les domiciles de six membres du directoire de cette association ont également été perquisitionnés, précise le ministère dans son communiqué.

"L'union est, selon les informations actuelles, une organistaion de soutien au PKK, qui est interdit en Allemagne", ajoute le ministère.

Au cours des perquisitions, du matériel a été saisi et est "en cours d'exploitation", conclut le ministère sans préciser la nature de ce matériel.

The Moment for Bush To Tackle Saddam

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — Take massive airpower. Add to it a substantial local force on the ground guided by special forces of a superpower determined to work its will. Put this military muscle to work on the side of an oppressed population eager for freedom. Result of combining the strong with the just: the overthrow of a tyrannical regime.

That's the lesson of the opening battle of the first war of the third millennium.

U.S. military leaders braced Americans for a long, bloody winter in Afghanistan and for the eventual commitment of American ground troops. U.S. historians direly reminded Americans of the 19th century defeat of the British and the Afghan quagmire into which the Soviets sank only a short generation ago.

But the magnitude of the Sept. 11 provocation overwhelmed any doubts about the need to fight. Had televised collateral damage turned world opinion against the United States, or if American casualties mounted with no light at tunnel's end, the seeds of doubt were there, ready to sprout.

Curiously, the same self-doubts came into play a decade

ago, when the first President Bush decided that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait "will not stand." Then, as now, Americans were warned that Saddam Hussein's forces were the most powerful in the Third World, that a grand coalition was needed to defeat them, and that half a million U.S. troops were needed to mount a costly conquest of Iraq.

The feared wilderness campaigns did not take place either time. The tyrants' armies fled at the application of serious pressure. Even in Kosovo more recently, the combination of the strong and the just worked: Air assault, imminence of ground troop movement and local resentment drove out the oppressors.

Now it appears that the routed Taliban rulers and their Arab Qaida guests are turning on one another. With his "Wanted: Dead or Alive" message, today's President Bush showed he has his priorities straight. The war-damaged Pentagon has every right to be proud; its strategy prevailed, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld emerges as the most stalwart and purposeful member of the Bush administration.

Toppling the Taliban was the necessary prelude to obliterating Osama bin Laden and his fanatic followers. As that is accomplished, attention turns to what the Bush people call "Phase II" — the dangerously unfinished business of eliminating the threat from nuclear and biological weapons in Iraq. Baghdad is now the world center of state terrorism. Only Saddam has both the capacity and the demonstrated will to destroy cities and launch epidemics.

Some of Mr. Bush's advisers are urging him to bask in the glow of victory in the first battle, using his popularity to advance his domestic ideas. Others in the delaying camp want him to wait until proof is positive of Saddam's involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks or the anthrax letters.

A more realistic view of Saddam's danger came Sunday from Condoleezza Rice, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, on the television talk show "Meet the Press": "We do not need the events of Sept. 11 to tell us that this is a very dangerous man who is a threat to his own people, a threat to the region and a threat to us."

That is a clear signal that the decision has been made to reassemble a combination of the strong and the just to oust Saddam. If Mr. Rice reflects the president's mind-set, Phase II is only a matter of time.

But timing is crucial; this is the moment to be seized. Saudi and Egyptian rulers, having been no help in this fight, recognize their need to be on the winning side,

safe from the hatred they can no longer deflect. Europeans can sense the tide's turn. Secular, Muslim Turkey is ready to talk.

The elder Bush once called political momentum "the big Mo." Nothing gathers support like a sense of inevitability. The younger Bush has it now. Let's hope he knows his Shakespeare: "There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune."

The New York Times.

LAST PICTURE OF OSAMA BIN LADEN:



INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2001

IRAN Des opposants nationalistes devant la justice

Procès de masse à Téhéran contre les libéraux

Le procès politique le plus massif depuis l'arrivée au pouvoir du régime islamique en Iran en 1979 se déroule actuellement à Téhéran, à huis clos. Plusieurs dizaines d'opposants nationalistes et progressistes y sont cités. Ce procès, ouvert dimanche, pourrait durer trois mois, selon un juge cité par la défense.

Téhéran :
de notre correspondant
Serge Michel

La scène politique iranienne n'est pas composée que des religieux réformateurs et des religieux conservateurs qui se disputent le pouvoir tout en se le partageant. Il y a aussi l'opposition libérale, des outsiders qui admettent le principe d'une République islamique mais souhaitent l'aménager pour diminuer les prérogatives du clergé et surtout celles du guide suprême.

Ou plutôt il y avait. Car la justice a décimé les rangs des libéraux, héritiers spirituels du nationaliste Mossadegh ou de l'éphémère premier ministre de 1979, Mehdi Bazargan, écarté lorsque la révolution s'est radicalisée.

Après les vagues d'arrestations au printemps, c'est le procès qui a commencé. Un procès d'une ampleur sans précédent

depuis la révolution islamique. Les audiences concernent 36 membres du Nesat-e Azadi (mouvement de la liberté, MLI) arrêtés le 7 avril dernier pour « tentative de renverser le régime ».

Ce parti d'opposition, fondé dans les années 60 par Bazargan, a été toléré par l'ayatollah Khomeyni, même après qu'il soit sorti du gouvernement provisoire de la révolution islamique de 1979 pour entrer dans une semi-clandestinité. Il a été totalement interdit le 18 mars dernier, sans doute pour justifier la vague d'arrestations de ses membres par la justice, un bastion des ultraconservateurs. Le chef du MLI, Ibrahim Yazdi, est toujours aux États-Unis pour un traitement contre le cancer. Selon ses proches, il n'attend que le feu vert de ses médecins pour se livrer à la justice iranienne.

Selon l'avocat de la défense, M^r Dadgha, 36 personnes sont concernées par ce premier procès, dont six ont été maintenues

en détention alors que les autres sont en liberté sous caution. Les audiences, à huis clos, se tiennent devant la branche 21 du tribunal révolutionnaire de Téhéran. Durant les deux premiers jours, seules 300 des 1 000 pages de l'accusation ont été lues.

Sur le banc des accusés, on retrouve des figures de l'opposition à la monarchie des Pahlavi, qui n'ont pas été beaucoup mieux traitées par le régime suivant. Il y a Mohammad Tavassoli Hodjati, 65 ans, maire de Téhéran de 1979 à 1981, son adjoint de l'époque Khosrow Mansourian, Hachem Sabaghian, ancien ministre de l'Intérieur de Bazargan, et une petite troupe d'octogénaires amènes tels qu'Ahmad Sadr Hadj Seyed Javadi, ancien ministre de la Justice.

Les accusations n'ont pas encore toutes été notifiées. Selon un des membres de la famille de Mohammad Tavassoli, elles s'articuleraient autour des chefs suivants : actions contre la sécurité nationale, tentative de renversement du régime, propos contre le système, appartenance au MLI, et avoir fait régner le chaos dans la société.

Certaines de ces accusations

peuvent être associées à la notion religieuse de « mohareb » (partir en guerre contre Dieu) et seraient alors passibles de mort. Mais les familles des accusés font preuve de philosophie : « Si ce tribunal agit selon la loi, nous n'avons aucun souci à nous faire. D'après nos avocats, le dossier d'accusation est faible. Mais nous savons que d'une manière ou d'une autre, ce tribunal trouvera moyen de les condamner. »

Un second procès devrait s'ouvrir plus tard devant la branche 26 de ce même tribunal révolutionnaire pour une vingtaine d'autres opposants, non directement membres du MLI mais sympathisants du courant plus large des « religieux nationalistes », composé d'intellectuels qui prônent entre autres une séparation de la politique et de la religion. Les deux figures de proue de cette mouvance sont Ezatollah Sahabi, 75 ans, ancien directeur de la revue interdite *Iran-e Farda* (« L'Iran de demain ») et le jeune Ali Afshari, membre d'une mouvance radicale des associations étudiantes. Tous deux ont été arrêtés.

« Nous espérons avoir été victimes de la dernière vague d'arrestations illégales de la République islamique », déclare un membre de la famille de Mohammad Tavassoli devant le tribunal révolutionnaire, où il n'a pas été autorisé à entrer.

Un jeune opposant kurde iranien condamné à huit ans de prison

TEHERAN, 20 nov (AFP) - 22h51 - Un jeune Kurde iranien proche de l'opposition libérale et nationaliste a été condamné à huit ans de prison ferme par un tribunal révolutionnaire, une juridiction d'exception, pour "action contre la sécurité nationale", a rapporté mardi le journal du soir Kayhan.

Khosro Kordpour, 30 ans, originaire de la ville de Bukan, dans le Kurdistan iranien (ouest) a été jugé à Mahabad (nord-ouest) et condamné pour "propagande hostile au régime islamique, détention de documents confidentiels propres à la justice et action contre la sécurité nationale", a ajouté le journal, citant son avocat.

Poursuivi comme la plupart des membres de l'opposition libérale et nationaliste, M. Kordpour est un opposant actif. Il a été poursuivi à plusieurs reprises et appréhendé par la justice pour ses activités politiques parmi les jeunes.

Une soixantaine d'opposants sont jugés depuis le 11 novembre devant un tribunal révolutionnaire, une juridiction créée au lendemain de la Révolution islamique de 1979 pour juger des responsables de l'ancien régime et des "contre-révolutionnaires".

Leur chef, Ibrahim Yazdi, ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères et chef du Mouvement de libération d'Iran (MLI, opposition nationaliste) a été formellement accusé le 13 novembre de tentative "de

renversement progressif" du régime, dans le même procès, le plus important depuis la Révolution islamique en raison du nombre et de l'importance des personnalités impliquées.

La justice avait lancé en juillet un mandat d'arrêt contre M. Yazdi, actuellement aux Etats-Unis pour traitement médical, l'accusant tout comme ses partisans et alliés politiques, "d'actions contre la sécurité intérieure de l'Etat".

Parmi les accusés dans ce procès figurent de nombreux membres du (MLI), fondé par l'ancien Premier ministre Mehdi Bazargan, tombé en disgrâce quelques mois après la victoire de la Révolution islamique dont il a été l'un des artisans, avec son mouvement.

Le MLI, jusqu'ici toléré, a été complètement interdit en mars.

Turquie: augmentation de 50% des cas de torture en un an, selon une ONG



22 novembre 2001,

ISTANBUL (AFP) - L'Association turque des Droits de l'Homme (IHD) a dénoncé une augmentation de 50% des cas de torture et une spectaculaire multiplication des entraves à la liberté d'expression au cours des 9 premiers mois de l'année par rapport à l'an passé, dans un rapport rendu public jeudi

L'association a recensé de janvier à septembre un nombre record "d'au moins" 762 cas de torture dans ce pays candidat à l'Union européenne, contre 508 pour la même période de l'an 2000, soit une augmentation de moitié d'une année sur l'autre.

En 1999, ce décompte s'établissait à 472 cas, rappelle l'IHD, soit 7% de moins que l'an dernier sur la même période.

L'IHD, principale organisation de défense des Droits de l'Homme de Turquie fondée en 1986, précise que ces chiffres s'appuient sur les plaintes verbales et écrites reçues dans ses différentes branches régionales, dont plusieurs sont fermées par les autorités

Par ailleurs, l'Association regrette une multiplication quasiment par 8 du nombre de personnes poursuivies pour leurs opinions entre les trois premiers trimestres de l'an 2000 et ceux de cette année.

1.921 personnes ont ainsi été poursuivies pour des délits d'opinion, contre 254 l'an dernier, précise le rapport.

L'ensemble des peines encourues représente une augmentation de près de 350% entre les 3758 années d'emprisonnement encourues cette année et les 1098 années requises l'an dernier, relève encore le rapport.

La situation des Droits de l'Homme est le principal obstacle à l'entrée de la Turquie dans la future Union Européenne élargie, comme le constate le rapport sur l'avancement des pays candidats publié le 12 novembre, qui stipule que "la situation actuelle et ses répercussions sur les individus nécessite des progrès".

L'IHD déplore en exergue de son rapport que les 12 autres pays candidats à l'élargissement de l'UE soient eux parvenus à remplir les critères de Copenhague en "un an et demi à deux ans", alors que la Turquie n'a pu en deux ans, depuis l'acceptation de sa candidature au sommet d'Helsinki de décembre 1999, que "modifier 34 articles de la Constitution".

Contrairement aux 12 autres candidats, la Turquie n'a pas encore ouvert de négociations d'adhésion.

Une trentaine de blessés à Sangatte dans une bagarre entre clandestins



SANGATTE (France), 21 nov (AFP) - 17h56 - Le centre de réfugiés de la Croix Rouge de Sangatte (nord) a connu mardi et mercredi ses incidents les plus importants depuis son ouverture en septembre 1999 et l'atmosphère restait tendue après une bagarre générale entre Afghans et Kurdes.

Vingt-neuf personnes ont été blessées au cours de ces affrontements qui se sont échelonnés sur une dizaine d'heures. Mercredi soir, des négociations se déroulaient avec les responsables du centre, alors qu'un quadrillage policier était maintenu.

La bagarre, impliquant près de 300 personnes, avait éclaté mardi après-midi après une dispute entre un Kurde et un Afghan concernant l'utilisation d'un robinet d'eau, a-t-on indiqué à la Croix Rouge. Un des deux hommes avait alors fait appel aux membres de sa communauté, transformant l'incident en bagarre généralisée.

Au cours de l'affrontement, les réfugiés ont démonté quatre tentes pour s'armer des tubes de fer, brisé plusieurs vitres et éventré les tôles du fond du bâtiment de la Croix Rouge.

Parmi les blessés figure un policier et deux clandestins plus sérieusement atteints par arme blanche.

Les forces de l'ordre étaient parvenues à ramener le calme à la fin de la nuit. Elles ont été renforcées mercredi matin par une cinquantaine de gendarmes mobiles et des policiers anti-émeute.

Après la bagarre, 150 Kurdes ont passé la nuit à l'extérieur du centre et ont allumé des feux de camp pour se réchauffer, à quelque 500 mètres du bâtiment principal.

Dans la matinée, près de 400 personnes, de différentes nationalités, ont quitté le centre, emportant leurs affaires, a précisé la Croix Rouge. "Ils n'ont pas voulu être mêlés à cette bagarre, devoir prendre partie, ou encore ont eu peur", a-t-on expliqué.

Mercredi après-midi, les Kurdes, qui avaient tenté plusieurs fois de pénétrer en force dans le centre, ont demandé à la Croix Rouge d'organiser des négociations avec les Afghans, notamment pour permettre aux familles de se mettre à l'abri et de manger.

Selon plusieurs réfugiés, les tensions entre les communautés afghanepersonnes) et kurde d'Irak (environ 200 personnes) se sont accrues au cours de ces dernières semaines.

Les bombardements américains en Afghanistan - où de nombreux réfugiés ont laissé de la famille -, les problèmes de racket lié aux réseaux de passeurs et les difficultés du passage en Angleterre depuis le renforcement des mesures de sécurité sur le terminal d'Eurotunnel, ont rendu plus pénible l'attente des candidats à l'émigration.

En deux ans, plus de 38.000 personnes, d'une centaine de nationalités, ont transité par le centre de la Croix Rouge. Les clandestins, Afghans, Iraniens et Irakiens du Kurdistan pour la plupart, tentent chaque nuit de passer en Grande-Bretagne, où ils espèrent trouver du travail.

Depuis début 2001, six clandestins sont morts en tentant la traversée et la Police aux frontières de Calais a procédé à plus de 73.000 interpellations, contre 25.000 en 2000, a-t-on précisé à la police des frontières.

Plusieurs clandestins ont été interpellés mardi à la suite des incidents au centre, avant d'être finalement remis en liberté.

Mercredi en fin d'après-midi, les forces de l'ordre ont allégé leur dispositif autour du centre, où une délégation de cinq Kurdes était en négociation avec les Afghans, par l'intermédiaire de la Croix Rouge.

L'Irak n'est jamais sorti de la ligne de mire de l'administration américaine

LE PRÉSIDENT irakien, Saddam Hussein, est « un homme très dangereux qui constitue une menace pour son propre peuple, une menace pour la région et une menace pour nous, en raison de sa détermination à acquérir des armes de destruction massive », déclarait, dimanche 18 novembre, Condoleezza Rice, conseillère du président George Bush pour la sécurité nationale. Saddam Hussein est l'un des « soutiens » du terrorisme, même « s'il n'est pas le seul », renchérisait le même jour le secrétaire adjoint à la défense, Paul Wolfowitz, l'un des plus ardents partisans d'une offensive contre l'Irak. Tous deux ont néanmoins rappelé que la priorité pour Washington était l'Afghanistan et le démantèlement d'Al-Qaida. Certes, mais après ?

Après, écrivait, lundi 19 septembre, l'éditorialiste Jim Hoagland dans le *Washington Post*, aucun de ceux qui se sont « autoproclamés

d'Al-Qaida [le réseau terroriste d'Oussama Ben Laden], la plus sérieuse menace est l'Irak ». « Le programme d'armes biologiques de l'Irak reste une menace sérieuse pour la sécurité internationale », a-t-il ajouté.

L'Irak n'est certes jamais sorti de la ligne de mire de l'administration républicaine américaine qui, dès son entrée en fonctions, a fait savoir que son objectif premier au Proche-Orient était de resserrer l'étau autour du président irakien. Et, bien qu'à ce jour aucun lien n'ait été établi entre Bagdad et les atten-

tats anti-américains du 11 septembre ou les envois de courrier à l'anthrax, les mises en garde et avertissements de différents responsables américains se sont multipliés. Parallèlement, les craintes – ou les espoirs, c'est selon – de voir l'administration américaine chercher à en découdre avec Bagdad perdurent, en dépit des conseils des pays amis et alliés de Washington – arabes, mais aussi français et britanniques – qui craignent de voir s'effondrer la coalition antiterroriste en cas d'attaque américaine de l'Irak.

Une échéance approche en tout cas, qui a toutes les chances d'être l'heure de vérité. A la fin novembre, le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU doit se prononcer sur la reconduction, la modification ou la suppression de sa résolution 986 sur l'Irak, plus connue sous l'appellation « Pétrole contre nourriture ».

Début juillet, les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne avaient essuyé un camouflet au Conseil, lorsque leur projet commun d'imposer des « sanctions intelligentes » au régime irakien n'avait même pas pu être mis aux voix – malgré le soutien de la France et de la Chine –, en raison d'une menace de veto russe. L'objectif de Washington et de Londres était de faciliter les importations par Bagdad de biens civils et d'installer un mécanisme de contrôle financier qui permette de mettre fin à la contrebande de pétrole et d'autres produits dont seule la nomenclature irakienne est bénéficiaire et dont les revenus permettent au régime de reconstituer, éventuellement, son arsenal militaire. L'armement irakien est en effet à l'abri de tout contrôle depuis qu'en décembre 1998, à la veille d'une opération aérienne américano-britannique de grande envergure contre l'Irak, « Renard du désert », la commission chargée du désarmement de Bagdad, l'Unscm, s'était retirée à l'initiative de son chef, Richard Butler.

Face donc aux objections de Mos-

cou, la formule « Pétrole contre nourriture » avait été reconduite en l'état, pour cinq mois, malgré les protestations de l'Irak, qui demandait la levée pure et simple de l'embargo commercial de l'ONU, estimant, avec le soutien de Moscou, avoir rempli les conditions requises pour cela.

C'était avant les attentats du 11 septembre et le lancement d'une coalition internationale antiterroriste à laquelle la Russie s'est ralliée, en même temps qu'elle s'est engagée avec les Etats-Unis dans une relation de « confiance », mettant fin à l'anti-américanisme qui caractérisait sa politique étrangère. Outre ses intérêts, pétroliers et autres, bien compris en Irak, le flirt de Moscou avec Bagdad avant le 11 septembre était l'une de ses cartes face aux Etats-Unis.

Que vaut encore cette carte aujourd'hui, et Moscou continuera-t-il de s'opposer à l'ONU à un projet de résolution américano-britannique, quelle qu'en soit l'appellation ? A en croire Londres, les tractations sont déjà en cours avec la Russie.

L'Irak, pour sa part, semble ne tenir aucun compte de la nouvelle

Fin novembre, l'ONU doit se prononcer sur la reconduction de sa résolution 986, plus connue sous l'appellation « Pétrole contre nourriture »

ennemis de l'Amérique » ne doit être épargné. Et, pour commencer, « l'Irak, que le monde a laissé pourrir aux mains d'une bande de psychopathes criminels qui prétendent être un gouvernement ». « Quiconque cherche des liens entre le mollah Omar [l'émir des talibans] et Saddam Hussein n'a qu'à voir la manière dont chacun d'eux a brutalisé son peuple, puis proclamé qu'il utiliserait des moyens similaires pour obtenir "la destruction de l'Amérique" », ajoutait l'éditorialiste, pour qui « aucune immunité ne doit être garantie au régime terroriste irakien ».

Le même jour, à l'ouverture des travaux à Genève de la cinquième conférence de révision de la convention sur les armes biologiques de 1972, le secrétaire d'Etat adjoint américain pour le contrôle des armements et la sécurité internationale, John Bolton, estimait qu'« au-delà

Le Monde

21 NOVEMBRE 2001

Between worlds

The IMF loan to Turkey underlines US perceptions of Ankara as a key ally of the west. But disagreements over Cyprus threaten its EU candidacy, say **Leyla Boulton** and **Quentin Peel**

When the International Monetary Fund agreed in principle last week to lend Turkey a further \$10bn to ease its debt burden, the move was instantly interpreted by many as a political reward as much as a recognition of economic virtue.

As the only Muslim member state in the Nato alliance, Turkey was swift to offer to send its troops to back the US-led campaign against terrorism and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

So when the IMF announced its decision on Thursday to negotiate a new loan, there was no doubt that the US administration was a vigorous supporter. A visiting US congressman described Turkey as "a shining crown jewel in a very unstable region".

The new mood in Washington contrasts starkly with the increasing frustration expressed on both sides of the Atlantic before September 11 over growing Turkish truculence in its international relations.

The Turkish government has been accused by the European Union of blocking attempts to forge a new European defence and security policy, in spite of US efforts to broker a compromise.

At the same time there has been little sign of Ankara using its good offices to help negotiate a peace deal on the divided island of Cyprus, without which the EU's entire enlargement process could be endangered.

The question now is whether the fall-out from September 11 will galvanise both Turkey and the EU to solve their diplomatic differences or instead tempt Ankara to use its good standing in Washington to resist the pressures from Brussels.

Bulent Ecevit, the prime minister, threatened this month to annex the Turkish-populated territory of northern Cyprus – the self-styled Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) – if the EU presses ahead with full membership for the Greek Cypriot-ruled south of the island on its own.

Such a move would certainly derail Turkey's candidacy for EU membership, in spite of the fact that at least two-thirds of Turks support joining the union.

The apparent contradiction between Turkey's official campaign to join the EU and its confrontational approach over Cyprus has puzzled many in Brussels and Ankara.

As Cengiz Candar, a liberal columnist at Yeni Safak, an Islamist newspaper, noted recently: "After September 11, the choice facing Turkey is not between the TRNC and the EU. It is about whether we become a Middle Eastern country or take our place in Europe."

A lack of clear political leadership is the most immediate cause of confusion. But the hesitation is also fuelled by fear of a nationalist backlash.

The three-party coalition of Mr Ecevit, a frail 76-year-old, combines the ultra-nationalist



National Action Party with former leftists and liberals whose views have often been at odds. Such differences help to explain Turkey's relatively slow progress, noted by the European Commission last week, in achieving the human rights reforms needed to start formal EU accession talks.

"It is obvious that we don't have a prime minister in the real sense of the word and that the coalition is not a coalition but a juxtaposition of fiefs," argues Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik, who as minister for EU affairs until two years ago played a key role in securing Turkey's hard-won candidate status. "This has caused us to lose time."

The divisions within the government give a disproportionate influence over policy to the powerful military and a bloated bureaucracy. Mim Kemal Oke, a political scientist at Bosphorus University in Istanbul, argues that "a tug of war between bureaucratic authoritarians and democratic liberals is the main axis of political delineation in Turkey today".

And while both camps say they support the goal of EU membership, many have yet to grasp what it entails.

"Our public authorities do not understand what it means to sit at the table with the EU," says Ozdem Sanberk, a former diplomat who runs the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. "It is only by sitting at the table that you gain power."

Mr Sanberk includes in his crit-

icism the armed forces, who vetoed a compromise deal with the EU on the common European defence policy earlier this year.

A lack of political resolve also underpins the economic woes that have made Turkey dependent on loans from the IMF to avoid a default on the government's big domestic debt. A devastating devaluation in February, triggered by a dispute between president and prime minister, followed months of delay in implementing structural reforms.

It is largely under pressure from the IMF that the government has made headway since

by the private sector and a small but effective state which regulates the market and provides social justice", according to Mr Dervis.

The biggest source of frustration for Turkey's liberal elite is the lack of effective popular pressure for change, in spite of widespread popular discontent with the government for its part in causing Turkey's worst slump since 1945.

"Civil society is not organised," complains Mr Irtemcelik, who fears that unless appealing alternatives emerge, Turks may resort to voting back into power dis-

'The choice facing Turkey is about whether we become a Middle Eastern country or take our place in Europe'

the devaluation in areas such as bank restructuring, market-based regulation and an overhaul of farm subsidies.

But success of the reform programme has been undermined by the continuing reluctance of the coalition leaders to explain or defend the changes. Kemal Dervis, the economy minister who is the chief spokesman for reform, has no political base within the government.

"It's like generals fighting a war and not talking to each other," says Bulent Eczacibasi, a leading industrialist.

The ultimate aim is to arrive at "an economy which is developed

The US, meanwhile, is also wary of Mr Erdogan since his party voted against the government's decision to dispatch troops to Afghanistan.

One encouraging development came with the announcement yesterday of plans for a new political movement by Sadettin Tantani, the former interior minister who was sacked from the current government for his tough stance against corruption.

The lack of a viable and clearly superior alternative helps to explain why the west is betting more IMF money on the coalition in Ankara. At a time when the US wants to avoid instability in a crucial ally on the fringe of the Middle East, Turkey's fourth IMF bail-out in three years is likely to ensure that the government is not pushed into early elections by a default that would amount to political suicide.

The EU is still waiting for progress in its dispute with Turkey over defence policy and the deadlock over Cyprus. Both are closely related. Above all, the sticking point is Cyprus. At the heart of the problem is the need to negotiate a solution to the island's division. There are faint signs of progress. Mr Glafcos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot president of Cyprus, has agreed to meet Mr Rauf Denktaş, his Turkish Cypriot counterpart.

But until a solution to Cyprus can be found, Turkey will remain torn between its European vocation, and its suspicion of EU bias in favour of Greece.

To Be Rid of Saddam, Help Iraqis to Take Over Their Country

By Kanan Makiya

CAMBRIDGE, Massachusetts — Watching the collapse of the Taliban and the scenes of Kabul being taken by troops of the Northern Alliance resurrects painful memories of what might have been, but wasn't, in the Gulf War fought against Saddam Hussein.

In 1991 the United States, swayed in part by the concerns of allies like Saudi Arabia, left Saddam in place, his dictatorial power to make life hell for Iraqis still intact.

Ordinary people who had stood on rooftops cheering on the allied planes that were bombing them and who had risen against the dictator, overpowering his police and armed forces in more than two-thirds of Iraq, were left locked up in a box called "international sanctions" and "containment," with the keys firmly in Saddam's hands.

Ten years after the American victory, U.S. policy for stability in the Middle East has all but collapsed. Even the Arab-Israeli peace process, which pushed "the Iraq question" to the back burner, has bitten the dust. And American officials are still arguing over what to do about Saddam Hussein.

Is it any wonder that the Iraqi people and others in the Arab world have grown more bitter and more anti-American than they were 10 years ago?

The cracks in this American policy toward Iraq were beginning to show in 1996, when for the first time since the Gulf War the United States let Saddam get away with invading a city, Arbil, in what used to be the safe haven of northern Iraq.

That was the year when the American-backed Iraqi opposition to Saddam was rooted out of the north of the country. More than 100 members of the Iraqi opposition died in Arbil waiting for American air support that never came.

That was a pivotal moment because the United States shrank from supporting an opposition that would have brought about deep structural change in Iraq — a change that would have included the Kurds and the Shiites in a pro-Western, non-nationalist, federally structured regime.

Instead, America held back in favor of what it thought to be

much safer: an officer-led coup that would replace one set of Ba'ath Party leaders with another. But that judgment proved to be wrong. The coup plot, organized by the CIA and supported by the Saudis, was penetrated by Saddam's agents.

Nearly 200 Iraqi military officers were executed in the summer of 1996. And the Clinton administration continued to consider the northern-based opposition — the only hope for fundamental change in Iraq — to be ineffective.

The reverberations of that episode and the perception in the Middle East that the United States is an unreliable ally continue to be felt to this day.

Whatever direct or indirect involvement Saddam Hussein turns out to have had in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, those attacks were conceived, planned and executed by Arabs, not by Afghans or Pakistanis or Muslims in general.

Arabs constitute less than 20 percent of the worldwide Muslim population. The view that tars the whole Muslim world with the same brush as a part of its Arab component is deeply misconceived.

Consider the case of the Taliban. They have nothing to do with Afghan history or traditions. The roots of their support in Pakistan were financed by Saudi oil money starting in the mid-1990s. It was Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia who urged backing for the Taliban.

Wahhabism, like the ideology of the Taliban, is a retrograde strain of Islam that is obsessed with the question of purity. So extreme is this purist creed that it views all non-Muslims (as well as non-Wahhabi Muslims like me) as a form of "pollution" of the entire "land of Mohanmed" — the terms Osama bin Laden uses when he talks about the presence of American military forces in Saudi Arabia.

Not only did bin Laden grow up with this ideology, the staple of the Saudi school system, but he turned it against his own regime when it violated these principles during the Gulf War.

For decades the Saudi royal family could count on support from the United States even as it allowed Wahhabism to project its hate-filled vision of Islam

around the world. Such support, so contrary to American principles of freedom and tolerance, is widely interpreted in the region as indifference to the suffering of ordinary Arabs in the Middle East.

I use the Iraqi case to illustrate that indifference. American policy, if redirected, can determine the future of that nation. It is, after all, a country that the United States went to the trouble of defeating militarily, only to stand aside as its citizens were slaughtered by the tyrant whom Americans had come to fight.

Iraq's infrastructure, its middle class, its secular intelligentsia, its high levels of education and even its military-industrial complex and current capability to produce weapons of mass destruction — all these are reasons for thinking that a new kind of political order can, with help from the West, be set up in Iraq just as it was set up in Germany and Japan after World War II.

Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq, with untapped oil reserves second only to Saudi Arabia's, can pay for its reconstruction.

But change of this nature requires a major rethinking of American foreign policy in the Middle East. And that will not come about through another bombing campaign. Iraq has been bombed enough.

Change for the better can be engineered in Iraq, over time, only if it is led by Kurds in the north and the Iraqi opposition based in both north and south. Experience in 1996 suggests that Saddam's regular army can be won over or bribed into changing sides.

What is desperately needed is an iron American resolve to end the existing regime, backed up with financial resources for the opposition and stronger security guarantees to the Kurds than are in place now. Operating from secured bases in the country, and perhaps in Kuwait or Jordan, Iraqis can do the rest.

There is now a tremendous opportunity to end American indifference and inaction toward the political cancer that Saddam Hussein represents in the region. This is a part of the world that needs a radical shift in American policy. If the challenge represented by the attacks of Sept. 11 is going to be met, then over-

throwing Saddam Hussein by reaching out to the people of Iraq is where it has to begin.

The writer, a professor of Middle East studies at Brandeis University, was born in Baghdad and is author of "Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq" and "The Rock: A Seventh Century Tale of Jerusalem." He contributed this comment to The New York Times.

INTERNATIONAL

HERALD TRIBUNE,

NOVEMBER 23, 2001

U.S. Points to Iraq and 5 Other Nations as Germ Warfare Suspects

The Associated Press

GENEVA — The United States identified Iraq and five other countries Monday as states that are developing germ warfare programs but refused to say whether any may have assisted Osama bin Laden in his quest for biological weapons.

John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control, said that the existence of Iraq's program was "beyond dispute" and that the United States strongly suspected North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran and Sudan of developing programs.

"The United States strongly suspects that Iraq has taken advantage of three years of no UN inspections to improve all phases of its offensive biological weapons program," Mr. Bolton said. "The existence of Iraq's program is beyond dispute."

Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush's national security adviser, on Sunday left open the possibility that Iraq could become a target in Mr. Bush's war on terrorism. She said the United States did not need the events of Sept. 11 to show that President Saddam Hussein "is a very dangerous man who is a threat to his own people, a threat to the region and a threat to us because he is determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction."

Mr. Bolton also told the 144 nations that have signed the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention that the United States found North Korea's biological weapons program "extremely disturbing."

He said the United States believed North Korea had a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a biological weapons capability and that it had "developed and produced, and may have weaponized" biological agents.

Mr. Bolton also said the United States was "quite concerned" about Iran, Libya, Syria and Sudan, all of which appeared to have biological weapons programs.

"There are other states I could have named which the United States will be contacting privately concerning our belief that they are pursuing an offensive biological weapons program," he said.

Mr. Bolton said the United States knew "that Osama bin Laden considers obtaining weapons of mass destruction to be a sacred duty and wants to use them against the United States."

"We are concerned that he could have been trying to acquire a rudimentary biological weapons capability, possibly with support from a state."

But Mr. Bolton said the United States was "not prepared to comment whether rogue states may have assisted" Mr. bin Laden in the plan.

Ali Asghar Soltanich, the Iranian ambassador to the conference, said the allegation that his country was developing biological weapons was "unjustified and baseless."

The United States, which has rejected a legally binding inspection plan under the treaty, said it would rather set up a mechanism under which the United Nations secretary-general would order inspections when violations were suspected.

Other countries, including Japan, said the binding commitment was necessary if the treaty was to be effective.

Ambassador Jean Lint of Belgium, speaking for the European Union, said the 15-nation bloc also supported the inclusion of "investigation measures" under the treaty.

Turkish delegation to visit PUK area, Talabani to come to Ankara

Iran mediates between the Kurds and Islamists in Iraq

SAADAT ORUC

As one of the key players in the region, Iran spends considerable time in easing the tension between the Iraqi Kurds and the Islamists, who have been at odds recently.

Meeting with the representatives of the two Iraqi Kurdish factions, the Jalal Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Massoud Barzani, Iran showed its interest in the frequently-shifting developments in Northern Iraq, which can be named as the most shaky ground.

Kosrad Rasul of the PUK was in Tehran.

And in a mediatory attempt, Iran initiated the signing of an agreement between the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and the PUK.

As a result of the Iranian efforts, the PUK permitted the entrance of Ali Abdulaziz of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) to Halabjah.

Omer Fettah, another PUK official was in Ankara two days ago, meeting with senior Foreign Ministry officials responsible for Iraq.

Mutual visits between Ankara and the PUK are to be held soon between Ankara and Suleymaniyah.

Jalal Talabani is expected to arrive in Ankara, while a Turkish delegation is to visit the area soon, PUK sources told the Turkish Daily News.

Economic matters, as well as security matters, dominate the agenda between Turkey and the PUK, Kurdish sources stated, calling Turkish businessmen to invest in the PUK-controlled area.

Jund-ul Islam 'saga' to disappear

PUK sources stated that the Osama bin Laden-backed Jund-ul Islam group was cornered, and had been forced to settle along the border with Iran, hinting at a decrease in the threat posed by the group.

Turkey could change position on Iraq

- **Amb. Logoglu: if credible evidence proving Iraq is behind terrorist acts is presented, Turkey will review its stance**

Turkey's ambassador to Washington Faruk Logoglu said that if credible evidence is given to prove that Iraq was behind the terrorist attacks on the United States, then Turkey would review its position vis-a-vis Iraq, the Anatolia news agency reported yesterday. In an interview with renowned defense periodical Defense News, Logoglu stated that Turkey wanted to raise its relations with the United States to the level of "strategic relations".

When asked what Turkey's attitude would be if the United States' war against terrorism spread to cover Iraq, Amb. Logoglu said: "We would definitely rather the war did not spread to a neighboring country. The Arab world is already very concerned about this. Such a situation would adversely affect the Middle East peace process and disrupt the delicate balances in the region. However, if credible evidence is given that proves Iraq was behind the terrorist attacks on the United States then Turkey would not ignore the matter, it would review its stance vis-a-vis Iraq."

Amb. Logoglu said that currently only Canada, Britain and Israel had got strategic relations with the United States and that Turkey's relation were at the lower "strategic partner" level. He expressed Turkey's desire to raise the level of relations to strategic level.

When the magazine asked Amb. Logoglu what Turkey's reaction would be if southern Cyprus were to be taken into the EU with a unilateral EU decision, he replied: "Such a situation would lead to huge pressure in Turkey-EU relations. Would these relations collapse? I would hope not. However, Turkey would definitely make its reaction known. This would be bad both for Turkey and Europe. I don't believe this would see Turkey's wish to join the EU go away."

US concerned about prospects of a second border gate with Iraq

Ilnur Cevik

Washington is concerned about reports that Ankara and Baghdad are preparing to open a second border gate near Habur which will bypass the Kurdish controlled areas and allow direct Iraqi access to Turkey, diplomatic sources reported.

Iraq has reportedly been pushing Ankara to open a second border gate that will be an alternative to Habur and Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit looks warmly to the idea.

The issue was raised during the recent visits of Iraqi Kurdish officials to Washington. The U.S. administration is against the idea that will allow the Iraqi administration of President Saddam Hussein to gain direct access to Turkey, increase ways and means of overcoming the international sanctions and earn cash outside the oil for food deal with the United Nations that may be used for clandestine purposes.

The new border gate would apparently bypass the region controlled by the Kurdistan Democracy Party (KDP) of Masoud Barzani and deny the Iraqi Kurds vital revenues obtained through transit fees and customs duties.

Meanwhile, Turkish Foreign Ministry sources have told the Turkish Daily News that the second border gate is still a plan and has not received a go ahead yet.

Military sources, on the other hand, say such a second border gate is impractical. They stress that it will be inevitable for the Iraqis to open a corridor in the Kurdish areas to gain access to such a border gate and that would simply mean a serious conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqis. It would also be an open invitation for American intervention. Kurds have said they will never allow such a project and will do all in their power to prevent it.

A cabinet minister who deals with such issues told TDN that the idea of opening a second border gate came from Ecevit but he himself was also skeptical about the project.

Analysts argue that the border gate at Habur can handle ten times more than the current volume. They stress that before the Gulf war Habur border gate used to process nearly ten times the current capacity despite the fact that the current customs and other modern border facilities did not exist then. At the time Turkey's trade volume with Iraq was around \$4 billion and most of the trade was conducted through Habur.

In Contrast to Expectations, Human Rights Violations Escalate

Economic crisis-hit Turkey had been expected to improve its bad human rights record, it was showing that it was willing to do so by amending some articles of its Constitution with the intention of bringing Turkey up to EU democratic standards.

Turkey's renowned human rights advocate, the Human Rights Association (IHD) report on human rights issues revealed that 762 cases of torture in police custody, including beatings and sexual abuse, took place in the first nine months of this year, up some 50 percent on the same period last year.

The number of people prosecuted this year under laws that limit freedom of expression is nearly eight times higher than last year, the report said.

IHD Chairman Husnu Ondul attributed the increases to politicians and civil servants who had not implemented recent democratic reforms.

"Lack of determination is the basic reason," Ondul said. "Legal, administrative, judicial and educational measures must be urgently taken."

There was no immediate government response to the report, but Deputy Premier Mesut Yilmaz, who leads Turkey's EU drive, conceded last week that the country had failed to take steps to meet EU standards in several areas, including democratic reforms.

In October, Turkey's Parliament passed 34 constitutional amendments aimed at bolstering the country's goal of joining the European Union.

The package gave greater broadcasting rights to Turkey's estimated 12 million Kurds, who are not officially recognized as a minority. The reforms also removed legal barriers to public rallies and made it more difficult to shut down political parties.

But many of the reforms will not take effect until related laws are also changed. Earlier this month, the European Union cautioned that although Turkey had taken positive steps to improve its democratic system, practical improvement in human rights was yet to be seen.

Under existing laws, dozens of writers, intellectuals and human rights activists have been jailed for speaking out against the state or its fight against Kurdish rebels.

"There's no progress in concrete terms," Ondul said. "Human rights complaints are increasing."

IRAN-LIBAN

Le profond malaise du radicalisme chiite

L'image révolutionnaire de l'Iran et de son allié libanais, le Hezbollah, est aujourd'hui ternie. Face au radicalisme de Ben Laden et des sunnites, qui s'en prennent à la planète entière, les radicaux chiites semblent provinciaux.

AL HAYAT
Londres

Parce qu'au Moyen-Orient c'est à qui sera le plus radical, et parce que la religion y occupe la moitié du champ politique, on peut affirmer que le radicalisme chiite passe actuellement par une phase critique. D'ailleurs, qui se souvient aujourd'hui de l'Iran de 1979 ? Deux ans à peine après le voyage de Sadate à Jérusalem, l'ayatollah Khomeyni débarquait à Téhéran et prenait le pouvoir. Israël devenait dès lors le "petit Satan" et l'Amérique le "grand Satan". L'Egypte de Nasser et de l'Université islamique d'Al Azhar faisait alors figure de modérée. Quant à l'Iran du chah, du bahaïsme et du zoroastrisme, il basculait dans l'extrémisme.

AUJOURD'HUI, L'IRAN PRATIQUE LE DOUBLE LANGAGE

La montée en puissance des deux tendances radicales, incarnées par l'Iran et par le Hezbollah libanais, a eu lieu à un moment où le projet palestinien, dans sa composante militante, régressait et où l'on assistait à l'avènement d'un islamisme radical qui sera ultérieurement incarné par Ben Laden. Dans l'intervalle, la région n'a pas manqué de radicaux sunnites, tel Saddam Hussein. Néanmoins, l'extravagance du radicalisme de ce dernier a démontré un fait important : lorsque des sunnites s'aventurent loin dans l'extrémisme, ils vont encore plus loin que le Hezbollah. Ils portent alors atteinte à la logique des relations internationales, comme ce fut le cas avec Nasser en 1956, et perturbent la logique des relations régionales, comme ce fut le cas avec la révolution palestinienne. L'extrémisme sunnite n'épargne pas non plus les ressources pétrolières, Saddam Hussein l'a suffisamment prouvé. Il a menacé la terre entière, comme le fait Ben Laden.

▼ Le président iranien Mohammad Khatami. Dessin de Medi Belortaja, Albanie.

Le Hezbollah est un parti qui recrute essentiellement en zone rurale, tandis que les courants sunnites radicaux sont plus présents dans les villes. Le premier vise la ville d'à côté, tandis que les autres ont des ambitions presque planétaires. Dans ces conditions, on comprend mieux la distance qui sépare le Hezbollah de Ben Laden. Aujourd'hui, l'Iran pratique le double langage, alors qu'il était, jusque-là, adepte des discours tranchés. Il est devenu "raisonnable". Téhéran s'est ainsi déclaré prêt à secourir, le cas échéant, les pilotes de la coalition qui

bombardent l'Afghanistan, malgré son refus formel de la guerre et d'une présence américaine prolongée en Asie centrale. Les acteurs politiques de l'Iran d'aujourd'hui agissent en ordre dispersé comme on a pu le voir lors de la dernière commémoration de la prise de l'ambassade américaine. Bon nombre de ceux qui avaient alors participé à cette prise d'otages ont changé, ils ont fait part de leurs regrets et sont devenus des partisans de Khatami. A présent, ils veulent dialoguer avec les Etats-Unis et soutiennent l'Alliance du Nord. D'autres, en revanche, crient encore "Mort à l'Amérique !" De la même façon, le Hezbollah semble actuellement assez perturbé. Sa chaîne de télévision, Al Manar, soulève un tollé lorsqu'elle traite de la guerre par le biais des reportages de la télévision iranienne réalisés depuis les régions de l'Alliance du Nord. En effet, se ranger du côté des "agents afghans de l'Amérique", qui sont eux-mêmes alliés de l'Iran, s'avère un exercice difficile ; d'un autre côté, prendre le parti des talibans, qui rejettent le chiisme, est encore plus compliqué. ■



'Bin Laden Saves Turkey:' Some See IMF Aid as Payoff for Help in Afghan War

By Paul Blustein
Washington Post Service

At a time when practically all major news connects one way or another to Osama bin Laden, it looked like no coincidence last week when the International Monetary Fund announced plans to increase lending to Turkey by about \$10 billion.

The cash-strapped country had recently declared its intention to dispatch special forces and peacekeeping troops to Afghanistan, providing valuable support from a Muslim ally to the U.S. military presence there. So despite the economic rationale cited by Horst Koehler, the IMF's managing director, for the new loan, cynics perceived a geopolitical quid pro quo.

"Bin Laden Saves Turkey!" proclaimed a headline Tuesday in the Turkish Daily News, where a columnist, Mehmet Ali Birand, wrote: "We are about to get fresh funds from abroad because Turkey's strategic importance has increased in the post-Sept. 11 climate." He added: "If it wasn't for bin Laden, we would not be getting anything. We would have gone bankrupt."

Such assertions evoke indignant reactions from top IMF officials, who maintain that the Turkish government has abided by the stringent terms of its previous IMF loans and deserves international assistance to overcome problems its economy has suffered since Sept. 11. Asked whether the IMF was showing favoritism to Turkey, Mr. Koehler replied: "I don't think this is right, and it's also not fair."

But while some experts agree that a new Turkish rescue can be justified on economic grounds, the decision is being watched closely as a possible case in which the IMF's most powerful shareholders, especially the United States, are using the Fund to reward governments for backing the anti-terror coalition.

During the Cold War, Washington regularly exercised its clout to ensure that regimes opposing the Soviet Union received loans from the IMF and its sister institution, the World Bank. The results often proved of little benefit to the long-term economic development of the countries involved, because the money helped prop up inefficient and corrupt governments.

Within the IMF and World Bank staffs, worries abound that, in this respect, history will repeat itself in the war against terrorism.

Turkey's case is noteworthy because

the announcement last week was the third time in a year that the IMF has pledged to substantially increase its aid to the country. An \$11.4 billion loan granted last November failed to prevent a disastrous plunge in the lira two months later, and when the IMF lent Ankara an additional \$10 billion in the spring, officials in Washington swore that was the end — yet now they are readying \$10 billion more. Furthermore, it comes at a time when the IMF is balking at lending any more to Argentina, whose government has desperately sought another bailout to avoid defaulting on its debts.

"Turkey's political importance, which has become more acute after Sept. 11 and the war on terrorism, is a factor that weighs heavily in Turkey's favor, and those factors just don't play in the same way for Argentina," said Michael Mussa, who retired this summer as the IMF's chief economist and is now a scholar at the Institute for International Economics. "The fact that that is vigorously denied tells you that it is undoubtedly true."

In a speech Wednesday in Washington, Kemal Dervis, Turkey's economy minister, acknowledged that one of the reasons for the IMF's continued aid is that "Turkey is a responsible member of the

international community and has taken the right decisions in the political field."

But that alone would not suffice, argued Mr. Dervis, a former top World Bank official. "International financial support is clearly linked to our economic policies and success in meeting the economic criteria" set in the IMF program, he said, citing deep cuts in government spending and major reforms of the state-owned banking system, which has been plagued by losses stemming from interference by powerful politicians over lending policies. "I wish Argentina well," Mr. Dervis added, "but they have missed every single criteria in their IMF program," such as requirements for

against the U.S. dollar this year. Although the collapse in the lira was hardly desirable, it does have a bright side because it makes Turkish exports much more competitive on world markets. In that respect, Turkey can claim that it stands a better chance of climbing out of its rut than Argentina, where the peso is rigidly fixed to the dollar and the country's goods suffer competitively against cheaper products made in neighboring countries.

Still, Mr. Rodrik said, the big question

is whether a new IMF loan "will at most buy time" — that is, give Turkey the means to pay principal and interest on its staggering debt for a while longer without doing much long-term good.

elimination of the budget deficit.

Dani Rodrik, a Turkish-born economist at Harvard University, agreed: "If the economic case wasn't there, I don't think the talk of additional aid would have materialized."

"Turkey has by and large done everything that the Fund has asked it to do; the problem is that the economy has not reacted as speedily as the IMF and the Turkish authorities were expecting" as a deep recession persists and interest rates remain in the high double digits, Mr. Rodrik said.

One of Turkey's greatest advantages, Mr. Rodrik noted, is the low value of the lira, which has fallen by more than half

Herald  Tribune

NOVEMBER 24-25, 2001

Le président turc dénonce la fermeture d'un parti pro-kurde



ANKARA, 23 nov (AFP) - 14h18 - Le président turc Ahmet Necdet Sezer a dénoncé la fermeture d'un petit parti pro-kurde par la Cour Constitutionnelle, l'estimant basée sur de simples "hypothèses", selon la presse vendredi.

M. Sezer commentait la décision prise en 1999 par la Cour, qu'il présidait à l'époque, publiée jeudi au Journal Officiel.

Il a regretté que le petit Parti Démocratique de Masse (DKP) ait été interdit sans crime ou délit avéré. "Ce jugement aurait dû être différent", a-t-il estimé, cité par Radikal.

Le DKP a été fermé en février 1999 pour avoir évoqué dans le chapitre "problème kurde" de son programme l'existence d'une nation kurde "assimilée", "sous pression", et qui aurait une "identité ethnique" propre, rappelle le quotidien.

"Les opinions exprimées par le DKP et ses membres n'ont pas été concrétisées par des actes, et il ne sied pas à la loi de fermer un parti en se basant sur l'hypothèse que celui-ci peut commettre des actions répréhensibles", a expliqué M. Sezer, cité par le journal Sabah.

Ancien magistrat respecté pour son engagement démocratique, le président constate qu'au contraire, "le programme (du DKP) professait l'égalité des groupes ethniques et religieux, et, au lieu de s'opposer à l'unité de la nation, se démarquait des idées séparatistes", ajoute Radikal.

Sous la houlette de sa puissante armée, la Turquie, dont la candidature à l'Union Européenne bute sur les droits de l'Homme, a interdit récemment plusieurs partis pro-kurdes, marxistes et islamistes.

Fin juillet, la Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme lui avait donné raison sur l'interdiction du parti islamiste de la Prospérité (Refah), arguant, contrairement à M. Sezer, qu'un Etat "peut raisonnablement empêcher la réalisation d'un projet politique incompatible avec les normes de la Convention européenne avant qu'il ne soit mis en pratique par des actes concrets".

La principale formation pro-kurde de Turquie, le Parti de la Démocratie du Peuple (HADEP), est également menacée d'interdiction pour "liens organiques" avec le Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK).

Ce dernier s'est battu pendant 15 ans pour créer un Etat kurde dans le sud-est anatolien avant d'arrêter les combats en septembre 1999 à l'appel de son chef Abdullah Ocalan, condamné à mort pour trahison et séparatisme.

Le parlement turc reconduit l'état d'urgence dans quatre provinces



ANKARA, 27 nov (AFP) - 15h45 - Le parlement turc a reconduit mardi l'état d'urgence en vigueur depuis 14 ans dans quatre provinces de l'est et du sud-est dont la population est en majorité kurde, a constaté l'AFP.

Ces provinces sont Tunceli (est), Diyarbakir (sud-est), Hakkari (extrême sud-est) et Sirnak (sud-est), théâtre pendant 15 ans de la rébellion séparatiste du Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK). La mesure s'applique pour quatre mois à partir du 30 novembre.

Le parlement se prononce tous les quatre mois sur le maintien de ce régime d'exception.

Sa levée fait partie des mesures politiques réclamées à "moyen terme" à la Turquie par l'Union européenne si elle veut ouvrir des négociations d'adhésion.

Le gouvernement turc s'est engagé à le lever, sans donner de date.

Le PKK a officiellement mis fin en septembre 1999 à sa rébellion armée, lancée en 1984 pour la création d'un Etat kurde indépendant dans le sud-est, à la demande de son chef Abdullah Ocalan, condamné à mort en juin 1999 pour trahison et séparatisme.

Depuis, les combats ont quasiment cessé dans la région.

Mais l'armée turque s'est déclarée déterminée à pourchasser jusqu'au bout les rebelles à moins qu'ils ne se rendent et poursuit des opérations dans le nord de l'Irak, sous contrôle de deux factions kurdes irakiennes, où la plupart des combattants du PKK se sont repliés.

Iraqis shun state-run newspapers

Iraq Press November 26, 2001

Amman - Iraqis show little interest in their sterile government-controlled press, according to a recent poll.

The poll carried out by an Iraqi researcher showed that less than one per cent of the nearly 19 million Iraqis living in government-held areas bothered to read a newspaper.

President Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime maintain an iron hold on the country, allowing no dissent and exerting relentless control over information. Newspapers, radio, and television are heavily censored and larded with paeans to the Iraqi strongman. Any criticism of Saddam and his regime carries mortal risks.

Journalists with zeal to criticize government performance either end up in jail or lose their jobs. Those criticizing the political structure may face death penalty. Media outlets not run by the state are controlled or influenced by Saddam's eldest son Uday who oversees an extensive media empire which includes Babel newspaper, the country's most influential daily, a television channel, radio and several weeklies.

But the poll, in rare and daring critical remarks, showed that even Uday's media was getting nowhere. It said Iraqi readers also showed no interest in Uday's weeklies for their hackneyed, boring and monotonous topics.

"There are no attractive articles in Iraqi press. The topics are stale and traditional," the poll said.

Iraq's literacy rates were among the highest in the region and Iraqis were said to be the most avid readers in the Middle East. There are no studies on the situation in the semi-independent Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, which is beyond the regime's control.

Rival Kurdish factions in the region operate their own television stations and newspapers beyond the reach of official repression. Unlike government-held areas, Internet, satellite dishes, mobile phones and fax machines are permitted and freedom of statement respected.

Apart from government restrictions, the press also suffers because of limited financial assistance. State-run newspapers, for example, had to reduce their circulation because of financial difficulties.

The austerity measures, however, are not applied to the newspapers owned by Uday who also heads the Iraqi Journalists Union which in 2000 named him "the journalist of the century" for his "innovative role, his efficient contribution in the service of Iraq's media family ... and his defense of honest and committed speech."

* * * * *

Iraq Should Wait

The surprisingly swift successes of the military campaign in Afghanistan have spurred talk about military action to oust Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. The world would be a safer place with Saddam's cruel dictatorship removed. At this point, however, there are no good short-term options for getting rid of him. The Bush administration would make a serious mistake by moving to wage war in Iraq.

One reason is that America's mission in Afghanistan is far from accomplished. Osama bin Laden and many top aides remain at large, Taliban fighters still hold out in the countryside and in a few urban redoubts, and the creation of a stable post-Taliban government has barely begun. Until these basic objectives are achieved, Afghanistan will remain a potential base for international terrorism.

Finishing the job in Afghanistan requires holding together the international coalition that Washington has skillfully assembled. War in Iraq at this juncture would almost certainly shatter that coalition.

While some Arab leaders have no love for Saddam, public opinion in the Arab world would not allow them to support U.S. military action against him, at least in the absence of clear evidence linking Baghdad to the events of Sept. 11 or subsequent bioterrorism. The American and British governments could quickly find themselves alone in any military campaign against Iraq.

War in Iraq would also undermine whatever possibility now exists for damping violence between Israelis and

Palestinians and restarting efforts toward a lasting peace. Progress in the new peace initiative announced by Secretary of State Colin Powell last week might make it easier to ratchet up the pressure on Baghdad at a later date. Moving militarily against Iraq now would hobble America's power as a Mideast peacemaker.

Diplomacy aside, the military challenges of war in Iraq are far more formidable than anything yet seen in Afghanistan. Saddam can count on the loyalty of a large army, equipped with more modern and lethal weapons than the Taliban ever had. The center of his power, Baghdad, is a sprawling metropolitan area unsuitable to the kind of special operations that U.S. troops are currently conducting in Afghanistan.

In another crucial difference, the United States would be operating without any effective local allies like the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. The Iraqi National Congress, the umbrella opposition group supported by Washington, is a feud-ridden collection of exiled politicians who command no combat forces.

Without ground fighters, U.S. airpower cannot prevail. The only military option with any realistic promise of success would be sending in an overwhelmingly large American ground force. It takes months to transport and build up such forces, and, unlike the situation prior to the Gulf War, Washington could not count on the use of staging bases in Saudi Arabia.

Even if these military obstacles could somehow be overcome, Wash-

ington would still be faced with the problem of putting together a new Iraqi government. The country is sharply divided between Sunni and Shiite Muslims and between Arabs and Kurds, and there is a real risk of it disintegrating into weakened fragments, easily manipulated by more powerful neighbors like Iran.

What Washington should do now is intensify its efforts to build up a more serious internal Iraqi opposition. Saddam's security forces are fearsomely effective, but there are hundreds of thousands of discontented Iraqis. Many can be found among the southern Shiite and northern Kurdish minorities that took up arms against Baghdad in 1991, only to be abandoned by Washington, and probably also among the Sunni Arabs. An effective internal opposition could develop into a potential fighting force and perhaps the nucleus of a future government.

Meanwhile, Washington should put maximum diplomatic and military pressure on Baghdad. It can use its improved ties with Russia to enact more sustainable UN economic sanctions and to press for an early resumption of international weapons inspections. More than two decades of experience suggests that Saddam Hussein is unlikely ever to become a respectable international citizen. The challenge of removing him is best left for a day when the United States can count on the strong and effective support of opposition forces in Iraq.

—THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Saddam's Regime in Iraq Should Be the Next Tyranny to Fall

By Stanley A. Weiss

LONDON — Albert Einstein once defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result. If he were alive today he might have in mind U.S. policy toward Iraq. For more than a decade, Washington policymakers have opted to wait for the Iraqi military to overthrow Saddam Hussein, instead of providing serious support for dissidents inside and outside Iraq.

Since Sept. 11, America's attention has properly been focused on Osama bin Laden, the Qaida terror network and their Taliban protectors. U.S. and Western security demanded that bin Laden and the Taliban be the first priority in any anti-terror campaign.

With the military victory on the ground nearly secure, and bin Laden's demise sure to follow, there seems little appetite in Washington or in the capitals of Europe to go after the Iraqi dictator now.

That is a mistake. Iraq is central to the war on terrorism.

It has chemical and biological weapons and is dangerously close to having a nuclear arsenal. No one is willing to bank on Saddam's reluctance to use weapons of mass destruction or make them available to a terrorist organization. Unless the West takes him on, once and for all, George W. Bush's prediction of a long war, with many

more U.S. military and civilian casualties, will probably turn out to be prophetic.

Iraq was the primary focus of American foreign and military policy during the Gulf War. Since then the United States and its allies have been content to "contain" Iraq through economic sanctions and a flawed (and now failed) effort to identify and destroy Saddam's capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction.

If President Bush is serious about pursuing "nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism," then Iraq must be next on the list of captive countries to be liberated.

The Northern Alliance's march through Afghanistan demonstrates that even the most entrenched dictatorial regime will bow to a supposedly toothless insurgency when faced with massive U.S. airpower and U.S. logistical assistance on the ground. And Saddam has even less support within Iraq than the Taliban had in Afghanistan.

Unlike the Taliban, who come from the majority Pashtuns, Sunni Muslims are a minority in Iraq, an artificial country with a majority of Shiites and Kurds. Unlike the Taliban, who had financial and military support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Iraqi regime is neither supported nor trusted by neighbors.

Washington seems wedded to the failed approach of relying on a military coup d'état.

A decade ago, as Iraqi forces fled toward Baghdad, the United States waited in vain for a coup while the Iraqi Kurds and Shiites it had encouraged to revolt were attacked and killed.

In 1996, the CIA, supported by Saudi Arabia, organized an officer-led coup that failed. The United States allowed what was supposed to be a safe haven for opposition forces in northern Iraq to be annihilated.

Little has changed. Washington is increasing its political ties with exiled Iraqi commanders, but it continues to give the cold shoulder to the opposition Iraqi

National Congress. Yet only U.S. political and military support for a popular uprising is likely to succeed anytime soon.

Most Iraqis despise Saddam. Like Afghans who welcomed liberation after suffering silently under the rule of the Taliban, Iraqis would be delighted to build a post-Saddam Iraq.

U.S. policymakers, under pressure from European capitals, fear that an attack on Iraq would blow apart the fragile anti-terrorism coalition. It probably would. But holding the coalition together should be a means to achieving its anti-terrorism goals, not the goal in itself.

Ending the threat of terrorism requires the West to address the political, economic and cultural

issues that give rise to terrorism. That begins by getting U.S. troops out of Saudi Arabia, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue and encouraging more political, economic and social freedom in the Muslim world.

With Saddam gone, U.S. troops would have nothing to protect the Gulf states from. And Israel would be more likely to make the concessions necessary to achieve peace with the Palestinians.

With Saddam's regime overthrown, 23 million men and women could begin to breathe again as free people. The economy would be invigorated with foreign investment in reconstruction and in the oil industry.

A popular uprising that led to

a popular government could allow Iraq to take its place alongside that of its northern neighbor, Turkey, as a secular Muslim democracy. The existence of a more modern Iraq would be a model for Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria and others.

If President Bush is serious, the United States and its allies must remove Saddam Hussein.

The writer is founder and chairman of Business Executives for National Security and former chairman of American Premier, a mining and chemicals company. He contributed this personal comment to the International Herald Tribune.

Get Saddam Out or Try to Get Inspectors Back In?

By Robert Kagan

WASHINGTON — Welcome to Phase II of the war on terrorism. On Monday George W. Bush talked tough about Iraq, and you don't need tea leaves to sense the administration's shifting focus. Saddam Hussein senses it. According to news reports he has begun hiding his military equipment.

Condoleezza Rice has called Saddam a "threat to us because he is determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction." Donald Rumsfeld said there was "no question" about the "interaction" between Qaida and "people in Iraq." President Bush proclaimed that Afghanistan "is just the beginning."

It's early days, but some administration officials appear to be establishing what international lawyers call a *casus belli*, a legal predicate for going to war. Significantly, it is not a case that requires linking Saddam directly to the Sept. 11 attack.

The argument goes like this:

Saddam is building weapons of mass destruction. Terrorists like Osama bin Laden and whoever takes his place in the future want to get hold of such weapons to use against the West. Saddam and his regime have a history of cooperating with these types. For this reason, Saddam and his regime pose a direct and unacceptable threat to the United States. And therefore the United States has the right to take preemptive action.

America need not wait "for terrorists to try to strike us again," the president said recently. It can take "the fight to the enemy" in order to "save ourselves and our children from living in a world of fear."

If Bush officials are building a case, one of their target audiences may be Europe, and especially Tony Blair.

Before Sept. 11, clever Europeans used to argue that Saddam Hussein could never really pose a threat because, even if he were building weapons of mass destruction, he would never use them against the United States or one of its allies because he knew he would be destroyed. Since Saddam Hussein was not crazy, deterrence worked. And since deterrence worked, containment was good enough. It was unnecessary to get rid of Saddam.

The logic behind what Ms. Rice and other Bush officials are now saying is that Sept. 11 changed the equation. In the new world of massive terrorist attacks, a sane Saddam can covertly and deftly provide weapons, know-how or weapons material to terrorists. Against them, deterrence demonstrably does not work. So mere containment of Saddam is no longer sufficient to guarantee U.S. security.

The question that Bush officials will start wrestling over in the coming weeks will be not whether to shut Saddam down but how. Top Pentagon officials are already studying military options, and they will argue that nothing short of a change of regime in Baghdad can provide the kind of security that Mr. Bush has promised. The problem for them will be coming up with a convincing plan for getting the job done.

Secretary of State Colin Powell recently complained to Bill Keller of *The New York Times*: "I never saw a plan that was going to take him out. It was just some ideas coming from various quarters about let's go bomb."

General Powell is right that bombing alone won't work. Pentagon planners surely know this. At the very least they will propose supporting Iraqi opposition forces in addition to bombing. But probably nothing short of an American ground attack can take out Saddam and his regime and his weapons plants with any degree of reliability. Will the Pentagon planners have the guts to present that option to the president?

General Powell will have his own problems in the Phase II debate. If it were up to him, he would keep pressing to apply his "smart sanctions." When asked about Iraq, he still insists, "We'll continue to contain it." But he probably knows that tinkering with sanctions is no longer an option. Not if Ms. Rice isn't there with him.

His fallback position may be to call for a new effort to get international inspectors back into Iraq — containment plus.

The Europeans would heartily endorse a new effort to get inspectors back into Iraq. Both Paris and Moscow, and maybe Prime Minister Blair as well, would see a new push for inspections as the best way to forestall any American intervention against Iraq.

Which route will Mr. Bush

take: Will he try to get Saddam out or try to get inspectors in? "Right now, the sumo wrestlers are just circling each other," a senior official told me.

The president seems to be mulling both options. On Monday he warned that Saddam had to let weapons inspectors back in the country or face the consequences. Asked what happens if Saddam refuses, he replied, "He'll find out." Translation: Mr. Bush doesn't know yet.

The writer is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He contributed this comment to The Washington Post.

INTERNATIONAL HERALD
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NOVEMBER 28, 2001

Ankara "pas prêt" à donner des droits culturels aux Kurdes (ultra nationalistes)



ANKARA, 26 nov (AFP) - 10h00 - La Turquie n'est "pas prête" à accorder des droits culturels aux Kurdes car cela peut "diviser" le pays, a estimé lundi un influent responsable du parti de l'Action nationaliste (MHP, ultra nationaliste) au pouvoir.

"Certainement, cela diviserait (le pays). La Turquie n'est pas prête à l'heure actuelle à ce genre de choses. Ce n'est pas un pays où l'atmosphère est propice à ces arrangements", a déclaré Sevkettin Bulent Yahnici au quotidien libéral Radikal.

L'Union européenne (UE) à laquelle la Turquie souhaite adhérer, lui réclame plus de droits culturels pour sa population kurde, notamment une télévision et un enseignement en kurde.

M. Yahnici, vice-président du MHP, l'un des 3 partis de la coalition gouvernementale, a affirmé que la "Turquie ne se précipite pas pour adhérer à l'UE". Selon lui, "de toute façon, les Quinze ont la même attitude" envers ce processus d'adhésion.

Mais il est une priorité pour la Turquie, a-t-il dit.

La Commission européenne a publié le 13 novembre un rapport annuel sur la Turquie où elle reconnaît qu'Ankara a fait un pas en adoptant des amendements pour libéraliser sa constitution, mais les juge insuffisants pour l'ouverture de négociations d'adhésion.

Concernant le bilan négatif de la Turquie en matière de droits de l'Homme, M. Yahnici a déploré l'existence de la torture dans le pays mais souligné que même si elle respectait tout les critères (de Copenhague) en la matière, cette pratique restera en vigueur car elle est "incrustée dans les esprits".

M. Yahnici a accusé l'UE d'agir avec "mauvaise volonté" au sujet de Chypre, soulignant qu'une solution à ce problème relevait de l'ONU.

Chypre est divisée depuis 1974, à la suite d'une intervention de l'armée turque en riposte à un coup d'Etat d'ultranationalistes chypriotes grecs visant à rattacher l'île à la Grèce.

La Turquie a récemment menacé d'annexer la partie nord (turque) de Chypre si le sud (grec) entre dans l'UE lors de la première vague d'élargissement en

L'Italie renvoie 47 immigrants clandestins kurdes vers la Grèce



ATHENES, 26 nov (AFP) - 22h22 - Les autorités italiennes ont renvoyé au port grec de Patras, en Péloponnèse (sud-ouest), 47 immigrants kurdes qui étaient arrivés au port d'Ancône (Italie) à bord d'un bateau venant d'Igoumenitsa (nord-ouest de Grèce), a annoncé lundi le ministère grec de la Marine marchande.

Les 47 immigrants clandestins ont été renvoyés à Patras à bord d'un ferry, après que les autorités italiennes les eurent découverts dans un poids-lourd portant des plaques d'immatriculation grecques. Le véhicule avait été transporté à bord d'un ferry du port d'Igoumenitsa jusqu'à Ancône, selon un communiqué du ministère.

Le chauffeur grec du poids-lourd, âgé de 48 ans, est détenu par les autorités italiennes, selon le communiqué.

Saddam Hussein relance son offre de dialogue aux Kurdes irakiens



BAGDAD, 29 nov (AFP) - 12h42 - Le président irakien Saddam Hussein a relancé son offre de dialogue aux Kurdes du nord irakien qui échappe au contrôle de Bagdad depuis la fin de la guerre du Golfe en 1991, a rapporté jeudi la presse.

"L'important, c'est le dialogue. Le peuple kurde est notre peuple, et celui qui tente de semer la désunion (entre Irakiens) doit être critiqué", a déclaré Saddam Hussein lors d'un entretien à Bagdad avec une personnalité kurde loyaliste, Fouad Aref, selon les journaux.

"Nous voulons que le peuple kurde fasse son choix et s'en tient à ce choix", ajouté le chef de l'Etat irakien sans plus de précisions.

Deux semaines auparavant, il avait menacé de recourir à la force au Kurdistan s'il s'avérait impossible d'établir un dialogue entre Bagdad et les factions kurdes.

"La sagesse doit être la base de tout dialogue pour résoudre les problèmes des peuples. Mais si la sagesse s'avère incapable de le faire (...), l'épée des Irakiens devrait être utilisée pour récupérer les droits", avait-il dit.

Le Kurdistan irakien s'était soulevé à la fin de la guerre du Golfe en 1991. Depuis, cette région est contrôlée par deux principales factions kurdes rivales.

La partie est frontalière de l'Iran est contrôlée par l'Union Patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK) de Jalal Talabani, et le secteur proche de la Turquie l'est par le Parti Démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK), de Massoud Barzani.

Le chef d'une faction kurde irakienne favorable au dialogue



DIYARBAKIR (Turquie), 30 nov (AFP) - 11h05 - Massoud Barzani, chef d'une des deux factions kurdes contrôlant le nord de l'Irak, s'est déclaré favorable au dialogue pour régler le problème kurde, après une nouvelle offre en ce sens du président irakien Saddam Hussein.

"Nous sommes pour la paix, nous ne voulons pas la guerre", a déclaré M. Barzani, chef du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK), dans une allocution jeudi soir sur la télévision de son parti, reçue à Diyarbakir (sud-est de la Turquie). "Nous voulons régler les problèmes par le dialogue et la paix", a-t-il ajouté.

Saddam Hussein a relancé son offre de dialogue aux Kurdes du nord de l'Irak, qui échappe à son contrôle depuis la fin de la guerre du Golfe en 1991, a rapporté jeudi la presse irakienne. Mais M. Barzani a prévenu que le PDK répondrait à toute attaque. "Nous sommes prêts à faire face à toute menace", a-t-il dit.

Le Kurdistan irakien s'est soulevé contre le régime de Bagdad après la guerre du Golfe et depuis, les provinces d'Erbil, Souleimaniyeh et Dohuk sont contrôlées par le PDK et l'Union patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK) de Jalal Talabani.

M. Barzani a réaffirmé qu'il ne souhaitait pas un Etat kurde indépendant dans le nord de l'Irak. "Nous n'aspirons pas et n'aspirerons jamais à un Etat kurde indépendant", a-t-il dit. "Notre but est une fédération au sein d'un Irak démocratique. Ce serait plus profitable pour nous et pour la région".

La Turquie, dont le sud-est à majorité kurde est frontalier avec l'Irak, est opposée à la création d'un tel Etat, craignant un regain de séparatisme parmi ses propres Kurdes.

Ankara a d'étroites relations avec le PDK et coopère avec lui lors des fréquentes incursions de son armée dans le nord de l'Irak, où se sont réfugiés les rebelles kurdes de Turquie après l'arrêt de leur lutte armée en 1999.

Mauvaise passe po

Le mois d'octobre aura été marqué en l'espace de 48 heures par deux le vote du Sénat américain suspendant la section 907 le 24 octobre rapport Lamassoure sur la Turquie. A Washington comme à international favorable aux alliés musulmans, potentiel

Washington suspend les sanctions contre Bakou

Le Sénat américain a adopté le 24 octobre un amendement autorisant George W. Bush à suspendre la section 907, qui limitait l'aide fédérale américaine apportée à Bakou pour sanctionner le blocus de l'Arménie. Une suspension expressément demandée par le Département d'Etat depuis le déclenchement de l'opération militaire menée en représailles aux attentats du 11 septembre. Les Etats-Unis pourront désormais apporter une aide militaire à l'Azerbaïdjan si la lutte anti-terroriste le justifie, ou si les frontières de l'Azerbaïdjan sont directement menacées. Mais stipule encore l'amendement, cette aide ne pourra en aucun cas être utilisée contre l'Arménie. Une dernière clause précise enfin que les Etats-Unis devront apporter à Erevan une assistance militaire d'environ 35 millions de francs.

Le texte qui a été adopté par le Sénat est donc une version atténuée de celui qui avait été déposé, et qui entendait purement et simplement supprimer la 907, sans aucune contrepartie pour l'Arménie. Ce résultat est à mettre à l'actif de la Communauté Arménienne des Etats-Unis qui s'était mobilisée de façon unitaire contre toute modification de cette sanction : une lettre en ce sens avait été adressée la veille du vote du Sénat à George W. Bush signée, fait sans précédent, par toutes les Eglises arméniennes, apostolique, évangélique et catholique, et par les plus importantes organisations, UGAB, Armenian National Committee, FRA, Croix-Bleue, Union des avocats arméniens... à l'exception notable de l'Armenian Assembly of America. L'organisation présidée par Van Krikorian avait en effet annoncé une semaine avant le vote du Sénat qu'elle renonçait à s'opposer au souhait de la Maison Blanche, indiquant que le contexte international obligeait les Etats-Unis à prendre une telle mesure. Mais l'Armenian Assembly avait alors indiqué qu'elle ferait tout pour que la levée de la sanction soit temporaire et sous conditions, notamment celle d'apporter une aide militaire à l'Arménie égale à celle qui pourrait être accordée à l'Azerbaïdjan. Or la somme allouée à Erevan a été fixée une fois pour toute, tandis que le montant, sans doute supérieur, et la forme de l'assistance militaire américaine à Bakou n'ont

pas encore été précisés. Ce qui n'a pas empêché l'Armenian Assembly de qualifier le vote du Sénat de "victoire pour l'Arménie", se félicitant d'une décision qui donne "au président Bush les moyens de mener son combat contre le terrorisme tout en protégeant les intérêts de l'Arménie et du Karabagh". Les déclarations de l'Armenian Assembly qui joue depuis quelques mois un jeu étrange en plaçant son président dans la commission de réconciliation arméno-turque, et en soutenant la politique étrangère américaine pro-azérie, n'ont trouvé aucun écho du côté arménien, à l'exception du ministre des Affaires étrangères. Vartan Oskanian s'est en effet dit satisfait de ce vote, soulignant que la 907 "n'avait pas été supprimée, mais uniquement suspendue et ce pour combattre le terrorisme" a-t-il précisé. Commentaire diplomatique dira-t-on, l'Arménie pouvant difficilement tenir un autre discours puisqu'elle a apporté son soutien aux Etats-Unis dans leur lutte anti-terroriste.

Mais l'Armenian National Committee qui n'est pas tenu à la même réserve, n'a pas hésité à critiquer le vote du Sénat, rappelant que la raison d'être de la 907, le blocus imposé à l'Arménie était toujours en vigueur. L'ANC s'est en outre inquiété de l'usage que l'Azerbaïdjan pourrait faire de cette aide militaire contre le Karabagh qui n'est mentionné nulle part dans l'amendement adopté par le Sénat, contrairement à ce que pourrait laisser entendre le discours de l'Armenian Assembly. L'ANC a donc entamé une action auprès du Congrès pour empêcher la suspension de la 907 qui devait être validée par une commission interparlementaire pour

être effective. Réunie le 14 novembre, cette commission composée de membres du Sénat et de la Chambre des Représentants a approuvé l'amendement, mais elle demande que l'aide américaine apportée à l'Azerbaïdjan ne puisse être utilisée contre les communautés arméniennes du Caucase, ce qui inclut les Arméniens du Karabagh. La commission précise également que le Congrès se réserve le droit de revenir sur cette suspension lors de l'examen de la loi fiscale 2003. Même si les recommandations de la commission mixte n'ont pas force de loi, l'ANC souligne qu'elles représentent "un avertissement adressé à la Maison Blanche" qui comprend ainsi que le Congrès veut conserver son droit de regard sur cette aide militaire que les Etats-Unis apporteront à l'Azerbaïdjan.

Elles sont peut-être aussi destinées à rassurer l'Arménie et à rendre la pilule un peu moins amère pour les défenseurs de la Cause Arménienne. ● H. P.

Tournée du groupe de Minsk

L'assouplissement de la section 907 a beau être assorti de certaines conditions, le vote du Sénat et l'attitude de la Maison Blanche ont montré l'importance accordée par les Etats-Unis à l'Azerbaïdjan qui pourrait y voir un feu vert pour relancer la guerre au Karabagh. Les déclarations en ce sens se multiplient à Bakou, mais "elles ne sont pas à prendre au pied de la lettre" selon le groupe de Minsk qui s'est rendu du 3 au 8 novembre en Azerbaïdjan, puis en Arménie en passant par le Karabagh. Les médiateurs ont présenté des "modifications de détails" à l'accord élaboré lors des sommets arméno-azéris de Paris et de Key West. Mais l'Azerbaïdjan a qualifié d'"inacceptable" la nouvelle version, tandis que l'Arménie s'est refusée à tout commentaire. Robert Kotcharian et Haydar Aliyev vont se rencontrer en marge du sommet de la CEI le 30 novembre à Moscou, ont indiqué les coprésidents du groupe de Minsk, qui malgré l'absence de résultat se déclarent optimistes pour l'avenir du processus de paix.

ur la Cause Arménienne

échecs de la cause arménienne de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique : est intervenu la veille de l'adoption par le Parlement européen du Strasbourg, le lobby arménien n'aura pas pesé lourd dans un contexte (l'Azerbaïdjan) ou avéré (la Turquie), des Etats-Unis.

Strasbourg passe le génocide sous silence

Cent fois sur le métier remettez votre ouvrage". Aux Arméniens dont le succès du Parlement français avait endormi la vigilance, les eurodéputés ont remémoré cette maxime en infligeant le 25 octobre un véritable camouflet : effacer, sans hésitation, toute demande de reconnaissance du génocide dans les conditions d'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union européenne. Le rapport d'étape d'Alain Lamassoure, successeur le 15 mars dernier de Philippe Morillon dans cet exercice d'évaluation annuel instauré depuis l'officialisation de la candidature d'Ankara en 1999, n'a retenu que "l'initiative civile lancée par un groupe d'anciens diplomates turcs et arméniens, dont le but est d'arriver à une appréciation commune du passé". Autrement dit, la CRAT, la Commission turco-arménienne (voir F.A. d'octobre 2001). Tous les amendements relatifs à 1915 et proposés ou soutenus par le CDCA-Europe ont été balayés, et avec eux, une once de cet espoir de justice né de la résolution de juin 1987. Tout est désormais à refaire.

La Commission des Affaires étrangères du Parlement européen avait donné le ton dès le 10 octobre en rejetant tous les amendements visant à réintroduire la nécessité pour les Turcs de reconnaître le génocide avant toute perspective de rejoindre les Quinze. Habitée à cette intransigeance, la branche européenne du CDCA, qui estimait début octobre la bataille "plus facile" qu'avec le général Morillon, avait reporté ses réels espoirs de modification sur la séance plénière où de nouveaux amendements pouvaient encore éviter la catastrophe. L'un d'entre eux, parrainé par 45 élus de trois groupes (socialiste, Gauche Unitaire Européenne (GUE) et libéral) et provenant de quatre pays (France, Grèce, Italie et Belgique), stipulait que "l'approfondissement du dialogue sur la question de la reconnaissance du génocide dont a été victime la communauté arménienne au début du XX^{ème} siècle constitue une étape importante" de la normalisation entre Turcs et Arméniens. Ce n'était pas l'idéal, mais "c'était mieux que rien", estimait le CDCA-Europe. Finalement, ce ne fut rien : par 271 voix contre 149, la phrase ne complètera pas le rapport. Pas plus que les trois autres amende-

ments déposés simultanément par les groupes Europe des Nations et GUE, mais pour la forme car sans assise politique. En argumentant le sien, Charles Pasqua a été très direct. "Je ne comprends pas la raison pour laquelle [le gouvernement turc actuel et les Turcs] s'obstinent à ne pas vouloir assumer la responsabilité de ce génocide. D'autres pays qui ont été responsables de génocides ont mieux assumé les responsabilités qu'eux-mêmes [...]. En tout cas, tant que cela n'aura pas été reconnu, en ce qui nous concerne, nous resterons fermement opposés à l'entrée de la Turquie dans l'Union européenne". Ses collègues resteront

sur certains élus français pour qu'ils repoussent les amendements sur le génocide s'est tout de même, paraît-il, fait sentir. D'autres n'ont pas eu besoin d'être aidés. Ainsi Daniel Cohn-Bendit, président Vert de la Commission mixte UE-Turquie, s'irrite de voir régulièrement la question arménienne s'immiscer dans le débat. "Je demanderai à tous ceux qui veulent encore dire à la Turquie qu'il y a eu un génocide il y a soixante-quinze ans (sic) - ce qui est vrai - en quoi cela accompagne-t-il le débat aujourd'hui en Turquie ? Je ne crois pas que cela l'accompagne".



Les quelques 300 manifestants devant le Parlement européen de Strasbourg la veille du vote

sourds à ces propos : l'amendement sera repoussé par 341 voix contre 95.

En revanche, les élus des Quinze, une fois de plus, n'ont pas été insensibles au contexte international dont Ankara sait jouer. Pivotal de la campagne antiterroriste américaine contre les talibans, la Turquie a provisoirement fait taire les critiques les plus virulentes contre son régime. Avec la naissance de la CRAT, le gouvernement Ecevit a directement ou indirectement marqué des points précieux. Avantage supplémentaire pour lui : les groupes politiques n'avaient pas de consigne de vote pro-arménienne ferme comme en 2000. L'influence de l'Elysée et de Matignon

Assommés par ce coup de massue, les Arméniens, très moyennement mobilisés sur cette affaire - 300 personnes à Strasbourg la veille du vote du rapport - jugeront peut-être le choc salutaire pour raviver l'envie de se battre, à un niveau continental cette fois. Attendue depuis des mois, la structure européenne du CDCA prend doucement forme, avec bientôt une présence continue à Bruxelles, cœur d'une Europe politique encore à conquérir, pour lancer enfin une politique sur le long terme plutôt que des "coups" à l'efficacité toute relative. Le temps presse car le prochain rapport sur la Turquie sera vite arrivé. ● CHRISTOPHE DIREMSZIAN

GUERRE CONTRE LE TERRORISME *Washington menace les pays disposant d'armes de destruction massive de devoir « rendre des comptes »*

L'Irak dans le collimateur de Bush

Washington :
de notre correspondant
Jean-Jacques Mével

Pendant que les Afghans cherchent la paix à Bonn, la Maison-Blanche envisage un autre règlement de comptes dans sa croisade antiterroriste : l'objectif serait l'Irak et le coupable Saddam Hussein, l'homme qui défie les Bush de père en fils.

L'avertissement est venu du président américain lui-même, sous la forme d'un addenda à ce que l'on appelle désormais la « doctrine Bush ». Depuis la tuerie du 11 septembre, les États-Unis considèrent que tous ceux qui arment, financent ou hébergent les réseaux du terrorisme international « *devront rendre des comptes* ». George W. Bush vient d'y ajouter une autre catégorie, taillée sur mesure pour le maître de Bagdad : « *Ceux qui mettent au point des armes de destruction massive dans le but de terroriser d'autres nations.* »

Après le régime des talibans, la dictature irakienne est-elle la cible n° 2 dans les plans du Pentagone ? « *Chaque chose en son temps* », répond le président pour signifier que la « Tempête du désert » bis n'est pas imminente et que la priorité reste à la campagne d'Afghanistan. En dehors des moyens militaires, la Maison-Blanche dispose aussi « *de nombreuses options* », ajoute Colin Powell, le chef de la diplomatie américaine.

Pourtant, il ne fait guère de doute que l'Administration Bush dépoussière ses dossiers et monte contre Saddam Hussein une solide mise en accusation. L'offensive a commencé il y a quelques jours à Genève, lorsque John R. Bolton, l'un des « durs » du département

d'État, a nommément reproché à l'Irak de poursuivre son programme d'armes bactériologiques, reniant sa propre signature à la face du monde.

George W. Bush a fait monter la pression d'un cran lundi, en exigeant publiquement le retour en Irak des inspecteurs en désarmement des Nations unies. Depuis trois ans, Bagdad s'y refuse avec constance et obstination. La Maison-Blanche ne peut l'ignorer, et le sentiment prévaut qu'elle cherche sinon un prétexte, du moins une justification. Interrogé sur ce qui attend Saddam Hussein, le président américain a répondu, sibyllin : « *Il l'apprendra bien assez tôt.* »

La répétition en Irak du scénario militaire afghan paraît peu vraisemblable, malgré de récentes escarmouches entre la défense antiaérienne de Bagdad et les avions de l'US Air Force qui policent l'espace aérien, au nord et au sud du pays. Les troupes de Saddam Hussein sont autrement plus équipées et coriaces que les talibans. Quant à l'opposition irakienne, elle n'a pas de troupes sur le terrain.

Pour la diplomatie américaine, ce serait aussi le plus mauvais moment. C'est Oussama ben Laden, et non pas Saddam Hussein, qui soude la coalition internationale contre le terrorisme. Qu'il s'agisse d'organiser l'après-guerre en Afghanistan ou de relancer les tractations entre Israéliens et Palestiniens, Washington a – pour l'instant – trop besoin de ses alliés européens et arabes pour se lancer dans une aventure solitaire. La Syrie, alliée de Washington dans la guerre du Golfe, décrivait hier le scénario comme « *une erreur fatale* ».

L'explication pourrait être la politique intérieure : George W. Bush ressent le besoin de

donner des gages à la droite de son parti. Chez beaucoup de républicains, Saddam Hussein est une figure quasi obsessionnelle. Il incarne à leurs yeux une décennie d'impuissance et d'atermoiements américains : même si rien ne prouve que les Irakiens ont trempé dans les attaques du 11 septembre, la « croisade » antiterroriste lancée par les États-Unis devrait donc nécessairement passer par Bagdad. Le débat déchire jusqu'à l'Administration. Il oppose notamment le « faucons » du Pentagone aux diplomates du Département d'État.

Le coup de menton de George W. Bush, soigneusement mis en scène, fait aussi monter la pression sur le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU au moment où se discute l'avenir des sanctions appliquées à l'Irak. Le dispositif international vient à échéance vendredi. L'embargo reste la règle, mais depuis 1995 Bagdad peut financer ses urgences humanitaires par des exportations limitées de pétrole.

Beaucoup considèrent ce régime « pétrole contre nourriture » comme une passoire. Mais faute de consensus sur les remèdes, il sera sans doute reconduit jusqu'au printemps. D'ici là, Washington entend faire avancer son projet de « *sanctions intelligentes* », censées libérer le commerce civil de l'Irak, tout en resserrant considérablement la vis sur les importations dites « sensibles ».

Le spectre d'une intervention militaire américaine en Irak reste diffus, mais il vient à point nommé. Il illustre également la nouvelle « *diplomatie coercitive* », que le président américain a placée au cœur de sa doctrine : la menace est crédible, mais c'est aussi une dernière chance de rentrer dans le rang.

Quant à Saddam Hussein, son adresse est connue et il ne risque pas de disparaître, à la différence d'Oussama ben Laden. « *Au bout du compte, l'Irak sera toujours là, dit Colin Powell au New York Times Magazine. Il n'est pas besoin de le mettre en tête des urgences.* » George W. Bush, lui aussi, sait ménager l'avenir...

28 NOVEMBRE 2001



Irak: rejet du retour des inspecteurs

Bush exige de contrôler le désarmement.

La France a souligné hier la nécessité de sortir du statu quo sur l'Irak, ne paraissant pas s'inquiéter outre mesure des déclarations du président américain George W. Bush, à quelques jours du renouvellement par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU du programme humanitaire, prévu le 30 novembre. Dérogation à l'embargo, ce programme autorise l'Irak à vendre du brut pour se procurer des biens de première nécessité sous strict contrôle de l'ONU.

Le 30 novembre, le Conseil de sécurité doit se prononcer sur le renouvellement du programme humanitaire qui autorise l'Irak à vendre du brut pour se procurer des biens de première nécessité.

Le président américain Bush avait durci le ton lundi contre l'Irak en l'enjoignant d'accepter le retour des inspecteurs de l'ONU pour prouver que Bagdad ne cherche pas acquérir des armes de destruction massive. Pour le porte-parole français, les propos de Bush ne constituent pas une menace, mais «mettent l'accent sur la nécessité du retour des inspecteurs». Malgré ces pressions américaines, l'Irak a réitéré hier son refus d'un retour des experts soutenant qu'il ne dispose plus d'armes prohibées et qu'il revient à l'ONU de lever l'embargo, conformément à la résolution 687 ayant instauré le cessez-le-feu dans la guerre du Golfe en 1991.

Les remarques du président Bush avaient immédiatement relancé les spéculations sur la volonté du président de placer l'Irak dans le collimateur américain, comme deuxième cible de la guerre contre le terrorisme. «L'Afghanistan est juste le début», a souligné George W.

Bush en réaffirmant sa doctrine antiterroriste. Peu après les remarques du président américain, la Maison Blanche s'était toutefois employée à souligner qu'elles n'annonçaient pas un durcissement soudain de la politique américaine envers l'Irak • (AFP)

Allies Caution Bush On an Iraq Campaign 'All European Nations' Are Skeptical About Widening War, Germany Says

By John Vinocur
International Herald Tribune

PARIS — Germany and France, in separate statements, cautioned the United States on Wednesday on expanding the American-led anti-terrorist campaign into Iraq.

Both countries' reluctance to be involved in widened strikes against Iraq has been known for many weeks, but they made their viewpoints public two days after President George W. Bush insisted that inspectors be allowed back into Iraq to determine if it was developing weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Bush has not specifically threatened Iraq, but when he was asked what would happen if Saddam Hussein refused to allow the inspectors to return, he replied, "He'll find out."

Some White House advisers have been pressing for a campaign against Iraq as the second phase of the war against terrorism.

Speaking during a Bundestag debate in Berlin, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said, "All European nations would view a broadening to include Iraq highly skeptically — and that's putting it diplomatically."

The German news agency DPA re-

ported that the European Union had made its "massive reservations" about a potential move on Iraq known to the United States. Russia also has reiterated opposition to any military action against Iraq, and the Arab League has warned that any strike against an Arab country such as Iraq would end the current international coalition against terrorism.

Traveling in Sofia, the French defense minister, Alain Richard, said that besides Afghanistan, "There is no other nation whose leaders have been active accomplices of terrorist actions. So we do not believe that it is today necessary to take military action against other sites."

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who also spoke in the Bundestag debate, said, "We should be particularly careful about a discussion about new targets in the Middle East — more could blow up in our faces there than any of us realize."

Germany, he said, was not "simply waiting to intervene militarily elsewhere in the world, such as Iraq or Somalia."

The remarks in Berlin and Sofia suggested that neither Germany or France had received specific indications from the United States about the promised second phase of the war against terrorism.

In London, Prime Minister Tony Blair,

was more circumspect than his European partners in responding to a parliamentary challenge to state that Britain would not support extending military action to Iraq, Sudan, Somalia or Yemen. He said: "I have always said there would be two phases of this operation. The first is Afghanistan and our military action is focused in Afghanistan. The second is, in a deliberative and considered way, to take what action we can against international terrorism in all its forms."

A Foreign Ministry spokesman in Berlin told Reuters that Mr. Fischer's remarks did not represent a shift in policy. The spokesman was quoted as saying that what Mr. Fischer had expressed "was that, as in the immediate aftermath of September 11, all steps should be considered carefully" and that "this holds particularly true in the case of Iraq and the Middle East."

Both Mr. Schroeder and Mr. Richard had underscored their backing of the coalition. Mr. Richard commented: "We said that where there is a precise justification against — on territory other than Afghanistan — we would provide unlimited support."

"But all the information we have now," he said, "concerns terrorist-activity planning of al Qaida."

Mr. Schroeder said Germany "will do what is necessary."

"We will do everything to make sure that the anti-terror coalition stays solid," he said. "But we should be careful about comments in magazines, newspapers, or from certain junior ministers, looking for new targets."

The chancellor was apparently referring to Christoph Zöpel, a Social Democrat assigned as a junior minister in the Foreign Ministry, who said last week that the chancellor's party would support an anti-terror group in Somalia.

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2001

IRAK Après les menaces américaines de frappes contre le régime de Saddam Hussein

Washington s'attire les foudres européennes

Alors que les Etats-Unis multiplient les menaces d'opérations punitives américaines contre l'Irak, les Européens prennent nettement leurs distances. A Berlin, le chancelier allemand, Gerhard Schröder, a carrément mis en garde les Etats-Unis contre toute velléité d'extension de la campagne menée en Afghanistan. « *Nous devons être particulièrement prudents quand on discute de nouvelles cibles au Proche-Orient – qui risquent de se retourner contre nous, bien plus que ce que l'on pense* », a estimé le chancelier allemand. Paris affiche également ses réticences, alors que seul Tony Blair reste totalement en phase avec George W. Bush. Pour le ministre de la Défense Alain Richard, une opération militaire contre l'Irak ou d'autres nations n'est « *pas nécessaire* ».

Mais c'est à Moscou que la gêne est la plus forte. Le vice-ministre russe des Affaires étrangères, Alexandre Salтанov, a réaffirmé l'opposition de la Russie à toute intervention militaire contre l'Irak, susceptible, a-t-il dit, « *d'entraîner une radicalisation dans les pays arabes, de compliquer encore la crise dans les territoires palestiniens et de déstabiliser*

gravement la situation dans le golfe arabo-persique ».

Il a souligné qu'il n'existait aucun élément impliquant Bagdad dans les attentats du 11 septembre à New York et à Washington. Selon lui, une opération contre l'Irak menacerait l'unité de la coalition internationale contre le terrorisme.

La Russie serait en fait placée devant un choix extrêmement difficile si les menaces du président George Bush à l'encontre de l'Irak devaient déboucher sur des frappes. Car il serait politiquement très douloureux pour le président russe, Vladimir Poutine, de revenir sur le rapprochement avec les Occidentaux qu'il a imposé contre l'avis d'une bonne partie de la classe politique russe.

La difficulté qu'éprouve Moscou à déterminer sa position face à la politique américaine à l'encontre de l'Irak a été illustrée mardi soir par des déclarations quelque peu divergentes des hauts responsables de sa diplomatie.

Contrairement à Alexandre Salтанov, le ministre des Af-

fares étrangères, Igor Ivanov, s'est refusé à condamner par avance une éventuelle frappe américaine contre l'Irak. « *Ce n'est pas le moment d'examiner différents scénarios* », s'est-il contenté d'indiquer. Au Caire, enfin, la Ligue arabe a prédit une dislocation de l'actuelle coalition internationale en cas d'intervention américaine.

Alors que ces divergences éclatent au grand jour, le régime irakien ne s'est d'ailleurs pas privé de dénoncer « *l'arrogance* » américaine. Et de faire savoir qu'il n'avait pas l'intention de plier. « *Nous refusons catégoriquement tout langage hautain, arrogant et imbécile tenu par les Etats-Unis* », a estimé le quotidien *As-Saoura*,

organe du parti Baas au pouvoir.

Un porte-parole officiel irakien avait donné le ton dès mardi, en indiquant que « *l'Irak est capable de se défendre et de défendre ses droits* ». Il a également rejeté les mises en garde du

Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU qui exige un retour en Irak des inspecteurs en désarmement de l'ONU. Quant au vice-président irakien, Taha Yassin Ramadan,

il a réaffirmé hier que son gouvernement n'accepterait qu'une reconduction pure et simple de l'accord « *pétrole contre nourriture* » avec les Nations unies, qui arrive à expiration vendredi.

En cas de refus d'accepter des inspecteurs, Saddam Hussein « *verra bien* » quelles seront les conséquences, avait précisé lundi M. Bush, relançant des spéculations sur la désignation de l'Irak comme future cible de la « *guerre contre le terrorisme* ».

A Londres, le premier ministre britannique, Tony Blair, s'est déclaré hier « *tout à fait d'accord* » avec les propos du président américain. « *La seconde étape de la campagne contre le terrorisme est, de façon concertée et réfléchie, d'entreprendre toute action possible contre le terrorisme international sous toutes ses formes* », a précisé M. Blair.

T. O. (Avec AFP et Reuter.)

C'est à Moscou que la gêne semble la plus forte

SYRIE Avant l'entrée de son pays au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU

Bachar el-Assad libère des opposants

Beyrouth : Sibylle Rizk

Depuis son accession au pouvoir en juillet 2000, Bachar el-Assad a cherché à montrer sa volonté d'ouverture tout en continuant à contrôler fermement la Syrie. Alors que Damas s'apprête à entrer en janvier au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, il vient de libérer 122 prisonniers politiques tandis qu'il maintient toujours sous les verrous des figures de proue du mouvement démocratique syrien.

Engagée depuis une semaine, l'amnistie concerne surtout des isla-

mistes, dont deux dirigeants du parti interdit des Frères musulmans. C'est la deuxième grâce présidentielle, après celle de novembre 2000, qui avait permis la libération de quelque 600 prisonniers politiques. Mais il reste plus de 1 000 détenus politiques en Syrie, arrêtés pour la plupart pendant le règne d'Assad père.

La grâce ne s'applique pas à dix opposants interpellés en août et septembre, dont deux députés, Maa-moun al-Homsi et Riad Seif, ainsi qu'un économiste réputé, Aref Dalila, et le plus célèbre dissident syrien, le vieil opposant communiste Riad el-Turk. Libéré en mai 1998 après 17 années de réclusion dans

une cellule d'isolement, Riad el-Turk a été interpellé à nouveau le 1^{er} septembre dernier dans un geste qui sonnait le glas du « printemps de Damas ».

Riad el-Turk n'avait pas renoncé à dire haut et fort son opposition au régime syrien, comme le montre un documentaire diffusé à Beyrouth, signé Mohammad Ali Atassi. Après le décès de Hafez el-Assad, en juin 2000, l'opposant communiste est le premier à avoir brisé la loi du silence, en annonçant qu'il ne participerait pas

au plébiscite de son fils Bachar. Il a ensuite publiquement qualifié de « dictateur » le défunt président et osé parler de « République héréditaire » après l'accession de Bachar al-Assad à la tête de l'Etat.

Les autorités syriennes n'ont retenu de ses discours que la critique de Hafez el-Assad, « elles n'ont pas compris que Riad el-Turk est avant tout un homme de réconciliation », déplore le réalisateur de *Cousin*, un film de 45 minutes tourné pendant les quelques mois de liberté accordés au militant communiste septuagénaire. Filmé avec sobriété, en légère contre-plongée, son regard est comme barré d'une ligne noire : l'ombre portée de ses lunettes amplifie la détermination, la ténacité hors

du commun d'un homme qui a tout sacrifié à son engagement politique.

« J'ai voulu comprendre comment il a survécu 17 ans dans une cellule de deux mètres carrés, dont 13 ans sans voir sa famille, 10 ans même un matelas pour dormir et 10 ans sans voir le soleil », explique le réalisateur dont le père, Nouredine Atassi, président de la Syrie entre 1966 et 1970, est décédé après des années passées dans les geôles syriennes.

Pour résister à la torture physique, à l'isolement, Riad el-Turk s'est accroché de toutes ses forces à une décision : « ne rien donner ». Il a « oublié le monde », s'est interdit toute « rêvasserie » en s'astreignant à une discipline de fer. Pendant 17 ans, il a

chassé le temps en dessinant des paysages grâce à de minuscules cailloux dénichés dans la soupe aux lentilles quasi quotidienne. A chaque repas, il lui fallait détruire son œuvre et recommencer ensuite.

A nouveau sous les verrous, Riad el-Turk a été traduit devant un tribunal d'exception devant lequel il a ajouté un adjectif à sa description de Hafez el-Assad : « Dictateur sanguinaire. » « Sa résolution reste intacte, sauf si son corps le trahit », commente Mohammad Ali Atassi, dont la caméra a permis de briser la censure. L'opposant a été opéré à cœur ouvert fin 1998. Il souffre de diabète et a besoin de soins réguliers.

IRAK Les Nations unies devaient se prononcer hier sur un allègement des sanctions contre Bagdad

Nouveau sursis pour Saddam Hussein

New York :
de notre correspondant
Jean-Louis Turlin

Lundi, George Bush menaçait Saddam Hussein de « conséquences » si l'Irak n'autorisait pas le retour des inspecteurs chargés de contrôler l'élimination des armes de destruction massive sur son sol. Mais hier, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies devait adopter une résolution prévoyant un élargissement du programme « pétrole contre nourriture » avec, en filigrane, la perspective d'une suspension puis d'une levée des sanctions.

Et pour en arriver là, Washington a fait une concession majeure à Moscou.

En juin, la Russie s'était opposée au projet de résolution anglo-américain qui aurait permis à l'Irak d'importer des biens à usage civil sans passer par le contrôle du comité des sanctions. Le système de « sanctions intelligentes » prôné par le secrétaire d'Etat américain Colin Powell avait le double but de contrer la propagande de Bagdad selon laquelle l'ONU asphyxierait la population irakienne, et de lutter contre le marché noir auquel se livre l'Irak avec la complicité passive ou active des pays voisins.

Mais pour s'assurer que Saddam n'en profiterait pas pour importer illégalement du matériel à usage militaire, le projet de résolution prévoyait de verrouiller les frontières de l'Irak. Moscou voyait dans le nouvel arrangement une pérennisation du système de sanctions, assoupli ou non.

Le bouclage eût été difficile à mettre en œuvre au demeurant, puisqu'il était censé s'appuyer sur la coopération des pays riverains - Jordanie, Turquie et Syrie notamment. Le peu d'empressement de ceux-ci et la menace d'un veto russe conduisirent à l'abandon du projet et à la reconduction pour six mois du programme « pétrole contre nourriture ». La prolongation arrivant à échéance aujourd'hui, le Conseil de sécurité s'est de nouveau donné six mois pour maintenir les choses en l'état tout en annonçant, pour le 1^{er} juin 2002, la mise en place d'un nouveau programme comportant une liste révisée des produits, voire des services autorisés.

Des deux volets, humanitaire et sécuritaire, c'est sur le second que Washington a fait le plus grand pas en renonçant au bouclage de l'Irak. Il n'est plus question de faire pression sur des pays dont les Etats-Unis ont

tant besoin pour maintenir la coalition dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. On y substitue donc une surveillance de l'intérieur par le retour des inspecteurs prévu dans la résolution 1284 - qui instituait parallèlement le programme « pétrole contre nourriture ». C'est la concession que George Bush a dû dernièrement négocier dans son ranch texan avec Vladimir Poutine pour éviter un nouveau blocage russe.

Le texte que l'ONU devait adopter hier comporte un paragraphe dans lequel le Conseil de sécurité « réaffirme son attachement à un règlement global sur la base des résolutions pertinentes (...) et des éclaircissements nécessaires à l'application de la résolution 1284 ». Ces éclaircissements concernent les délais et les conditions qui permettraient de passer à une suspension puis à une levée des sanctions en place depuis plus de dix ans. Contrairement aux Anglais et aux Américains, les Russes, comme les Français et les Chinois qui s'étaient eux aussi abstenus, estimaient que la 1284 n'est pas assez claire sur ce point. Saddam Hussein a toujours lié le retour des inspecteurs à une levée des sanctions.

Les « éclaircissements » pourraient constituer un pas dans ce sens. Avec l'assouplissement

des échanges commerciaux, ils fourniront à l'ONU la « carotte » qui pourrait convaincre Saddam d'autoriser les inspecteurs sans perdre la face. Le « bâton », en cas de refus, ce sera l'inévitabilité de l'attaque militaire à laquelle faisait allusion George Bush lundi. Bref, le nouveau programme, dont la mise en application est prévue pour le 1^{er} juin quoi qu'il arrive, sera à prendre ou à laisser.

Ce délai laisse aux Etats-Unis le temps de terminer leurs opérations en Afghanistan et de préparer une intervention en Irak avec le bon droit de leur côté. Saddam a six mois pour réfléchir.

LE FIGARO

30 NOVEMBRE 2001

Die Türkei hält keine Verträge

Die EU wird keine Rechte für Kurden und Minderheiten durchsetzen

VON YILMAZ CAMLIBEL

DIn der Türkei gibt es zwei Staaten: den jedermann sichtbaren, legalen Staat und den illegalen „inneren Staat“ unter der Kontrolle einer Bürokratie aus Militär und Zivilisten. Dieser Innere Staat ist der Ansicht, daß die EU mit den von der Türkei geforderten Änderungen die nationale Sicherheit und die unteilbare Einheit des türkischen Staates in Gefahr bringt und wendet sich gegen die von der EU gewünschte Durchführung demokratischer Schritte. Wie kann ein Land, das in seinem eigenen Machtbereich gegen ein vielstimmiges und anteilnehmendes Leben eingestellt ist, Teil eines so farbigen Mosaiks wie der EU sein?



Foto: Irina Wießner

Alle Parteien in der Türkei, die in Regierungen mitwirken, unterwerfen sich der offiziellen kemalistischen Ideologie. In allen Systemparteien herrscht unter der Diktatur des Parteivorsitzenden und einer Handvoll ihm nahestehender Politiker eine Cliquenwirtschaft. Können denn Parteien, die in ihrem eigenen inneren Gefüge Demokratie nicht zulassen, im Lande die Demokratie aufbauen?

Über Parteien, die in Gegnerschaft zu diesem System stehen, schwebt die ständige Drohung des Verbots. Verschiedene Gesetze der Türkei schränken die Organisations-, Versammlungs- und Meinungsfreiheit direkt ein. So z.B. heisst es in §81 des Parteiengesetzes: „Die politischen Parteien dürfen nicht behaupten, daß es auf dem Gebiet der Republik Türkei Minderheiten gibt, die auf nationalen und religiösen Kulturunterschieden sowie Konfessions- oder Sprachunterschieden beruhen. Sie dürfen nicht das Ziel verfolgen, andere Sprachen und Kulturen außer der türkischen Sprache und Kultur zu schützen und zu bewahren. Auf diese Weise dürfen sie nicht tätig werden. Außer dem Türkischen dürfen sie keine andere Sprache benutzen.“ In einem Land, in dem es verboten ist, Gedanken und gesellschaftliche Gegebenheiten und

Unterschiede zur Sprache zu bringen, können sich Vielfalt und Opposition nicht entwickeln.

Die EU hat sich der Türkei auf Drängen der USA einen Spaltbreit geöffnet. Amerika ist ein pragmatischer Staat, der seine Beziehungen zu anderen Ländern gestaltet ohne darauf zu achten, ob sie demokratisch oder diktatorisch regiert werden. Allerdings, die EU legt Wert auf die Normen, derer sie sich angenommen hat. Wenn sie mit anderen Ländern Beziehungen aufbaut, behält sie doch neben ihrem Vorteil auch ihre Kriterien zur Wahrung von Menschen- und Minderheitenrechten im Auge. So will die EU die Türkei vor einer Vollmitgliedschaft einer strengen Untersuchung unterziehen.

Doch die Türkei unternimmt keinen ernsthaften Schritt, um die von ihr erwarteten demokratischen Reformen einzuleiten. Die türkischen Machthaber halten sich an die Verpflichtungen keines einzigen Rechtsdokumentes, unter das sie ihre Unterschrift gesetzt haben. Wenn die Türkei mit der EU Verträge über den Schutz von Menschen- und Minderheitenrechten unterzeichnet, dann wird sie diese Verträge nicht umsetzen.

Der 15 Jahre währende Krieg der Türkischen Republik gegen die Arbeiterpartei Kurdistans (PKK) hat den Nationalismus bei Türken und Kurden angefacht. Angriffe der PKK auf Zivilisten hat die türkische Staatsführung zum Anlaß genommen, um zu behaupten: „Es gibt keine kurdische Frage, es gibt nur ein Terrorproblem.“ Andererseits hat sie mit ihrer Propaganda die kurdische Opposition in die Arme der PKK getrieben. Die PKK wurde als einzige Vertretung der Kurden dargestellt. So haben beide, Staat und PKK, verhindert, dass kurdische Stimmen, die eine friedliche und demokratische Verständigung suchten, die Massen erreichten. Der Staat stempelte die friedenswilligen Türken, die PKK die friedenswilligen Kurden als „Verräter“ ab.

Nach Öcalans Ergreifung änderte sich die Lage nicht. Wieder wird die PKK als Vertreter der Kurden vorgezeigt. Ihr auf den Nationalismus Atatürks, den Einheitsstaat und Sprachfreiheit gestütztes Projekt der „Demokratischen Republik“ wird den Kurden nun injiziert. Öcalan lenkt die Kurden mit den Möglichkeiten, die ihm im Gefängnis gewährt werden, mit systematischer Propaganda in der vom Staat gewünschten Art und Weise. Wer sich dagegen wendet, wird weiterhin als Verräter abgestempelt.

Seit der Gründung der Türkischen Republik ist die Zahl der ethnischen Minderheiten im Land durch erzwungene Assimilation von 50 bis 60 auf etwa 10 gesunken. Falls diese Politik so weitergeht, wird diese Zahl unvermeidlich weiter sinken. Außer den Kurden stellt heute keine einzige Gruppe mehr Forderungen wegen ihrer Rechte auf gesellschaftliche Identität.

Wie man weiß, wird der Rechtsstatus der Minderheiten in der Türkei vom Lausanner Vertrag garantiert. Acht Paragraphen des Vertrages, von 37 bis 44, tragen die Überschrift „Minderheitenschutz“. So z.B. heisst es in §39 „Keinem türkischen Staatsangehörigen können irgend-

welche Beschränkungen beim Gebrauch irgendeiner Sprache in seinen privaten und geschäftlichen Beziehungen, bei der Ausübung der Religion, in der Presse oder jeder Art von Veröffentlichungen und auf öffentlichen Versammlungen auferlegt werden."

Der Lausanner Vertrag ist ein völkerrechtliches Dokument, das noch über der türkischen Verfassung steht. Und dennoch sind alle Gesetze in der Türkei voll mit Vorschriften, die diesem Text entgegengesetzt sind. Kurdische Zeitschriften, Zeitungen, Bücher, Kassetten sind noch immer verboten. Wer bei Gericht kurdisch spricht, wird bestraft. Wir Kurden haben weder ein Fernsehprogramm noch eine Tageszeitung.

Auch die in Lausanne anerkannten Rechte der Nichtmuslime werden ständig mit Füßen getreten: Für die Restauration von Kirchen und Synagogen, sogar zum Anstreichen und Tünchen muß die Genehmigung von Ankara eingeholt werden. Die Gotteshäuser zerfallen. Armenische, jüdische und auch griechische Schulen werden geschlossen. Kein Staatsbürger kann griechischen, armenischen oder jüdischen Stiftungen irgendwelche Güter spenden. Trotz solcher offenen Rechtsverletzungen treten weder die Garantiestaaten, die Lausanne unterzeichnet haben, noch die Weltöffentlichkeit genügend für die nichtmuslimischen türkischen Staatsbürger ein.

Die Kurden gehören mit ihren insgesamt 35 Millionen Angehörigen, mit ihrer Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur zu einem der ältesten Völker des Nahen Ostens. Allein in der Türkei leben 15-20 Millionen Kurden. Sie als „ethnische Minderheit“ zu bezeichnen, wie es die EU in ihren Dokumenten jetzt tut, ist falsch.

Im Osmanischen Reich galten die Kurden als gleichberechtigtes Volk. So z.B. war die Unterrichtssprache in Religionschulen Kurdistans Kurdisch. Noch in der Gründungsphase der Türkischen Republik wurden kurdische Abgeordnete „Kürdistan Mebusu“ (= Abgeordneter Kurdistans) genannt. Mustafa Kemal, der spätere Atatürk, schlug in seinen Briefen an die kurdischen Führer vor, gemeinsam gegen die Okkupation der imperialistischen Mächte zu kämpfen und einen Staat als Partner zu gründen. Noch in Lausanne erklärte Ismet Pasha auf Lord

Curzons Vorschlag der Gründung eines unabhängigen kurdischen Staates: „Wir gründen gemeinsam mit den Kurden einen Staat.“

Doch sofort nach der Gründung der Türkischen Republik wurde die Existenz der Kurden zurückgewiesen und geleugnet. Es begann eine mitleidslose Assimilationspolitik. Während der Geschichte der modernen Türkei kämpften die Kurden 29 mal mit Waffen für ihre nationalen und individuellen Rechte. Tausende Dörfer und Kleinstädte wurden angezündet und zerstört. Zehntausende starben, Hunderte kurdische Führer wurden gehängt. Dieses Leid dauert bis heute an.

Der Autor dieser Zeilen hat immer betont, dass der Weg der Gewalt nicht richtig ist und den Kurden schaden werde. Erst der bewaffnete Kampf der PKK gegen den türkischen Staat hat es diesem überhaupt ermöglicht, Millionen von Kurden aus ihren Dörfern zu vertreiben.

Heute verteidigt die PKK das türkische Regime und wir erleben ein zweites Lausanne. Die türkischen Machthaber, die PKK und einige Europäer wollen die Kurden einlullen. In den Dokumenten

der EU zum Beitritt der Türkei ist von den Kurden keine Rede. Wie in Lausanne will man vollendete Tatsachen schaffen. Doch wie in der Vergangenheit wird diese Täuschung nicht die kurdische Frage lösen. Diese wird vielmehr die Türkei und Europa weiterhin beschäftigen.

Niemand sollte meinen, die Kurden seien besiegt und erheben sich nicht mehr. Die PKK oder eine andere Organisation kann vielmehr morgen schon von neuem zur Gewalt greifen. Das kurdische Problem ist der Schlüssel zu allen Problemen der Türkei. Ohne seine Lösung ist eine Demokratisierung dieses Staates unmöglich. □

Dieser Beitrag entstand im Anschluss an einen Besuch von Yilmaz Camlibel bei der GfbV Deutschland im Februar 2001. Übersetzung aus dem Türkischen von Irina Wiefner. Kürzung und Bearbeitung für pogrom von Dr. Andreas Selmeci.

¹ Übersetzungen aus dem Lausanner Vertrag aus Christian Rumpf: „Die rechtliche Stellung der Minderheiten in der Türkei“.

Yilmaz Camlibel – ein kurdischer Demokrat

Yilmaz Camlibel, geboren 1938, ist Vorsitzender der kleinen Partei für Frieden und Demokratie (DBP). Der diplomierte Maschinenbauingenieur hat sich seit den 70er Jahren mutig für Demokratie und die Anerkennung der Kurden als gleichberechtigte Volksgruppe in der Türkei eingesetzt. Seine Ablehnung von Gewalt hat ihm nicht nur im türkischen Staatsapparat, sondern auch unter den Anhängern der PKK Feinde eingetragen. 1980-86 war Yilmaz Camlibel im Militärgefängnis von Diyarbakir inhaftiert. Unter den Folgen der Folter, die ihm während drei Jahren täglich beigebracht wurde, leidet er noch heute.

Am 13. April 2000 wurde Yilmaz Camlibel wegen einer Rede, die er am 14. 12. 1992 (!) zur Eröffnungsfeier des Menschenrechtsvereines in Kütahya gehalten hat, nach § 312 des türkischen Strafgesetzbuches zu einem Jahr Gefängnis und Aberken-

nung seiner bürgerlichen Rechte verurteilt. Dieses Verfahren war, nachdem es acht Jahre lang geruht hatte, in aller Eile wieder aufgenommen worden, um eine Verjährung zu verhindern. Der Vollzug der Strafe wurde vom Ergebnis von vier neuen Prozessen abhängig gemacht, die unter ähnlichen Anklagen seit Frühjahr 2001 gegen Yilmaz Camlibel geführt werden. Im Namen der Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker hat Irina Wiefner an Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer appelliert, sich persönlich dafür einzusetzen, dass Yilmaz Camlibel nicht abermals Opfer der türkischen Terrorjustiz wird. Camlibel und die DBP, die liberal-konservative Positionen vertreten, haben bis heute leider wenig europäisch und deutsche Unterstützung erfahren, obwohl sie sich kompromisslos für die kurdische Sache engagiert haben.

Andreas Selmeci

Turkey Moves To Punish Students For Kurdish Education Demands

ANKARA, Nov 27 (AFP) - Turkey's Higher Education Board (YOK) on Tuesday called for disciplinary action against university students who have held demonstrations and filed petitions for education in the Kurdish language, which is banned under Turkish law.

The YOK said in a statement that the students' acts did not constitute "innocent civilian demands", but an organized movement masterminded by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which waged a 15-year armed campaign for Kurdish self-rule in southeast Turkey.

The petitions filed by the students were exactly the same as sample petitions issued on nine internet websites affiliated with the PKK, it said.

"The (student) acts are regarded as separatist activities aimed against the Turkish Republic's indivisible unity," said the statement, which was carried by the Anatolia news agency.

The board urged universities not to allow pro-PKK acts and asked them to take disciplinary sanctions against students who have participated in the demonstrations or handed in petitions.

The sanctions YOK is seeking involve either expulsion from the university or a suspension of one to two years.

The Kurdish language has been legally banned in Turkey for a long time, even though authorities have long tolerated a series of magazines and music cassettes in Kurdish. Last month, the Turkish parliament approved a constitutional amendment scrapping a ban on using "forbidden" languages to voice opinions, which paves the way for the country's Kurds to broadcast and publish material in their mother tongue.

But education in the Kurdish language is still out of the question over fears that such a move could fan Kurdish separatism and lead to the break-up of Turkey. The PKK ended its armed campaign against Ankara in September 1999 to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict upon peace calls from its condemned leader Abdullah Ocalan, who is on death row in Turkey.

But the PKK truce was brushed aside by the powerful military as a ploy.

* * * * *

Turkey is still strongly against an attack on Baghdad: Ex-diplomat affirms Ankara's opposition

November 29, 2001 Daily Star (Beirut)

Despite speculation to the contrary, Turkey's opposition to any renewed American military assault on Iraq appears firm and unbending, the former Turkish ambassador to the US, Sukru Elekdag, told the Daily Star.

Expectations that Washington might make Iraq the next target of its "war on terror" were raised again on Monday after President George W. Bush demanded that Baghdad re-admit the UN arms inspectors withdrawn ahead of the December 1998 Anglo-American aerial bombardment of Iraq.

The prospect of Turkey dropping its objections to a blitz on Iraq was raised a few days earlier, when the country's ambassador in Washington, Faruk Logoglu, stated that it may re-examine its position if the US came up with solid evidence that Iraq has links with Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network.

The statement was regarded by the Turkish press and by many Turkish commentators as a green light to the US for a strike on Iraq, despite a disclaimer by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. Declaring that he did not know "with what intention Mr. Logoglu made these remarks," Ecevit declared: "I wish that such a harmful intervention would not occur near our borders." The Turkish prime minister reasoned: "Now all attention should be focused on Afghanistan. The Taleban have been vanquished, but there is no government, no legal authority in Afghanistan. Consequently, instead of envisaging operations regarding the other countries, we should direct all our attention on the establishment of healthy and stable state governance in Afghanistan."

According to former ambassador Elekdag, this affirms that "the Turkish government's firm opposition to any possible military campaign against Iraq is continuing." Elekdag, speaking to The Daily Star by telephone from Istanbul, said his own inquiries with Turkish policy makers, including Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, "also led me to believe that there is no change in the Turkish government's position. Ankara is firmly opposed to any possible military campaign against Iraq."

He explained that Ankara shared the concerns of others that a military operation aimed at bringing down President Saddam Hussein would be de-stabilizing for Iraq's neighbors.

"Other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, are also opposed to a US military intervention in Iraq," he said. "The Saudi authorities refuse to believe there is any evidence of the Iraqi government providing support to bin Laden (that would justify) making Iraq a military target in the war on terror."

Elekdag said that other Gulf countries "fear that a military campaign against Iraq will entail the disintegration of the country and will lead to the establishment of a Shiite state in the south, in the buffer area. They regard this as a scourge since on both sides of the Gulf there would then be a Shiite state. This development would change the balance in the Gulf area and will lead to dangerous instability – and Turkey shares that view."

Ankara also has "serious pre-occupations that a military intervention in Iraq would lead to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the (Iraqi) north," he said.

But Elekdag said fears that Turkey might invade Iraq in the event of a US attack were misplaced. "Turkey does not have any ambition regarding the Mosul and Kirkuk oil areas," he said. "Top-level Turkish foreign service sources have confirmed that to me. They said such an action would create a new confrontation front which would deplete Turkey's energy and resources."

Turning to developments in Afghanistan, Elekdag said the troops Turkey pledged to send would not be dispatched until such time as some of the political uncertainties surrounding the country's immediate future are resolved. And he made clear that while Ankara would be willing to join a future UN peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, it was not keen on the idea of a multinational force drawn from pro-Western Muslim countries, as has been suggested.

"We are not sending our military contingent there because perhaps there is no need for them now. If a peace corps is established under the United Nations, then a larger Turkish military unit would be sent. But for this, the situation has to be cleared up," he said.

Elekdag denied that Ankara was being deterred from getting directly involved in Afghanistan by domestic opposition to the American-led war there, especially on the part of the country's two Islamist-leaning parties.

He noted that the parties – formed by rival factions of the former Islamist opposition Fazilet (Virtue) Party after it was banned by Turkey's constitutional court in June – did not in any case see eye to eye on the matter. While the more conservative of the two, Recai Kutan's Saadet Party is "totally against" sending the Turkish military to Afghanistan, the Justice and Development Party (AK) led by former Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan "is not as strongly opposed," Elekdag judged. The AK's position is, in effect, that "under other circumstances it would have supported (sending military units) but as it is an opposition party it has to be in harmony with the opposition."

Elekdag stressed that, even though it was too early to tell what role Turkey would play in the political restructuring of Afghanistan, its strong historic and cultural ties to the country gave it an enduring interest in its future.

Turks have a "strong affinity" with Afghanistan – even though the younger generation may be less conscious of it – and "show great interest in what is going on."

* * * * *

HADEP Leader Calls for General Amnesty for PKK Guerrillas

Voice of America November 29, 2001 BY AMBERIN ZAMAN

INTRO: The leader of Turkey's largest pro-Kurdish party has renewed calls for a general amnesty for armed rebels of the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party, or P-K-K. As Amberin Zaman reports from Ankara, the chairman of the People's Democracy Party said some 5-thousand P-K-K guerrillas still under arms pose a threat to Turkey's security.

TEXT: Speaking at a news conference, Murat Bozlak chairman of the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party - or HADEP for short said some 5-thousand P-K-K fighters were based along Turkey's border with Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.

Mr. Bozlak said the P-K-K rebels continued to constitute what he termed a potential threat to Turkey's security a concern that he says is shared by the Turkish authorities.

Mr. Bozlak says Turkish leaders should muster the courage to grant an amnesty to these fighters and secure their return to Turkey. Like many Kurdish leaders here, Mr. Bozlak sees a two year long cease-fire called by the P-K-K (in the wake of the capture of their leader, Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999) as a unique opportunity for Turkey to make peace with its restive Kurdish population.

Mr. Ocalan, who was sentenced to death on treason charges in June 1999, called off his 15 year long insurgency at the time and also demanded clemency for his fighters. Mr. Ocalan told a Turkish court that he had dropped his demands for an independent Kurdish homeland and that some 12-million Turkish Kurds would be willing to settle for cultural autonomy instead.

Turkey has brushed aside calls for a general amnesty for P-K-K fighters saying clemency will only be extended to those rebels who surrender voluntarily and provide information on their comrades in the mountains.

In what Western diplomats here describe as an encouraging step forward, the Turkish parliament in October passed legislation easing bans on broadcasting and publishing in the Kurdish language. But there are few signs that the constitutional changes are having any effect.

Earlier this month, a private radio station in the largest Kurdish dominated city, Diyarbakir, was banned from the airwaves for playing Kurdish songs.

Nevzat Bingol the owner of the private channel called Metro says none of the songs were political in content.

Like many Kurds in the region Mr. Bingol says he sees the closure of his radio station as part of a broader struggle between hawks within the Turkish administration who are opposed to granting the Kurds greater rights and those who back Turkey's membership in the European Union (E-U). The E-U continues to cite what they consider Turkey's poor human rights record and its denial of broader linguistic rights to the Kurds as one of the main reasons why it has blocked Turkey's membership bid so far.

Murat Bozlak of HADEP sounds a more optimistic note. He says that the atmosphere in the largely Kurdish southeastern provinces has changed dramatically for the better with the P-K-K cease-fire and that state harassment of his party has subsided as well.

Mr. Bozlak says he hopes that HADEP will be permitted to survive. HADEP is facing a constitutional ban on charges of acting as a political front for the P-K-K. Mr. Bozlak declines to comment on possible reasons why scores of HADEP members have been detained for questioning in recent weeks during a string of police raids staged across the southeast provinces.

* * * * *

Kurds wary of Saddam's intentions

Iraq Press November 30, 2001

Arbil - The Iraqi government has conducted large-scale military exercises close to the semi-independent Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq.

The exercises were the first on such a scale and so close to the region which Kurdish parties have been administering away from Saddam's authority for nearly a decade. Residents told Iraq Press explosions and artillery fire could be heard in the Kurdish province of Dahouk. Roads to the province were blocked. Various military units including tanks and armored personnel carriers were involved.

The Kurds view the maneuvers as a warning, sources said. They said a state of fear and anxiety has gripped the region's nearly 3.5 million inhabitants since the beginning of the exercises three days ago.

The maneuvers follow threats by Saddam to reoccupy the Kurdish region. He was recently reported as saying that his army was capable of moving against the Kurds. He also said the "extraordinary situation" in the area should be addressed.

The Kurds control much of Iraqi Kurdistan. U.S. and British warplanes, policing a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, have so far prevented Saddam from moving against the Kurds.

But in remarks two weeks ago the Iraqi strongman said the presence of U.S. warplanes would not deter him if he decided to take military action. Saddam reiterated his position only three days ago during a meeting with Fuad Arif, a renowned Kurdish politician.

Saddam was reported to have told Arif that his government was "deeply concerned" over the situation in the Kurdish region "and may do anything" if the United States strikes Iraq.

Iraqi political analysts say Arif will most probably head to northern Iraq to deliver in person Saddam's message to Kurdish leaders. Local newspapers issued in Baghdad on Thursday said Saddam also renewed his call for dialogue. The Kurds turned down previous calls for talks with the government, saying they cannot trust any promises by Saddam. "Dialogue is the foundation (of solution) and we deal with the (Kurdish) issue on the basis that the Kurdish people are our people and those working for schism have to be criticized," the newspaper said, quoting Saddam.

Saddam did not make clear which party was trying to sow division. Arif is a retired army general. He held several ministerial posts in the aftermath of the 1958 revolution which toppled the monarchy in Iraq.

Meantime, Iraqis have started stocking up on food and fuel in anticipation of a U.S. military strike. Residents told Iraq Press that the last few days saw a rush on food stores and filling stations as prices soared and the Iraqi dinar plummeted to 2,060 to one U.S. dollar.

* * * * *

PUK and KDP: resisting the division of Iraq or preparing the ground for negotiation with Saddam?

December 1, 2001 KurdishMedia.com
By Hassani Mahmoodi

London (KurdishMedia.com) 01 December 2001: Both Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the last few days have supported negotiation with Saddam's regime and insisted on the integrity of Iraq. In its editorial Al-Ittihad, Kurdistan-based PUK Arabic weekly, (23 November 2001) gave a great weight to the Iraqisation of the Kurdish issue.

The paper set out four points to justify negotiation with Saddam. The paper stated:

"- Firstly - we are Iraqis, Iraqi Kurds. We insist on the integrity of Iraqi people and Iraqi territory."

"- Secondly - We reject removal [of Iraqi regime] and random bombardment of Iraq."

"- Thirdly - We ask for through democratic changes in Iraq.

"- Fourthly - The removal [of Iraqi regime] will lead to bringing about a totalitarian regime, which is attractive and acceptable to the Arab countries and US."

The editorial has addressed several issues:

- Emphasised strongly on that Kurds are Iraqis before being Kurds: a concept that does not go down with Kurds.
- Stood strongly against the US policy of removal of Saddam and bombardment of Iraq: a policy that does not go down well with the US and the West.
- Stood Strongly in favour of the Integrity of Iraq: a policy that does not go down with Kurds.

The question that imposes itself: Why have the PUK and KDP started to put these issues forward just now? This can only raise further questions.

- Can the editorial be seen as groundwork for a high profile negotiation with Saddam?

- Do the PUK and KDP know a US-led plan of giving Mousul Wilayet to Turkey, which they try to resist? If this is the case, the parties should express this concern to the nation. It is for the Kurdish nation to decide.

Barzani, the leader of the KDP, also expressed similar concerns, albeit milder. So it is not just PUK. Barzani said that Kurds do not pursue an independent Kurdish state. "We are for resolving problems through dialogue and peace," Barzani added. However, Barzani emphasised that Kurds do not pursue a Kurdish state, not because a Kurdish state is not Kurdish legitimate rights; but because the international criteria is not ready. "We do not wish to take steps which is not in the interest of Kurdish nation," Barzani added. The PUK this week went even further in "the integrity of Iraqi people and Iraqi territory". In the last page of Al-Ittihad (30 November 2001), the prominent headline of the page was "Southern dates in Sulemani market", which talked about the availability of Iraqi dates in Kurdish markets. Is this also part of the stitching Iraq together?

The final question is: what is pushing the PUK and KDP to come out in favour of the "unity of Iraq" and stand against the US policy in Iraq ?

* * * * *

Une cinquantaine de membres du parti pro-kurde HADEP interpellés à Istanbul

ISTANBUL, 30 nov (AFP) - 14h55 - La police turque a interpellé un cinquantaine de membres du parti pro-kurde de la Démocratie du peuple lors de perquisitions dans ses bureaux à Istanbul vendredi, a indiqué un porte-parole du HADEP à l'AFP.

Les perquisitions se basaient sur une décision d'une Cour de sûreté de l'Etat dont le parti ignore la teneur, a précisé le porte-parole, M.Eyup Demir. "La police a saisi des livres et interpellé une cinquantaine de personnes", a-t-il ajouté.

Les bureaux du HADEP ont également été perquisitionnés dans la province de Siirt (sud-est à majorité kurde), a-t-il précisé, sans pouvoir donner plus de détails.

Le HADEP est accusé par les autorités turques de liens avec les rebelles du Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK). Ce dernier a mené pendant quinze ans une lutte armée dans le sud-est en vue d'obtenir une autonomie pour les Kurdes.

Le HADEP, qui plaide pour une solution pacifique à la question kurde, rejette cette accusation mais il est sous le coup d'une procédure d'interdiction pour "liens organiques" avec le PKK.

Le PKK a abandonné en septembre 1999 sa lutte armée, à l'appel de son chef Abdullah Ocalan, condamné à mort par la justice turque. Depuis les combats dans le sud-est ont depuis considérablement diminué.

SYRIE

Scènes de rébellion à Damas

Le procès du député syrien Maamoun al-Homsi a fourni à l'opposition l'occasion de dénoncer la police d'Etat et de réclamer davantage de liberté et de démocratie.

THE DAILY STAR

Beyrouth

La circulation était difficile dans le centre-ville de Damas en cette matinée de novembre, en raison du rassemblement des partisans de Maamoun al-Homsi, l'un des députés de la capitale. La foule venait assister à son départ de la prison pour sa seconde audience au tribunal. Autour du palais de justice, ils étaient environ 3 000 à scander des slogans, les uns à la gloire d'Al Homsi, les autres à celle du parti Baas [au pouvoir]. Drapé dans un drapeau syrien, le parlementaire pénétra dans le bâtiment en criant : "Vive la Syrie ! Vive la liberté et la justice !"

Al Homsi s'assit derrière la barre, parmi dix autres personnes accusées non pas de crimes politiques, mais d'homosexualité ou de vol de voitures. A la différence des autres prévenus, qui étaient enchaînés et vêtus de l'uniforme rayé du prisonnier, Al Homsi portait un costume sombre et n'avait pas de menottes aux poignets. Des observateurs venus des Etats-Unis, de Norvège, de France, du Japon et d'Italie assistaient à la séance, ainsi que deux députés indépendants de Damas, Adnan Dakhakhni et Mounzer Mousilli. Ce dernier avait récemment écrit au président Bachar el-Assad pour protester contre l'arrestation de son collègue, en soulignant le caractère "anticonstitutionnel" de cette action. Le Comité arabe pour

► *Dessin de Matthew Bandsuch paru dans The New York Times Book Review, Etats-Unis.*

■ **Diffamation**
Alors que le régime syrien vient de libérer une dizaine de détenus politiques, la presse officielle de Damas poursuit sa campagne de diffamation à l'encontre du député Maamoun al-Homsi (photo ci-dessous). Le quotidien *Techrine* lui a trouvé un passé de corrompu. Il aurait escroqué le fisc de 1,1 million d'euros et serait à la tête d'un gang de trafiquants de voitures volées au Liban et revendues en Syrie !



les droits de l'homme était également représenté.

L'avocat de Maamoun Al-Homsi, Walid Bunni, nous a récemment confié que son client était en bonne santé, avant d'ajouter que, "depuis quatre mois, sa seule lecture autorisée était celle du quotidien officiel *Al Thawra*". Al Homsi avait pu regarder la télévision depuis une date récente, mais on lui interdisait toujours d'avoir "simplement le temps de souffler". Il était "en prison dans la prison". Avant l'audience, le frère et deux fils de Maamoun al-Homsi ont distribué un tract dans lequel le prévenu déclarait : "Ni ce pays ni ses ressources n'appartiennent à qui que ce soit." Il rappelait à Bachar el-Assad que, lors de la cérémonie d'investiture à la présidence, il y a un an, le président s'était engagé à respecter la Constitution. "Ceux qui violent celle-ci avec égoïsme sont souvent des laquais du président." Faisant allusion à la vieille garde, il assurait que ces gens étaient "hais par le peuple".

"J'AI BIEN DROIT À QUATRE MINUTES DE PAROLE"

Durant la séance, Maamoun al-Homsi tenta de prendre la parole, mais le juge l'en empêcha, ce qui le fit hurler : "Ceci est une violation de l'article 66 de la Constitution, qui stipule explicitement qu'un député jouit de la liberté d'expression et d'action. Mon arrestation est anticonstitutionnelle." Le magistrat lui intima l'ordre de se taire, ce à quoi l'accusé répliqua : "J'ai passé quatre mois en prison. Alors, j'ai bien droit

à quatre minutes de parole. Ce n'est pas la justice que vous rendez. Vous vous mettez en travers de nos droits, et personne ne vous a conféré cette autorité."

Le procureur de la République l'interrompt et il se mit à lire les chefs d'accusation retenus contre lui : violation de la Constitution, attaques contre l'Etat, entrave à l'exercice de leurs fonctions par les autorités de l'Etat, tentative de provoquer des dissensions confessionnelles, insultes envers les institutions publiques. Il en conclut que "le châtiment le plus sévère s'imposait", ce qui pourrait signifier la prison à perpétuité. Maamoun al-Homsi répondit : "Je veux exercer mes droits de citoyen et de député du Parlement syrien. Les pères de la nation ont écrit cette Constitution avec leur sang, vous ne pouvez pas la violer aussi simplement. En prison, même mon père n'avait pas l'autorisation de me rendre visite. Les seules personnes que j'avais le droit de voir étaient les membres des forces de sécurité." Pendant ce temps, une foule nombreuse se pressait à l'extérieur de la salle d'audience. Emmené sous bonne escorte à la levée de l'audience, Al Homsi lança : "Nous donnerons tout pour la Syrie !"

Maamoun al-Homsi avait été arrêté le 9 août, deux jours après avoir entamé une grève de la faim à son bureau de Damas. Jurant de ne pas se nourrir tant que la police d'Etat existerait, il avait alors formulé une série de neuf revendications qui allaient à l'encontre de l'état actuel des institutions en Syrie. Il s'agissait notamment de supprimer les services de renseignements, de respecter davantage l'immunité parlementaire, de réduire la pression fiscale et de mettre fin à la mainmise sur l'économie exercée "par les caciques du régime et leurs enfants".

Sami Moubayed

TURQUIE

Les lampistes paieront pour les violations de l'Etat

Condamné à verser des millions d'euros par la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, Ankara demande à ses propres fonctionnaires de régler la facture...

HURRIYET

Istanbul

La Turquie figure parmi les pays ayant eu le plus grand nombre de condamnations prononcées par la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme. Rien que l'année dernière, la Cour a accepté d'examiner 735 des

3 964 plaintes déposées contre Istanbul. Selon les explications du ministre de la Justice, Hikmet Sami Türk, la somme des dommages et intérêts versés par la Turquie dans les 115 procès qu'elle a perdus, ainsi que pour les accords à l'amiable, s'élève à 21 trillions 513 milliards de livres

turques [16 millions d'euros]. En outre, 4,3 millions d'euros ont été versés pour préjudice moral et remboursement des frais de justice. Les accords à l'amiable, conclus pour tenter de sauvegarder la réputation de la Turquie, ont nécessité le déboursement de quelque 382 000 euros, cor-

respondant à 343 plaintes. De même, les amendes prononcées par la Cour et les frais de justice, non encore payés, s'élèvent à 12 millions d'euros.

L'importance des sommes versées par la Turquie à la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme a conduit l'an dernier le gouvernement à sévir. "Les dédommagements décidés par la Cour européenne et payés comptant par le Trésor doivent être recouverts auprès de l'employé public qui a commis la faute." Le but de cette décision est de pousser les fonctionnaires à ne plus violer la loi. Conformément à cette décision, les versements d'indemnités décidés par la Cour ou correspondant aux accords à l'amiable ont été signalés par le ministère des Finances aux établis-

sements concernés [prisons, postes de police...]. Par exemple, les 26 dossiers concernant le paiement de 700 000 euros (en dédommagement des cas de torture ou de mauvais traitements) ont été envoyés au Bureau du directeur général de la police. Sept dossiers ont été transmis au ministère de la Justice, certains juges ou procureurs ayant indûment prolongé la durée de jugement ou de garde à vue. La plupart des condamnations prononcées par la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme contre la Turquie concernaient les retards de paiement dans les cas d'expropriation. Maintenant, l'Etat turc demande à ses fonctionnaires de payer la facture. Mais l'administration des forêts et des routes explique ses retards

de paiement des expropriations par le fait que "le Trésor public tarde à envoyer les fonds nécessaires"!

Des hauts fonctionnaires des ministères de la Justice, de l'Intérieur, des Affaires étrangères, ainsi que des officiers de l'état-major, se sont réunis pour trouver une solution à ce problème. Ils soulignent tous "la difficulté de faire payer aux fonctionnaires responsables les importantes sommes déboursées par l'Etat". Selon un haut responsable de la police, "un policier, dont le salaire ne dépasse pas 230 euros par mois, devra travailler toute sa vie pour pouvoir rembourser le montant d'une condamnation". **Muharem Sarikaya**

Cozying Up to Iran Won't Help America's War on Terrorism

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — Here is the modern corollary to a Middle Eastern proverb: The enemy of my enemy can be my enemy, too.

Iran's Shiites despise the Taliban Sunnis; fundamentalists of both branches of Islam have long been killing one another. Iran's ayatollahs also hate another U.S. enemy, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who killed a half million Persians in the Iran-Iraq war.

Does that enmity of America's enemies make Iran a friend of the United States? You might deduce that from the warm handshake extended to Iran's foreign minister by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the United Nations last week, the first such contact since the mass kidnapping at the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979. Or from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld when he said on CBS television, "You're going to see new relationships coming out all across the globe."

That's because America has been falling for the tough-cop-nice-cop routine from Tehran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who rules as Iran's religious commander, punishes dissenters as he spews hatred of Israel and "Great Satan" America. Meanwhile, nice-cop President

Mohammed Khatami condemns the Sept. 11 attacks and supports the Afghan rebels, feeding dreams of "moderation" in bloom.

But reformers in Iran's Parliament are repeatedly squelched by Ayatollah Khamenei's ruthless Guardian Council. Suppressed Iranians now know that Mr. Khatami's election led to a false spring. Fifty newspapers have since been closed; the vigilantes of Hezbollah, the Party of God, are urged by clerics to beat up students with democratic yearnings; savage public executions are on the rise. When rumors spread last month that the government had bribed soccer players to lose a World Cup qualifying match, tens of thousands marched in the streets to denounce the ayatollahs and to hail America.

In the State Department's most recent report on global terrorism, Iran beat out Iraq and Syria to win the title of "most active state sponsor of terrorism." This conclusion, unwelcome to dovish policymakers, was not lightly arrived at. Evidence is mounting that Tehran sponsored the killing of Americans at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Even today, Iran's air cargo planes fly arms and explosives to Damascus for

trucking to terrorist headquarters of Hezbollah in Lebanon, for use by suicide bombers against Israeli civilians.

Most dangerous to us, Iran leads the terror-sponsorship world in the development of nuclear capacity. Sitting atop a sea of cheap oil, Iran needs atomic energy like a hole in the head, but its rulers take income sorely needed by hungry Iranians and spend it on nuclear material and scientific know-how from Russia. Vladimir Putin, President Bush's fervently trusted ally, continues to refuse all appeals from the United States and Israel to curtail sales to its customer at the center of terror sponsorship.

Why the intense economic and diplomatic pressure from Tehran on Moscow, which overwhelms the pleas of the Bush White House? Because Iran's

Hezbollah wants its nuclear bomb and no so-called moderates in Tehran stand in its way.

Here's new evidence of Hezbollah's increased power: Imad Mughniya is called by Israelis "the Lebanese Carlos," after the former jackal of terror, because he is suspected of leading a string of hijackings and embassy bombings, including the attacks on Jews in Buenos Aires in 1994. A key figure in

the Islamic Jihad, he has enjoyed asylum in Iran.

Six weeks before Sept. 11, in a meeting in Beirut, the top Hezbollah commander, Hassan Nasrallah, placed Mr. Mughniya on the terror group's governing body, the Shura Council. To maintain the fiction that Hezbollah is a local Lebanese political party, the global terrorist's name was changed to Jawad Nour Din.

Whatever he calls himself, the Lebanese Carlos is now considered by Israelis to be the man selected by Iran's strongman, Mr. Khamenei, to be Tehran's operational leader in Lebanon. The significance is that Mr. Mughniya is not a radical politician, but an experienced international terrorist on the lam from three governments.

In Iran as in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria, local tyranny and global terror go hand in hand. That's why the United States should resist strange anti-terrorist bedfellowship with Iran's tough-cop-nice-cop rulers.

Iran is becoming ripe for democratic revolution. The United States should not ally with the cruel clerics whom secular Persian patriots will one day throw out.

The New York Times.

Le Monde

MERCREDI 5 DÉCEMBRE 2001

Les dirigeants chypriotes grecs et turcs reprennent le dialogue sous l'égide de l'ONU

La négociation de Nicosie se déroule sur fond d'intégration européenne

Le président chypriote grec, Glafcos Cléridès, et le dirigeant chypriote turc, Rauf Denktash, devaient se rencontrer, mardi 4 décembre, pour un som-

met que l'ONU appelait de ses vœux depuis 1997. Le ministre grec des affaires étrangères, Georges Papandréou, a qualifié la rencontre d'« occasion

historique » de mettre fin à une dispute vieille de vingt-sept ans, alors que l'accession de l'île à l'Union européenne est prévue pour 2004.

NICOSIE

de notre envoyée spéciale

Du dernier étage de l'hôtel Saray, le contraste est frappant : d'un côté de la ligne de démarcation, un paysage d'urbanisme prospère, immeubles neufs et grues de construction ; de l'autre, le charme désuet d'une ville provinciale appauvrie, aux petites maisons défraîchies, où le temps semble s'être arrêté. C'est pour tenter de réunir ces deux mondes que les dirigeants chypriotes grecs et turcs, Glafcos Cléridès et Rauf Denktash, vont reprendre le dialogue sous l'égide de l'ONU à Nicosie le 4 décembre. Leur dernière rencontre en tête à tête remonte à quatre ans. Des négociations indirectes avaient été suspendues l'an dernier par M. Denktash, qui réclamait la reconnaissance officielle de sa République turque de Chypre du Nord (RTCN) et des pourparlers sur la base d'une confédération entre deux États indépendants plutôt que l'état fédéral, bi-zonal et bi-communal prôné par l'ONU.

Cette fois-ci, le temps presse. L'Union européenne a déjà annoncé que Chypre figurerait parmi les premiers pays candidats admis dans l'Europe élargie. La décision est attendue l'an prochain. Cette prise de position européenne a provoqué les foudres d'Ankara, qui menace désormais d'« annexer » la RTCN si l'île est acceptée au sein de l'UE en dépit de sa division. « Il n'y a aucune différence entre sacrifier la RTCN et sacrifier une partie du territoire turc », a récemment affirmé Bülent Ecevit, le premier ministre turc, qui avait ordonné l'intervention militaire turque de 1974.

Une telle décision marquerait vraisemblablement la fin du rêve européen d'Ankara. En Turquie, où

la politique officielle sur la « cause nationale » de Chypre a rarement été remise en question, ce risque très concret a, pour la première fois, donné lieu à un furieux débat. Les milieux d'affaires, pour qui la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE est cruciale, ont récemment accusé M. Denktash d'intransigeance. Mais dans la partie nord de Chypre, les avis sur la politique à adopter diffèrent. La présence de 30 000 sol-

gauche, le Parti turc républicain. Tout le monde s'accorde cependant sur le fait que l'embargo imposé par la communauté internationale à la RTCN, qui ne peut pas exporter ses produits vers l'UE et développer son économie, a contribué à pousser les Chypriotes turcs dans les bras d'Ankara. Quelque 45 000 personnes reçoivent un salaire, une retraite ou autre pension du gouvernement de la RTCN, soute-

symétrie, sans égalité, il est difficile de trouver une solution », affirme Peker Turgut, banquier et ancien ambassadeur de la RTCN à Ankara. « Il faut trouver une nouvelle formule que les dirigeants grecs pourront présenter à leur population comme étant une fédération et notre côté comme une confédération ». Les Chypriotes turcs, qui ont un niveau moyen d'éducation supérieur à celui de leurs cousins du continent, n'apprécient pas toujours l'influence d'Ankara. Un fossé semble notamment se creuser entre ceux qui ont vécu les événements intercommunautaires sanglants entre 1963 et 1974 et les jeunes, qui perçoivent l'Union européenne comme une porte s'ouvrant sur le monde.

Le fait que M. Denktash ait suggéré une reprise du dialogue est perçu comme un signe positif, mais peu de Chypriotes turcs semblent croire que la situation pourra se débloquer rapidement. Favorables au gouvernement ou opposants, ils affirment qu'il revient également à l'Union européenne d'aider à mettre fin à une dispute qui défie les médiateurs internationaux depuis plusieurs décennies. « Le progrès n'est possible que si l'UE déclare clairement que Chypre ne pourra pas adhérer tant qu'une solution n'a pas été trouvée, sans quoi les dirigeants chypriotes grecs seront satisfaits de laisser les choses telles qu'elles sont », affirme Dervish Eroglu. A Chypre nord aussi bien qu'en Turquie, tout le monde est conscient que l'échéance prochaine de l'élargissement de l'UE a fait monter les enjeux et que les mois à venir seront cruciaux.

Ankara se fait conciliant sur la défense

S'il se confirme, l'accord annoncé dimanche 2 décembre à Ankara lève un des principaux obstacles politiques à la mise en place de la défense européenne. Le premier ministre turc, Bülent Ecevit, a annoncé que son pays a décidé de renoncer à l'attitude d'obstruction qui était la sienne depuis de nombreux mois s'agissant des « arrangements permanents » entre l'Union européenne et l'OTAN, qui doivent permettre aux Quinze de faire appel, le cas échéant, aux dispositifs et moyens de l'Alliance atlantique pour intervenir dans une crise.

Selon M. Ecevit, les « attentes » de la Turquie ont été « en grande partie » satisfaites, ce qui devrait signifier que celle-ci sera consultée lorsque les Quinze décideront d'intervenir dans des zones relevant des intérêts géopolitiques d'Ankara (mer Egée, Chypre). Cet arrangement apparaît de bon augure pour la suite des relations diplomatiques entre l'Union européenne et la Turquie. - (Corresp.)

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La décision est attendue l'an prochain. Cette prise de position européenne a provoqué les foudres d'Ankara, qui menace désormais d'« annexer » la RTCN si l'île est acceptée au sein de l'UE en dépit de sa division. « Il n'y a aucune différence entre sacrifier la RTCN et sacrifier une partie du territoire turc », a récemment affirmé Bülent Ecevit, le premier ministre turc, qui avait ordonné l'intervention militaire turque de 1974.

Une telle décision marquerait vraisemblablement la fin du rêve européen d'Ankara. En Turquie, où la politique officielle sur la « cause nationale » de Chypre a rarement été remise en question, ce risque très concret a, pour la première fois, donné lieu à un furieux débat. Les milieux d'affaires, pour qui la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE est cruciale, ont récemment accusé M. Denktash d'intransigeance. Mais dans la partie nord de Chypre, les avis sur la politique à adopter diffèrent. La présence de 30 000 soldats turcs, l'arrivée de colons turcs, la dépendance économique et politique vis-à-vis de la Turquie, qui est le seul pays à reconnaître la RTCN, sont considérées par certains comme des facteurs de sécurité et par d'autres comme une source constante d'irritation.

« Les décisions de l'UE ont donné le dessus au côté grec ; mais sans

Nicole Pope

To Stem Terrorism, Depose Saddam

By David L. Phillips

NEW YORK — After surviving the Gulf War and evicting United Nations weapons inspectors, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein is surely continuing to develop an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. But more than settling scores is needed to justify military action against Iraq by the United States and its allies. The international community will not concur with such action unless evidence is uncovered linking Baghdad to the Sept. 11 terrorist hijackings in the United States.

Secretary of State Colin Powell recently told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there was no hard evidence implicating Saddam. But there are enough indications of contact and cooperation between Iraq and Osama bin Laden's Qaida organization for serious concern about Saddam's intentions and global terrorist connections. Defectors from Iraqi military intelligence have disclosed details about a secret training camp in Iraq where terrorists are taught hijacking techniques, including

simulations in the fuselage of a Boeing 707.

There are certainly some links between Iraq and the Qaida cells responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks. The Czech interior minister confirmed that Mohamed Atta, a ringleader of the attacks, met twice in April with an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague.

The Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella opposition group, reports that bin Laden's right-hand man, Ayman Zawahiri, visited Baghdad in 1998. Last spring, Mr. Zawahiri paid a call on the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, a key Iraqi overseas intelligence operative. Immediately after the rendezvous, the ambassador hurried back to Baghdad to report on the meeting.

President George W. Bush has said that the global campaign would target terrorists, as well as countries that harbor them. Iraq fulfills both criteria. Saddam has used chemical agents to attack his neighbors as well as Iraqi citizens. Since UN weapons inspectors were evicted from Iraq in 1998, there has been growing alarm

about Iraq's capabilities to deploy weapons of mass destruction.

Those in the Bush administration who favor action to depose Saddam say that the removal of his regime would eliminate a major threat to world security, help deter future terrorist attacks and demonstrate American resolve to counter rogue regimes.

Key Muslim coalition partners, however, strongly oppose military action against Iraq. They say that there is not enough hard evidence to convince them that such action is justified. Yet there

is a widely shared concern among Western and Muslim countries about Saddam's capacity to do harm. There are steps, short of military action, which can and should be taken in the short term against Saddam.

The United Nations should insist that weapons inspectors resume operations, and impose a deadline. Russia should demonstrate its commitment to the coalition by stopping its obstruction of Security Council efforts to adopt smart sanctions that would hit the Iraqi regime, not the Iraqi people. And front-line states such as Turkey should more aggressively interdict oil


smuggling. The West could support a renegade faction in the Republican Guard, equip an opposition force and recognize a government in exile.

Until Osama bin Laden is killed or captured, international military action against Iraq is unlikely. Many coalition partners would not condone such action without indisputable evidence implicating Iraq in global terrorism. Although Saddam is a threat to international peace and security, getting rid of him is ultimately the responsibility of the Iraqi people. Like anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan, they need international support.

Iraq and Afghanistan could share a common future in which relief from sanctions, debt reduction and foreign aid would help to consolidate democratic development.

The world's attention is now focused on Afghanistan, but success in the campaign against global terrorism will only be achieved when Saddam is deposed.

The writer, deputy director of the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations, contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.



Congressional Letter to Bush: Support Iraqi Opposition

Congress of the United States
December 5, 2001 (Text below)

Dear Mr. President:

The events of September 11 have highlighted the vulnerability of the United States to determined terrorists. As we work to clean up Afghanistan and destroy al Qaeda, it is imperative that we plan to eliminate the threat from Iraq.

This December will mark three years since United Nations inspectors last visited Iraq. There is no doubt that since that time, Saddam Hussein has reinvigorated his weapons programs. Reports indicate that biological, chemical and nuclear programs continue apace and may be back to pre-Gulf war status. In addition, Saddam continues to refine delivery systems and is doubtless using the cover of a licit missile program to develop longer-range missiles that will

threaten the United States and our allies. For much of the last year, the Administration has struggled to plug loopholes in the international sanctions against Iraq. Unfortunately, efforts to coopt Saddam's illegal trading partners - particularly Syria - have failed. In the meantime, the illegal oil trade from Iraq has flourished, and Saddam now earns an estimated \$2 billion annually, much of which he has devoted to his military and his illegal weapons programs.

If we have learned one thing from the ongoing battle in Afghanistan, it is that working effectively in coordination with locals on the ground can significantly leverage our own use of military force. While we have no doubt that in the long run, the United States will always prevail in battle with the likes of the Taliban (not to speak of Saddam Hussein), we also know that we can minimize casualties and shorten conflict by cooperating with opposition forces. That has been a key element of US strategy for several decades.

Since the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act three years ago, we have fought to provide support for Iraqis inside Iraq. The Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella group of all the significant anti-Saddam forces inside Iraq, has consistently requested Administration assistance for operations on the ground in Iraq ranging from the delivery of humanitarian assistance and information-gathering to military and technical training and lethal military drawdown.

Despite the express wishes of the Congress, the INC has been denied U.S. assistance for any operations inside any part of Iraq, including liberated Kurdish areas. Instead, successive Administrations have funded conferences, offices and other intellectual exercises that have done little more than expose the INC to accusations of being "limousine insurgents" and "armchair guerillas". We note the troubling similarity of these accusations to charges made against the Afghan guerillas now helping us win the war against the Taliban.

The threat from Iraq is real, and it cannot be permanently contained. For as long as Saddam Hussein is in power in Baghdad, he will seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. We have no doubt that these deadly weapons are intended for use against the United States and its allies. Consequently, we believe we must directly confront Saddam, sooner rather than later. Without allies on the ground inside Iraq, we will be handicapping our own efforts. Each day that passes costs us an opportunity to unite and professionalize the Iraqi opposition, thus ensuring it will be less capable when the conflict begins.

Again, we can learn from our experience in Afghanistan. We cannot be drawn into the ethnic politics of any particular nation, but should find a way to work with all the opposition in a unified frame work. The Iraqi National Congress is the only umbrella organization comprising all elements of the Iraqi opposition. No one group is excluded, no one group is favored. Mr. President, all indications are that in the interest of our own national security, Saddam Hussein must be removed from power. Let us maximize the likelihood of a rapid victory by beginning immediately to assist the Iraqi opposition on the ground inside Iraq by providing them money and assistance already authorized and appropriated.

We look forward to working with you on this most important matter.

Sincerely,

John McCain Joseph Lieberman Jesse Helms Trent Lott Henry Hyde Ben Gilman Richard Shelby Sam Brownback
Harold Ford Jr.

Cracks appear in Turkish policy on Iraq, but Ankara warns against neighbor's disintegration

Turkish Daily News December 6, 2001 By Lale Sariibrahimoglu

There have been increasing signs of a divergence of opinion emerging, among both Turkish civilians and the military bureaucracy, over the Turkish standpoint in case of U.S. strikes on neighboring Iraq as a second phase of its war against terrorism. Ankara nevertheless cautioned its close ally, the United States, during U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit yesterday, against the disintegration of its southeastern neighbor.

During the past weeks, different opinions emerging among the tri-party Turkish coalition government over possible U.S. strikes against Iraq became apparent when Turkish National Defence Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu did not rule out on Nov. 28 that new conditions might bring new assessments onto Turkey's agenda. Cakmakoglu's statement, which came one day after the National Security Council (MGK) meeting where top generals were also ready, has been interpreted as the military possibly now backing U.S. strikes with certain conditions.

There have been some hawkish active and retired top generals who have also been regarding a U.S. strike against Iraq as a good idea. Earlier, a senior Turkish general speaking to the Turkish Daily News said that as Turkey has given support to the U.S. war in Afghanistan against terrorism, it could not pursue a double standard when it comes to Iraq.

But Cakmakoglu's statement came despite the fact that Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has on various occasions stressed a U.S. strike against Iraq will be undesirable. Ecevit has also earlier openly described as odd a remark made by Turkish Ambassador to the United States Faruk Logoglu that Turkey may consider its position if the United States comes up with solid evidence that Iraq has been involved in terrorism.

Nevertheless, if the United States decides to strike Iraq and finish off its leader Saddam Hussein, neither Turkey nor the countries in the region could do much about it, says a military analyst. "If Turkey is left with a choice of supporting the United States then we have to do our best to safeguard our interests," says the same analyst.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, however, has been cautious in responding to a question during a joint press conference he held in Ankara yesterday with the visiting U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. Cem recalled that Turkey has given support to the United States on every kind of terrorism. Cem also stressed that support should be given not only against terrorism sponsored by states but also for those kind of terrorist acts too which some nations might close their eyes. "Terrorism does not have a geography. Support of terror may take place in the Middle East, in Africa or in Western Europe. We are against terrorism as a whole. On Iraq, we (Turkey) have said that this country has been violating UN decisions, but no country would like to see a neighbor having problems," Cem stated cautiously.

Powell, on his part, once again emphasized that U.S. President George W. Bush had not yet made any plans on Iraq, thus he said that the United States had not made any requests from Turkey to this end. But Powell once again recalled that Iraq has been developing weapons of mass destruction while refusing to allow UN inspectors to enter into the country to verify the state of such weapons.

Cem cautions Powell on Iraq's disintegration

Despite Powell's words that the United States had not made any requests from Turkey, Cem has already cautioned his U.S. colleague over the disintegration of Iraq in case a strike takes place, urging the United States to make necessary arrangements to avoid any such chaotic situation.

The second point Ankara made clear to be heard by United States on Iraq was that the rights of the Turcomans of Iraq, with which Turkey has ethnic ties, and which constitute the second major group in Iraq after the Kurds, should be preserved, and that they must take part in a new political structure in Iraq to be established following a possible U.S. strike. In the final analysis, Turkey has already been making mental exercises over the future of Iraq while displaying the divergence of opinion on Turkish standpoint in case of a U.S. strike.

Turkey holds the key in making U.S. strikes on Iraq easier. But many Arab countries rejecting a U.S. strike on Baghdad have been keen to find out what has been cooking in Ankara on the Iraq issue during the talks with Powell.

Turkey has feared that a possible U.S. strike will not only worsen its already fragile economy but also cause a political instability in neighboring Iraq as well as causing massive migration over Turkey's border.

But Turkey's strong support extended to the United States on its war against terror, say many U.S. officials, will be followed with some gift, such as various formulas to compensate for any economic or political losses.

* * * * *

Court of Cassation to assemble again for Susurluk in December

Turkish Daily News December 5, 2001

The decision on the Susurluk Case has been suspended until a second Court of Cassation meeting set for Dec. 11, the Anatolia news agency reported on Tuesday.

Court of Cassation members were expected to make a decision on the application of Court of Cassation Chief Prosecutor Sabih Kanadoglu on charges of reversing a former decision of the court in the Susurluk case.

Earlier, the Court of Cassation overturned jail sentences handed down to Ibrahim Sahin, the former chief of special police forces and Korkut Eken, a former official of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) who were convicted of organizing and running a crime ring in a scandal known as the Susurluk Scandal linking Turkish politics with underworld gangs.

Sahin and Eken were convicted in February of "founding and directing a gang with the aim of committing crimes" and were sentenced to six years in prison, as a part of the Susurluk scandal.

The court also ordered a retrial for Sahin and Eken and 12 other defendants, including seven police officers, a convicted drug smuggler and two former casino owners, who had previously received four year prison sentences for membership in a criminal gang.

Sedat Bucak, a lawmaker, who survived the crash and current independent deputy Mehmet Agar who was a former interior minister were implicated in the scandal, but were not tried because they have parliamentary immunity.

The long lasting Susurluk case only included a part of the Susurluk scandal participants. There are high expectations that politicians who are involved in this case will be punished too.

A traffic accident that occurred in the Susurluk township of Balikesir exposed the existence of a state-mafia-politics triangle. A super-luxurious Mercedes ran full-speed into a truck, killing Chief of Police Huseyin Kocadag, an "ultranationalist" gang leader, along with alleged murderer Abdullah Catli and his girlfriend, Gonca Us. True Path Party (DYP) Urfa deputy and clan chieftain Sedat Bucak escaped the accident with some injuries.

Special assassination guns, special bullets, forged identifications and false gun licenses signed by Mehmet Agar a former interior minister, were found scattered about the car. The ominous incident, which occurred while a fugitive gang leader and a multiple-homicide suspect, a senior member of the police and a parliamentary deputy were sharing the same vehicle, was instrumental in disclosing the state-mafia-politics triangle.

In particular, after the road accident occurred in Susurluk province on November 3, 1996 dark connections between security forces in the Southeast and the underworld became clear. In short, after the accident the real face of the gang was publicly discovered, and leading names involved in the gang were killed or arrested such as Abdullah Catli and the former head of the special teams, Ibrahim Sahin.

The case sparked widespread protest from a nation demanding an anti-corruption cleanup. Critics at home and abroad have said Turkey's political system relies too heavily on patronage and argue that has contributed to the country's massive debt burden.

* * * * *

Mr Mas'ud Barzani expresses his party's stance regarding the Turkish statements and Iraqi threats

Iraqi Kurdistan Dispatch December 5, 2001

Amid growing tension in the region with possible US strike against Iraq and Iraq's massing of troops on the border with Kurdish-held areas, the leader of Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP, Mr Mas'ud Barzani expressed his parties stance towards the current developments in a speech he addressed to his party members on 29 November. Passages of his speech were broadcast by KTV satellite channel on 29 November 2001.

Mr Barzani said: "As all of you are following the events, we are in an area that could be affected by these events in a way or another, positively or negatively. For this reason, we have to follow these events very carefully and be extremely aware. As far as we are concerned, our people's interest, peace and security is our top priority. I want to clearly say that we will not follow anybody blindly. We will not take any steps that do not serve the interest of our people. We believe in our cause and we gave great sacrifice to it. No one should think that we will sacrifice our cause for something else or put the interest of others before that of our people. We, as the KDP, endeavour, as we have always been, to be a positive factor for the whole of Iraq and especially for the people of Kurdistan. Be assured that we will only do what is in the interest of the Kurdish people."

Without naming them, Mr Barzani responded to the recent remarks by Turkish officials, made earlier last month, about the threat of the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and also the recent threats made by the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who has recently massed his troops on the border with the Kurdish-held areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. He said:

"Often, we have been hearing absurd remarks from various sources talking about a Kurdish state to be formed in northern Iraq and the consequences of such an event; we have also been hearing various threats.

"We will not play with the fate of our nation. We know very well the current situation of the world and we know what are our limits today. Our objective is very clear and it was set by the [1992] elected [Iraqi Kurdistan regional] parliament that expressed the will of our people. Our objective is to settle the issue of the people of Kurdistan on the basis of federalism within the framework of a democratic Iraq. This is our slogan. The reason for adopting it is because we believe that it is applicable.

"We have not asked for an independent state. Not because it is not our right, but because we are aware of the current situation.

"Showing such anxiety or sensitivity is only a provocation of Kurdish feelings. If the Kurds have not demanded such things, why accuse them of it?

"Regarding the threats, we are a peaceful nation and we do not like anybody to threaten us, because we do not threaten anybody. But if someone thinks that he can impose his will on us by force or threaten us to do something that is not in the interest of our people, this person is making a big mistake.

"If we were forced to defend the Kurds and Kurdistan we are ready for it and we are ready for all sacrifice.

"We will continue our path, our peaceful and democratic path. We will not be provoked by other peoples' remarks. But there are facts that should be known, we will not be forced to surrender to anyone.

"The Kurdish question is a cause that can not be solved by ignoring or disregarding it by this state or the other. The state which settle its Kurdish issue first, is the one that will benefit the most.

"The cause of a 30 to 40-million people can not be solved by violence or killing. It could not be done for the past century and it will not be done in many more centuries."

Pointing to his party's stance on terrorism, Mr Barzani said: "We, as Kurds, know that we can never gain anything through terrorism. The only way is peace and dialogue, however long they be. We think that the Kurdish issue has to be settled so that peace and security prevail in the Middle East. (...)

"This is not a stance that we adopted after 11 September. Long before 11 September we have been adopting this stance. For many years the KDP has been against terrorism."

Regarding the implementation of the Washington agreement signed in 1998 between his party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK, with US backing, he said: "Although it did not reach its final stages, but I hope that the remaining obstacles disappear and the process reaches its final stages. (...)

"We have to put the Kurdish house in order because we will only gain through this. If the situation reaches a stage that there is a danger on the Kurdish nation we should completely disregard our internal problems. We should put the interest of our nation above everything else."

* * * * *

IRAK

L'islam voile la face de Bagdad

Le régime irakien a lancé au cours des dernières années une "grande campagne de piété", qui s'est traduite par une islamisation massive de la société.

AL QUDS AL-ARABI
Londres

Depuis 1993, une pratique vestimentaire s'est répandue chez les Irakiennes : elles sont de plus en plus nombreuses à porter le *hijab* [voile qui couvre les cheveux, mais pas le visage]. Le phénomène a commencé avec la campagne de conscientisation religieuse (ou "grande campagne de piété") lancée par le président Saddam Hussein. Au programme : introduire des cours de religion dans tous les cycles scolaires ou en augmenter la proportion ; obliger leaders des partis et hauts fonctionnaires à suivre des séminaires sur le Coran et les textes religieux ; diminuer les peines des prisonniers de droit commun qui apprendraient le Coran et suivraient un enseignement religieux ; construire des mosquées en grand nombre, fonder des instituts spécifiquement islamiques ; organiser, au niveau national, des concours de mémorisation et de récitation coranique pour les étudiants qui excellent en la matière...

Des lois ont été promulguées par le Conseil de commandement de la révolution, la plus haute instance de l'Etat, visant à consolider les principes de la foi et à bâtir une société musulmane développée en fondant des écoles arabes et islamiques. Le ministère des Affaires religieuses a donc pris en charge la construction de ces établissements, la formation des enseignants, la mise en place des programmes. Il s'est également employé à augmenter le nombre de professeurs ou de prédicateurs diplômés, en leur octroyant résidences et salaires attractifs. Dès avant 1995, 436 stages d'éducation islamique avaient été mis sur pied, rassemblant plus de 36 000 stagiaires. Une somme de 345 millions de dinars [environ



► Saddam Hussein, le croyant, écrivant avec la main de quelqu'un d'autre le premier verset du Coran.
Dessin de Farzat paru dans El Watan, Koweït.

1,3 million d'euros] a été consacrée à la campagne de conscientisation, et environ 1,1 million d'euros de primes ont été allouées aux enseignants les plus zélés.

En outre, pendant cette période, nombre de revues et journaux à caractère religieux ont vu le jour, sans compter d'innombrables thèses en sciences coraniques et en jurisprudence islamique. Selon les libraires, ce sont les ouvrages religieux qui se vendent le mieux, notamment auprès des femmes et des jeunes. Quant aux trois chaînes de la télévision irakienne, elles diffusent régulièrement la prière du vendredi et les prédications, ainsi que les cérémonies d'inauguration des nouvelles mosquées et des émissions sur la restauration des mosquées anciennes, sans oublier les cinq appels quotidiens à la prière.

On a pu noter en outre qu'un nombre croissant de femmes de

classes sociales variées (enseignantes, journalistes, médecins, ingénieurs, étudiantes, employées...) avaient

adopté le *hijab* et abandonné les tenues vestimentaires modernes. Si certains sociologues expliquent le phénomène par des mobiles religieux et sociaux, nombre d'économistes l'analysent plus volontiers comme la conséquence de restrictions financières : bon marché, *hijab* et vêtements longs peuvent se porter toute l'année et en toute occasion. Le phénomène s'accompagne de campagnes médiatiques invitant à revenir au Coran et encourageant le mariage précoce.

Hani Achour

Courrier
INTERNATIONAL

DU 6 AU 12 DÉCEMBRE 2001

Irak : convaincre l'ONU *par Raphaël Picon*

COMMENT convaincre ? Comment déplacer un point de vue et modifier une donne géopolitique ? Fin novembre, le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU a voté à l'unanimité une énième résolution prolongeant pour six mois le programme « Pétrole contre nourriture » et acceptant enfin l'idée d'une liste écrite et publiée des biens autorisés en Irak.

Cette mise par écrit permettra de dissiper quelques-unes des nombreuses ambiguïtés qui planent sur ces sanctions. Mais les réformer pour les rendre toujours plus « intelligentes », comme aime à dire l'ONU, procède d'une volonté évidente de les rendre plus acceptables, de les « moraliser », de les entériner. Et comme Colin Powell et George W. Bush veulent nous préparer à la possibilité de nouvelles frappes américaines en Irak, nous ne pouvons nous défaire de cette envie de convaincre...

Depuis plus de onze ans, l'Irak est soumis à un régime de sanctions internationales désastreuses sur le plan humain, politique et géopolitique. Un million six cent mille morts – plus de la moitié sont des enfants. Soixante-dix pour cent des infrastructures éducatives du pays sont détruites, tous les hôpitaux souffrent de pénurie énorme, aucune eau n'est potable, le pays ne s'enrichit plus d'aucune production culturelle, des générations entières ont été sacrifiées et privées de toute potentialité et de tout

avenir. On sait tout cela, et cela reste insuffisant pour changer la donne. Comment convaincre ? Délaissant l'arithmétique morbide, on la remplacera par une autre, plus économique, mais tout aussi glaçante.

Le programme « Pétrole contre nourriture », proposé par l'ONU en 1996 afin d'alléger le poids des sanctions pour les populations innocentes, n'a été d'aucun effet. Quarante-quatre milliards de barils de pétrole ont été échangés contre 26 milliards de dollars de nourriture ; seulement 13 sont arrivés à destination, soit la modique somme de

performative. Ici, dire n'est pas faire. Il ne suffit pas de clamer l'illégalité pour l'imposer à tous comme un fait évident.

Comment convaincre alors ? Délaissant le recours malheureusement infructueux aux grands textes fondateurs de nos droits humains, le discours se risquera ensuite à une parole plus politique. On sait parfaitement de quelle manière le régime de Bagdad s'accommode plutôt bien de ces sanctions qui ont incontestablement huilé les rouages mafieux de la société irakienne et comment son président se sert de cet opprobre international

fiable la présence des grands de ce monde qu'elle doit bien y être délibérée.

Comment oublier que nous avons déjà épuisé 50 % de nos ressources en cette denrée non reproductible qu'est le pétrole ? Le Conseil des Eglises du Moyen-Orient (CEMO), qui rassemble les vingt millions de chrétiens du monde arabe, vient d'organiser une conférence internationale pour la levée des sanctions en Irak. Le CEMO y a exprimé les plus vives inquiétudes face aux dangers considérables que représenteraient pour l'ensemble de la région de nouveaux bombardements sur l'Irak. A plusieurs reprises, le Conseil des Eglises du Moyen-Orient a exhorté l'ONU à devenir « une véritable maison de dialogue ».

Au terme de ces onze années qui ont mobilisé tant d'ONG, tant d'Eglises et tant d'associations, le seul espoir qui reste est que l'ONU rende honneur à son prix Nobel en redevenant précisément ce lieu de débat. C'est alors que de nouvelles convictions pourront y être entendues, nous laissant espérer que le Conseil de sécurité cesse d'adopter des résolutions visant simplement à rendre acceptables des sanctions qui ne le sont pas. De l'ONU, nous devons attendre plus et mieux.

Raphaël Picon est pasteur, chargé des relations internationales de l'Eglise réformée de France.

Les principes non dits qui commandent nos politiques internationales : instabilité, instrumentalisation et utilitarisme

119 dollars par personne et par an. L'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à l'ONU a déclaré le 5 décembre 2000 : « *Le programme est satisfaisant car il comble les besoins de la population.* »

Comment convaincre ? On empruntera alors le discours juridique qui fait remarquer, pour qui veut l'entendre et le sait souvent déjà, que ces sanctions sont en tout point contraires à la Déclaration des droits de l'homme, des droits de l'enfant, à la Convention de Genève, à la Charte même de l'ONU. Mais la parole juridique n'est pas toujours

pour doper sa posture héroïque de grand résistant contre l'arrogance occidentale. Cela aussi, on le sait et on s'en accommode plutôt bien.

Que nous reste-t-il alors pour tenter de convaincre lorsque l'argumentaire s'épuise, sinon à lever toujours plus le voile sur les principes non dits, mais ô combien impérieux, qui commandent nos politiques internationales : instabilité, instrumentalisation et utilitarisme ? Il est incontestable que l'instabilité au Proche-Orient est tellement utile pour y rendre nécessaire et justi-

Expulsion de 34 demandeurs d'asile de Grèce vers la Turquie selon l'OMCT



GENEVE, 7 déc (AFP) - 17h52 - Trente-quatre demandeurs d'asile afghans, irakiens et kurdes ont été expulsés en début de semaine de manière illégale par la police grecque vers la Turquie, a accusé vendredi à Genève l'Organisation mondiale contre la torture (OMCT).

Selon cette organisation humanitaire non gouvernementale basée à Genève, ces 34 personnes appartenaient à un groupe de 89 demandeurs d'asile entrés en Grèce illégalement par bateau le 17 novembre. Ils avaient été placés en détention à Kimi au nord d'Athènes dans la région d'Euboea, depuis leur arrivée.

Mais la police aurait choisi 34 d'entre eux, leur assurant qu'ils allaient être transférés vers un autre centre de détention à Athènes. Au lieu de cela, ils ont été expulsés le 3 décembre vers la Turquie via le port d'Alexandroupolis (Thrace, est de la Grèce), affirme l'organisation humanitaire.

Les autres seraient toujours en détention à Kimi.

Les autorités grecques ont refusé d'accepter les demandes d'asile que voulaient déposer ces personnes, dont

plusieurs avaient été des victimes de torture dans leur pays, selon cette ONG.

L'OMCT rappelle qu'il y a d'autres précédents du même genre qui se sont produits en Grèce.

Fin novembre, le Haut commissariat des réfugiés de l'ONU (HCR) en Grèce avait exprimé son inquiétude sur le sort des immigrés, à la suite de la signature d'un protocole gréco-turc prévoyant le renvoi de clandestins dans le pays de départ.

Le HCR avait appelé le gouvernement grec à "garantir les droits des immigrés, y compris des immigrés en situation irrégulière, dans les procédures de renvoi".

La section grecque d'Amnesty International a également appelé la Grèce à respecter les conventions internationales sur les réfugiés ratifiées par le pays.

Clamor to Oust Saddam Grows

Advocates Assert Debate Has Progressed to Ways of Hitting Iraq

By Elaine Sciolino
and Alison Mitchell
New York Times Service

WASHINGTON — When President George W. Bush told Saddam Hussein last week to submit to weapons inspections or else, he stoked the spirits of a coalition of conservatives, Cold Warriors and Iraqi exiles determined to persuade the U.S. administration to overthrow the Iraqi leader once and for all.

Since the terror attacks of Sept. 11, this loose-knit group with ties to power centers in research institutes, law firms and magazine offices, and to the White House, has been steadily sounding the drums for an American military campaign against Iraq.

If this coalition once looked as if it was fighting a fringe battle, its members now contend that their viewpoint is gaining ground. They say the debate inside the administration is no longer over whether to go after Mr. Saddam, but how.

"It strikes me," said Newt Gingrich, the former House speaker, assessing the mood inside the Bush administration, "that the Saddam-is-evil-and-dangerous wing seems to be winning." He also made it clear that he shared that view.

The campaign, which had its genesis in the Gulf War, is part of a broader battle in the Republican Party's foreign policy establishment, pitting proponents of cautious realism against champions of military activism.

"It's something that has been percolating for the past decade," said Marshall Wittmann, a senior fellow at the conservative Hudson Institute. "It sprang from the failure to eliminate Saddam at that time."

Inside the administration, the guiding principle is to move cautiously in the absence of consensus. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld insisted Sunday that Mr. Bush had made no decisions about the next phase of the war on terrorism.

But there are differences. On one side, Mr. Rumsfeld; Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary; Wayne Downing, a retired general and the president's counterterrorism chief, and Lewis Libby, the vice president's chief of staff, favor a military strategy that would put the Iraqi opposition in power, officials said.

On the other side, Secretary Powell; Richard Armitage, Mr. Powell's deputy, and Anthony Zinni, a retired Marine general who is the new Middle East envoy, insist that the United States should work with its allies to force Mr. Saddam to accept international inspections of weapons facilities. They also favor streamlining the punitive economic sanctions against Iraq.

Mr. Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, is believed to be not quite in either camp.

But the outsiders are formidable warriors. They come armed with credentials derived from years in government, an ability to articulate their message in the media and access to power. Even in the world of Washington politics, their connections are unusually strong.

The group includes a former spy-master, an array of Iraqi exiles and veterans of the last three administrations. In some cases, they are publicly voicing the views that their friends inside the administration cannot voice. In others, they are continuing old battles.

Much of their campaign is ad hoc. "There is no organization, no secret handshake, and if there are any meetings or planning sessions, nobody invites me," said James Woolsey, a lawyer and former director of central intelligence who has rankled many senior administration officials with his point-blank assertions that Mr. Saddam is tied to a series of terrorist plots.

Mr. Woolsey described his role modestly, saying: "I'm just practicing law. If the press calls, I answer the phone. If

someone asks me to be on CNN, I go."

Perhaps the group's most important power base is the Defense Policy Board, a bipartisan group of national security experts that meets in a room just outside the office of the secretary of defense.

Its 18 members include Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of state; Harold Brown, the former secretary of defense; Admiral David Jeremiah, the former deputy chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff; Dan Quayle, the former vice president; James Schlesinger, a former secretary in both the defense and energy departments; Mr. Gingrich and Mr. Woolsey.

Under its chairman, Richard Perle, a former assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, the board has assumed a quasi-official status.

In September, the secretary of defense's office of protocol invited Ahmed Chalabi, who heads the London-based Iraqi National Congress, and Khidhir Hamza, a former director of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, to brief the group.

"Rumsfeld was in and out of the meetings, and he offered a general statement of support for us," said Francis Brooke, the Washington adviser to the opposition group, who also attended the meeting. "He said: 'We're with you. Don't worry.' He and Ahmed are good friends."

Neither Secretary Powell nor George Tenet, the director of central intelligence, both of whom have grave reservations about Mr. Chalabi's leadership, knew that the Iraqis were there, senior administration officials said. "It's outrageous that these guys were there," said one senior official. "They could end up influencing policy."

But Mr. Perle has tirelessly promoted the Iraqi National Congress for a strategic role that would have the U.S. military occupy southern Iraq, create a new government of Iraqi exiles and protect them until Mr. Saddam is overthrown.

Afghanistan is a template, he says, noting, "The Northern Alliance could not have taken an inch of territory until

we supplied them with ammunition."

Indeed, Mr. Rumsfeld on CNN this past weekend called Mr. Perle "very bright, very talented," but noted: "He is

not a government official. He does not speak for the president. He does not speak for me."

Bush Hasn't Decided What to Do About Iraq, Powell Tells Turks

The Associated Press

ANKARA — Secretary of State Colin Powell told anxious Turkish leaders Wednesday that President George W. Bush had not yet decided whether the next phase of the war on terrorism should include Iraq.

The United States remains concerned about the efforts of the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, General Powell said.

"But the president has made no decision with respect to what the next phase in our campaign against terrorism might be," he said.

Turkish officials had pressed General Powell to clarify the U.S. position amid rising speculation that the United States might target Iraq next.

"No country would like to see trouble" in its neighborhood," said the Turkish foreign minister, Ismail Cem, at a joint news conference with General Powell.

General Powell welcomed "positive developments" at talks in Germany about a post-Taliban government.

"Now the real work is ahead, as we put that interim government in place in Kabul," he said.

General Powell said the United States would consult its allies over "what support may be required to make it a viable government."

Turkey, the first Muslim country to pledge troops to serve as peacekeepers in Afghanistan, has expressed concern about widening the war to Iraq.

Turkey was a launching pad for allied air attacks against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. There remain about 50 U.S. warplanes in southern Turkey to monitor a "no flight" zone over northern Iraq.

Some hard-liners in the Bush administration want Iraq to be the next theater in the war, but General Powell insisted that no decision had yet been made.

"The president has indicated for a long time that we are concerned about Iraq as it tries to develop weapons of mass destruction," General Powell said. "We're doing everything we can to keep it from getting such weapons. We also know that Iraq is a sponsor of terrorism over the years. And that continues to be a concern of ours."

Recent remarks by Mr. Bush and other U.S. officials have fueled speculation that an Iraq campaign might be next. Mr. Bush challenged Mr. Saddam late last month to allow UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq and declared that Mr. Saddam would "find out" the consequences if he refused.

The Turkish government fears that if Mr. Saddam is overthrown, Iraqi Kurds who control a de facto autonomous zone in northern Iraq would take advantage of a power vacuum to establish a Kurdish state.

This, in turn, could fuel the aspirations of autonomy-seeking Kurdish guerrillas in Turkey.

■ 'All Options' on Table

James Gerstenzang of the Los Angeles Times reported earlier from Washington:

Mr. Bush has held out the possibility that the war on terrorism might eventually lead U.S. military forces to targets beyond Afghanistan.

While Bush administration officials have repeatedly said they are keeping all options open in their avowed worldwide war on terrorism, the president's remarks about sending troops to more countries come as success in Afghanistan appears likely and there is an increasing focus on where to go next.

Officials at a variety of U.S. government agencies, including the Pentagon and the State Department, are drafting post-Afghanistan strategies for rooting out terrorism. National security aides are debating whether U.S. military force should next be directed at Iraq.

"There may be need to use military troops elsewhere," Mr. Bush said. "I just want the American people to know that we're keeping all options on the table."

The president made the comments in an interview recorded in the White House for broadcast Wednesday on ABC News' "20/20."

His remarks were made amid seemingly rapid progress in the current phase of the war in Afghanistan and after warnings to Mr. Saddam last week.

Without making a specific threat, Mr. Bush said Mr. Saddam must let United Nations weapons inspectors back into Iraq. He suggested Tuesday that the United States' progress in Afghanistan might even change Mr. Saddam's opposition to inspections.

"It may just be that countries say, 'Well, gosh, there's a full intent of the coalition to hold us accountable for harboring terrorists and/or developing weapons of mass destruction which could be used by terrorists,'" he said, adding: "They may say, 'Please, come in.'"

Does that mean, Mr. Bush was asked by Barbara Walters, who did the interview, that Iraq might say, "Please come?"

The president replied: "Could very well be. We don't know yet."

More than a dozen possible target countries beyond Afghanistan have been mentioned, including Iraq, Colombia and North Korea.

Considered among the most likely next targets are some of the weaker and poorer countries in Asia and Africa, including Somalia, Yemen and Sudan, where Qaida and other terrorist groups have become established.

What Worked in Kabul Won't in Baghdad

Washington Post

By Henri J. Barkey December 9, 2001;

So -- next stop, Baghdad?

That's what some Bush administration officials are hoping in the wake of the resounding success of the war in Afghanistan. Having so swiftly routed the Taliban, they proclaim, we should now move to depose Saddam Hussein and rid ourselves of a terrorist threat even greater than al Qaeda. According to this thinking, the United States can adopt a strategy similar to the one we used in Afghanistan: If we can only empower and help the Iraqi opposition, then Saddam's regime, too, can be undone. For these officials, a number of whom are veterans of

Ronald Reagan's presidency, it's not a surprising way to think: They hearken back to the 1980s and the Nicaraguan contras' war against the Sandinistas as another example of the successful use of internal opposition to dislodge an undesirable regime.

But imagining that we can duplicate these happy outcomes in Iraq could be dangerous. Not only is Saddam Hussein hardly the pushover the Taliban has turned out to be, there is a real question as to whether a credible Iraqi opposition exists anywhere other than in the minds of a few hawks in Washington. Certainly, there is no fighting force comparable to the Northern Alliance for the United States to back.

When people speak of the "Iraqi opposition," they are generally referring to the Iraqi National Congress (INC), headquartered in London and led by Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, a banker with a PhD in mathematics from MIT and strong contacts in Washington. This is the group upon which Congress has bestowed its largess since the end of the Persian Gulf War, and the group some Bush administration officials and supporters on the Hill still champion as the great hope of Iraqi liberation.

The INC is nominally an umbrella organization uniting a variety of regime opponents, including the two largest constituent groups of the Iraqi demographic mosaic: the Kurds of the north (who make up 20 to 25 percent of the Iraqi population) and the Shiites of the south and of Baghdad's shantytowns (the country's majority at 55 percent). But unity, in the case of the INC, is strictly a relative term. For its entire existence, the group has reflected and suffered from the divisions that have historically bedeviled Iraq and enabled regimes such as Saddam's to survive.

Chalabi, who single handedly built the INC from the ground up, is a Shiite who has tried to remain above the sectarian fray, but he cannot escape the suspicions of the Sunni minority of central Iraq, which is as critical to any coalition in Iraq as the Pashtuns are in Afghanistan. Saddam not only bases his power on this Sunni minority, but to keep them in line, he exploits their fear that his overthrow would give rise to a vengeful Shiite-based regime.

For a time after the Gulf War, the INC was an important -- but certainly not overwhelming -- source of opposition to the regime in Baghdad. Based in the Kurdish-controlled north, it had extensive contacts within the country, and, with Kurdish backing, it had modest military force behind it. It helped lure defectors from Saddam's military machine and in 1995 undertook a small military campaign against Iraqi forces with one of the two Kurdish factions, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). But it fell apart in the fall of 1996, when infighting between the two Kurdish camps escalated into civil war. Saddam entered into a temporary alliance against the PUK with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and ordered Iraqi forces into Kurdish territory. By the time they left, Saddam had achieved a critical goal: He had demolished the INC apparatus in northern Iraq, torturing and killing countless of its operatives.

It was a debacle for the INC. With its networks smashed, the organization lost much of its international credibility. Chalabi and others were forced to flee to the West. The Clinton administration's decision to retaliate by launching a few cruise missiles at targets in southern Iraq further disheartened the movement, and internal tensions degenerated into squabbling. Increasingly, Iraqi opposition figures complained about Chalabi's autocratic style and his reluctance to share information. The Kurds remained under the INC umbrella, mostly to please the United States, but ceased to be eager supporters. More and more, the INC seemed to derive its strength not from its component parts, but from Chalabi's Washington connections. Slowly, Chalabi seemed to become the INC, and the INC nothing more than Chalabi.

Since 1996, Washington is the only place the INC has scored any victories. Despite the group's dysfunction, U.S. lawmakers and officials have never given up trying to put Humpty Dumpty together again.

In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, allocating some \$97 million in aid to the INC. But the fractured movement has proven incapable of making use of these resources. Meanwhile, the State Department appointed a special liaison to help remake the INC into a broad-based opposition movement. We at State had great admiration for what Chalabi had accomplished in creating the INC, but by this time we found that the department's and Chalabi's visions of a future course of action were at odds with each other. While State wanted the INC to concentrate on rebuilding internally -- and away from Iraq -- Chalabi thought his group could re-infiltrate the homeland. Ironically, this dispute continues to this day, despite the change in administrations. Last month, the INC refused a State Department offer of \$8 million because the department would not allow the funds to be used for INC activities inside Iraq.

The INC today exists essentially in name only. There is no muscle behind Chalabi. Both the Kurds and the Shiites pay only the feeblest lip service to the group. These two groups are the only opposition movements with real forces on

the ground in Iraq, but they would be highly unlikely to bow to the INC if the United States made a move against Saddam.

No opposition movement in history, of course, has been absolutely free of internecine fighting. Had we focused on the splits in the French Resistance during World War II, the movement may never have existed at all. Still, those who look to the INC to free Iraq from Saddam Hussein would do well to consider how different the Iraq experience would be from Afghanistan. As weak and disorganized as the Northern Alliance was, it had been physically fighting the Taliban since 1996. More importantly, in the Taliban, it confronted an army nearly as weak and disorganized as itself. The Iraqi military, though weakened by years of U.N. sanctions, is still a formidable force. The Kurds, while armed, are no match for Iraqi Revolutionary Guard divisions.

Furthermore, unlike the Northern Alliance, Chalabi and his INC do not enjoy the support of any of the states bordering Iraq. Iraq's neighbors worry the country might break up in a post-Saddam environment; some, such as Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, would prefer Saddam in Baghdad to most other alternatives.

The good news from Afghanistan is that an opposition force aided and abetted by U.S. airpower and ground troops can indeed unseat a regime. But the bad news is that the overthrow of the Taliban couldn't have been achieved without U.S. power. In fact, before Sept. 11, the Northern Alliance was on the verge of collapse. This clearly means one thing: Repeating "the Afghan success story" in Iraq would require a major U.S. military commitment. The question is, how much is the United States willing to invest in the effort to overthrow Saddam?

Before we engage in an opposition-based strategy in Iraq, we should explore alternatives to a direct military confrontation. A better approach would be an all-out, coercive diplomatic offensive to unseat Saddam -- backed by the threat of using U.S. ground forces. Our greatest handicap in confronting the dictator is the fact that no one wants us to intervene militarily: The regional powers, Russia, France and some of our other European allies are deathly afraid of the ramifications of a U.S. attack. Yet this fear is, at the same time, our ace in the hole. These governments know that a U.S. administration flush with victory in Afghanistan and with significant domestic public support can do just about anything it chooses. If they do not want us to go in with guns blazing, they need to get behind a diplomatic strategy -- one that could well involve Chalabi and the INC to accomplish our objective.

We have yet to try such a diplomatic approach. But it may prove to be less expensive and more promising than trying to make the INC into a force that could lead a military charge for us.

Henri Barkey, professor of international relations at Lehigh University, served on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff from 1998 to 2000.

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From Iran, Fresh Signs Of Shift in Tone on U.S.

By Amy Waldman
New York Times Service

TEHRAN — For 22 years, and as recently as last week, chants of "Death to America" have been used to rally the Islamic revolution's faithful at the Friday prayers.

But since the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States and during the subsequent war in Afghanistan, a rhetorical counter-current is gathering strength here.

Talk to America.

For the first time since the United States severed relations with Iran in 1980, officials here are openly pushing for a resumption of dialogue. For now, they say, it should be over Afghanistan, but they also describe Afghanistan as only a means to the end of eventually resuming relations.

In the press and on the street, there is an increasing boldness about arguing the merits — seen as primarily economic — of talking.

Members of Parliament openly discuss their desire for a dialogue and have established a parliamentary committee to push for one. An adviser to President Mohammed Khatami wrote an article calling for him to sit at the negotiating table with President George W. Bush over Afghanistan.

Even a leading conservative, Mohsen Rezai, the secretary general of the powerful Expediency Council, has acknowledged the two countries' common interests in Afghanistan and obliquely suggested that better relations might be possible, were the United States to take the first step.

"There is a new discourse for relations with America," said Ahmed Bourghani, a member of Parliament.

But discourse is both everything and nothing in Iran. It can signal a fundamental policy shift. But given the country's constitutional structure, in which appointed clerics have far more power than elected representatives, it

can also demonstrate the powerlessness of those seeking such a shift to effect it.

Relations with the United States have become one more political weapon in the pitched battle between reformers, who tend to favor relations, and conservatives, who at least publicly oppose them. As reformers intensify their calls for dialogue, conservatives step up their opposition, and some reformers say conservatives may try to stall any improvement in relations to prevent reformers from getting credit.

Similarly, there is resistance in the United States to any improvement of ties with Iran. The United States believes that Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction including, with Russia's help, nuclear weapons. While it is not clear whether Iran still harbors terrorists, the country has not disavowed support for groups like the radical Palestinian group Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Iran, which bristles every time it makes the annual State Department list of countries that support terrorism, argues that it does not define such groups, which it sees as engaged in a struggle against an occupying force, as terrorist.

Iranian reformers are also ruffled by the rhetoric of those U.S. policymakers implacably opposed to improving ties with the current Iran. Richard Perle, a Pentagon adviser, recently said, "We should be doing everything we can to encourage the centrifugal forces in Iran that, with any luck, will drive that miserable government from office."

Mahmoud Shamsolvaezin, a journalist and political analyst, likened the ties between Washington and Tehran, which was ruled for decades by a pro-American shah put in place with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency, to a long-lost marriage in which both partners harbor lingering tinges of passion.

Before Mr. Khatami traveled to New York last month for the UN General Assembly, for example, Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Sayed Ali

Khamenei, delivered a harsh attack on those calling for closer ties with the

For the first time since 1980, officials are pushing to resume dialogue.

United States, saying that anyone who did so was unfit to hold office. Many people interpreted that as a warning to Mr. Khatami against talking to U.S. officials.

Soon afterward, the leader of Iran's judiciary created a legal committee to deal with members of Parliament and other political officials if they called for starting dialogue with the United States, although it is not clear whether anyone has actually been called before the committee yet.

There is certainly a radical faction of conservatives who see opposition to the United States as essential to their political survival. Others are believed to fear that a renewal of economic ties, and the probable resulting influx of U.S. products, could undermine the economic control they have amassed since the revolution via government-controlled monopolies.

Some conservatives, on the other hand, secretly favor closer ties, believing that they would profit economically.

Close watchers say that even Ayatollah Khamenei's position is more complicated than it might appear. Two recent developments, they say, almost certainly had his approval: a dinner meeting between Iran's representative to the United Nations and members of the U.S. Congress, and the dispatching of Kamal Kharrazi, the foreign minister, instead of his deputy, to the second meeting of representatives of the six countries that border Afghanistan with those of the United States and Russia. Yet another sign: Mr. Kharrazi shook hands there with the U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell.

Some say that Ayatollah Khamenei's allowing any talks with the United States would be a concession of the failure of the Islamic revolution, which was built in large part on opposition to the "Great Satan." As the writing outside the former American Embassy in Tehran says, "On that day when the United States of America will praise us, we should mourn."

Herald INTERNATIONAL Tribune

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DECEMBER 12, 2001

Une équipe de médiateurs américains pour des Kurdes d'Irak



WASHINGTON, 10 déc (AFP) - 21h59 - Une équipe américaine dirigée par un diplomate de haut rang est en mission de médiation entre factions kurdes rivales dans le nord de l'Irak, a annoncé lundi le département d'Etat, en soulignant que Washington entend montrer ainsi son soutien à l'opposition irakienne.

L'équipe, dirigée par Ryan Crocker, vice-secrétaire d'Etat adjoint pour les affaires du Proche-orient, doit rencontrer des membres du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK) et de l'Union patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK), a précisé le porte-parole adjoint du département d'Etat Philip Reeker.

Le dirigeant de l'UPK, Jalal Talabani, et celui du PDK, Massoud Barzani, avaient demandé l'aide des Etats-Unis pour surmonter leurs différends, a souligné M. Reeker.

"Cette délégation est une première étape dans ce processus de médiation", a-t-il précisé.

La mission de M. Crocker doit servir à démontrer "l'engagement continu des Etats-Unis au côté de l'opposition irakienne". Elle permettra également, notamment, d'évaluer la mise en oeuvre du programme pétrole-contre-nourriture dans le nord de l'Irak, a dit M. Reeker.

Saddam Hussein avait relancé le mois dernier, en vain, son offre de dialogue aux Kurdes du nord de l'Irak, qui échappe à son contrôle depuis la fin de la guerre du Golfe en 1991.

Le Kurdistan irakien s'est soulevé contre le régime de Bagdad après la guerre du Golfe et, depuis, les provinces d'Erbil, Souleimaniyeh et Dohuk sont contrôlées par le PDK et l'UPK. Le PDK contrôle les zones les plus proches de la frontière turque, l'UPK celles proches de la frontière iranienne.

Un député irakien dénonce la visite d'une délégation US dans le Kurdistan



BAGDAD, 11 déc (AFP) - 13h12 - Un député irakien a dénoncé mardi la visite d'une équipe américaine, dirigée par un diplomate de haut rang, dans le Kurdistan irakien, la qualifiant d'"une ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de l'Irak".

"Cette visite est une nouvelle mesure agressive de l'administration américaine contre l'Irak, une ingérence dans ses affaires intérieures et une violation flagrante de toutes les conventions internationales", a déclaré à l'AFP M. Salem Koubeissi, président de la commission des Affaires arabes et internationales au Conseil national (parlement).

Cette visite "confirme que les Etats-Unis, la super-puissance mondiale, viole les lois et fait fi des conventions internationales", a souligné M. Koubeissi.

Le porte-parole adjoint du département d'Etat Philip Reeker avait indiqué lundi que l'équipe, dirigée par Ryan Crocker, vice-secrétaire d'Etat adjoint pour les affaires du Proche-orient, devait rencontrer des membres du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK) et de l'Union patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK), dans le cadre d'une médiation entre les deux factions rivales dans le nord de l'Irak.

Le président irakien Saddam Hussein a relancé le mois dernier, en vain, son offre de dialogue aux Kurdes du nord de l'Irak, qui échappe à son contrôle depuis la fin de la guerre du Golfe en 1991.

Cinquante Kurdes syriens de l'East Sea obtiennent le statut de réfugié



LYON (France), 12 déc (AFP) - 17h47 - Cinquante Kurdes syriens, accueillis dans la banlieue de Lyon (centre-est) après l'échouement du navire East Sea en février 2001 sur une plage du sud-est de la France, ont obtenu le statut de réfugié, a annoncé mardi l'association Forum Réfugiés.

"Cela se termine bien parce que nous avons pu les garder et les convaincre qu'il était possible de rester", a déclaré à l'AFP Olivier Brachet, directeur de Forum Réfugiés, association basée à Villeurbanne.

L'association estime que 145 à 150 des 910 réfugiés -- hommes, femmes et enfants -- de l'East Sea se trouvent encore dans ses structures d'accueil, à Villeurbanne, mais aussi Istres, Manosque (sud-est), Migennes (centre-est) et Lagrasse (sud).

"Dans les autres centres (de Forum Réfugiés), certains ont déjà obtenu le statut de réfugié, et si les dossiers ont été bien préparés, ils devraient tous l'obtenir à terme", a estimé Mourad Talbi, responsable du service d'accueil d'urgence de Forum Réfugiés.

Pour les 50 personnes accueillies à Villeurbanne --27 adultes et 23 enfants--, Forum Réfugiés propose désormais des cours de français et une démarche d'insertion par le travail et la recherche d'un logement autonome.

La majorité des Kurdes qui sont restés en France après avoir débarqué du cargo sont de nationalité syrienne, selon le CIMADE, une association d'aide aux réfugiés.

Neuf cent dix personnes avaient été recueillies sur le navire échoué dont 380 enfants et 430 adultes. Plus d'une centaine avaient déposé une demande de séjour en France comme réfugié politique.

La police turque a arrêté un responsable du PKK (agence Anatolie)



ANKARA, 13 déc (AFP) - 11h29 - La police turque a récemment interpellé à Ankara un responsable présumé du Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) qui a été écroué après sa comparution devant une Cour de sûreté de l'Etat, a indiqué jeudi l'agence officielle Anatolie.

Baris Cengiz serait le responsable pour l'Anatolie centrale du PKK. Deux autres militants ont été interpellés lors des opérations de la police, dont la date n'a pas été précisée par l'agence.

Lors de son interrogatoire, Baris Cengiz, alias Baran, a indiqué s'être rendu en Grèce après avoir été libéré de prison consécutivement à une interpellation en 1996, affirme l'agence.

Il aurait séjourné dans un "camps du PKK à Athènes" et se serait rendu ensuite à Damas où il aurait suivi en 1998 un programme d'entraînement donné personnellement par Abdullah Ocalan, le chef du PKK condamné à mort en 1999 par la justice turque sur l'île d'Imrali (nord-ouest) où il est emprisonné.

Cengiz se serait par la suite rendu "dans un pays voisin", où il a été nommé "responsable pour l'Anatolie centrale" par Osman Ocalan, frère d'Abdullah qui se cache en Iran ou dans le nord de l'Irak, selon les autorités turques, ajoute l'agence.

Le PKK a abandonné en septembre 1999 sa lutte armée, à l'appel de son chef Ocalan. Depuis les combats dans le sud-est ont depuis considérablement diminué. Mais l'armée turque s'est dite déterminée à traquer "jusqu'au dernier" les rebelles kurdes.

Baghdad renews contacts with pro-Kurdish tribes

Iraq Press December 16, 2001

Arbil - The Iraqi government is trying to rally Kurdish tribes within areas under its control through largesse and other benefits.

The move comes amid heightened tension as the government builds up troops in areas close to the semi-independent Kurdish enclave outside its jurisdiction. The authorities hope to use the tribesmen as foot soldiers to destabilise the Kurdish-ruled areas following reports that leaders of the main Kurdish parties have spurned recent calls by President Saddam Hussein for a dialogue.

It is not clear how far the government will succeed in mobilizing Kurds living in areas under its control particularly in the northern city of Mosul and the oil-rich center of Kirkuk. About one million Kurds live outside the Kurdish-controlled enclave many of them with relatives and families in Kurdish-held areas.

Iraqi government's move also comes at a critical juncture. Many observers believe the United States is intent to use the Kurdish region as a launch pad for attacking Saddam's regime. The measure also follows a crucial visit by a U.S. Department delegation to the region, which the observers interpret as a gesture of continued U.S. commitment to the protection of Kurds.

The delegation, led by senior State Department official Ryanb Crocker, met leaders of the two main parties in the region. The leaders, Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have both expressed satisfaction with the visit.

It is not the first time the authorities try to use Kurds against Kurds. Pro-government Kurds in Mosul formed the bulk of the so-called "national battalions", which the authorities deployed to quell rebellion in northern Iraq.

Kurdish sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, say the authorities were reviving the battalions in the hope of using them in any operations against the rebels. The pro-government Kurds have recently lost prestige and credibility in the eyes of their countrymen. The government hopes to resurrect their influence once again.

Apart from cash, weapons and other benefits the government is said to be giving each of the Kurdish tribal chiefs in its areas huge amounts of diesel fuel almost free of charge to sell on the open market. One source told Iraq Press that each chief is given on average 6,000 liters of diesel per day. The amount at current prices is worth up to 700,000 dinars (about 450 dollars) - a huge sum in Iraq.

The source said certain tribal chiefs were getting up to 20,000 liters a day. The government apparently hopes the chiefs will make enough money to recruit their men for yet another fight with their ethnic brethren in the north.

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"The Other Iraq"

JERUSALEM REPORT Michael Rubin
December 17, 2001

In the safe haven of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Jews and Israel are remembered fondly, if increasingly vaguely.

"THEY CALL That lack of restraint?" the former Iraqi army officer exclaimed, while watching the BBC's coverage of the Al-Aqsa Intifada on satellite TV last winter. "If this demonstration were held in Baghdad, there'd be 10,000 bodies in the street," said the Arab from Baghdad who now teaches in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Almost 4 million people live in the safe haven of northern Iraq. A de facto autonomous region, it has been administered by the Kurds since 1991 when Saddam Hussein withdrew his administration in a failed bid to embargo the insurgent Kurdish regions of the country into submission. The vast majority are Kurds, but there are also many Turkmans and Assyrians. In addition, thousands of Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs have taken refuge in the Denmark-sized haven, which was created by the United Nations and is protected by U.S. guarantees. They have either fled from Saddam's rule or surreptitiously sought employment in the safe haven, where the economy is better. Others simply come here to shop.

Though the region is run by the Kurds, they don't always see eye to eye with each other, and even fought a civil war from 1994 to 1996. Since it ended the two main parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have basically divided the turf between their rival parliaments, working out of the cities of Irbil and Sulaymaniyah respectively. Unlike the rest of Iraq, residents of the Kurdish-controlled north are free to speak their minds, without fear of retribution. And while the media across the Middle East portray a monolithic anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian sentiment, in this corner of Iraq the truth is quite the opposite.

When they see TV pictures of Palestinians marching through the streets of Hebron, Jenin, and Gaza waving portraits of Saddam, most Kurds feel anything but sympathy. "If the Palestinians love Saddam so much, why don't they try living under him; we'd be glad to move to Israel," comments a professor at the University of Sulaymaniyah. Many Kurds express outright disgust for Palestinian support for Saddam, a man they accuse of genocide.

Memories of the 1988 Anfal campaign are fresh in the minds of residents of northern Iraq. In a ten-month orgy of violence toward the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam's forces murdered some 182,000 Kurdish men, women, and children. Saddam justified his brutal actions by accusing the Kurds of disloyalty during the war. His forces destroyed most of the region's towns and villages. The worst single atrocity took place on March 16, 1988, when the Iraqi air force dropped chemical weapons on Halabja, killing over 5,000 civilians.

THE IRAQI KURDS HAVE RISEN from the ashes of burned villages and destroyed communities. Much of their recovery is the result of the United Nations' so-called oil-for-food program, under which the U.N. funnels proceeds from Iraq's oil sales to humanitarian programs. New schools are apparent in the smallest villages, roads are being repaired and the major cities boast new sewers.

Though the program covers all of Iraq, Saddam appears to have invested more of his portion of the income in the military and new palaces than in reconstruction.

The north's economy also benefits from the fact that the Kurds use an older issue of Iraqi dinars than the rest of the country, avoiding the inflation caused by Saddam's unlimited printing of bank notes in Baghdad. The old notes are worth 100 times as much as Saddam's dinars.

As for the Kurds' distaste for Palestinians, a case in point came in 1999, when the Jordanian director of UNICEF in northern Iraq decided to replace Swedish early childhood education specialists with Palestinians from UNRWA. The local population protested and, according to sources in the non-governmental organization community, UNICEF had to reverse the decision because of the "psychological trauma" the presence of Palestinians caused among Kurds whose families had been subject to Saddam's chemical weapons.

But the Iraqi Kurds' sympathy toward Israel is not simply shaped by their antipathy toward Palestinians. While the Kurds now acknowledge that independence is not an option in their part of Iraq, let alone pan-Kurdish unity with their brethren in Turkey, Syria or Iran, they view Israel as a model of a minority establishing control over its own future. Indeed, in 1967, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, father of the current KDP leader Masud Barzani, visited Israel for consultations with Moshe Dayan, among other government officials. The Kurds hoped for and received some training and equipment, but the flirtation did not last. Instead, the Kurds turned to the Shah's Iran, which could provide them with material assistance more directly.

Today, there remains considerable admiration for Israel, but high-ranking politicians in both the KDP and Jalal Talabani's PUK stress that the neighborhood in which they find themselves – sandwiched between Syria, Saddam's Iraq and Iran -- precludes any relations. As for their neighbor to the north, many Iraqi Kurds blame the development of Israel's relationship with Turkey for preventing real progress in Israeli-Kurdish relations. While Turkey is no friend of Saddam and cooperated in the establishment of the autonomous zone, the Kurdish national issue remains a highly sensitive one within Turkey, largely because of the campaign of terror waged inside that country by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) .

Iraqi Kurds do retain some connection with Israel via the airwaves and cyberspace. Iraqis generally distrust state television. There's a joke about a man who complains that the black-and-white TV he bought in a Baghdad market doesn't work. The merchant pastes a photo of Saddam Hussein on the screen, and exclaims, "See, it works fine. And now it's in color."

But north of the Kurds' line of control, the media situation isn't nearly as dire. Over 50 newspapers are available in Sulaymaniyah, ranging from the Baghdad official press to Kurdish and Assyrian local publications. In Iraq proper, only Baath Party papers are allowed. Those who can afford the \$400 satellite receiver can access the BBC and CNN. Still, many Iraqis rely on the Voice of Israel in Arabic for their news.

A personal experience makes the point. Last spring, I sat in a shared taxi near the dividing line of territory controlled by the PUK and KDP, as a PUK peshmurga (militia man) rummaged through the trunk in search of weapons. Another soldier gazed upward at the clouds rolling over the drought-stricken region. "Do you think it's going to rain?" he asked his comrade. "Yes," was the response, "Israel Radio said it would rain, so it will rain." An hour later I was caught in a downpour. The Kurds also get Israeli TV via satellite. Hotels in the north program guest TVs to receive Israel's Channel 2, and some students in Sulaymaniyah tune in for the American films.

While the Internet is available only to Baath Party elite in the rest of Iraq, the north is fully connected. Sulaymaniyah and other cities boast numerous Internet cafes and home connections. In ministries, universities and

cafes, agronomists surf the website of Ben-Gurion University for hints on desert agriculture, while newspaper columnists and policy-makers check Tel Aviv University's Dayan Center site for the latest developments in Middle East policy.

The personal Kurdish-Jewish/Israeli connection, however, is clearly fading. The older generation of Iraqi Kurds fondly remember Jewish neighbors and friends, most of whom left in the late 1940s and 50s, but younger people don't have the same recollections. Residents of Halabja, Sulaymaniyah, Irbil, Akre and Zakho can still point out what used to be the Jewish quarters, but finding old synagogues and graveyards proves much more difficult. In

Amadya, residents recently argued over where the Jewish graveyard had been -- even though a centuries-old Jewish community had departed just decades earlier.

And as Jews themselves become less familiar, the positive image of both Israel and Jews is, inevitably, on increasingly shaky grounds. The militant Saudi-financed Islamic Unity Movement of Kurdistan, which has grown up along the Iranian border, and its off-shoots tap into dissatisfaction with the arrogance and petty corruption of local administrations in both the PUK- and KDP-administered regions. The Islamists have tens of thousands of adherents today and won over 70 percent of the vote in Halabja in the last elections.

Saudi-funded mosques and schools preach virulently anti-Israel and anti-Semitic lessons. A popular myth circulated by Islamists in the Gulf and Egypt last year, that Pepsi is a secret Jewish acronym for "Purchase Every Pepsi and Support Israel," is making the rounds in Halabja. A university student from Tawella insisted that the Crusades had been fought between the Jews and the Muslims, as he had been taught by a teacher from the Wahabbi sect that holds sway in Saudi Arabia. There are university students who genuinely believe that Jews control the United Nations, and that Jews dominate the U.S. government.

But there are also residents of the safe haven who envision a region where Jews, Arabs, Kurds, Persians, and Turks can live in relative peace, and not only accept Israel, but also uphold the Jewish state's success as a model to be implemented in their own troubled corner of the Middle East. As one university professor commented, "What we want is to get rid of Saddam so that we can do what the Jews did in Israel. We have a diaspora. People will work furiously hard. All we need is security."

And while Kurds may have a special affinity for Israel, the Iraqis' wider disgust with Saddam may make the feeling even more general. A Kurdish pharmacist from Baghdad, visiting friends in the safe haven, told how a mullah who had come to fill a prescription had commented that he would "welcome an Israeli flag over Baghdad so long as they threw out Saddam and then left us to our business. We couldn't care less about Arab nationalism," the mullah told the pharmacist. "We're not crazy like Syria. We just want to rebuild our country."

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Thinking Things Over: Liberate Iraq, Unleash Democracy

Wall Street Journal December 17, 2001

By Robert L. Bartley

As fighting winds down in Afghanistan, Ahmad Chalabi is moving from obscurity to the biggest issue in the next step of the war against terrorism. He's president of the Iraqi National Congress, the anti-Saddam group "dedicated to the institution of constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic government in Iraq."

U.S. officials up to and including President Bush have suggested that the war against terrorism is likely to include Iraq. Saddam is clearly developing weapons of mass destruction, has actually used poison gas and sent terrorists trying to assassinate former President George Bush. But in thinking about military action against Iraq, you come quickly to the question of the INC, with military proposals and political ambitions highly controversial here and abroad. I remember a dinner, for example, where Mr. Chalabi recounted his conversations with the authorities in Saudi Arabia. Yes, they kept telling him, we will help your attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Yes, we are willing to spend money. But late in the week came the caveat: But of course, you will have to forget all this business about installing a democracy.

The Iraqi National Congress asserts, further, that the Iraqi people so hate the Saddam dictatorship that they would rise in revolt and rally to its banner if only the U.S. gave it unambiguous backing. Would a new war against Iraq require the 500,000 troops the U.S. deployed in 1991? Or could it be more like the Afghan fighting, with a local militia backed by U.S. airpower and special forces?

Pentagon civilian planners, it's widely reported, give Mr. Chalabi enough credence to consider the INC as a potential umbrella group for bringing together an armed resistance. Mr. Chalabi, a University of Chicago mathematics Ph.D. from a wealthy Shi'ite family that left Iraq when the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in 1958, also enjoys the support of the U.S. Congress, which earmarked \$29 million for the INC's use last year. The CIA and the State Department, by contrast, regard Mr. Chalabi and his ideas with deep suspicion. State refuses to release money to the INC except for activities outside of Iraq, for example, using the Congressional funds not as support but as a leash. The CIA animus is notorious, perhaps deriving from charges of financial improprieties surrounding the 1989 closing of a bank Mr. Chalabi ran in Jordan. More likely Jordanian authorities were intent on keeping him from exposing their then-substantial financial dealings with Saddam Hussein, and the real root of CIA feelings is that in the past it was burned in dealings with the INC.

Or perhaps a bigger sin, that the INC was burned by the CIA. For Mr. Chalabi and his allies are no armchair revolutionaries. They took advantage of the U.S. "no fly" zone to establish a presence in northern Iraq, attract defectors, momentarily unify the perpetually feuding Talabani and Barzani Kurds, and in 1995 launch a meaningful offensive. Just before the offensive opened, Washington withdrew offers of U.S. support offered by a CIA operative in the field, and the Kurds started fighting each other instead of Saddam. After an abortive coup attempt sponsored by the U.S. and Saudis the following year, Saddam sent tanks into the Kurdish zone to expel the INC; some 150 of its defectors were executed or killed in the fighting.

The U.S., that is, chose to support a palace coup rather than a popular uprising. It did the same thing in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, when insurrection broke out in all but three or four of Iraq's 18 provinces. The U.S. decided let an abjectly defeated Saddam fly armed helicopters to suppress the revolts. Bush administration planners apparently felt the uprising interfered with a planned coup, and may even have thought the helicopters were part of the anti-Saddam plot. The lesson seems to be that Saddam is much better at coups than the CIA and Saudis are.

Backing a popular uprising certainly carries risks. John Foster Dulles pretty much stopped talking of "roll-back" in Eastern Europe, for example, when he found himself unable to justify the risk of supporting the 1956 Hungarian uprising. But the prospects of both military success and political democracy in Iraq deserve to be reassessed in the light of experiences since September 11. The Afghan fighting goes far to vindicate visions of a new era of warfare, with the decisive factor being not massive formations but small, mobile and exceedingly precise strikes. And the spectacles of the Afghans greeting U.S. troops as liberators and Iranian students demonstrating in favor of the U.S. suggest that even among Muslims democracy, or at least freedom in some form, may not be so wild a dream.

In the past couple of weeks I've talked to two authorities who find Mr. Chalabi's hopes quite plausible, both militarily and politically. Former CIA director James Woolsey has in his private capacity become something of an INC advocate, for example representing some of its members in disputes with immigration authorities. He stresses that since the Gulf War airpower has become much more deadly -- only one in 10 bombs dropped then was a smart munition, now even the gravity bombs have a lot of guidance. Regular troops massing to confront a citizen militia would be devastated from the air.

A second and even more impressive believer is Princeton historian Bernard Lewis. His warnings of Muslim rage in 1990 and Osama bin Laden's jihad against the U.S. in 1998 confirm him as our pre-eminent expert on the Middle East. As recently as 1996, he wrote pessimistically about the prospects of democracy in the Middle East. That, he now says, was before he got to know the Iraqi National Congress. He divides Middle Eastern nations into three categories: In those with anti-American dictatorships, Iraq and Iran, public opinion is pro-American. In those with pro-American dictatorships, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, public opinion is anti-American. And finally, in the democracies, Israel and Turkey, both governments and people are pro-American. He adds that Saddam has let his conventional military degrade while investing in weapons of mass destruction, which makes him more dangerous every year he remains in power. An anti-terrorist offensive against Iraq would of course be no light thing, given his capabilities with poison gas and threats to attack Israel. But it's far from clear a popular uprising need fail. And it's entirely clear, at least to me, that the objective should be not to enthrone a Saudi-approved strongman, but to create a pluralistic and modernizing Iraq.

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Turkey: Rays of light

Dec 13th 2001 The Economist By Amberin Zaman

For the first time in a year, Turks are seeing some flickers of hope

A RARE shaft of light has penetrated the gloom which for the past year has shrouded Turkey. The economy, crippled by a recession that followed a banking crisis and currency crash last February, is showing hints of recovery. After nearly four decades of bickering or non-communication, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots are at least back to talking of some kind of deal to reunite their divided island. And just as encouragingly, Turkey has agreed to drop its threat to use its veto in NATO to prevent close co-operation with the EU's proposed rapid-reaction force, after being assured that the force would not be used against it in a conflict with an EU country (read Greece), or in any fight in Turkey's part of the world without Turkey being consulted.

What has caused this startling change of mood? On the economic front, Turkey's odd coalition government of fierce nationalists and mild leftists had to swallow the bitter medicine prescribed by the IMF as part of a rescue arrangement worth \$19 billion, or face a complete collapse of the bank system. The IMF's executive director for Europe, Willy Kiekens, last week praised the Turks for their recent efforts to reform. As a result, he has been negotiating a fresh loan, worth \$10 billion, to help the government service the huge domestic debts that had piled up since it sought to bail out the banks after the February crash.

In any case, the capital share of state-owned banks as a proportion of the total has shrunk from 40% to barely a fifth. As new rules about openness bite, politicians should find it much harder to borrow from state banks as their age-old means of dispensing patronage.

Buoyed by promises of still more cash from the IMF, shares on the battered Istanbul stock exchange have gone up by 23% in the past month, while the Turkish lira, which shed more than half its value after the crisis, has risen by almost 10%. It all amounts to "an economic revolution", writes Metin Munir, a prominent financial commentator in a mass-circulation daily newspaper, Sabah.

This burst of confidence is caused in part by Turkey's growing importance in western eyes since September 11th. After becoming the first Muslim country to offer troops to the American-led campaign in Afghanistan, Turkey has even changed its tune on Iraq: it has indicated that, if America takes on Saddam Hussein, Turkey will not object. "We should go after terrorists wherever they are," said Ismail Cem, the foreign minister, when Colin Powell, the American secretary of state, visited Ankara last week. For good measure, the Turks kicked out Iraq's ambassador, supposedly for links with Osama bin Laden.

The Americans are pleased too by the apparent flexibility of the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, who has dropped his long-standing demand that his bit of Cyprus should be recognised as an independent entity before any peace talks with his Greek-Cypriot equivalent. "Turkey has realised it cannot join the EU until Cyprus is solved and that's highly encouraging," says a European ambassador.

But the shadows still lurk. Bulent Ecevit, the prime minister, who is 76, sounds shaky. One newspaper says that he left a recent cabinet meeting without putting his shoes back on. If he were to resign, his awkward coalition might collapse. And if Tayyip Erdogan, the Islamist-minded former mayor of Istanbul, won an election, as many pollsters predict, the IMF, which he rails against, might just change its mind.

Moreover, many of the country's 12m-odd Kurds (nearly a fifth of the population) go on grumbling. Curbs on the Kurdish language in education and broadcasting are to be loosened, as part of an effort to polish up Turkey's democratic credentials. But the changes have yet to be felt. Security forces in the mainly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, in the south-east, recently banned a local radio station, confiscated its equipment and prosecuted its owner for airing Kurdish love songs. Soon after, police raided the offices of some Kurdish-language publications and arrested their owners, besides scores of officials from the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party.

The crackdown has provoked threats of renewed violence from members of the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party, who have stuck to a truce in their 15-year-long battle for independence since their leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured nearly three years ago. Another Kurdish upheaval is the last thing that Turkey needs.

Iraqi Kurds buoyed by US visit

15 December, 2001 BBC
By the BBC's Hiwa Osman

Iraqi Kurds have hailed the visit of a US State Department delegation to their region as a gesture of continued US commitment to their protection. The delegation, led by senior State Department official Ryan Crocker, met the leaders of the two main parties - Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

The PUK said the Americans had reaffirmed the commitment of President Bush's administration to the protection of the Kurdish region and its 13% share of the UN oil-for-food programme.

At the same time, the Kurdish parties played down speculation that Washington was planning to use the region as a base for attacking Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's regime. The US visitors also discussed the implementation of a peace treaty between the PUK and KDP signed in Washington in 1998.

In an interview with BBC News Online, the PUK's prime minister, Barham Salih, described the visit as "an important reminder of American engagement with the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan". Hoshiyar Zebari, the KDP's foreign relations chief, told the BBC for his part that the visit had been "timely" and was very well received by the KDP and PUK leaders.

"It will have a substantial affect on the morale of the people," he said.

Saddam's approaches

The visit comes amidst growing speculation that the US is planning to extend its war on terror to Iraq.

Baghdad and Washington are engaged in an ongoing undeclared rivalry to woo the Kurds. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has made calls for dialogue in a softer and more compromising tone than he did in November when he vowed to "cut out the tongue of whoever refuses".

The Iraqi president's repeated calls for dialogue are seen by observers as an indication of an increased conviction by Baghdad of the certainty of a US-led attack. A likely scenario in such attack would be for the Kurdish region to be used as a launch-pad for attacks against the Baghdad government.

But the Kurds say they did not discuss any scenario of this kind with the US delegation.

"Any talk of attacking Iraq or turning Iraqi Kurdistan into a launch-pad or replicating the northern alliance scenario in Afghanistan is premature and this was never raised in the talks," said the KDP's Mr Zebari.

Iraqi threat

The position of the Kurds in the case of an attack remains unclear, but it seems it will be dictated by American intentions about the future of Iraq. "It depends on whether this attack is part of an overall policy of regime change or a deterrent policy to bring a new Iraq where the Kurdish people would be fully represented," said Mr Zebari. Another factor the Kurds are taking into account is the ever-present risk of Iraqi reprisals.

"We are very mindful of the implications of any evolving situation on the plight of the Kurdish people," said the PUK's Mr Salih.

He added that Iraqi Kurds had made "an important statement about the viability of democracy" which could have "important bearings" on the future of Iraq.

* * * * *

In search of a policy for Iraq

The US is determined to attack Baghdad. If Europe wants to stop it, it needs to come up with a credible alternative



PHILIP STEPHENS


Maybe the European Union needs a constitution. Probably it does not. One thing is certain. European leaders at today's Laeken summit have more pressing things to do than dream up silly questions for constitutional conventions. They could start by thinking about where the US is going next in its war on terrorism. What, for example, about Saddam Hussein's Iraq?

Every whisper from Washington suggests that the US administration is moving steadily towards an all-out assault on the Baghdad regime. The absence of evidence linking Iraq to the September 11 attacks on America is neither here nor there. George W. Bush has quietly broadened the scope of his war against terrorism. Now it includes any state that develops weapons of mass destruction that threaten America and its allies. Mr Saddam certainly fits that bill. A decade of sanctions has failed to disarm him. So it is time to destroy him.

We are not talking next week or next month. The long-awaited phase two of the US campaign is more likely to focus on al-Qaeda cells in places such as Somalia, Sudan, the Yemen and the Philippines. But the focus will also stay on Iraq. Some time next year, the US may well be re-fighting the Gulf war. Europe has to make up its mind which side it is on.

Afghanistan has provided powerful testimony to US military might. It has also brought us a new type of war – the marriage of American air power and intelligence with proxy armies on the ground. Most important, it has delivered victory faster, and at less cost, than anyone predicted.

We should not miss the



momentum here. One European foreign minister speaks of the air of exultant excitement in Washington at the scope and speed of the Afghan victory. A US official borrows a metaphor from the athletics track. Think, this diplomat says, of a 100-metre sprinter who suddenly finds he has broken through the finishing tape at 50 metres. The athlete is still at full power. It is too late to stop.

The early beneficiaries of victory have been Washington's conservative cold warriors. The liberals, you hear them say, got it all wrong. First Afghanistan would be another Vietnam. Pakistan would fall to

fundamentalists. Riots on the Arab streets would threaten America's few allies in the Middle East. Every prediction was debunked.

But the impulse to confront Iraq runs deeper than the gnawing guilt of conservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz, the defence department deputy, who have never quite forgiven themselves for acquiescing when George Bush senior called a halt to the Gulf war. The case for going after Mr Saddam is heard across a broader spectrum.

The argument is quite a simple one. Baghdad is still developing weapons of mass destruction. It has chemical and biological capabilities

and, perhaps, a few Scud missiles to deliver them. It is working again on a nuclear weapons programme. There have been no United Nations inspections since 1998. The UN sanctions regime resembles nothing so much as a colander. Mr Saddam is still dangerous. Why give him his chance?

Europe has thrown up its hands in horror. Iraq, European leaders say, cannot be compared to Afghanistan. It is a functioning state, albeit a rogue one. Mr Saddam has a powerful army. The Iraqi opposition – the Kurds in the north, the Shias in the south – is weak and fragmented. It would require

half a million American soldiers to take Baghdad. Mr Saddam might well launch his missiles against Israel. Iraq would break into three. Iran, hardly America's best friend, would be the principal beneficiary. The Arab world would be in uproar. The US would lose for ever any role as Middle East peacemaker. And just think what could happen to the oil price.

Most of these are worthwhile points. Many are heard in Colin Powell's state department as well as Europe's chancelleries. One of the obvious things nations should do before going to war is to have a fairly robust idea of the desired political end state. Who should replace Mr Saddam? Should Iraq be divided? Washington's warriors have

yet to provide answers.

The big problem with Europe's stance, though, is that it is entirely negative: a list of things the US should not do.

Missing is an alternative strategy to topple, or even effectively contain, Mr Saddam. A policy that says nothing save that the US must exercise restraint lacks credibility. More, Europe's breathless litany of objections carries a sinister inference that it might even prefer Mr Saddam to stay. Better the devil...

European leaders, of course, would dismiss this as a parody. Of course they want Mr Saddam removed. Failing that, they have been working to ensure that deterrence works. Jack Straw, Britain's foreign secretary, played a pivotal role in winning Russian

support for "smart sanctions" - the targeted trade restrictions that will

next year replace the present generalised system.

It is not enough. If Europe wants to persuade the US that war against terrorism should be waged in failed states and not against rogue states, it has to come up with something better. A lot better. It must signal simultaneously that if fresh efforts to contain Baghdad prove ineffective, it will support US military action.

The *sine qua non* is a commitment to make sanctions effective and secure the return to Iraq of UN inspectors. Russia must be pressurised and persuaded to play by the rules - and if that threatens its economic interests in Iraq it should be compensated. Jordan, reliant on subsidised

Iraqi oil, must be offered the same combination of carrot and stick.

Europeans must show complete solidarity with the US in making coercive diplomacy work. France will have to drop the absurd notion that Mr Saddam can exercise a veto over the choice of new inspectors. Baghdad must be convinced that its divide-and-rule tactics have run out of road.

The leader with the biggest incentive to make this work is Tony Blair. Since September 11 Britain has played a brilliant game in supporting the US and in framing Europe's response. Mr Blair wants a voice in Mr Bush's counsels about what comes next. His popularity in the US has been matched by a new respect among Europeans. A transatlantic split over Iraq would put an

end to that. He would be forced to take sides.

Worse, a US military campaign against Iraq would be the more dangerous for lack of allies. Mr Saddam would benefit. The European case against going to war with Baghdad could be a powerful one. But it has not properly been made.

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U.S. War on Iraq? Some Arabs Are Wary

By Neil MacFarquhar
New York Times Service

CAIRO — Most Arab governments share the American sentiment that removing Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, could much improve the neighborhood.

But, despite reports from Washington that support is growing for an attack on Iraq, there seems to be little stomach yet in the Arab world for watching the United States take war to yet another Islamic nation after Afghanistan.

Indeed, some Arab governments believe that the U.S. priority in the Middle East should be halting the bloodshed between the Israelis and the Palestinians rather than trying to rewrite the end of the Gulf War more than a decade after Saddam's government survived.

The absence of any evidence tying Iraq to either the Sept. 11 or anthrax attacks increases the difficulty of convincing Arabs that it is necessary to strike now. A U.S. attack on Iraq may well enhance the perception that the United States is making Muslims its target and thus unravel the reluctant Arab support for dismantling Al Qaeda.

"Most countries would like to see Saddam go," said a senior Egyptian official. "But attacking Iraq will not solve the problem of Saddam Hussein. It will just attract sympathy for him."

Many Arabs blame the United States for Palestinian deaths because Washington supplies weapons to Israel, and also see America as the prime mover behind the sanctions that have brought hardship to Iraqis. If more Iraqis die under American bombs, many in the region predict,

radical Arabs will gain strength and American allies will feel undermined.

"It will add to the frustration and anger that is rampant in the Middle East," said Amr Moussa, secretary-general of the Arab League. "If you continue to pressure people and act regardless of the feelings of people, you shouldn't blame them if they oppose the United States."

People in the region draw a clear distinction between targeting the Taliban and targeting Saddam.

"The whole policy of the Taliban was opposed by the vast majority of Muslim and Arab countries," Mr. Moussa said, "so the cause of supporting bin Laden and so forth by the Afghan regime was a strange cause, while the cause in Iraq is how to save the Iraqi people from the rigors of the sanctions, which has a very strong appeal in Arab public opinion."

The governments of American allies, notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are already struggling to contain public outrage over their ties to Washington in light of its strong support for Israel.

For the last 14 months, television screens across the region have been filled nightly with images of Israeli soldiers gunning down Palestinian protesters.

So far, Arab governments have contained popular dissent largely by banning demonstrations. But they are wary of their domestic constituencies.

Senior officials in Egypt and Syria have warned of the dire consequences of attacking Iraq. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Abdullah, who runs the country, has made a public display of trying to distance Riyadh from Washington.

For two months he has held almost

weekly sessions with different groups of leaders to explain how the Saud dynasty is trying to put pressure on the United States to help the Palestinians.

"The Saudis are trying to calm down their own internal audience," said Abdul Rahman Rashed, editor in chief of Al Sharq al Awsat, the London-based daily. "They need to take a break from American adventures that lead to nothing."

Any attack on Iraq would require at least tacit approval from the Saudis, not to mention logistical and other military support. They quietly allowed the Americans to use the technologically advanced command and control center at Prince Sultan Air Base south of Riyadh for the attacks on Afghanistan. But it would be far more difficult to maintain such a low profile in combat with an Arab nation right next door.

For Egypt, a coalition against Iraq could be fraught with danger. Discontent is rising — the economy is in tatters and unhappiness over the plight of the Palestinians is rising — and the time seems ripe for Islamic movements to flourish.

"It comes out in indirect ways, in creating tension with Islamic forces," said Bassma Kodmani, a political analyst with the Ford Foundation, speaking of the worries of Arab governments about Islamic movements. "In the inability to confront these forces, political assassinations can happen, radicalization."

The U.S. track record on Iraq makes governments doubly wary. In 1991, Kurds and Shiites responded to Washington's call for an uprising. But they got no U.S. military support and were brutally suppressed by Iraqi forces.

L'Irak sous le règne de la terreur

Un rapport dénonce la terrible répression du régime de Saddam.

La politique de terreur menée par Saddam Hussein contre son peuple reste l'une des plus féroces au monde. « Sous ce régime, la population irakienne subit tout l'arsenal possible de la répression: entraînement militaire des enfants, arrestations et détentions arbitraires, traitements inhumains et dégradants, exécutions, disparitions forcées, nettoyage ethnique et déportations », dénonce le rapport publié vendredi par la Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme (FIDH) et Human Rights Alliance France. Les deux organisations internationales de défense des droits de l'homme n'ont évidemment pas pu se rendre en Irak et c'est en interrogeant, en juillet, de nombreux réfugiés irakiens en Jordanie et en Syrie qu'elles ont réussi à dresser un tableau d'ensemble de cette « répression intolérable, oubliée, impunie ». Le rapport ne donne pas les noms des nombreux témoins cités qui, tous, ont montré « une terreur indescriptible en relatant leur histoire et en imaginant ce qui pourrait arriver à leur famille s'ils étaient reconnus ». L'horreur cible depuis des années les minorités ethniques, comme les Kurdes et les Turkmènes, et des groupes religieux comme les chiïtes. « Le régime n'a cessé d'exclure et de détruire des communautés entières au nom d'une conception raciale de la nation irakienne », affirme le rapport, soulignant l'hégémonie désormais totale des Arabes sunnites et, en particulier, de la tribu de Saddam Hussein. Mais elle

vise aussi à anéantir toute opposition et toute dissonance.

Oreilles coupées.

« Pour maintenir la population dans un perpétuel état de terreur, les autorités prennent des décrets instituant des châtiments cruels et dégradants de façon à ce qu'il y en ait toujours un en application », explique le document. Après les

« Les feddayis miliciens de Saddam ont bandé les yeux des trois hommes, attaché leurs pieds puis leurs mains derrière le dos. Ils ont tiré sur la langue très fort avant de la couper. »
Extrait du rapport



Saddam Hussein lors d'une parade militaire, le 31 décembre 2000.

oreilles coupées pour les déserteurs, il y a depuis le milieu de l'an 2000 les amputations de langue pour insulte à Saddam ou au régime et les décapitations de femmes accusées de prostitution. « La condition misérable dans laquelle vit une grande partie de la population à cause de l'embargo [...] fait que la prostitution s'est réellement développée », note le rapport, mais « il est clair que l'accusation de prostitution est « une couverture » selon le terme employé par les témoins pour décapiter des épouses ou des parentes d'opposants, dont les têtes sont exposées de deux heures à vingt-quatre heures devant les domiciles. » Les membres de la mission ont dressé une liste nominative de 56 victimes en un an. Leur nombre réel serait plus important, quelque 130 ou plus, certains réfugiés parlant de 2000 cas. Le rapport cite plusieurs témoignages directs qui, à chaque fois, mettent en cause les « feddayis de Saddam », la milice personnelle du dictateur dirigée par son fils aîné, Oudaï.

Exécutions. « L'opération se mène en deux temps. Les feddayis procèdent à une descente de nuit en compagnie des diri-

geants du parti Baas du quartier. Celui-ci est passé au crible pour éliminer toutes velléités de révolte et trouver les armes que certains pourraient détenir. La population est mobilisée pour le lendemain à l'heure de la prière de midi ou du crépuscule. Ils débarquent alors au domicile de la victime, dont les yeux sont bandés, les cheveux rasés ou

attachés. Elle est traînée puis allongée la tête pendante sur un établi devant ses enfants, sa famille et toute la population du quartier », écrivent les enquêteurs. Un des témoins raconte ainsi les exécutions, en août 2000 à Rachidia, des épouses de deux hommes condamnés à quinze ans de prison pour de présumées activités islamistes: « Amina était connue pour être une femme honorable, elle avait 25 ans. Ils ont dit qu'elle était une prostituée. Ses pieds et ses mains étaient attachés et ses longs cheveux tirés noués en haut du crâne... 150 à 200 personnes étaient présentes dont des femmes et des enfants. Ils (les feddayis, ndlr) étaient habillés avec une chemise brune à

manche courte et leurs visages étaient découverts, car, pour eux, c'est un motif de fierté de faire ce qu'ils font. Le bourreau avait un assistant qui lui a tenu le sabre. Dans un silence pesant, on a entendu un grand « ha ». Son corps a été enlevé pour éviter le deuil, la famille aussi a été enlevée puis libérée au bout de vingt-cinq jours. » D'autres témoins assurent que des militantes de l'Union des femmes irakiennes (organisation officielle) assistent souvent aux exécutions qui se terminent avec des tirs en l'air aux cris de « Vive la gloire irakienne, à bas celles qui nous font honte. »

Campagne de terreur. Le nombre de ces exécutions aurait commencé à baisser depuis six mois. Peut-être en raison des protestations internationales. « D'autres pensent en revanche que c'est une pratique courante que de lancer une campagne de terreur puis de la diminuer pour en lancer une autre », note le rapport. Cela est particulièrement évident dans le cas

des mutilations. Les amputations d'oreille « pour refus d'accomplissement du service militaire et recel de déserteur » avaient été legalisées par un décret du 25 août 1994. Le décret fut suspendu deux ans plus tard « mais les amputations ont continué au moins jusqu'en 1998, date à laquelle le régime serait revenu à la peine capitale pour punir la désertion ». « Il fallait tout couper au ras du crâne pour que cela se voie », témoigne un réfugié à Amman, lui-même mutilé après avoir été pris dans une rafle et emmené à l'hôpital militaire. Selon les rapporteurs, un nouveau châtimement est apparu l'an dernier avec l'amputation de la langue « pour punir ceux qui ont insulté Saddam ou sa famille ». Des témoins font état de six cas, dont trois dans le governorat de Hilla, à l'ouest de Bagdad. Tout s'est passé sur une place publique: « Les feddayis ont bandé les yeux des trois hommes, attaché leurs pieds puis leurs mains derrière le dos. Ils ont tiré sur la langue très fort avant de la couper » ■

M. S.

POLITIQUE

Commission de réconciliation : les Turcs achèvent la bête

Les Arméniens se sont retirés, après que les Turcs eurent subitement dénié au Centre international pour la justice transitionnelle le droit d'étudier les événements de 1915

La nouvelle est officiellement tombée mardi 11 décembre, sous la forme d'un communiqué : les quatre membres arméniens de la Commission de réconciliation arméno-turque (CRAT) ont décidé de cesser leur participation aux travaux de la Commission, après que leurs homologues turcs «eurent unilatéralement donné instruction» au Centre international pour la justice transitionnelle (CIJT) de ne pas vérifier l'applicabilité de la Convention des Nations unies de 1948 sur le génocide au cas arménien.

Dans leur communiqué du 11 décembre, les membres arméniens de la CRAT annoncent qu'ils ont informé le président David Phillips que «l'existence de la CRAT ne [pouvait] se poursuivre». «Nous continuons à croire qu'il est nécessaire d'aboutir à une normalisation complète des relations entre Arméniens et Turcs et entre l'Arménie et la Turquie. Les contacts entre membres des sociétés civiles arménienne et turque, ainsi que ceux rendus possibles à travers la CRAT, restent indispensables en vue de parvenir à ces objectifs essentiels», soulignent MM. Arzoumanian, Hovhannissian, Krikorian et Mhrianian.

Une semaine à peine après les déclarations de l'Américain David Phillips, qui révélait que les dix membres de la CRAT s'étaient mis d'accord pour confier au CIJT la rédaction d'un rapport sur les événements de 1915 (cf. n° 386), la partie turque a opéré un virage à 180 degrés, très vraisemblablement sous la pression de l'Etat turc, en refusant soudainement à cet organisme indépendant basé à New York le droit de conduire cette étude.

«La confiance mutuelle et le respect des accords conclus sont vitaux pour le succès de toute entreprise commune et de notre commission en particulier», a déclaré Alexandre Arzoumanian à Radio-Liberté. «Comme ces principes n'ont pas été respectés par la

partie turque, nous avons jugé que c'était le moment de cesser notre participation», a-t-il indiqué.

L'ancien ministre arménien des Affaires étrangères et les trois autres membres arméniens de la Commission ont laissé entendre que leurs homologues turcs ont subi les pressions de l'Etat turc, qui les aurait contraint finalement à refuser de confier l'étude des événements de 1915 au Centre international pour la justice transitionnelle (CIJT). Ils ont souligné néanmoins que la Commission n'avait pas formellement cessé d'exister, et qu'elle pourrait reprendre ses activités. «Je pense qu'il serait prématuré d'affirmer qu'elle n'existe plus», a estimé Arpi Vartanian, de l'Armenian Assembly des Etats-Unis. M. Arzoumanian a tenu un discours à peu près similaire, précisant que les contacts entre les deux parties se poursuivront. «Nous discuterons de la situation et tenterons de trouver ensemble les moyens d'en sortir», a-t-il dit, en jugeant probable la publication d'un communiqué commun dans un futur proche. «Ces cinq mois de travail ont constitué un pas important. Ils seront utiles à l'avenir, [si les Turcs] décident de reprendre leurs efforts de réconciliation».

Une source arménienne proche de la Commission a déclaré à Radio-Liberté que «la balle est dans le camp des membres turcs [de la Commission]». «Je pense qu'ils devraient s'en référer à leur gouvernement et décider de la marche à suivre», a ajouté la source.

En Arménie, c'est la FRA Dachnaksoutioun qui a réagi la première, mercredi 12 décembre, au communiqué des membres arméniens de la Commission dans lequel ces derniers annonçaient leur retrait. Le Parti Dachnak considère qu'il s'agit là d'un «aveu tardif» de l'échec des objectifs proclamés par les membres arméniens de la Commission. Ces derniers, ainsi que l'Armenian Assembly des USA, qui ont soutenu cette

initiative, «auraient dû prévoir depuis le début que cette Commission ne visait qu'à saper les efforts orientés vers la reconnaissance internationale du génocide arménien». Durant les cinq mois d'existence de la Commission, poursuit la FRA, de «graves revers» ont été essuyés côté arménien sur des questions exigeant une unité d'action, et le processus de reconnaissance du génocide arménien aux USA et en Europe a été «sérieusement entravé». Par conséquent, estime le Bureau de la FRA, «tous ceux qui ont pris part aux travaux de la Commission ou l'ont assistée dans sa tentative aventureuse sont comptables devant l'Histoire, dans la mesure où les effets négatifs de cette expérience continueront à n'en pas douter à se faire sentir pendant quelque temps encore». Pour le

Parti Dachnak, la réconciliation entre l'Arménie et la Turquie «ne peut être réalisée sans la reconnaissance de la vérité historique». Le dialogue arméno-turc ne pourra être efficace «qu'une fois que la Turquie aura reconnu le génocide arménien», une nécessité sur laquelle «on ne peut transiger». Tout en acceptant la «nécessité d'un dialogue» entre deux Etats souverains, la reconnaissance de la responsabilité de la Turquie dans le génocide arménien «ne peut être séparée» du problème des relations arméno-turques, faisant ainsi de cette question «une partie inséparable de la politique étrangère de l'Arménie». «Plus que jamais», les efforts orientés vers la reconnaissance internationale du génocide arménien vont retrouver «une nouvelle vigueur», et la FRA attend une aide de l'opinion publique et des milieux politiques internationaux dans ce sens, notamment «au regard de la détermination affichée par le peuple arménien pour rétablir et garantir la vérité et la justice».

Côté arménien, le retrait des «4» de la Commission va probablement être accueilli avec un certain soulagement par une opinion publique majoritairement hostile à l'existence de cette Commission. Côté turc, Ankara a sans doute exercé une forte pression sur ses représentants, pour éviter de les laisser à terme dans une situation intenable. Reste à savoir comment vont réagir les Etats-Unis, initiateurs de cette entreprise très controversée. Affaire à suivre. ●

Sentiment Is Growing For Strike On Saddam

By Patrick E. Tyler
New York Times Service

WASHINGTON — The option of taking the war against terrorism to Iraq and Saddam Hussein has gained significant ground in recent weeks, both

inside the Bush administration and among some key allies in the Muslim world, according to administration officials and diplomats from the region.

President George W. Bush's top national security advisers have made no recommendation to attack Iraq. But serious consideration to drive Mr. Saddam from power and planning how to do so are under way in the State Department and at the Pentagon, officials said.

These new considerations appear unrelated to efforts by Iraqi opposition groups and members of Congress who have sought, unsuccessfully so far, to prove an Iraqi connection to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

Rather, in their own statements and in consultations with key allies, senior Bush administration officials have indicated that the success of military operations in Afghanistan is changing

opinion in the Middle East over the feasibility of moving against Mr. Saddam.

European opposition to any move against Iraq remains strong. But Middle Eastern diplomats say that Turkey's leaders have privately signaled that the United States could use Turkish bases if the administration were committed to toppling Mr. Saddam.

Such regional support is almost certainly a critical factor in the deliberations of the Bush administration. Equally, however, it will be important to Mr. Saddam's neighbors to feel that Washington is determined this time to overthrow Mr. Saddam.

The Iraqi leader, who held on to power after the Gulf War in 1991, is believed to be developing both chemical and biological weapons, and is still interested in nuclear weapons, though the secret

nuclear program he developed before the 1991 war has been destroyed.

Turkey's shifting view became public late last month when Defense Minister Sebahattin Çakmakoglu said, "We have several times said that we don't wish an operation in Iraq, but new conditions would bring new evaluations to our agenda."

In the last two weeks, at least one prominent Arab envoy in Washington has reversed his view that an American-led military operation in Iraq would be a disaster, or that it would fan the flames of Arab dissent and perhaps lead to the overthrowing of some of the region's weaker rulers.

The diplomat, who refused to be identified, noted that most countries in the region harbored a latent desire to be rid of Mr. Saddam. He argued that the current military success in Afghanistan, the demonstration of a new model of warfare there and the undermining of Osama bin Laden's radical message had created a new opportunity to act in Iraq.

"I now think it is doable," the diplomat said, adding that his government might oppose such an operation in public

until its chances for success became clear. "This would require a lot of governments to accept big political risks, but I believe that in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria, the governments are strong enough to hold the people and not have an uprising or collapse."

In the past month, the Bush administration has worked with Russia to formulate a new ultimatum to Baghdad, insisting that Mr. Saddam allow the return of United Nations inspectors to search for weapons of mass destruction, as required under the terms that ended the Gulf War.

Two weeks ago, Mr. Bush's remark that Mr. Saddam would "find out" the consequences of not allowing the return of inspectors fueled speculation that an attack on Iraq might be imminent. The remark appeared to signal the president's determination to keep Iraq on the agenda, even though his principal advisers are far from agreed on how to proceed.

When he was asked Monday whether Iraq was "next" in the anti-terrorist campaign, Mr. Bush said: "Oh, no, I'm not going to tell the enemy what's next. They just need to know that so long as

they plan, and have got plans, to murder innocent people, America will be breathing down their neck."

In remarks over the weekend, Secretary of State Colin Powell reiterated that it was U.S. policy to overthrow Mr. Saddam: "We are constantly reviewing ideas, plans, concepts" to achieve that end, he said. In another appearance, Secretary Powell indicated that his dispatching of a State Department team to Iraq last week was part of an evaluation of the "feasibility" of "putting in place an armed opposition inside Iraq."

The leader of the team, Ryan Crocker, the deputy assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern affairs, was said by Iraqi opposition officials to have received a strong endorsement from one key Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, for a new military campaign against Baghdad. But the other Kurdish chieftain critical to any campaign in northern Iraq, Massoud Barzani, was said to be more circumspect.

Iraqi opposition figures said that Mr. Barzani is engaged in extensive business operations with Mr. Saddam's relatives.

Le régime de terreur s'est aggravé en Irak depuis 1991, selon deux mouvements de défense des droits de l'homme

IL EST DIFFICILE de croire que lorsqu'elles adressent des « recommandations » aux autorités irakiennes les organisations de défense des droits de l'homme s'attendent à voir les prémices d'une exécution. La dernière enquête, publiée vendredi 14 décembre, et menée par la Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme (FIDH) et Human Rights Alliance France (HRA France) – une ONG membre de la Coalition pour la justice en Irak – montre que le régime irakien, qui a en effet érigé « la terreur, la violence et le chantage » en méthode de gouvernement depuis une trentaine d'années, a accentué sa poigne depuis la guerre de libération du Koweït en 1991. C'est plus particulièrement vrai depuis le soulèvement des populations kurdes et chiïtes au printemps de cette même année, la terreur d'Etat étant devenue plus que jamais un gage de la pérennité du régime.

L'Irak étant hermétiquement fermé à toute enquête sur les droits de l'homme sur son territoire, la FIDH et HRA France ont mené leurs investigations en juillet 2001 en Syrie et en Jordanie, auprès de réfugiés irakiens, qui préfèrent vivre là dans des « conditions déplorables et proches de la misère », plutôt que de subir chez eux les pires formes de tyrannie. Les missions de la FIDH et de HRA France ont également rencontré des membres d'associations de défense des droits de l'homme et

des représentants de l'opposition.

Leurs conclusions donnent froid dans le dos : déplacements de populations, notamment kurdes et chiïtes, liquidation physique des opposants, y compris les religieux à cause de leur influence jugée néfaste, pressions morales et physiques sur leurs familles – dont la torture, qui n'exclut ni les femmes ni les adolescents –, arrestations et détentions arbitraires, torture systématique des prisonniers, « disparitions » de mal-pensants... De plus, le pays est étroitement encadré par une légion de services et d'appareils de répression s'adosant à un « arsenal juridictionnel constitué de procédures, lois et décrets » et sur des tribunaux d'exception dont les jugements expéditifs sont sans appel.

AMPUTATION DE LA LANGUE

Malgré l'annonce officielle, en 1996, du décret y afférant, la peine d'amputation de l'oreille pour refus d'accomplissement du service militaire, décidée deux ans plus tôt, a continué d'être appliquée. Un nouveau châtement, l'amputation de la langue, est apparu en 2000, sans aucune déclaration ou décret officiel à ce sujet. Le « nettoyage des prisons », c'est-à-dire « l'élimination massive continue et systématique des prisonniers et détenus politiques », se pratiquerait depuis 1997. Les témoignages font état de décapitations publiques, dès juin 2000 et jusqu'en mai 2001, de femmes et d'hommes

accusés de proxénétisme, le plus souvent abusivement, les victimes étant « coupables » de parenté avec des opposants ou de dévier elles-mêmes de la voie politiquement correcte. Le rapport énumère une liste nominale non exhaustive de 130 femmes décapitées, ainsi que d'autres listes, elles aussi non exhaustives, de personnes exécutées et dont les corps n'ont jamais été rendus à leurs familles, de prisonniers d'opinion exécutés entre 1993 et 2001 et de personnes condamnées à la peine capitale « qui auraient été exécutées ».

Même les enfants sont pris en charge dès leur plus jeune âge au sein de l'organisation des Loutch de Saddam (Ashbal Saddam) pour les soustraire à « l'influence rétrograde au foyer » et « harmoniser » l'unité de la famille « avec des coutumes centralisées, réglées par la ligne et les traditions révolutionnaires ».

L'Irak revient certes régulièrement dans les premiers titres de l'actualité, à propos des effets pervers sur la population de l'embarco imposé par les Nations unies, ou des risques sérieux d'une relance des programmes de fabrication d'armes chimiques et biologiques, mais très rarement à propos de la cruauté de la répression qu'exerce le régime. Les Irakiens sont les premiers à déplorer cet « oubli » d'une « répression intolérable et impunie ».

Mouna Naïm

PROCHE-ORIENT Pour dénoncer « l'agression contre le peuple palestinien »

Saddam Hussein appelle à un sommet arabe

Le président irakien Saddam Hussein a appelé hier à un sommet arabe urgent consacré à « l'agression » israélienne contre les Palestiniens et invité les Arabes à « oublier » leurs différends.

► **Saddam Hussein** a invité ses pairs arabes à « tenir une réunion au sommet, rapidement et sans délai, pour examiner exclusivement la question de l'agression contre le peuple palestinien ». Deux sommets arabes ont eu lieu depuis le déclenchement de l'intifada, le 28 septembre 2000, sans résultat déterminant.

« Tenons notre réunion à Al-Qaaba (la grande mosquée de La Mecque, en Arabie Saoudite) ou dans n'importe quelle capitale arabe où tout le monde pourra y assister », a-t-il ajouté, laissant entendre qu'il compte participer à ce sommet. Saddam Hussein n'a jamais quitté son pays depuis le début de la crise du Golfe en 1990. Bagdad a rompu ses relations diplomatiques avec Riad lors de la guerre du Golfe en 1991.

► Une réunion des ministres de la Ligue arabe doit se tenir

demain au Caire. Les pays arabes devraient réitérer leur soutien à la cause palestinienne, malgré leurs dissensions qui opposent les modérés, tels que l'Égypte et la Jordanie, qui soutiennent M. Arafat, et les radicaux, comme l'Irak et la Syrie, qui veulent la poursuite de l'intifada.

► **Les pays arabes modérés** souhaitent que la réunion ministérielle avalise le discours de M. Arafat (appelant à l'arrêt des opérations contre Israël) comme étant la ligne actuelle à suivre afin d'encourager la re-

prise de la médiation américaine », a indiqué un responsable à Amman.

► **Le Hamas s'apprête à viser des cibles stratégiques en Israël.** Selon de hauts responsables israéliens de la Défense, le mouvement intégriste palestinien s'oriente vers des opérations d'un type nouveau. Il n'y aura plus seulement des attentats suicides, mais des attaques contre des bâtiments et contre des personnalités israéliennes de premier rang, ont indiqué ces mêmes sources, selon la radio israélienne.

► **L'Autorité palestinienne fera preuve de fermeté** contre les groupes qui « menacent les intérêts nationaux », au risque d'aller à l'affrontement, a affirmé Jibril Rajoub, chef de la sécurité préventive palestinienne en Cisjordanie. « Les forces qui mènent des activités destructrices se trompent si elles pensent que nous leur permettrons de menacer les intérêts nationaux, même si cela doit mener à l'affrontement », a déclaré le colonel Rajoub à l'AFP.

► **Le Liban exige l'arrêt des survols israéliens.** Beyrouth a sollicité l'intervention de Washington et des Nations unies pour mettre fin à l'intense survol israélien du Liban Sud. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Mahmoud Hammoud, a pris contact avec les États-Unis et les Nations unies pour leur demander de « mettre fin aux violations israéliennes de l'espace aérien libanais et de la ligne bleue », tracée par l'ONU pour tenir lieu de frontière entre le Liban et Israël.

LE FIGARO MERCREDI 19 DÉCEMBRE 2001

Répression « intolérable » en Irak

Marie Boëtou
et Clément Wyplosz

Deux organisations de défense des droits de l'homme dressent un réquisitoire contre la « répression intolérable, oubliée, impunie » que fait subir le régime de Saddam Hussein à la population irakienne.

« La terreur règne partout, y compris parmi les proches du pouvoir, à l'intérieur des familles, dans la rue, dans les écoles, à l'université, à la mosquée. Chaque Irakien peut être un coupable en puissance, un ennemi de Saddam Hussein », affir-

ment la Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme (Fidh) et Human Rights Alliance France.

Effectuée du 16 au 31 juillet, cette enquête a été menée auprès d'Irakiens réfugiés en Syrie et en Jordanie. Sous le régime de Saddam Hussein, poursuit ce rapport de 40 pages, « la population subit tout l'arsenal possible de la répression : entraînement militaire des enfants, détentions arbitraires, disparitions, nettoyage ethnique et déportation ».

Le rapport met l'accent sur le sort de prétendues prostituées, victimes d'une campagne de décapitations lancée en juin 2000. « Dans plusieurs cas, les témoins excluent que les femmes exécutées soient des prostituées. Elles ont été traitées comme telles à cause de leur parenté avec des opposants politiques. » D'autres témoignages font état de nettoyage ethnique dans les régions à majorité kurde : confiscation

de leurs biens et de leurs terres, privation de travail... Le nombre de disparus, principalement kurdes, approche les 200 000.

Autre population victime de la répression : les musulmans chiites. Un homme témoigne : « J'ai été empaillé sur un bâton et j'ai reçu des chocs électriques sur les parties génitales. J'ai été suspendu par une main qui a dû plus tard être amputée. »

Selon la FIDH et Human Rights Alliance France, « plusieurs des victimes ont exprimé leur désespoir devant le peu d'intérêt et de réaction de la communauté internationale » pour ces souffrances infligées à la population.



« Dessin de Majidpour paru dans Al Qada al-Arabi, Londres.

À QUI LE TOUR ?

La bataille de l'Afghanistan étant sur le point de s'achever, les stratégies de Washington s'interrogent sur les suites à donner à la "guerre contre le terrorisme".

■ Faut-il attaquer l'Irak sans attendre, comme le réclament les faucons de l'administration depuis le 11 septembre, afin de se débarrasser définitivement de Saddam Hussein ? ■ Ou bien vaut-il mieux viser des cibles moins problématiques, tant du point de vue militaire que diplomatique, comme la Somalie ou le Soudan ? ■ Soumis à des influences disparates, George W. Bush n'a apparemment pas encore tranché entre la manière forte et la diplomatie Powell.

■ Paroles de faucon

La revue *The National Interest* rapporte des propos de Richard Perle, qui préside le Conseil de politique de défense, sur la dissuasion envers les Etats qui aident les terroristes. "Par exemple, les Syriens peuvent décider de se retirer des activités terroristes parce que ça devient trop risqué. Mais supposons qu'ils ne le fassent pas. Même avec un tout petit nombre de B-2, nous pouvons faire en sorte que Bachir el-Assad se lève un matin et s'aperçoive qu'il n'a plus de bases aériennes, qu'il n'a plus de centres de renseignements, que tous ses camps de la Beqaa sont réduits en poussière. Cela ne passerait pas inaperçu, et il n'y aurait pas beaucoup

de dommages collatéraux." "Saddam Hussein est indifférent à un tas de choses, mais il tient à ses 44 ou 46 palais, et il pourrait disparaître du jour au lendemain. Quand on lui aura fait perdre son air d'invincibilité, les choses changeront rapidement en Irak. Et nous pouvons agir en ce sens. [...] Nous avons été vraiment myopes en envisageant toujours l'opposition à Saddam Hussein telle qu'elle était, et non telle qu'elle aurait pu devenir. De nombreux Irakiens alimenteraient se débarrasser de Saddam Hussein et manquent seulement de moyens. Même l'administration américaine actuelle refuse le moindre soutien à une opposition politique."

Les faucons autour de Saddam

Les partisans d'une action militaire contre l'Irak gagnent de l'influence à Washington. Au cœur de ce lobby, d'anciens ministres et de hauts gradés.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Lorsque fin novembre le président Bush a enjoint Saddam Hussein de se soumettre à l'inspection [par les Nations unies] de ses installations militaires, il a ranimé l'ardeur d'une coalition de conservateurs regroupant des partisans de la guerre froide et des exilés irakiens bien décidés à convaincre le gouvernement de déboulonner une bonne fois pour toutes le chef de l'Etat irakien. Depuis les attentats du 11 septembre, ce groupe hétérogène appelle inlassablement à une opération militaire américaine contre l'Irak.

Si, par le passé, il a pu donner l'impression de mener un combat d'arrière-garde, ses membres affirment aujourd'hui que leur point de vue gagne du terrain. "Ce qui me frappe",

déclare Newt Gingrich, l'ancien président de la Chambre des représentants, à propos des tendances au sein du gouvernement Bush, "c'est que l'aile qui soutient que Saddam Hussein est mauvais et dangereux semble l'emporter". Il s'empresse de préciser qu'il partage cette opinion. "C'est quelque chose qui couve depuis une dizaine d'années et qui provient de notre incapacité à éliminer Saddam à l'époque", explique Marshall Wittmann, membre du très conservateur Hudson Institute.

Le 2 décembre, le secrétaire d'Etat Colin Powell a souligné que George Bush n'avait rien décidé quant à la prochaine phase de la guerre contre le terrorisme. Mais, à en croire certaines sources officielles bien placées, le ministre de la Défense Donald Rumsfeld, son secrétaire adjoint Paul Wolfowitz, le général à la retraite et responsable du contre-terrorisme auprès de la Maison-Blanche Wayne Downing et le chef de cabinet du vice-président Lewis Libby seraient partisans d'une stratégie militaire musclée qui porterait l'opposition irakienne au pouvoir.

D'un autre côté, Colin Powell, son adjoint Richard Armitage et le général à la retraite Anthony Zinni, nouvel émissaire au Proche-Orient, tiennent à travailler main dans la main avec les alliés pour contraindre Saddam Hussein d'accepter des inspections internationales de ses sites militaires. Parallèlement, ils seraient prêts à alléger les sanctions économiques imposées à l'Irak. Condoleezza Rice, la conseillère à la sécurité nationale de Bush, n'aurait pour sa part pris fait et cause pour aucun des deux camps. Mais certaines personnalités extérieures au pouvoir ► sont de farouches va-t-en-guerre. Elles arrivent bardées de références, qu'elles doivent autant à leurs années d'expérience au gouvernement qu'à leur capacité à faire passer leur message dans les médias et à leurs nombreuses relations dans les milieux du pouvoir.

Dans certains cas, ils disent tout haut ce que ne peuvent se permettre de dire leurs amis qui sont au gouvernement. Dans d'autres cas, ils perpétuent d'anciens combats. Les lobbyistes œuvrent par l'intermédiaire d'un certain nombre de centres décisionnels, tels le conservateur American Enterprise Institute, et des journaux d'opinion comme le *Weekly Standard*. Mais ils mènent surtout campagne au coup par coup. "Il n'y a aucune organisation, pas de rencontres secrètes, et, s'il y a des réunions ou des séances préparatoires, personne ne m'y invite", déclare James Woolsey, avocat et ancien directeur de la CIA, qui a hérisé plus d'un membre du gouvernement en affirmant que Saddam Hussein était derrière toute une série de complots terroristes. Il minimise néanmoins volontiers son rôle : "Je ne fais jamais que pratiquer le droit. Si la presse m'appelle, je décroche mon téléphone. Si on me demande de passer sur CNN, j'y vais."

Leur principale base de pouvoir est sans

doute le Conseil de politique de défense, un groupe bipartisan d'experts en sécurité nationale qui se réunit juste en face des bureaux du ministre de la Défense. Parmi ses dix-huit membres figurent l'ancien secrétaire d'Etat Henry Kissinger, l'ancien ministre de la Défense Harold Brown, l'amiral et ancien président adjoint de l'état-major interarmées David Jeremiah, l'ancien vice-président Dan Quayle, l'ex-ministre de la Défense et de l'Energie James Schlesinger, ainsi que Gingrich et Woolsey. Sous la présidence de Richard Perle, ancien sous-secrétaire à la Défense dans le gouvernement Reagan, qui, dans les cercles extérieurs au pouvoir, est peut-être la personnalité la plus influente, le Conseil a acquis un statut quasi officiel.

En septembre dernier, le service du protocole du ministre de la Défense a invité Ahmed Chalabi, président du Congrès national irakien (CNI) en exil à Londres, et Khidhir Hamza, un ancien directeur du programme nucléaire irakien, à informer le groupe de réflexion. "Rumsfeld venait de temps en temps aux réunions et nous a fait une déclaration générale de soutien", résume Francis Brooke, le conseiller des exilés à Washington, qui assistait également à la réunion. "Ne vous en faites pas, nous sommes avec vous", a-t-il dit. Ahmed et lui sont très amis." Or ni Colin Powell ni George Tenet, directeur de la CIA, qui ont de sérieux doutes sur la capacité de Chalabi à gouverner, n'étaient au courant de la présence des Irakiens, s'insurge-t-on en haut lieu. "C'est absolument scandaleux que ces types soient venus ici, estime un haut fonctionnaire. Ils pourraient finir par influencer notre politique."

Richard Perle s'est employé à défendre le Congrès national irakien, arguant qu'il faisait

partie intégrante d'une stratégie qui permettrait à l'armée américaine d'occuper le sud de l'Irak, de mettre en place un nouveau gouvernement d'exilés irakiens et de les protéger en attendant que Saddam Hussein soit renversé. L'Afghanistan fournit selon lui à cet égard un excellent banc d'essai. "L'Alliance du Nord n'a pas pu reprendre un pouce de terrain avant que nous lui fournissions des munitions, assène-t-il. Et personne n'a armé l'opposition irakienne." Perle est tellement incontournable que Rumsfeld a reconnu qu'il est un personnage "très intelligent et bourré de talent". Mais, a-t-il tenu à préciser, "il n'est pas un représentant officiel du gouvernement. Il ne parle ni au nom du président, ni en mon nom."

Les lobbyistes ont craint que George Bush ne s'intéresse qu'à l'Afghanistan. C'est pourquoi, après les attaques du 11 septembre, le rédacteur en chef du *Weekly Standard* (et ancien chef de cabinet du vice-président Quayle), William Kristol, a rassemblé près de quatre douzaines de signatures sur une lettre adressée à Bush lui demandant de prévoir dans sa campagne le renversement du régime de Bagdad, même si aucun élément concret ne prouvait l'implication de l'Irak dans les attentats. Parmi les signataires figuraient des républicains conservateurs, mais aussi des démocrates farouchement pro-israéliens, tels Martin Peretz, le rédacteur en chef de *The New Republic* [voir l'article va-t-en-guerre de ce journal, page 53], et l'ancien sénateur de Brooklyn Stephen Solarz. Kristol ne pense plus qu'il soit maintenant nécessaire d'envoyer des pétitions au président : "On ne peut pas prendre Bush au sérieux lorsqu'il expose ses objectifs de la lutte contre le terrorisme alors que l'on sait qu'il ne fait rien contre l'Irak."

Elaine Sciolino et Alison Mitchell

■ L'option échec

"Les plans actuels visant à renverser Saddam Hussein font en tout point penser à l'échec de la balle des Cochons", écrit un éditorialiste du *Chicago Tribune*. "Les faucons sont si occupés à nous rassurer qu'ils en oublient la question principale : et si les choses tournaient mal ? Devrions-nous alors déployer des troupes en Irak ou abandonner l'opposition irakienne à son triste sort et accepter la défaite ? On risque surtout de se demander si on n'aurait pas dû se contenter de refréner Saddam Hussein plutôt que de vouloir à tout prix l'éliminer."

FIGURES

Les trois hérauts de la croisade



■ **Paul Wolfowitz**
A 57 ans, le vice-ministre de la Défense est un vieux routard des questions diplomatiques au sein du Parti

républicain. Négociateur de la réduction des armements sous Nixon, directeur de la programmation du Pentagone sous Reagan, il était sous-secrétaire à la Défense pendant la guerre du Golfe. Défenseur des seuls intérêts américains, il milite pour que soit achevé le travail entamé en 1991 : le renversement de Saddam Hussein.



■ **Richard Perle**
Le président du Conseil de politique de défense est l'un des personnages les plus influents de Washington et l'un des plus

intransigeants. Sous-secrétaire à la Défense du gouvernement Reagan, il a démissionné en 1987 pour protester contre les accords de désarmement signés avec l'URSS, qu'il juge inefficaces. Lobbyiste actif d'une action contre l'Irak, il est l'un des signataires d'une lettre au président Bush réclamant "un effort résolu pour chasser Saddam Hussein du pouvoir".



■ **R. James Woolsey**
L'ancien patron de la CIA, démissionnaire en 1994 après la découverte d'une taupe au sein de l'Agence, se

consacre désormais à la lutte anti-Saddam Hussein. Il défend la thèse de l'implication de Bagdad dans les attentats du World Trade Center, en 1993, et dans ceux du 11 septembre. En 1998, il a signé, comme Donald Rumsfeld et Paul Wolfowitz, une lettre au président Clinton affirmant que "renverser Saddam Hussein devrait être le but de la politique étrangère américaine".

À QUI LE TOUR ?

— COURRIER INTERNATIONAL N° 580

DU 13 AU 19 DÉCEMBRE 2001 —



▲ Oussama Ben Laden, George Bush et Saddam Hussein.
Dessin de Kal, États-Unis.

Eviter les erreurs de Bush père

Washington s'apprête à intervenir en Irak. Pour *The New Republic*, il est urgent de se débarrasser définitivement de Saddam Hussein.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
Washington

Comment frapper Saddam Hussein. L'administration continue à évaluer différentes options, qui vont de la campagne aérienne de courte durée, dans le style de la salve tirée par le président Clinton en 1998, à un véritable effort de guerre, comme en Afghanistan. Aujourd'hui un compromis semble se dessiner, que certains présentent comme le "plan des vingt et un jours". Ce plan prévoit une offensive aérienne intensive, éventuellement appuyée par le déploiement de forces spéciales au sol, et qui aurait essentiellement comme objectif d'éliminer les armes de destruction massive. L'idée, déjà proposée au gouvernement Clinton lors des frappes de 1998 contre l'Irak, a gagné en force ces derniers temps. Pour commencer, l'administration exigerait publiquement de l'Irak qu'il autorise le retour des inspecteurs du contrôle de l'armement, ce que le président Bush a fait à la fin du mois de novembre. Ensuite, en partant du principe que

Saddam Hussein refuse de coopérer, les États-Unis commenceraient à bombarder des cibles irakiennes. Mais comme l'affirment des représentants du Pentagone, "nous sommes à des mois d'une telle phase, qui ne pourrait commencer qu'une fois terminées les opérations en Afghanistan, voire en Somalie et ailleurs".

Pourtant, ces mêmes responsables considèrent qu'en visant les armes de Saddam Hussein plutôt que son régime, on passe à côté de l'essentiel. "Finalement, à quoi bon ? dit l'un d'eux. Nous l'avons déjà fait, mais il fabriquera tout simplement de nouvelles armes." Le problème, soulignent-ils, ce n'est pas les armes de Saddam Hussein, mais Saddam Hussein lui-même. De fait, on voit mal ce qui distingue les partisans d'une campagne limitée de ceux qui justifient la non-intervention. Pour les deux tendances, le Congrès national irakien [CNI, mouvement d'opposition] n'est pas à la hauteur. A en croire les intéressés, Washington n'a pas renforcé ses contacts avec les représentants de ce Congrès depuis le 11 sep-

tembre. Le CNI continue de se heurter à l'implacable hostilité de la direction du Moyen-Orient du département d'Etat. Il y a trois semaines, le secrétaire d'Etat adjoint, Richard Armitage, ordonnait à la direction du Moyen-Orient de libérer des fonds pour le CNI. Ce qui n'a pas empêché le même Armitage de stigmatiser le CNI comme un groupe d'incompétents lors de réunions internes. Selon des membres du département d'Etat, le général Anthony Zinni, Richard Haass, Colin Powell et Frank Ricciardone, chargé de la liaison avec le CNI du temps de Clinton, s'efforcent de réduire au minimum les contacts avec l'Irak.

Pourtant le CNI est loin d'être aussi anarchique que le prétendent ses détracteurs. Il contrôle déjà une portion non négligeable du territoire irakien, regroupe des milliers de combattants armés et, lors de sa dernière grande offensive en 1995, a réussi à bousculer deux divisions de la Garde républicaine. Comparée à l'Alliance du Nord, également dénigrée par le département d'Etat, l'opposition irakienne aligne des forces impressionnantes. Alors que l'armée irakienne, elle, ne s'est toujours pas remise de sa défaite lors de la guerre du Golfe, au cours de laquelle près de la moitié de ses effectifs ont disparu. A vrai dire, l'équation afghane pourrait se révéler encore plus efficace en Irak qu'en Afghanistan même.

Deuxième argument en faveur d'une action limitée en Irak, la "stabilité", un des chevaux de bataille du département d'Etat. Ce qu'avait décrété Powell il y a dix ans : "Si l'Irak était fragmenté en entités politiques séparées, sunnite, chiite et kurde, cela ne contribuerait en rien à la stabilité à

laquelle nous souhaitons parvenir au Moyen-Orient", reste parole d'évangile. Les représentants du département d'Etat affirment que seule une force d'opposition plus importante que les Kurdes au nord et les chiïtes au sud serait à même de renverser Saddam Hussein sans déclencher le chaos. Si l'opposition s'aliène les sunnites du centre du pays, l'Irak pourrait alors sombrer dans le chaos. Mais les prédictions qui annoncent des troubles ethniques en Irak sont encore plus exagérées qu'en Afghanistan. Contrairement aux talibans,

Saddam Hussein n'est soutenu par aucune minorité ethnique et aucun groupe religieux. Quant à l'opposition irakienne, c'est une force multiethnique. Quoi qu'il en soit, le danger de voir éclater des affrontements interethniques n'est rien face à celui d'un Saddam Hussein brandissant des armes bactériologiques, chimiques ou même nucléaires.

En 1991, Bush père avait parié que "Saddam Hussein fuirait hors de l'Irak ou serait tué, vu l'étendue de sa défaite". Mais il a perdu son pari, et des

milliers d'Irakiens l'ont payé de leur vie. Les responsables qui ont poussé George Bush dans cette voie, comme Powell, Haass et Scowcroft, refusent encore aujourd'hui de reconnaître leur erreur. Ce qui constitue un argument inéluctable mais rarement évoqué en faveur du maintien du statu quo en Irak : en renversant Saddam Hussein, surtout avec l'aide de l'opposition irakienne, on ébranlerait du même coup quelques réputations à Washington.

Lawrence Kaplan

Colin Powell affaibli

Jugé d'une prudence excessive, le secrétaire d'Etat risque de perdre son influence auprès de George W. Bush.

LOS ANGELES TIMES (extraits)

Depuis le début de la présidence Bush, certains responsables de l'actuelle administration – des civils du Pentagone, pour la plupart – réclament la tête de Saddam Hussein. Ce "clan des bellicistes", mené par le vice-ministre de la Défense Paul Wolfowitz, propose d'armer et d'entraîner les Irakiens exilés en Jordanie et au Koweït, tout en renforçant les milices kurdes pour les lancer à l'assaut des troupes de Saddam Hussein, avec le soutien de l'aviation américaine.

Le département d'Etat de Colin Powell s'y est fermement opposé, rappelant qu'une telle entreprise, qui risquerait de réveiller l'opposition islamiste, était hors de question pour les dirigeants saoudiens. Autre élément diplomatique capital : l'hostilité du gouvernement turc, car une victoire des Kurdes ne ferait que raviver les velléités nationalistes de leur communauté en Turquie.

Les objections de Colin Powell à ce projet sont avant tout d'ordre militaire. Selon lui, les exilés irakiens ne sont qu'une troupe de beaux parleurs et n'iront jamais au combat. Les Kurdes, profondément divisés, comptent parmi eux une faction acquise à Saddam Hussein, et la puissance aérienne américaine ne pourrait pas compenser ces faiblesses, d'autant que l'utilisation des bases aériennes en Arabie Saoudite et en Turquie seraient bloquées.

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Quant à l'armée irakienne, elle ne risque pas d'être démantelée puisque Saddam Hussein pourrait s'appuyer sur les divisions choyées de sa garde républicaine. A elles seules, ces dernières pourraient mettre en déroute ces faibles opposants, tout en évitant de lancer dans la bataille l'armée plus fragile des conscrits.

La plupart des hauts gradés américains se sont rangés au côté de Colin Powell. Le ministre de la Défense, Donald Rumsfeld, dont l'influence est encore limitée, n'était pas encore prêt à s'engager au nom de ses subordonnés.

Et comme la Maison-Blanche ne souhaitait ni accepter ni rejeter catégoriquement ce concept de guerre – Condoleezza Rice, qui est généralement du côté des civils du Pentagone, s'en était assurée –, le débat a tourné à vide jusqu'à ce que surviennent les attaques du 11 septembre. La cuisante révélation de la vulnérabilité des Etats-Unis n'a fait que renforcer le clan des bellicistes. Quant à Rumsfeld, il a abandonné ses réticences pour adhérer à la logique de son équipe. Powell ne concevait toujours pas le bienfondé d'une offensive militaire en Irak, mais le

bombardement de l'Afghanistan l'a également laissé perplexe. Dès qu'il a été clair que Powell s'était manifestement trompé sur l'Afghanistan, ses adversaires du Pentagone en ont profité pour rappeler au président Bush que Powell s'était déjà opposé au bombardement du Kosovo en 1999 et qu'il avait même initialement tenu tête à l'époque [en 1991] à son père à propos de l'intervention américaine dans le Golfe, selon la même litanie : les bombardements sont inutiles, et seule l'intervention terrestre d'une puissante armée peut mener à la victoire.

Pour récuser cette objection purement stratégique, les bellicistes peuvent s'appuyer sur le cas de l'Afghanistan, car les mêmes méthodes opérationnelles peuvent être répétées : les forces spéciales forment les exilés irakiens et les milices kurdes au combat et aux manœuvres tactiques, et les frappes aériennes sont contrôlées à distance. Le point faible des partisans de la guerre est que Powell est le responsable des négociations diplomatiques essentielles à ce projet auquel il est manifestement opposé. Selon lui, toute machine de guerre atteint un pic et ajouter l'Irak à l'Afghanistan pourrait gripper ses rouages. Tous les espoirs des bellicistes reposent à présent sur l'influence grandissante de Donald Rumsfeld. Le sort de Saddam Hussein est entre ses mains.

Edward N. Luttwak



À QUI LE TOUR ?

COURRIER INTERNATIONAL N° 580

DU 13 AU 19 DÉCEMBRE 2001

PHASE II

A la recherche d'un casus belli

■ Bienvenue à la phase II de la guerre contre le terrorisme ! Le président Bush n'a pas mâché ses mots à propos de l'Irak, et il n'est pas nécessaire de savoir lire dans le marc de café pour deviner à qui l'administration va maintenant s'intéresser. Il est encore un peu tôt, mais certains responsables semblent être occupés à établir ce que les spécialistes du droit international dénomment un casus belli, sorte de justification légale pour une opération de guerre. L'argument est à peu près le suivant : Saddam Hussein développe des armes de destruction massive. Or les terroristes veulent mettre la main sur des armes de ce genre pour les

utiliser contre les Etats-Unis et l'Occident. Historiquement, Saddam Hussein et son régime ont toujours coopéré avec ce genre de personnages. Saddam Hussein aurait même fourni des bacilles du charbon à Al Qaida. Un jour, il pourrait livrer une bombe nucléaire à d'autres terroristes. Pour cette raison, lui et son régime représentent une menace directe et inacceptable pour les Etats-Unis, qui ont le droit de prendre des mesures préventives. Si l'équipe Bush monte un dossier, c'est probablement avant tout pour convaincre l'Europe – et surtout Tony Blair. Avant le 11 septembre, les Européens les plus réfléchis affirmaient que Saddam Hussein ne représenterait jamais vraiment une menace parce que, même s'il développait des armes de destruction massive, il ne les utiliserait jamais contre les Etats-Unis ou l'un de leurs alliés, sachant que cela entraînerait sa propre destruction. Saddam Hussein n'étant pas fou, la dis-

suasion fonctionnait. Et, puisque la dissuasion fonctionnait, on pouvait se contenter de le contenir. Il était donc inutile de s'en débarrasser. Selon M^{me} Rice et d'autres membres de l'administration Bush, les attentats du 11 septembre ont modifié la donne. Dans le monde nouveau des actes terroristes de masse, un Saddam Hussein sain d'esprit peut – de façon clandestine et difficilement démontrable – fournir des armes, un savoir-faire ou des matériaux dangereux à des terroristes comme Ben Laden. La dissuasion n'opère pas face à eux. Et, puisque la dissuasion ne fonctionne pas avec les terroristes, se contenter de bloquer Saddam Hussein ne suffit plus à garantir la sécurité des Etats-Unis. Il faut le mettre hors d'état de nuire. La question n'est plus de savoir s'il faut éliminer Saddam Hussein, mais plutôt comment y parvenir.

Robert Kagan, *The Washington Post* (extraits)

■ Bioterrorisme

"L'Irak a reconnu, en 1995, qu'il avait produit 29 526 litres de produits servant à la construction d'armes biologiques, dont du bacille du charbon et des toxines botuliques", rapporte *The Christian Science Monitor*. "Les inspecteurs de l'ONU ont aussi découvert des vaporisateurs et des boîtes en forme de cerucell pouvant être utilisés pour vaporiser du bacille du charbon et

d'autres bactéries. L'Irak a profité de ses ventes de pétrole pour développer un vaste réseau d'achat d'équipement dans 'au moins vingt pays différents', selon un rapport de l'ONU. Parmi les produits achetés figurent des lignes de production complètes, du savoir-faire industriel, des pièces détachées de haute technologie et des matières premières, tous liés à la production d'armes de destruction massive."

Tentation dangereuse

Les commentateurs arabes ne se font guère d'illusions sur le désir américain d'en finir avec l'Irak. Mais, en l'absence de conditions politiques favorables, une guerre contre Bagdad serait bien plus meurtrière qu'en Afghanistan.

AS SAFIR

Beyrouth

Les intellectuels arabes peuvent se préparer à rédiger des communiqués de solidarité avec le peuple irakien car George W. Bush a de mauvaises intentions à l'égard de l'Irak. D'ailleurs, il l'annonce haut et fort. Il faut dire qu'il

est actuellement soumis à une campagne politique et médiatique pour mettre fin à toute forme de laxisme à l'égard du régime de Bagdad. Un laxisme qui a tout de même fait, après la guerre du Golfe, des centaines de milliers de victimes ! L'évolution de la campagne militaire menée en Afghanistan exige, du point de vue américain, l'ouverture du dossier irakien. Il est vrai qu'une campagne d'envergure mondiale contre le terrorisme ne peut pas s'arrêter comme cela et doit continuer (pour englober éventuellement d'autres pays).

Des tentatives dans ce sens ont déjà eu lieu au lendemain du 11 septembre pour convaincre George W. Bush, mais sans succès. Les "modérés", regroupés autour de Colin Powell, avaient alors eu le dernier mot. Ceux qui voulaient persuader le président Bush d'attaquer l'Irak ont échoué parce qu'ils n'ont pas réussi à établir de

LOBBYING

Un plan signé Wayne Downing pour l'opposition irakienne

■ Francis Brooke est le représentant de l'opposition irakienne à Washington. C'est un homme d'une quarantaine d'années, au style *college boy*. Il n'est pas irakien, mais américain. Il se dit "lobbyiste", chargé par le Congrès national irakien (CNI, rassemblement de l'opposition irakienne, installé à Londres) de mobiliser le gouvernement Bush en faveur du projet d'insurrection pour la libération [de la dictature de Saddam Hussein]. Il est payé par le CNI, dit-il avec une franchise désarmante, et aussi par le département d'Etat américain. Au début, il y a dix ans, il percevait "des sommes astronomiques" de la CIA. Grâce à cela, il s'est acheté la collaboration d'un ancien général américain

pour mettre au point un plan de bataille. En voici les grandes lignes : d'abord, l'Amérique arme l'opposition et la forme. Ensuite, le président décrète une interdiction de survol de l'Irak et interdit tout mouvement militaire au sol. Si les ordres ne sont pas respectés, l'armée de l'air attaque. Sous la protection des armes de précision américaines, l'opposition avance, prend Bassorah au sud, puis Mossoul au nord. Puis tout se passe comme en Afghanistan. Des commandos spéciaux interviennent également. A eux de neutraliser les armes de destruction massives. Mais recourir à des troupes au sol par centaines de milliers, à une invasion de l'Irak ou même à une occupation par des troupes de main-

tien de la paix – ce que les militaires jugent pourtant indispensable si le changement de régime doit réussir –, tout cela n'est pas nécessaire. Comme l'a montré l'Afghanistan. L'auteur de ce plan de bataille, vétéran de la guerre du Golfe et commandant des unités spéciales, s'appelle Wayne Downing. Le président Bush a rappelé le général récemment et l'a intégré au Conseil de sécurité nationale. Downing dirige actuellement la nouvelle cellule antiterroriste. Son bureau à la Maison-Blanche jouxte le Bureau ovale. Ainsi, il a aisément la possibilité d'exposer ses plans et de convaincre le président.

Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff et Constanze Stelzenmüller, *Die Zeit* (extraits), Hambourg

façon convaincante un lien entre Bagdad et les attentats de New York et de Washington.

Mais nous assistons depuis quelques jours au retour des vieilles accusations permettant de fournir des arguments pour une guerre. Ces accusations se concentrent essentiellement sur le fait que l'Irak dispose d'un arsenal d'armes conventionnelles que le régime irakien pourrait décider d'utiliser, directement ou en le faisant parvenir à des organisations terroristes. On peut s'attendre dans les jours prochains à une accumulation d'études, de commentaires et d'"informations fondées sur des documents originaux" décrivant l'ampleur de la puissante destructrice de l'Irak. Cette démonstration "logique", selon ses auteurs, suffit à justifier le déclenchement d'une guerre préventive dont le but serait de changer le régime.

Il n'est pas certain toutefois que les ultimes décideurs américains s'alignent sur ce point de vue. Dans les propos de George W. Bush, cette

option apparaît comme un moyen de pression pour permettre le retour en Irak des experts en désarmement. Ce retour pourrait ensuite être lié à des conditions allant dans le sens d'une amélioration des "sanctions intelligentes". Mais, dans la mesure où Saddam Hussein se révèle incapable d'accepter cela, il est très probable qu'un contexte favorable à des frappes américaines sur l'Irak se dessine alors peu à peu.

La volonté américaine de faire monter la tension contre Saddam Hussein est connue de tous. Les moyens aussi. Chaque jour, des avions américains s'y emploient. Toutefois, ce qui manque jusqu'à maintenant, ce sont les conditions politiques locales, régionales et internationales propices à la réalisation d'un tel objectif : il n'y a pas d'opposition irakienne digne de ce nom. Le contexte régional ne s'y prête pas (voir les récentes déclarations du ministre des Affaires étrangères syrien à Beyrouth ou encore la position iranienne). Il n'y

a guère d'enthousiasme du côté des Européens (France, Allemagne...). En Afghanistan, où la solution militaire a précédé la solution politique, les problèmes sont déjà énormes. Alors, on ose à peine imaginer ce qu'il en sera pour l'Irak, dont le cas est encore plus complexe et donc beaucoup plus risqué.

La politique américaine à l'égard de l'Irak risque ainsi d'aller jusqu'aux prolongations. Sauf que les Américains n'auront pas complètement perdu leur temps. En effet, ils auront réussi à adopter une position qui leur permettra par la suite de réagir en fonction de leurs intérêts. De toute façon, les Arabes jouent toujours les prolongations. En effet, nous bâillons en attendant un but que nous faisons tout pour encaisser, tandis que nous nous préparons à sortir nos plus belles insultes.

Joseph Samaha



21 DÉCEMBRE 2001

L'Irak dans le viseur des faucons de Bush

Le pays détiendrait des armes de destruction massive.

Washington
de notre correspondant

Si Saddam Hussein n'est pas la cible immédiate des Américains, qui préfèrent se concentrer sur les pays où sont implantés des groupes de combattants d'Al-Qaëda, Washington n'a pas adouci le ton à son endroit. A écouter certains de ses collaborateurs, Bush semble déterminé à faire tomber le régime de Saddam Hussein avant la fin de son mandat. Dans une interview publiée hier au quotidien arabe *Al-Hayat*, la conseillère pour la sécurité nationale du Président, Condoleezza Rice, clame ainsi que le monde «vivrait mieux sans Saddam Hussein»: «C'est un régime qui menace la région, nos intérêts et les intérêts de nos amis. Il menace également son peuple.»

*«C'est un régime qui menace la région, nos intérêts et les intérêts de nos amis. Il menace également son peuple.»
Condoleezza Rice, conseillère de Bush*

de posséder des armes de destruction massive.» Pour Rice, les chances de voir Saddam Hussein coopérer sont faibles. Si le leader irakien refuse le retour des inspecteurs de l'ONU dans son pays, c'est pour «une seule raison: il cherche à posséder des armes interdites».

Les faucons de l'administration Bush (Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz...), qui rêvent de frapper Bagdad, estiment que même si un lien direct est difficile à prouver entre le régime de Saddam Hussein et les attentats du 11 septembre, le régime de ce dernier fait peser la menace la plus grave sur la sécurité des Etats-Unis. Il peut en effet, selon eux, un jour fournir des armes chimiques, bactériologiques voire nucléaires à des terroristes. Hier encore, le *New York Times* révélait le témoignage d'un ingénieur du génie civil irakien, ayant re-

joint les rangs de l'opposition en exil, qui affirme avoir participé l'an dernier à l'installation de laboratoires militaires secrets sous l'hôpital de Bagdad et dans des villas privées. Le mois dernier, interrogé sur ce que les Etats-Unis feraient si Saddam Hussein n'autorisait pas le retour des inspecteurs de

l'ONU, le président Bush avait lancé: «Il verra bien!»

Les partisans d'une intervention américaine en Irak suggèrent donc de rééditer avec le Congrès national irakien (CNI, l'opposition à Saddam Hussein) ce qui a été fait en Afghanistan avec l'Alliance du Nord. Le seul problème, c'est qu'à la différence des Kurdes (dans le Nord) ou des chiites (dans le Sud), le CNI n'a pas vraiment de troupes de com-

battants. Et aider les Kurdes ou les chiites à prendre Bagdad est impensable: tant les Turcs que les pays arabes se révolteraient contre cette idée, qui ne ferait que renforcer le soutien de l'armée irakienne à Saddam Hussein. Selon Martin Indyk, ancien ambassadeur en Israël, la seule option envisageable est donc d'envoyer des troupes américaines au sol, et en grand nombre: «Le but ne serait pas de prendre Bagdad nous-mêmes, mais de faire passer un message clair à l'armée irakienne: soit vous êtes détruits, soit vous faites le travail à notre place», a-t-il estimé mardi lors d'une conférence à la Brookings Institution. Un tel coup ne sera jouable, nuance cependant Martin Indyk, que lorsque le calme sera revenu au Proche-Orient voisin, ce qui est loin d'être le cas ●

PASCAL RICHÉ

A Washington, une « recherche permanente de plans et d'idées » pour en finir avec Saddam Hussein

NEW YORK

de notre correspondant

Après la défaite des talibans et la frustration de n'avoir pas capturé Oussama Ben Laden, Washington renoue avec l'un de ses passe-temps favoris : le débat entre partisans et adversaires de la manière forte pour en finir avec Saddam Hussein. Il existe un fort consensus au sein de l'administration Bush et de la classe politique sur la nécessité de renverser le dictateur. Mais les divergences sont grandes sur les moyens à employer pour y parvenir.

Au lendemain des attentats du 11 septembre, la tentation était forte de mettre dans le même sac Al-Qaïda et le pouvoir irakien. En dépit des efforts des adversaires les plus acharnés de Saddam Hussein, aucun lien solide n'a pu être établi jusqu'à aujourd'hui entre lui et les pirates de l'air ou entre son régime et l'attaque à l'anthrax.

Le FBI s'oriente vers une piste intérieure comme source de l'anthrax. La CIA ne semble pas accorder de réelle importance à la rencontre, à Prague en avril, de Mohammed Atta, un des organisateurs des attentats du 11 septembre, avec un membre des services secrets irakiens.

Il n'est plus question d'impliquer directement l'Irak dans les attaques contre New York et Washington. Mais les partisans de la solution militaire ne jugent plus nécessaire de lier formellement Bagdad aux attentats pour s'en prendre à un régime qui cherche en permanen-

ce, selon eux, à se doter d'armes de destruction massive. Le raisonnement a été tenu par George W. Bush quand il a réclamé, le 26 novembre, le retour d'inspecteurs de l'ONU en Irak.

Les responsables politiques favorables à une offensive militaire contre Saddam Hussein sont de plus en plus nombreux. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de républicains voulant effacer l'« erreur » de George Bush, lorsque le père de l'actuel président n'avait pas marché sur Bagdad à l'issue de la guerre du Golfe. La coalition est maintenant bien plus large. Elle regroupe des stratégies jugeant que le moment est favorable, comme le secrétaire d'Etat à la défense Donald Rumsfeld, et des démocrates soucieux de mettre définitivement hors jeu un ennemi acharné d'Israël.

Le 5 décembre, dix membres du Congrès, et non des moindres, parmi lesquels Trent Lott, le leader des républicains au Sénat, Henri Hyde, le président républicain de la commission des affaires étrangères, John McCain, l'ancien candidat républicain à l'investiture présidentielle, et l'ancien candidat démocrate à la vice-présidence, Joseph Lieberman, ont demandé à George Bush de faire de l'Irak la prochaine cible. « Il est impératif d'éliminer la menace irakienne. Nous n'avons pas de doutes sur le fait que ces armes mortelles [de destruction massive] sont dirigées contre les Etats-Unis et leurs alliés. En conséquence, nous devons nous en prendre directement à Saddam, et le plus tôt sera le mieux. »

La semaine dernière, le secrétaire d'Etat Colin Powell, pourtant hostile à une aventure militaire, n'hésitait pas à évoquer la recherche « permanente de plans et d'idées » pour renverser le dictateur irakien. Il a également reconnu que l'envoi, la semaine dernière, d'une équipe du département d'Etat dans le nord de l'Irak faisait partie d'un processus devant « mettre sur pied une opposition armée ».

Le succès en Afghanistan a créé, aux yeux des partisans d'une guerre contre Bagdad, un précédent dont ils estiment qu'il faut profiter militairement et diplomatiquement. L'appel lancé le 18 décembre par Saddam Hussein pour réunir un sommet arabe à La Mecque sur la

Palestine est perçu aux Etats-Unis comme un signe de son inquiétude. Il tenterait de se protéger d'une menace grandissante et de rallier les masses arabes.

La victoire contre les talibans est aussi considérée comme un exemple à suivre en matière de stratégie. D'où la volonté à Washington de renforcer, armer et entraîner les forces d'opposition, notamment au Kurdistan irakien, voire même en Iran, pour créer, selon les propres mots de Colin Powell, « une alliance du Sud ».

Le refus de la Turquie de servir de base arrière à une offensive contre l'Irak semble s'infléchir. Le mois dernier, Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, ministre de la défense turque, expliquait : « Nous avons à plusieurs reprises déclaré être opposés à une opération contre l'Irak, mais les conditions ont changé et nous amènent à réviser notre jugement. » Ces propos étaient ensuite contredits par le premier ministre turc, Bülent Ecevit.

« Ils veulent bombarder l'Irak quoi qu'il arrive », affirme Edward Walkern, assistant au secrétariat d'Etat sous la présidence Clinton. Les opposants à la stratégie « guerrière » se manifestent aussi dans les médias. Ils font remarquer que l'Europe dans son ensemble, la Russie et les pays arabes sont opposés à une intervention contre l'Irak. Que, sur le plan militaire, la partie s'annonce bien plus difficile qu'en Afghanistan.

Les Kurdes sont loin d'avoir les capacités de l'Alliance du Nord. Le général Anthony Zinni, ancien chef d'état-major de l'armée américaine et envoyé spécial américain au Proche-Orient, ne croit pas à la possibilité de créer une armée au Kurdistan pouvant s'opposer à celle de Bagdad. Enfin, Saddam Hussein pourrait cette fois entraîner avec succès Israël dans le conflit.

Colin Powell préfère multiplier les pressions pour forcer l'Irak à accepter à nouveau des inspecteurs de l'ONU. Il faut pour cela faire peur au dictateur de Bagdad et, pour le moment, les appels à une offensive militaire font aussi le jeu de la solution diplomatique. En attendant, l'armée américaine peut s'en prendre aux réseaux d'Al-Qaïda en Somalie, au Yémen, au Soudan et aux Philippines.

Eric Leser

Les partisans de la solution militaire ne jugent plus nécessaire de lier formellement Bagdad aux attentats pour s'en prendre au régime

Des avertissements répétés

● **18 novembre.** Saddam Hussein « est un homme très dangereux qui constitue une menace pour son propre peuple, une menace pour la région et une menace pour nous en raison de sa détermination à acquérir des armes de destruction massive, déclare la conseillère de la Maison Blanche pour la sécurité nationale, Condoleezza Rice. Le monde serait clairement plus sûr et les Irakiens se sentiraient mieux si Saddam Hussein n'était pas au pouvoir en Irak. »

● **26 novembre.** George Bush, répondant à des questions sur de prochaines cibles éventuelles : « En ce qui concerne Saddam Hussein, il faut qu'il laisse les inspecteurs revenir dans son pays pour nous prouver qu'il ne fabrique plus d'armes de destruction massive. » Prié de prédire ce qui se passerait en cas contraire, le président répond : « Il verra bien. »

● **2 décembre.** Le secrétaire d'Etat américain à la défense, Donald Rumsfeld : « Il est très difficile, même avec les missions d'inspection les plus sévères, de découvrir ce qui se passe vraiment. Nous savons que cet homme est déterminé à se doter de ces armes. Il les a et il les a utilisées contre ses propres populations. »

● **4 décembre.** Les troupes américaines pourraient être amenées à intervenir ailleurs qu'en Afghanistan, assure le président Bush. « Les frappes seront incroyablement importantes. Et l'utilisation de soldats ailleurs sera peut-être nécessaire. (...) Je veux juste que les Américains sachent que nous n'excluons aucune option. »

● **11 décembre.** Le vice-président Dick Cheney : « Si j'étais Saddam Hussein, je réfléchirais sérieusement à l'avenir et j'observerais de très près ce qui est arrivé au régime taliban. » La Somalie, ajoute-t-il, est « clairement l'un de ces endroits où une organisation peut opérer avec impunité sans être l'objet d'un contrôle de la part des forces de l'ordre, représentant ainsi une menace pour ses voisins ou pour les Etats-Unis ».

Pays arabes et opposition à Saddam Hussein s'interrogent sur une éventuelle intervention

L'IRAK est-il ou non l'une des cibles de la « phase 2 » de la lutte antiterroriste lancée par les Etats-Unis depuis les attentats du 11 septembre ? A l'unisson d'autres pays, les voisins de l'Irak et plus généralement les gouvernements de la région s'interrogent sur les intentions réelles de l'administration républicaine américaine. Celle-ci, il est vrai, n'a laissé planer aucune ambiguïté, dès son entrée en fonction, sur sa volonté d'obtenir la chute d'un régime soupçonné de vouloir relancer ses programmes d'armes de destruction massive – si tant est qu'il n'a pas déjà commencé à le faire. L'interrogation se fait plus pressante depuis que le ton monte à Washington à propos de l'Irak.

Pour l'heure, ce qui paraît certain c'est que, sauf dérapage, Bagdad bénéficie d'un sursis de cinq mois, depuis que le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies a reconduit, le 29 novembre et pour une période de six mois, le programme dit « pétrole contre nourriture » qui permet à l'Irak de vendre du pétrole pour subvenir aux besoins essentiels de sa population. Cinq mois, qui sont néanmoins d'ores et déjà mis à profit par Washington pour engager des consultations, notamment avec la Russie, pour passer au stade supérieur à l'expiration de cette période. L'objectif est de s'entendre sur une formule qui imposerait à Bagdad une exigence stricte : accepter le retour des inspecteurs du désarmement. Un refus irakien pourrait donner à Washington un argument pour sévir.

Il est tout aussi certain qu'aucun gouvernement du Proche-Orient, pas davantage que les formations de l'opposition irakienne, ne nourrissent la moindre empathie pour le gouvernement de Bagdad. Depuis le départ d'Irak des inspecteurs du désarmement en décembre 1998, nombreux sont ceux qui craignent par ailleurs que Bagdad ait effectivement relancé son ou ses programmes d'armes de destruction massive. Ce qui ne veut

pas dire pour autant que les mêmes ne se posent pas de questions sur les moyens et le sérieux d'une éventuelle intervention américaine.

S'agit-il pour les Etats-Unis de rééditer le scénario afghan, c'est-à-dire de se livrer à des bombardements en Irak, tandis que l'opposition irakienne se chargerait des opérations au sol ? Cette dernière ne paraît pas disposée à se prêter inconditionnellement à la manœuvre : le souvenir des révoltes kurde et chiite au printemps 1991, encouragées par le président George Bush père, qui ont été écrasées dans le sang sans que les Etats-

le Parti démocratique du Kurdistan de Massoud Barzani est, lui, plus rétif.

Près de onze années de rodomontades américaines contre Bagdad, assorties d'une véritable débandade des agents de la CIA dans le Kurdistan en 1996, de raids aériens américano-britanniques quasi quotidiens depuis trois ans, voire d'opérations musclées – telle l'opération dite « Renard du désert » en 1998 –, d'annonces de coups d'Etat manqués, ont laissé opposants et gouvernements régionaux perplexes quant aux intentions réelles des Etats-Unis et à leurs possibilités d'action.

Ces mêmes gouvernements s'interrogent également sur la nature du régime qui serait installé à Bagdad après la chute éventuelle de M. Hussein : s'agira-t-il d'un pouvoir à dominante chiite, aux portes d'un autre grand pays chiite, l'Iran, dans un environnement régional quasi uniformément sunnite ? Ou l'Irak sera-t-il doté d'un système fédéral, qui accorderait une certaine autonomie à ses minorités ? L'une et l'autre formules ne sont pas tout à fait rassurantes, l'instauration d'une fédération inquiétant plus particulièrement des pays tels que la Turquie, l'Iran ou la Syrie, dont les importantes minorités kurdes pourraient réclamer la même chose. Sans oublier que nombre de gouvernements de la région se satisfont parfaitement de la situation actuelle et engrangent d'importants bénéfices grâce aux échanges économiques – officiels et de contrebande – avec Bagdad.

Ces réserves risquent bien sûr de voler en éclats si les Etats-Unis obtiennent du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU le feu vert pour intervenir en Irak. Ce qui n'est pas garanti à cette heure : il n'est en effet pas certain que les quatre autres membres permanents du Conseil acceptent de suivre Washington sur cette voie.

Nombre de gouvernements de la région se satisfont parfaitement de la situation actuelle

Unis et leurs alliés volent à leur secours, demeure en effet encore vivace ; l'aide apportée jusqu'à maintenant par Washington à l'opposition n'a pas été à la hauteur de l'objectif fixé : ce ne sont pas les 100 millions de dollars, accordés au compte-gouttes, en vertu de l'Irak Liberation Act (1999), qui auraient pu permettre ou qui permettraient aujourd'hui aux opposants de renverser le régime.

Par ailleurs, les plus importantes formations d'opposants ont été jusqu'à maintenant sinon divisées, du moins hésitantes quant à une immixtion américaine : certaines sont rétives à un changement qui se ferait sous l'ombre des Etats-Unis (c'est le cas notamment des principales formations chiites, le Conseil supérieur de la révolution irakienne et le parti Al-Daawa). Côté kurde, si l'Union patriotique du Kurdistan de Jalal Talabani ne s'opposerait pas à un tel scénario,

Mouna Naïm

L'ONU rappelle que Bagdad ne remplit pas ses obligations

NEW YORK (Nations unies)
de notre correspondante

A lire la presse américaine depuis une quinzaine de jours, l'impres- sion qui domine est celle d'une atta- que militaire imminente contre l'Irak. S'agit-il d'une stratégie déli- bérée et coordonnée de pressions psychologiques et diplomatiques sur Bagdad, avec fuites intention- nelles à la presse, ou d'un véritable changement de rapport de forces au sein de l'administration améri- caine en faveur du camp des « durs » ?

D'après une série de conversa- tions avec nombre de diplomates sur ces bruits de bottes entendus à Washington, il semble que les deux

hypothèses ne sont pas nécessaire- ment incompatibles. Forts du suc- cès de la guerre en Afghanistan, les Américains multiplient les mena- ces d'une intervention militaire d'une part et, de l'autre, continuent à élaborer avec les autres grandes puissances membres du Conseil de sécurité, et en particulier les Rus- ses, une solution politique.

L'ACTION DIPLOMATIQUE

Vu de l'ONU en tout cas, il sem- ble que la politique irakienne de l'administration Bush reste plutôt constante. « D'après les messages qui nous parviennent du gouverne- ment américain, l'Irak n'est pas à l'ordre du jour et la priorité, à ce

sujet, reste l'application de la derniè- re résolution du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU », déclare un diplomate français. Adoptée à l'unanimité le 29 novembre, la résolution 1382 demande le retour des inspecteurs du désarmement en Irak en échan- ge de la levée de facto des sanc- tions économiques en vigueur contre ce pays depuis onze ans. « En ce qui concerne nos discussions avec les Américains, la priorité reste l'ac- tion diplomatique au Conseil de sécurité, poursuit un diplomate bri- tannique, car nous ne voyons aucun lien entre l'Irak et les terroristes d'Al- Qaida. »

Certains n'en jugent pas moins que les militaires américains sont

enhardis par le succès – « au-delà de toute espérance » – de la guerre en Afghanistan. Ils ont en outre constaté que ce succès a mis fin aux manifestations anti-américai- nes dans le monde musulman. Cela renforce la main des faucons au sein de l'administration. Selon nombre d'observateurs, le rapport de forces à Washington a changé en faveur du secrétaire adjoint à la défense Paul Wolfowitz contre le secrétaire d'Etat Colin Powell, qui se trouve désormais isolé sur la question de l'Irak. M. Wolfowitz s'est, depuis le 11 septembre, systé- matiquement prononcé en faveur d'une attaque de l'Irak.

Interrogé mercredi 19 décembre, le secrétaire général de l'ONU, Kofi Annan a répondu : « Je crois qu'il ne serait pas sage d'attaquer l'Irak car je n'ai vu aucune preuve liant l'Irak aux attentats terroristes du 11 septembre, ni d'ailleurs à l'an- thrax, et, à mon avis, toute action militaire contre l'Irak en ce moment ne ferait qu'exacerber le terroris- me. » Et d'ajouter : « Cela dit, je dois dire que je ne vois aucun signe non plus que Bagdad soit prêt à coo- pérer sur le retour des inspecteurs alors que les Irakiens savent très bien que le Conseil de sécurité l'exi- ge, pour une fois, à l'unanimité. »

Si les grandes puissances don- nent une suite à leur résolution, elles pourraient charger M. Annan de la présenter à Saddam Hussein. « A ce moment-là, s'il refuse, une opération militaire américaine serait en quelque sorte justifiée », explique un diplomate.

A. B. P.

TROIS QUESTIONS À...

HANS BLIX

1 Le 16 décembre 1998, les der- niers inspecteurs en désarme- ment de l'ONU ont quitté l'Irak. En tant que président d'Unmovic (la commission de l'ONU chargée du désarmement de l'Irak), savez- vous si l'Irak a repris ses program- mes d'armes de destruction massi- ve ?

C'est fort probable. Le program- me d'armement biologique est celui sur lequel demeurent le plus d'interrogations. Cela dit, il est évi- dent que sans la présence des ins- pecteurs il est difficile de savoir exactement ce qui se passe sur le terrain, mais nous essayons de nous tenir informés par plusieurs moyens, à savoir l'achat systémati- que d'images satellitaires, par des

informations que nous fournissent les milieux de renseignements des Etats membres ou encore l'achat, à un institut français, d'analyses de la presse mondiale.

2 Si l'Irak devait accepter la reprise des inspections, vos ins- pecteurs seraient-ils prêts à s'y rendre ?

Bien évidemment, nous sommes prêts depuis des mois. Nous avons 243 experts en armes de destruc- tion massive qui peuvent se rendre en Irak à tout moment, comme le demande la résolution du Conseil de sécurité. A propos de cette réso- lution, je veux aussi dire que le Conseil nous demande de lui four- nir une liste des tâches dites « rési- duelles » en matière de désarme- ment, ce qui encore une fois ne sera pas possible sans une inspec- tion sur le terrain, car cela fait

désormais trois ans que nous som- mes absents de l'Irak. Nous som- mes en train d'analyser plus d'un million de documents dans nos archives pour voir ce que l'Unscm [la commission précédente] savait des programmes militaires de l'Irak et ce qu'elle ne savait pas.

3 La destruction des programmes d'armes de destruction massive de l'Irak est-elle possible avec des frappes militaires ?

Nous sommes chargés de les identifier et de les détruire sur le terrain. Il est vrai qu'en décem- bre 1998 les opérations militaires américano-britanniques ont détruit beaucoup d'installations militaires. Ont-elles été reconstrui- tes ? Il faut aller voir....

Propos recueillis par
Afsané Bassir Pour

Powell Warns on Applying The 'Afghan Model' to Iraq

By Alan Sipress and Peter Slevin
Washington Post Service

WASHINGTON — The swift American military success in Afghanistan is no reason to believe that a similar campaign in Iraq to depose President Saddam Hussein would succeed, according to Secretary of State Colin Powell.

In an interview, Secretary Powell sought to quiet speculation that the Iraqi government would be an early target in the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign. He said that Mr. Sad- dam's military was far stronger than the ill- equipped Taliban forces and that the Iraqi opposition was not comparable to the North- ern Alliance in Afghanistan.

"They're two different countries with two different regimes, two different military capabilities," Mr. Powell said Thursday. "They are so significantly different that you can't take the Afghan model and immediately apply it to Iraq." He asserted, however, that the administration was "constantly looking" at ways to topple Mr. Saddam.

Still, Mr. Powell said, the Bush admin- istration's focus remains on Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan. U.S. special forces and Pa- kistani troops are searching caves along the Pakistani border for clues to the location of the Qaida leader. Mr. Powell said that President George W. Bush intended to persevere for as long as it took to track down Mr. bin Laden and destroy his terrorist network.

"I don't know where bin Laden is," Mr. Powell said. "Nor does anyone else. We're chasing. We're looking. We may trip over him. We may trip over his body. We may get a lucky hit, a lucky piece of intelligence. Who knows?"

The Bush administration, studying coun- tries in which Qaida could function after the Taliban's collapse, is taking a particular interest in Somalia, according to Secretary Pow- ell. U.S. authorities believe that some of Mr. bin Laden's followers are holed up there, taking advantage of the absence of a func- tioning government.

"It makes itself ripe for misuse by those who would take that chaos and thrive on the chaos," he said. "That's why we're really looking at Somalia — not to go after Somalia as a nation or a government, but to be es- pecially sensitive to the fact where Somalia could be a place where people suddenly find haven."

Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the secretary of state has argued against an early move against Iraq despite a strong push early

on from the Pentagon leadership to consider striking Baghdad as part of the U.S. counteroffensive against terrorism.

"Everybody is focusing on Iraq as if it is the only thing out there, or it is time for us to do something beyond what we are doing," he said. "There are lots of Qaida cells around throughout the world that we're going after, and there are other countries that are of concern to us besides Iraq."

Secretary Powell said the administration remained committed to working with both the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, although some U.S. officials have said peace will remain elusive in the Middle East as long as they are in office. "We have to deal with the people who are there," he said. "We can't sit back and say just wait for a better or different or newer or other leaders to come in."

He added: "The enemy of this process right now is not Yasser Arafat or Sharon. It's Hamas. It's Palestinian Jihad. It's others. The burden now is for Mr. Arafat to demonstrate his commitment by going after these organ-

izations."

He also said that the administration wanted to explore whether Russia shared the American interest in developing a missile defense system. He noted that Russia this year proposed jointly developing a shield against theater, or short-range, missiles.

"We'll tell them what we're doing," he said. "We want to hear what they're doing, see if there are any ideas that might be of mutual interest to each other with regard to theater defense or see if they want to talk about strategic missile defense, limited missile defense — we'll explore that as well."

Secretary Powell reiterated his cautionary position about an assault on Iraq at a time when speculation has grown about a U.S.-led effort to overthrow Mr. Saddam.

Policy analysts, former government officials and foreign diplomats have been wondering aloud whether the U.S. success in Afghanistan, where the Taliban regime that sheltered Mr. bin Laden was driven from power within weeks, will embolden the administration to attack Iraq. President Bush

warned this month that if Mr. Saddam did not admit international weapons inspectors, he would face unspecified consequences.

Suspicion about Iraqi development of weapons of mass destruction increased in the past week on allegations from an Iraqi defector, Adnan Ihsan Saeed Haideri. He said that until last year, as a civil engineer, he had helped rebuild Iranian facilities for producing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Francis Brooke, an Iraqi National Congress consultant, said that the Iraqi opposition group had publicized Mr. Saeed's account to help make the case that Mr. Saddam must be overthrown.

The Senate majority leader, Thomas Daschle, Democrat of South Dakota, further fueled the debate Thursday when he urged the president not to move unilaterally or hastily against the Iraqis. "I think a strike against Iraq at this time would be a mistake," he said.

Mr. Daschle also cautioned against "any overt attack" against Iraq. He said such an attack would cause serious problems in the Middle East and give the Islamic world "concern about the direction of U.S. policy."

Une opération US en Irak peut mener à la création d'un Etat kurde (général turc)



ANKARA, 26 déc (AFP) - 9h03 - Une extension de la campagne antiterroriste des Etats Unis à l'Irak peut provoquer la création d'un Etat kurde indépendant sur le territoire de ce pays à laquelle la Turquie est catégoriquement opposée, a estimé le chef d'état-major des armées, le général Huseyin Kivrikoglu.

"Une telle éventualité peut provoquer la création d'un Etat kurde indépendant", a-t-il dit à des journalistes mardi soir, cité par l'agence Anatolie, interrogé sur l'éventualité d'une extension des opérations américaines à l'Irak voisin. Il a précisé que "non seulement tous les pays arabes, mais aussi la Russie est contre une division de l'Irak et la création d'un pays à base ethnique".

Le général turc a en outre estimé qu'en cas d'une intervention militaire américaine en Irak, cela aura des répercussions encore plus graves pour la Turquie que lors de la guerre du Golfe en 1990. "Il y aura encore davantage de problèmes pour la Turquie et ils ne seront pas limités au commerce et à l'oléoduc" reliant l'Irak à la Turquie, a-t-il ajouté.

La Turquie estime à plus de 35 milliards de dollars les pertes subies par son économie depuis le début de l'embargo contre l'Irak. Un oléoduc relie les champs pétrolifères irakiens de Kirkouk au terminal turc de Ceyhan, sur la Méditerranée. L'oléoduc, fermé par une décision du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU après l'occupation du Koweït par l'Irak, avait été rouvert en 1996, dans le cadre du programme "pétrole contre nourriture".

Ankara a réitéré depuis les attentats du 11 septembre aux Etats-Unis son opposition à des frappes contre l'Irak. Mais le ministre de la Défense Sabahattin Cakmakoglu a récemment déclaré que "de nouvelles conditions" pourraient entraîner "de nouvelles évaluations". La question de frappes contre l'Irak agite la presse et les milieux politiques américains, mais le gouvernement du président George W. Bush maintient le flou sur ses intentions.

Ankara craint une déstabilisation de l'Irak qui aboutirait à la création d'un Etat kurde dans le nord irakien, contrôlé depuis la fin de la guerre du Golfe en 1991 par deux factions kurdes.

Un tel Etat risquerait, selon Ankara, de stimuler les velléités séparatistes des Kurdes de Turquie, alors qu'Ankara a lutté pendant 15 ans contre la guérilla du Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK).

