From Productive Power to Blunt Control: Theses on the technology of (re)settlement in Turkey and the Kurds

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“Heaven cried out, earth groaned
Day grew silent, darkness emerged
Lightning flashed, fire broke out
[Flames] crackled, death rained down
Gilgamesh, Tablet IV

“We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in its negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks, it ‘conceals’. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.
Michel Foucault

“War has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life.”
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri

Abstract

The forced (re)settlement of Kurds within the borders of the contemporary states they live in is a contentious issue in Kurdish historiography. This paper will discuss this issue of (re)settlement, focusing on resettlement policies and practices in Turkey and the Kurds. Based on archive research and field work, this paper will formulate some (new) theses on (re)settlement and the Kurds in Turkey. It will contribute to an understanding of (re)settlement policies and practices as means for the constitution of a homo-nationalis. It will be emphasized that modern resettlement policies are to be considered and analyzed as

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practices of biopower, concerned with the spatial management of population. It will emphasize the importance of the concept of space and the writing of micro-studies.

Key-words
Kurds, Turkey, Resettlement, Production of Space, Governmentality, Rural Areas and Villages, Modernity, Nationalism, War

Introduction
Modernization⁵ is a major theme in social and political sciences. The concept first became fundamental in the vocabulary of American and European scholarship during the 1950s and 1960s, aiming to provide an alternative explanation of development to Marxist scholarship. More than just a research object, however, modernization was treated as a guiding principle. In the economic domain, it was associated with the development of capitalist relations of production (‘free’ labor, ‘free’ market); in the political domain, it was equated with the creation of powerful authoritarian states (with a particular role for military institutions, since the perceived impersonal social relations of the military were considered exemplary of what was universal in modern society); while in the cultural domain, it was held responsible for the production of homogenous culture (contributing to the creation of state-based nations). In short, modernization was considered to be capitalist, authoritarian and nationalist. It was in the cultural context of modernization that resettlement emerged as a tool of the state, a technology contributing to the realization of modernity’s nationalist content, with a scope varying from the physical ‘cleansing’ to the assimilation of people and appropriation of land.

In Turkish scholarship, resettlement is treated as one of the most important instruments of nation-state building. In general, Turkish social science literature holds to the proposition that resettlement gave Anatolia its Turkish imprint (Ari, 1995; Karpat, 1985) or, more specifically, contributed to a 'nationalization' of the petty bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1979-1980). Other writers, however, have emphasized the destructive content of resettlement (Beşikçi, 1991a; 1991b; Van Bruinessen, 1997), which demonstrates that the project of modernization involves destruction in order to create (Harvey, 1989: 16). The Turkish sociologist, Ismail Beşikçi, has clearly demonstrated this in the Kurdish case with a series of seven studies in which Kemalist policies towards the Kurds are analyzed as instances of ‘nation-destruction’. Two volumes of the seven are concerned with the (re)settlement of Kurds. Volume 1 discusses the Settlement Act of 1934, which constituted the legal framework for the resettlement of Kurds as a means of assimilation. In volume 4 there is discussion of a special law passed in 1935, which placed the province of Tunceli under military rule and prepared the way for brutal military campaigns in 1937 and 1938, in the course of which a considerable part of the population was killed and many of the survivors deported to western Turkey (Bruinessen, 2003-2004).

Compared to the discussion of resettlement, settlement has been seriously understudied in Turkish and Kurdish scholarship. The spectacle of deportation has attracted considerably more attention than settlement policies, for obvious reasons, but actually it was the latter which entailed the more comprehensive attempt to assimilate people and appropriate land, and by a long way. An exception is Fuat Dündar’s study of the settlement policy of the

⁵ We should distinguish between modernity and modernization. Originally, modernity refers to a project of radical democracy and liberation. Only later it acquired a cultural and liberal-economic meaning. Modernization is a project derived from the second interpretation of modernity, focusing on the transition of societies to state-based nations and capitalism.
Committee of Union and Progress between 1913 and 1918 (Dündar, 2002). Dündar analyzes the immigration and settlement policies of Turkish nationalists during the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, interpreting them as instances of ‘population politics’. In my thesis, Settlement Wars (2006), I have analyzed settlement policies in relation to a concern of the state with the (social and cultural) management of population, which was to become a national body, and discussed resettlement as a particular form of settlement policy.

In this paper, I will discuss both settlement and resettlement, as means for the production and the productive destruction / destructive production of (the) population(s), using Turkey as the case-study, and with special reference to the Kurds there. I will do this in the form of four theses, three on ‘content’ and one on ‘method’. The discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely to contribute to the exploration of four different ‘realms’ of (re)settlement. Before embarking on this, however, let us first consider resettlement as a technology.

The Technology of Resettlement: an investigation of terrain

More than five decades ago, the political scientist Robert Koehl (1953) highlighted the essential logic of resettlement as the attempt to dominate a region by removing from it all those who are believed to be uncontrollable, and filling it instead with a population considered controllable. Practices of resettlement, he argued, aim at the mastering of a territory. Koehl evaluated resettlement as a means to cleanse and exchange populations, and related these resettlement practices to the process of a transformation of empires into nation-states and the rising concern of states with the characteristics of their subjects. The idea of ‘bringing logic to the map’ resulted in a territorial reshuffling of people between newly emerging nation-states and aimed at overcoming the discrepancy between the nationalist ideal of congruence between political and cultural units and the reality on the ground. Initially, therefore, the term resettlement was defined as the physical transition of an individual or group from one societal configuration (nation-state) to another. It referred to such practices as the so-called transfer of populations between states by international agreement (Koehl, 1953: 232; Stola, 1992: 326), such as the population exchanges agreed between Turkey and Greece in 1923 – 1924, an inter-state reshuffling facilitated by the League of Nations which affected more than one and a half million people.

The construction of nation-states, however, did not only depend on the excommunication and deportation of those who were considered not to fit the socio-cultural blueprint of the nation. In order to overcome the discrepancy between the nationalist ideal of congruence between political and cultural units and the reality on the ground, state institutions also became concerned with the production and management of (their) populations, and engaged in identity-producing activities. One of the most fundamental problems of nation-states is the production of a socio-cultural category called ‘the people’. As the philosopher Etienne Balibar emphasizes, ‘(a) social formation only reproduces itself as a nation to the extent that through a network of apparatuses and daily practices, the individual is instituted as homo nationalis from cradle to grave’ (Balibar, 2002: 93). The individual is carefully fabricated as an instantiation of the population. In his book, ‘Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914’, Eugene Weber (1976) analyzes the means by which people are constituted as ‘the people’, emphasizing the role of ‘education’ and ‘military service’. Settlement and resettlement practices are discussed here as a means of organizing social life, or, more precisely, of organizing social life as national life.

Before going any further, it would perhaps be appropriate to distinguish between and clarify my usage of the concepts ‘settlement’ and ‘resettlement’ and. Broadly speaking, one can say
that the meaning of ‘resettlement’ is derived from the noun settlement, and the prefix re-. Derived itself from the verb to settle, the noun, settlement, is defined as the movement of people to a new settlement or their re-establishment upon land in some relatively permanent matter. The prefix re- indicates that prior to the settlement a particular kind of dislodgement occurred. This implies that settlement is the more inclusive concept, and resettlement used only where there is a particular form of dislodgement before settlement (Chambers, 1969: 11). Whereas resettlement is essentially about leaving and ejection, settlement focuses on arriving and integration. Because this is about tendency and implication, there is not clear demarcation between the two. I consider settlement and resettlement as technologies, that is to say, material entities created by the application of mental and physical effort in order to achieve particular ends. A technology embraces both hardware (for example, a settlement scheme) and software (management practices, selection of people, organization of transfer, etc).

A fundamental position in this paper is that contemporary resettlement practices are a modern phenomenon, and should be analyzed as such; that is, they should not be considered an invariable phenomenon of Kurdish history, as is sometimes done (see, for example, Izady, 1992; Koivunen, 2002). It was communitarian modernity, emerging as a political current in the 19th century, that gave birth to many of the resettlement practices we have witnessed in the 20th century. Originally, in the 18th century, modernity was understood as a project of liberation and radical democracy, comprising the idea that every citizen is a part of the sovereignty and can acknowledge no personal subjection (Paine, 1791-1792). In the course of the 19th and 20th century, however, something dramatic happened to the concept of modernity. It lost its content of radical democracy and liberation, and acquired a cultural meaning, referring to a unique people, with peculiar characteristics, distinct from other peoples. A vein in modern thought became dominant, holding that cultural homogeneity is a requirement of the modern state, an inescapable imperative appearing in the form of nationalism (Gellner, 1983: 39). This communitarian or national modernity is exclusive and intolerant, dictating that people who do not have the ‘right’ cultural characteristics have the choice between integration and migration, while the options of states range from assimilation to eviction and ethnic cleansing (Gellner, 1997: 240). It is against this background that resettlement policies emerged, not only as an instrument of deportation and cleansing (such as the Turkey-Greece population exchanges referred to), but also as a means of establishing political control over people and land and producing socio-cultural assimilation, or, as I put it, the ‘fabrication of the people’ (Jongerden, 2006).

Let us turn now to the four theses on re(settlement). The theses assume Turkey as the focus of inquiry, with special reference to the Kurds. As mentioned in the introduction, three of them (the first three) are concerned with ‘content’, while one (the fourth) is concerned with ‘method’. The theses are expressed as four propositions.

6 The root – settle, affixes – re & ment > re + settlement or resettle + ment. By common usage, the prefix re- before settle(ment) tends to carry the additional idea of force, implies an enforced movement of dislodgement.

7 So, Kurds were resettled by the state in the 1990s, as opposed to just evacuated, insofar as they were forcibly directed from rural to urban entities. They we not resettled in a strict sense of e.g. rehoused, only in the looser sense of being told which town/city to go to first (the nearest, generally). This could be termed orchestrated resettlement (i.e. tracked), as opposed to specified resettlement (i.e. schemed). Also, the territory from which they were de-settled was not, by and large resettled. It was just left, empty.

8 The ‘displacement’ of a ‘citizen’s right’ by a ‘cultural’ discourse is constantly reproduced. Think for example about the displacement of the slogan ‘We are the people’ by the slogan ‘We are one people’, in the former DDR in 1989 – the first slogan claimed the decision-making powers from the bureaucratic elite that had spoken and acted in the name of the people, while the second claimed a project of ‘national unification’.
Proposition 1: Settlement and resettlement policies are instances of biopower and terrapower

As early as the 18th century, political theorists had taught that a disciplined, productive population was the true wealth of a sovereignty. The goal was to maximize the population, by marriage or conquest, without much regard to peoples’ (cultural) characteristics. Power was concerned with control over the land, or terrapower. In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, (new) states emerged with their politics modeled on the twin ideas of nation-state, a political construct in which the borders of political units (states) and cultural units (nations) are supposed to coincide, and nationalism, which teaches that the power of a state depends on the degree to which its subjects respond to the ideal of the particular cultural identity that is thought to characterize the nation (Koehl, 1953: 231). The population begins to represent more the ends of government than the power of the sovereign. In response, government turns into administration, concerned with the management of population, by means of cultural politics (defining the population’s identity), control of birth rates and flow of population (Foucault, 2006: 140). The ancient right to ‘take life or let live’ becomes a power to ‘foster life’, to produce it (Bove & Empson, 2006). This is what Foucault calls biopower, the interference of states with the production of population, the turning of people into ‘the people’.

But biopower does not replace terrapower. Rather, biopower usurps terrapower. This is the logic of nationalism, the political principle, which holds that human collectivities are spatially separated and should have their own state (Hobsbawn, 1990: 9). True, the idea that human collectivities are spatially organized in separate entities is a false one (Giddens, 1985; Taylor, 1985; Hobsbawn, 1990). Yet the idea of territory-based cultures that hold states of their own is actually pursued. In fact, the end of government has become the practice which makes and consecrates a unity of territory and people, an inexorable linking of space with people, as if they are two attributes of one and the same substance, the nation (Negri, 2003: 190).

The Turkish Settlement Act No. 2510 represents an instance of biopower and terrapower in action. This law may be considered the most important piece of legislation for the organization of a spatial framework for national settlement in the history of Turkey, aiming at the creation of both a population as a social body and land as a territorial body, each being an expression of the idea(l) of the nation. The Settlement Act No. 2510 was passed by the Turkish Parliament on June 14, 1934 (and announced in the Official Newspaper Resmi Gazette exactly one week later, after which it came into effect). Depending on individual perspective, the law has been both hailed as a method of nation-building in Anatolia (Köymen, 1934), and denounced as a tool for nation-destroying (Besikçi, 1991).

The Act categorized Turkey’s inhabitants into three groups (articles 12, 13, and 14) and divided Turkey into three zones (articles 2, 12, 13, and 14). The three groups were those who spoke Turkish and were considered to be of Turkish ethnicity (Turkish speaking inhabitants of Anatolia and Turkish speaking immigrants); those who did not speak Turkish but were considered to be of Turkish ethnicity (non-Turkish speaking ‘Turkish’ immigrants, and maybe Kurds, who were deemed Turks by the new regime), and those who did not speak Turkish and were considered not to be of Turkish ethnicity (Arabs and non-Muslim minorities, the two ‘others’ in the east and the west of the country). The three zones were those areas in which it was deemed desirable to increase the density of the culturally Turkish population (Zone 1), those areas which were deemed appropriate for the establishment of populations that had to be assimilated in the Turkish culture (Zone 2), and all those areas which it had been decided
should be evacuated for economic, political, military, or public health reasons, and where settlement was forbidden (Zone 3).

Following the Turkish sociologist İsmail Beşikçi (Beşikçi, 1991a), the Settlement Act No. 2510 has been mainly criticized and exposed as a law intended for the assimilation of Kurds by means of forced and collective resettlement (mass-deportations). For example, Van Bruinessen argued that resettlement was the most spectacular method for forced assimilation in Turkey (Bruinessen, 1997: 6). Beşikçi would later advance his argument by positing the thesis of a colonization of Kurdistan (Beşikçi, 1991b). Although the assimilation of Kurds by means of resettlement was a major concern, the law was equally concerned with the settlement and assimilation of Muslim migrants from former Ottoman territories. Elsewhere I have illustrated this by showing that the Settlement Act of 1934 synthesized a patchwork of decrees and laws that which had been adopted over the previous two decades (the 1910s and 20s), and served to regulate the settlement of both Muslim migrants from lost Ottoman territories and Kurdish deportees (Jongerden, 2006). The main objective of the Settlement Act was not the destruction of a Kurdish identity, but much broader, to create a ‘population’. In Foucault’ words, the law was not only repressive and destructive, but productive too. Modernity destroys in order to create (Harvey, 1989: 16).

Further to the objective of creating a population – not just people, but the people – this population needed to be tied to the land, and the land had to become the people’s territory. As a concept, territory is derived from the Latin terra meaning land and torrium meaning belonging. It was originally applied to the surrounding districts over which a city had authority (Taylor, 1985). In the era of communitarian modernity, or national modernity, the belonging (torrium) came to refer to ‘the people’ as nation. The idea of congruence between land and people, that nations are territorially organized, packaged bundles of culturally homogenous and distinct people, had to be produced as a fact of life.

A small illustration of the production of land-people congruence can be found in the shape of decree 2/12374, issued from Ankara in 1939. This decree designated a Zone 1 settlement area, mainly strips on either side of certain roads and railways in the Southeast, plus a 25 kilometer strip along the borders with Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Soviet Union. Alongside these roads, railways, and borders (strategic locations, linking provincial centers with rebellious peripheries or demarcating international boundaries) peasants of Turkish ancestry and language had to be ‘tied to land’ (article 2 of decree 2/12374). Peasants in that area who did not speak the Turkish language (mostly Kurds and Arabs) were to be concentrated in settlements, where they were not allowed to occupy more than 20 % of the land. In this way, the land was to be produced as the belongings of the Turks. However, we should carefully differentiate between policies, their expected results and the reality on the ground. I have argued elsewhere, that, for example in the province of Diyarbakir, this practice was not very successful. Bulgarian migrants of Turkish origin, who were settled near the city and its district towns in the 1930s, headed to the West from the 1950s onwards, or else were Kurdicized, at least linguistically, in the sense of taking up the Kurdish language. (Jongerden, 2006).

Probably more spectacular, but less discussed, is the paragraph in the Settlement Act on the abolition of small rural settlements (paragraph 8 of the Settlement Act refers to the abolition of dispersed and small settlements, and the concentration of their population in ‘appropriate centers’). The small rural settlements were considered a ‘negative environment’, that is to say, an anti-national environment, fostering backwardness and tribalism (concepts often used as synonyms), and a multitude of other fortresses against nation building practice. It is against

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9 The law was used for the forced settlement of Kurds from Sason, Zeylan, Ağrı and Dersim in western parts of Turkey.
this background that, in 1937, the then Prime Minister, Şükrü Kaya, concluded that ‘the principal shortcoming of our villages is that they are dispersed and small. It is evident that civilization (…) does not go to these small places’ (Özefe, 2001a: 24). It must be emphasized that the paragraph concerning the abolition of small rural settlement was a state-wide intention, and applied not only to the areas were Kurds lived. Following Weber (1976), one could say that the intention was to turn a Muslim population into Turks.\textsuperscript{10}

The sociologist Nusret Kemal Köymen, a key figure in the peasantist-movement of the 1930s in Turkey, hailed Settlement Act No. 2510 as a means for societal development because it would pave the way for measures to abolish the small rural settlement grid, and allow the development of new types of settlements in the countryside. He referred to the law as a means for ‘soy düzeni’, which would today translate as racial or ethnic order, but which was used by Köymen at that time with ‘soy’ used in the sense of ‘cemiyet’, meaning ‘society’.\textsuperscript{11} It was thought that the law would facilitate nation-building activities, based on the principles that socio-cultural differentiation and grouping of populations was undesirable. In conclusion then, the Turkish Settlement Act No. 2510 provides an example of settlement and resettlement aimed to produce national population.

\textbf{Proposition 2:} Settlement and resettlement policies are concerned with the development of a new settlement structure and environment production

Settlement and resettlement policies are concerned with the development of new settlement structure as an environment for the production of the nation. I would like to emphasize here that the development of new settlement structure, and its relation to the production of identity, is one of the contentious issues of modernity. In Western social thought, for example in the work of Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tönnies, the transition of rural-agricultural communities to urban-industrial society is regarded as the most important process of our time, associated with the passing away of feudal loyalties and the birth of a national affiliation (according to Durkheim ‘national life is the highest form of social phenomenon and sociology cannot know one of a higher order’, Durkheim and Mauss, 1998: 152). The Turkish nationalist and sociologist Ziya Gökalp, a great admirer of Durkheim, distinguished between two type of civilizations, namely city-civilization (\textit{şehir medeniyeti}) and village civilization (\textit{köy medeniyeti}) (Gökalp, (1923) 1992: 130, 136-9). Gökalp argued that in the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire (what is now the southeast and east of Turkey and the north of Iraq) city civilization was marked by a Turkish culture, while village civilization was constituted by centers of Kurdish culture. He further argued that Turks who settle in villages Kurdicize, while Kurds who settle in cities Turkify. Since Gökalp was convinced that modern society is essentially urban, he anticipated that the general tendency would be a Turkification of Kurds.

In the 1920s and 1930s various thinkers, of whom the nationalist and sociologist Nusret Kemal Köymen was the most original, rallied against the idea that national society is urban. The civilization process as it was allowed for in Europe, Köymen argued, did not signify a historical transition from rural-agricultural communities to industrial-urban society – rather, it produced simultaneously rural-agricultural communities on the one hand and urban-industrial

\textsuperscript{10} It seems as if Turkish nationalists such as Ziya Gökalp, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Yusuf Akçura, and to some extent also Ahmet Rıza, and Abdullah Cevdet, were concerned with turning Muslims into Turks. They considered Muslim religious identity to be a constitutive part of and fundamental to the development of a Turkish national identity, a notion taken from the positivist Ernest Renan, who himself was a secularist and anti-clerical, but saw religion as a fundamental human need and social bond (Zürcher, 2001).

\textsuperscript{11} The use of terms also shows that the concepts of nation and race were not strictly demarcated from each other; for a discussion, see Haldun Gülalp, 2006).
society on the other as two separate social entities, creating factional interest instead of national unity. He considered the detachment of industrialization from the rural economy and its establishment in urban centers to be a historical error. According to this perspective, urbanization as a phenomenon was not contained by the physical movement of people from the countryside to ever growing cities, but was directed toward the development of a new spatial and economic entity, one that is rural and urban, agricultural and industrial at the same time. It was believed that only this new hybrid could provide the basis for a social life that was truly national.

Köymen’s quest was nothing less than a new paradigm, one that would, in a rather positivist way, produce a civilization that would prevent, and if needed, reverse the simultaneous disintegration and scattering of rural settlements and the emergence of large cities, thereby, he thought, fostering the nation. He envisaged a new spatial settlement type, which he called a *rurban* (Köymen 1940c) and which, he considered, could and should be the basic cell of national life. In his books and many articles, Köymen systematically rethought the various dimensions of a modernization that would create the fertile ground in which the seed of the nation would germinate and grow.12 The ideas of Nusret Kemal Köymen are not isolated thoughts, but part of a tradition of thinking that challenges the modernization process, by arguing not only that the coincidence of urbanization and industrialization is not the only format for progress, but that it is even a wrong one. His idea of a rurban may be considered an unpolished precursor to the center-village (*merkez-köy*) and village-town (*köy-kent*), two settlement models that were developed in the 1960s and 1970s. These models aimed at a horizontal integration of small settlements, assuming to facilitate their integration in administrative centers, national economy and national culture. These models were also considered for developing a new settlement structure in the areas which were cleared by the Turkish Armed Forces in their struggle against the Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*) in the 1990s.

Abolition of small settlements and concentration of the population is sometimes interpreted as part of the anti-Kurdish policies in Turkey. I would like to emphasize, that at the time these models (center-village and village-town) were developed, the idea of abolition and concentration was part of a shared image of societal transformation shared by intellectuals from both Turkish and Kurdish backgrounds, although they articulated this transformation with different political perspectives. Both considered the abolition of small settlements, and the concentration of their populations in large villages of considerable size was looked upon as part of the ‘progress’ of history (see, for example, Bozarslan, 1966 (2002) 226-7). In conclusion, various currents in Turkish thought, notably the work of Nusret Kemal Köymen, conceived of settlement and resettlement in terms of aiming at the production of new positive environments (for the constitution of the *homo nationalis* and his control), environments which were located beyond the rural-urban divide.

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12 Turkey, to Köymen’s mind, was the only country developing a policy for a society with a combination of this new type of village as a basic structural and functional unit, and cities serving as functional centers with little production. In countries where urbanization and Christianity are widespread the development of this alternative civilization would be difficult, Köymen thought. However, he identified elements of this alternative civilization elsewhere. In particular Köymen refers to Japan, the Soviet Union, and Mexico. Japan, Köymen thought, had decentralized its industry. The Soviet Union had developed *sovkhozes* and *kolchozes*, which represented a new village type – although urbanization had gathered great speed since the Russian Revolution, industries had been established in rural areas supporting the formation of new villages. Mexico too, Köymen argued, had tried to develop new village types with the breaking up of large holdings, but he did not provide much evidence for this (Köymen, 1937).
**Proposition 3:** The Evacuation of Villages in the 1990s was a military resettlement campaign aiming at environment deprivation

The evacuation of thousands of villages and the displacement of hundreds of thousands or even millions of Kurds should be viewed not as collateral damage from a war of state forces against insurgents, but as one of its very objectives. I consider the evacuation of villages a *resettlement* campaign, because it comprised the organized dislodgement of people and their physical removal from rural to urban entities in order to change their residential habitat in a relatively permanent matter (from a settlement structure with a strong rural component to an urban settlement structure). Many eventually resettled in cities in the region (Diyarbakir) or outside the region (Mersin, Adana, Istanbul, Bursa). However, they were not resettled in these new urban areas.

It is termed resettlement *campaign* because the evacuation and destruction of rural settlements and the forced change of habitual residence were not executed arbitrarily, but in several related operations and series of actions. It must be acknowledged that this campaign was relatively invisible. The massive resettlement campaign avoided attention from the world’s media almost completely; the Turkish military establishment was not embarrassed by emotive scenes of fleeing refugees. Instead, many of the displaced crowded in with relatives and found shelter in local neighborhoods congested to bursting-point.

This brings us to a striking feature of the organization of this army resettlement campaign. The resettlement of the rural population did not take the form of a scheme, meaning an elaborate and systematic plan of action encompassing the provision of shelter and the reconstruction of livelihood and for the execution of which specific personnel and resources are allocated. Rather, the resettlement campaign was organized in the form of what I have named ‘tracked resettlement’, a collection of multiple routes, or tracks, from hamlet and village to town and city. This was a haphazard but orchestrated resettlement from rural to urban entities, along tracks which people were forced to follow without any support from the authorities.

The decision to track rather than scheme resettlement resulted in a massive migration to cities, both inside and outside the region. From a military perspective the decision not to scheme resettlement was a rational and logical choice. Empirically, the case against military-induced resettlement is overwhelming and has been part of only one successful counter-insurgency campaign (that of British troops in Malaya), a success that military experts have warned should be regarded as an aberration rather than replicable model. From a legal perspective, this form of resettlement is illegal; from a social perspective, it is disastrous, in particular for those deprived of their livelihood, without recourse to material or financial compensation.

I have located the resettlement campaign within the changing military strategy of the Turkish Armed Forces. It must be viewed as a resettlement campaign, in particular after 1991, when the evacuation of villages became a constituent element of the Turkish counter-insurgency strategy against the guerrilla of the PKK. Initially, in the period between 1984 and 1991, the Turkish Armed forces contributed to the fulfillment of the PKK strategy, in particular as a consequence of the decision to defend larger villages and towns. By ignoring the smaller rural settlements the Turkish army ceded to the PKK the opportunity to establish a guerrilla network throughout the southeast of the country. This situation was dramatically changed by the ‘field domination doctrine’, announced by the general staff in 1991 and systematically implemented from 1993 onwards.

The objective of the new doctrine was the destruction of the social environment of the PKK and penetration of the physical environment by special counter-insurgency units, applying the principles of a war of movement. The destruction of the social environment of the PKK had
two dimensions: resettlement and the militarization of civilian populations: basically, villagers were offered the choice of being either drafted into the paramilitary system or else evacuated, to urban entities. At a tactical level this drafting and resettlement policy denied the guerrilla food, shelter, intelligence and recruits from rural-based sympathizers, and created kill-zones in the countryside. At a strategic level the army engineered a new settlement pattern by vastly accelerating the pre-existing phenomenon of rural-urban migration (enforced at gunpoint, by burning down houses and whole villages in the countryside, etc), forcing the guerrilla to retreat or to engage in confrontations with the state in urban entities (which is a tough environment for insurgents, but favorable for the state).

The aim of the resettlement campaign was environment deprivation. The evacuation of villages was a means for destroying these ‘positive environments’ for the guerrilla, which were ‘negative environments’ for the State. The countryside, once the livelihood of the insurgents, the social environment of the PKK, was to be altered to a kill-zone and the insurgents forced to retreat in high mountains or cross the border to Iraq, where the guerrilla was relatively safe, but suffered from hardship and isolation from the rural population, now resettled to urban environments where the state had more control. In fact, the evacuation of villages did lead to a contracted environment for guerrilla warfare (penetrated by special units using guerrilla tactics) and a retreat of PKK forces.

Therefore we must conclude that the evacuation of the rural settlements was no collateral damage or simple reprisal, but a constituent part of counter-insurgency, the destruction of negative environments. Rural environments became the target of counter-insurgency, and people were forced to move to urban environments. The military campaign in Turkey against the PKK provides an example of resettlement used by the state specifically for the purposes of defeating an enemy, by environment deprivation.

**Proposition 4:** The development of Kurdish studies needs the writing of micro-studies

With a few exceptions (see, for example, Wiessner, 1997) micro-studies (histories, sociologies) of villages and regions in the southeast of Turkey, or northern Kurdistan, have hardly yet been written. Much has been said about how the state deals with the Kurdish issue, from policy-analyses to discourse analyses, but few micro-studies have been written. This lack is the result of two main factors: first, the political situation in the area, which has complicated field work, with sanctions for those who dare to speak out on the Kurdish issue causing scholars who were or might be interested to avoid the issue; and second, the dominance of the modernization paradigm, with its nationalist (nation-state) conception of societal transformation and disregard of ‘locality’.

Considering first the political situation, researchers, not only foreign ones, have been hampered by the inaccessibility of the region and its villages resulting from what is a kind of permanent state of exception. Martial Law and State of Emergency regulations have operated in the area almost continuously since 1928. The area (the Kurdistan region of Turkey) was declared a military zone forbidden to foreigners until 1965, and then administered under a rule of exception (Martial Law and State of Emergency) continuously after 1978. In the 1980s and 1990s, the area was ravaged by the war between Turkish armed forces and the PKK, in which thousands of villages were razed to the ground and large swathes of the countryside

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13 The alternative was to change strategy and prepare for combat in ‘urban’ environments. The PKK did not switch to urban guerrilla warfare, although it did establish a ‘front’ with the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front, DHKP/C (Devrimci Halk Kuruluş Partisi/Cephesi), a Turkish left wing urban guerrilla group. The collaboration remained ineffective and was terminated by the DHKP/C in 1998.
turned into military zones and no-go areas. Since the State of Emergency was lifted in November 2002, field access has continued to remain limited. The inaccessibility is not only spatial: decades of war have produced a lack of trust among people, sometimes even between families and neighbors – so how much more suspicion would settle upon a stranger seeking to probe into the past?

Further hampering the research necessary for compiling micro-studies has been nationalist ideology and the ethnic/cultural problem of Kurdishness, including language. Until recently, anything Kurdish was officially taboo, and academic researchers who braved the field faced serious repercussions. Mehmet Emin Bozarslan was sentenced to long imprisonment for his books on Kurds and the Kurdish language. But in particular the continuous prosecution of the sociologist İsmail Beşikçi must have been a threatening example for those who dared to touch upon the Kurdish issue. Beşikçi was dismissed from university and publicly exposed as a terrorist. No other writer in Turkish history has had to face such an endless series of trials and prison sentences (Bruinessen, 2005). The treatment of Beşikçi showed the way that would lay ahead for any other scholar who dared to speak out.

The second factor resulting in the lack of micro-studies is the dominance of the modernization paradigm. One cannot overestimate the effects of modernization theory in social and political sciences. Modernists from the 19th and 20th centuries (such as Wilbert Moore, Ernest Gellner, Talcott Parsons, Daniel Lerner, and Bernard Lewis) did not conceive modernization as an open-ended process excited by radical democracy and liberation, but as a preconceived picture of nationalism and market relations, turning modernity from a liberating process into an imposed condition. Locality and people were transformed into the objects of a preconceived process of societal and social transformation, and thus did not constitute research objects in themselves, much less subjects of their own histories.

Yet there is a lot to gain from micro-studies, notably a new research agenda in which space is not evoked as simply an empty area, but as socially constructed. Let me give three examples.

1) In the Turkish scholarly literature, the establishment of Turkish settlers from abroad is often associated with the advancement of a Turkish identity (Ari, 1995; Tekeli, 1990: 58; Karpat, 1985; Keyder, 1979-1980). Yet this proposition only holds when one assumes the equation of Turk with Muslim (and indeed most Turks were Muslim, but not the other way around). In fact, if one takes the perspective of language, Anatolia had probably become less ‘Turkish’ in 1923 than it had been in 1913, or 1820, before the exodus of Armenians and influx of Muslims from the old Ottoman Empire outside of Anatolia. Many of the non-Muslims in Anatolia spoke Turkish, but many of the Muslims entering Anatolia from the Greek exchanges did not speak Turkish, or their Turkish had, over generations, become a dialect, different from Anatolian Turkish. And if we do not assume the collapse of a difference in meaning between religious and a national identity, it is difficult to explain why Turkish speaking Greeks of Anatolia and Christians who were known to have been from Turkish descent were exchanged with Muslim Greeks who hardly knew any Turkish (Akarlı, 1998: 57)! Turning to the region, the Kurdistan region in Turkey, the relationship between ‘Turkish’ (im)migrants (e.g. Turkish-Bulgarians who were settled in Diyarbakir in the 1930s, Turkish migrants from the Black Sea coastal area to Van in the 1970s, or Turkish Afghans who were settled in Ağrı, Antep, Diyarbakir, Kars, Malatya, Urfa and Van in the 1980s) and the indigenous Kurdish population has not been a topic of previous research. I touched upon it in my study of settlement and resettlement in the Kurdistan region of Turkey, indicating that in the case of the settlement of Bulgarian immigrants in Diyarbakir, the attempt to Turkify the land and people was a complete failure. But how little we know about what happened between settlement and failure.
2) It is also held that (im)migrants from former Ottoman territories introduced new agricultural practices. Allegedly, people coming from the Caucasus contributed to the development of animal husbandry, and those from the Crimea to the development of wheat production in the Ankara-Eskişehir-Konya triangle, while the introduction of the potato in Anatolia is related to the establishment of other (unspecified) (im)migrant communities (Tekeli, 1990: 58). When it comes to the Kurdistan region of Turkey, it is hard to find evidence for the (im)migrant-innovation theory. There seems to be little in the public domain regarding any such contributions to agriculture by Bulgarian settlers in the Diyarbakir-Bismil-Çınar triangle, or the Turkish settlers in Van-Özalp. But again we do not know much about the relation between the transformation of agricultural spaces and settlement and population dynamics in the region.

3) Much has been written on the emergence of Turkish nationalism, and on the policies of the Committee for Union and Progress. But what do we know about the decline of Ottoman power elites and the emergence of an elite inspired by Turkish nationalism, changing inter-communal relations and settlement patterns in, for example, Diyarbakir at the turn of the 20th century? A comprehensive understanding of how nationalism mapped the world in territories and people in distinct cultures cannot be reached by studying meta-levels. After all, the ‘nation’ is not the space which explains, but needs explanation itself. As such, it is the product of spatial practices, of local experiences. The aim of micro-studies here would be nothing more and nothing less than to establish and contribute to a knowledge project on the production of space.

Final remarks

Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) said in one of his speeches that ‘civilization [modernization] is such a fire that it destroys those who ignore it’ (Kasaba, 1997: 22-30). The phrase quite well illustrates that modernization emerged as a destructive, narrow path from the deeds and discourses of political elites, who considered the destruction of the old society so urgent that it seemed not to matter which methods were used. The literary archetype is Goethe’s Faust, who forces everybody to create a new (social) landscape and eventually deploys Mephistopheles to kill an old couple who live in a small cottage by the sea shore for no other reason than that they did not fit his master-plan (Harvey, 1989: 16). Modernity, as we have noted, destroys in order to produce, and settlement and resettlement policies are constituent parts of this productive destruction.

This productive destruction has been discussed as a means of fostering life and of fostering control. Fostering life includes the production of a population, while fostering control takes in command over their behavior – and both comprise the production of space. It was seriously believed that the production of a new Turkish man was contingent on the production of space. Classical modernists like Ziya Gökalp thought that the space of the Turkish homo nationalis was urban, but alternative modernists like Nusret Kemal Köymen, a prolific writer who passed into oblivion, thought that the basic cell of society was neither urban nor rural, but rurban (Gökalp 1923; Köymen 1937). More than Gökalpian, from the 1930s onwards rural settlement policies in Turkey were Köymenian, concerned with a change of small and dispersed rural settlements into a new entity, in which the production of population could take root.

In the Kurdistan region in Turkey, we may witness a string development, from productive biopower to blunt control. This shift from production to control can be illustrated by two very different citations, one from 1933 and the other from 2003.
In 1933 Abdullah Ziya, an architect, argued.

‘Today the Turkish villager is about to lose his existential self. (…) There are brothers who have forgotten their language and talk another language. There are brothers who consider it an insult if you called them Turk. It is our responsibility to construct their villages and to make our brothers talk, dress, and live like us’ (Ziya, 1933).

In 2003, the general Osman Pamukoğlu argued:

‘Where there is sea there are pirates. In this province [Hakkari] are 674 villages and hamlets. These settlements form the spider’s web in which the PKK feeds itself. (…) Why don’t we concentrate all [the villagers] into two or three main settlements?’ (Pamukoğlu, 2003).

The shift seems to illustrate a transition from settlement as the production of positive environments (for the constitution of national life) to settlement as the destruction of negative environments (that feed the other). Both have different spatial dimensions. The first implied a quest for a new settlement type in the countryside, one beyond the rural-urban divide. The second aimed at a clearance of the countryside and the migration of people to urban centers, with the objective of producing control, however without a positive image of the future.

As a final, conceptual, remark I would like to emphasize that without the concept of space and its production, power cannot achieve concreteness (Lefebvre 1991: 281). In respect to the study of settlement and resettlement in Kurdistan, the challenges is to study the production of space and the exercise of power, between productive force and blunt control, through series of micro-studies (historical, anthropological, sociological) and disclose and discuss how power is exercised over people by means of which spatial policies.
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