Paper prepared for delivery at the Kurdish Studies
Conference organized by the Institut Kurde de Paris and Salahaddin University, Irbil, Iraqi
Kurdistan, Sept. 6-9, 2006.
1. Who are the Emerging
emerging leaders can quickly become an exercise either in the obvious or
obscure. For years, any such list would simply catalog the Barzanis, Talabanis,
and their closest allies. Since the creation of the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) of Iraq in
1992, however, an emerging civil society has considerably broadened this exercise.
Nevertheless, nepotism continues. Thus, any list of the emerging leaders must
still start here, while also recognizing that one needs financial resources to
become a leader.
Massoud Barzani—the president of the KRG since June 2005 and the
sole leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) since his elder half
brother Idris Barzani suddenly died in 1987—turned 60 on August 16, 2006. For
some time his heir apparent has been his nephew and current prime minister of
the supposedly unified KRG, Nechirvan Idris Barzani, born in 1966. Nechirvan
Idris Barzani represents an interesting merging of the progressive and
conservative factions of the KDP in that his ideas seem modern while his late
father Idris Barzani was notably traditional. Much less known is Massoud
Barzani’s eldest son Masrour Barzani. Masrour Barzani speaks excellent English,
was educated at the American University in Washington, DC, and has
already been a member of the KDP Politburo for several years as well as the
leader of the KDP’s intelligence branch. In addition, there is an entirely new
generation of Idrises, Mustafas, etc., in the Barzani family.
Jalal Talabani—the longtime leader of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and presently the president of Iraq—was born in 1933 and thus is approaching his mid-70s.
Recently, his second son Qubad Jalal Talabany (born in 1977) has emerged as a
promising future leader. Qubad was educated in Britain,
speaks excellent English with a conspicuous English accent, and is presently
the most prominent Iraqi Kurdish representative in Washington, DC.
Norshirwan Mustafa Amin, often mentioned as
a possible number two leader of the PUK, is now in his 60s, speaks English
well, but is a heavy smoker. The other frequently mentioned number two member
of the PUK is Kosrat Rasul, somewhat younger than Norshirwan Mustafa Amin but
now partially crippled. Rasul’s successor as the PUK regional prime minister
and currently the deputy prime minister of Iraq
is the much younger Barham Salih (born 1960). Barham Salih earned a Ph.D. in
statistics and computer modeling from the University of Liverpool in Britain and speaks flawless English, but lacks the deep party roots possessed
by Norshirwan Mustafa Amin and Kosrat Rasul.
The list of the 111 members of the new
Kurdistan Regional Parliament elected on December 15, 2005, and roll of the 32
members of the supposedly unified KRG cabinet announced on May 7, 2006, contain
the names of some obvious other current leaders as well as candidates for
future leaders. These names, of course, are easily available and thus not
necessary to mention specifically.
Despite exhortations to enlist women, only two females were appointed to the
new KRG cabinet, Ms. Chinar Saad Abdullah as the Minister for Martyrs and
Victims of the Anfal, and Ms. Nazanin Mohammad Waso as Minister for
Mahmoud Ali Othman (Osman), a medical
doctor by profession and once a top lieutenant of the legendary Mulla Mustafa
Barzani (1903-1979), is now almost 70 and has become one of the grand old men
of Kurdish politics. He has played a prominent role in the various Iraqi
governments since 2003 and will probably continue to offer his services. For
the future, however, his son Hiwa, who speaks excellent English and has worked
as a journalist, might bear scrutiny.
Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman—the daughter of the
longtime prominent KDP leader Sami Abdul Rahman assassinated in February
2004—is the KRG representative to Britain, speaks
excellent English, and is also a former journalist. Given her pedigree and the
perceived need for female leaders, she also bears watching.
Mohammed Ihsan—the former KRG Minister for
Human Rights and presently the KRG Minister for Extra-Regional (Iraqi)
Affairs—won Massoud Barzani’s gratitude for discovering the bodies of Barzani
family members murdered and buried by the Baathist regime in southern Iraq.
Ihsan has a doctorate in law from the University of London, speaks excellent English, and just recently turned
40. Fuad Hussein is Massoud Barzani’s chief of staff and has a Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam. Latif Rashid is the competent Minister of
Water Resources in the Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki and a son-in-law of
Jalal Talabani. He has a Ph.D. in engineering from Manchester University in Britain and is now over 60 years old. Khaled Salih, a former academic, has
become the advisor to KRG prime minister Nechirvan Idris Barzani and is the
KRG’s first official government spokesman. He has a Ph.D. in politics, speaks
excellent English, was a consultant for the Iraqi Reconstruction and
Development Council, and served in Kurdistan as a
constitutional advisor to the KRG.
Kamran Karadaghi, another former journalist
with a wealth of experience and able to speak good English as well as Russian,
is presently serving as a close advisor to Iraqi president Jalal Talabani.
Mohammed Sadik, is the president of Salahaddin University in the KRG capital of Irbil
and thus represents an entirely new potential list of possible leaders from the
universities. His tribal connections suggest yet another area from which
potential leaders might emerge. Dr. Rebwar Fatah, who writes the much-read web
site <KurdishMedia.com> currently lives in Britain and epitomizes possible leaders from the Kurdish diaspora. Dr.
Najmaldin O. Karim, the president of the Washington Kurdish Institute in the United States where he is also a prominent neurosurgeon is
particularly well connected to most of the current Kurdish leaders and also has
good relations with numerous prominent U.S.
politicians and officials. Indeed, several of the current Kurdish leaders long
lived in the Kurdish diaspora before recently returning to Iraqi Kurdistan.
Barham Salih is a good example. This, of course, is only a very partial
listing. Many future leaders are probably almost completely unknown at this
time. Finally, the United Nations, United States, and
European Union discreetly should play a role in developing future leaders.
2. The Dynamics between the
KRG and the Iraqi Government
At the present
time, the Iraqi Kurds not only possess their most powerful regional government
since the creation of Iraq following World War I, but also play a very
prominent role in the Iraqi government in Baghdad including the posts of
president (Jalal Talabani), deputy prime minister (Barham Salih), foreign minister
(Hoshyar Zebari), and six other cabinet positions (Fawzi Hariri – Industry,
Latif Rashid – Water Resources, Bayan Dazee – Housing and Construction, Narmin
Othman – Environment, Assad Kamal Mohammed – Culture, and Ali Mohammed Ahmed –
Minister of State). This dual governmental role stands in mark contrast to the
situation that existed before the events of 1991 and 2003, when the Kurds were
treated as second class citizens and worse. The ultimate question, of course,
is for how long this unique Kurdish position of strength will last. Many Arabs
still resent the Kurdish claims to autonomy as a challenge to the Arab
patrimony and a federal state for the Iraqi Kurds within Iraq as simply a prelude to secession.
Indeed, most Kurds would quickly opt for independence when they perceive the
time as ripe. When will the Iraqi Arabs get their act together and start trying
to reduce the Kurds again? For the Kurds, on the other hand, their current role
in Baghdad is a hedge against
renewed Arab chauvinism. The current interplay between these two governmental
roles for the Kurds is very interesting and instructive. A brief analysis
The long struggle for ultimate power in Iraqi Kurdistan between
Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani—a contest that led to a bloody civil war
between the two as recently as the mid-1990s and even saw Barzani call upon
Saddam Hussein for help in 1996—for now has been put on hold by ceding Barzani
the presidency of the KRG while Talabani has assumed the largely ceremonial
presidency of Iraq. Thus, the Barzani-Talabani rivalry potentially has been
grafted partially onto the dynamics for power between the KRG and the Iraqi
The Iraqi Constitution approved by a hotly contested referendum on
October 15, 2005, establishes a federal structure for Iraq that grants significant powers to the regions. Indeed, for the first time ever
most Kurds now think of their government in Irbil, not the one in Baghdad, when the concept is broached. The actual division of power between
the Iraqi government and the KRG, however, remains in potential dispute. These
contested powers include the ownership of natural resources and the control of
the revenues flowing from them, the role of the KRG army or peshmerga
(militia), and the final status of Kirkuk as well as several other disputed territories such as Sinjar and
Makhmur, among others. Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city, has a big
Kurdish population in its eastern part and is also likely to be contested.
Dr. Ashti A. Hawrami, the KRG Minister for Natural Resources and a
well known former international oil executive, addressed the issue of natural
resource ownership in a wide-ranging interview in the KRG capital of Irbil on June 14, 2006. He argued strongly that Article
115 of the new Iraqi Constitution “states the supremacy of regional laws over
federal laws, and can be invoked if no agreement is reached on the management
of oil and gas resources and the distribution of proceeds.” He also argued that
Article 112 of the Constitution only permits the Iraqi Government “an
administrative role confined to the handling, i.e. exporting and marketing, of
the extracted oil and gas from existing producing fields. . . . The elected
authorities of the regions and producing governorates are now entitled to
administer and supervise the extraction process; in other words local oilfield
managers are answerable to the local authorities.” Hawrami went on to maintain
that since the new Constitution was silent on undeveloped fields or any new
fields, “the regions and governorates will have all the controls.” Although he
stated that the KRG and the government in Baghdad would be able to cooperate, the possibility for conflict over the
issue of natural resources is obvious.
Given the security problem to the south, many foreign investors have
been attracted to the Kurdistan
region. Chief among them have been Turkish firms, which have been heavily
involved in such projects as building international airports in Irbil and Sulaymaniya as well as cement
plants, among other projects. On the other hand, Turkey fears that a Kurdish federal state in Iraq will entice rebellion among the Kurds living across the border in
southeastern Turkey. Thus
ironically, while Turkey has
presented major political problems to the legitimacy and thus future of the
KRG, Turkish businesses have brought much-needed investments and thus implicit
legitimacy to the region.
On July 7, 2006, the KRG parliament unanimously approved a new
foreign-friendly investment law in hopes of attracting more foreign capital to
Before, two different investment laws had been in force allowing foreign
companies in the region to hold only minority stakes, a provision that deterred
many foreign investors. Under the new legislation, foreign firms will be
permitted to hold up to 100 percent of a company. In addition, foreigners will
also be allowed to own land, while also enjoying a five-year tax holiday
exempting them from import duties, income taxes, and taxes on repatriated
profits. Dier Haqi Shaways, the head of the KRG parliament’s economic and
financial committee, argued that “this [new] law will offer investors
guarantees and facilities with regard to taxation and custom tariffs.” Douglas
Layton, the director of the Kurdistan Development Corporation—a joint public-private
company that seeks to promote economic investment in the region—agreed. Layton warned, however, that the bureaucracy remained cumbersome, the
infrastructure dilapidated, and education unable to prepare graduates to enter
the business world. Nevertheless, he argued that all of these problems
presented opportunities for foreign investment, rather than deterrents. Hersh
al-Tayyar, the chairman of the Iraqi Businessmen’s Union based in Irbil, too has promoted the Kurdistan
region as a gateway to the remainder of Iraq. The process, however, may also lead in the opposite direction
toward even greater KRG independence.
On June 7, 2006, KRG president Massoud Barzani declared that the
Kurds had not sought to use their successful experience in promoting security
in their region by trying to nominate a Kurd for the post of interior minister
in the new Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki: “A Kurdish interior minister .
. . will still be accused of being biased to a certain side or of committing
crimes against this sect or that party.” Barzani cited how Kurdish soldiers
were accused of killing Arabs in Fallujah and concluded that “the past
circumstances were not encouraging.”
On June 17, 2006, KRG prime minister Nechirvan Barzani pointed to still other
problems between his government and Baghdad involving training courses or scholarships abroad offered to Iraq as well as the receipt of medicines.
Barzani concluded that “this is occurring because federalism is very new to Iraq, and we need time to develop
necessary mechanisms and to learn how to work within a federal system.”
As sectarian violence increased in Baghdad in July 2006, Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki journeyed to Irbil to plead for several thousand
Kurdish peshmergas as a possible way to help the situation. The new Iraqi prime
minister was accompanied by one of his two deputy prime ministers, the
prominent Kurdish official Barham Salih, and his Minister of Oil, Hussain
al-Shahristani. Al-Maliki’s appeal was particularly ironic given his recent promises
to curb the militias and the past disdain in which the Arabs held the Kurds. In
addition, of course, what had happened to the much-proclaimed new Iraqi forces
trained by the United States?
For their part, however, the Kurds appeared to be in no hurry to respond to
al-Maliki’s appeal. After all why should they become involved in the Arab
Shiite-Sunni conflict when they were relatively secure within their own region
and even the potential benefactors if Iraq completely collapsed?
KRG prime minister Nechirvan Barzani explained that the Kurds did
not consider their peshmerga forces to be militia that must be integrated into
the Iraqi national army. He also found constitutional sanction in the new Iraqi
Constitution for his view, declaring that “due to past injustices, our people
have the right to possess a regular army trained up to the latest military
Barzani did welcome al-Maliki to the Kurdish region and promised that
mechanisms would be put in place to strengthen regional-federal relations. He
added that a KRG delegation would soon visit Baghdad and a KRG representation office would be established to address
budget and other issues.
Already Dr. Dindar Zebari holds the position of Kurdistan Regional Coordinator
to the United Nations and has called upon the United Nations to appoint a
political advisor to the KRG.
As for the future status of Kirkuk, al-Maliki promised that Baghdad would accept the outcome of the referendum to be held before the
end of December 2007 under the provisions of Article 140 of the new Iraqi
Many Kurds remain skeptical of Baghdad’s ultimate intentions because the new Iraqi Constitution does not
specifically acknowledge the previous Arabization that had occurred there as a
crime. In addition, the Kurds do not like how al-Maliki appointed a member of
the Iraqi Turkmen Front as the head of the committee of normalization for Kirkuk.
Trouble in Kurdistan
rosy depictions and prognostications, all is not well in Iraqi Kurdistan. The
riot in Halabja on March 17, 2006 aptly demonstrated this situation. Hundreds of stone-throwing
protesters—most of them students from universities in the Kurdistan region home for vacation—beat
back government guards, stormed, and then destroyed a museum dedicated to the
memory of the chemical attack on Halabja on March 16, 1988. “We’ve had enough
of these liars and we don’t want to see them in our town,” cried one protestor.
The demonstrators also marched through Halabja chanting “we don’t want any
government officials here” and waved banners declaring “you have done nothing
for the city” and “all government officials are corrupt.” It was arguably the most
serious popular challenge to the KDP-PUK-run KRG in its 15-year history.
Amazingly, the prominent PUK leader Kosrat Rasul suggested that all
of the party’s highest-ranking officials, including himself, should resign
except Talabani. This would pave the way for new, younger party staff. If the PUK did manage to
reform itself by initiating an elected succession as well as achieving greater
transparency, the process and result could enable it to give more Kurds a sense
of being true stakeholders in the party and help it surpass the more hidebound
KDP. For his part, Massoud Barzani recently suggested that both the KDP and PUK
“should turn into two civil parties and melt within one government.”
Earlier, human rights advocates expressed concern about flagrant
abuses involving two critics of the KRG. Kamal Sayid Qadir, an Austrian
national of Kurdish origin, was imprisoned in October 2005 for allegedly
defaming KDP political leaders such as Massoud Barzani. High school teacher
Hawez Hawezi is also facing prosecution on similar charges for defaming PUK
leaders. Amnesty International has called upon the KRG to free the two and
amend existing legislation that permitted such abuses. Commenting upon the over-all
situation, Time magazine went so far as to characterize the Kurdistan
region as “a veritable police state, where the Asyeesh—the military
security—has a house in each neighborhood of the major cities, and where the
Parastin secret police monitors phone conversations and keeps tabs on who
attends Friday prayers.”
KRG officials have responded that such security measures are necessary to keep
the Kurdistan region free from
jihadi and resistance cells plaguing the south from infiltrating the north.
Opponents counter that these measures are often used by the ruling parties as a
mere excuse to maintain their position in power. KRG president Massoud Barzani
recently declared that “civilians have the right to criticize the
establishments and institutions of the Kurdistan Regional Government for the
current shortcomings but they should also remember that these establishments
are there to serve them and it takes time to completely overcome existing
Huge discrepancies in wealth have developed and a lot of new
millionaires are living in Sulaymaniya and Irbil. This economic situation already has led to inevitable problems.
Considerable popular dissatisfaction also exists over the KRG’s perceived
compromises with the Baghdad
government. Ultimate among these grievances, is the deeply felt desire for
Kurdish independence. Unofficial referendums in February 2004 and again in
January 2005 almost unanimously called for Kurdish independence. The KRG, of
course, has opposed independence as premature and therefore dangerous given the
virtually universal opposition of the Iraqi Arabs, Turkey, Iran, and the United States. A related problematic
element is the question of a pan-Kurdish state that would include portions of Turkey, Iran, and Syria. The
lack of such a state, of course, is an historical injustice, but to even hint
at such an entity guarantees the strongest reaction from the KRG’s regional
neighbors. Any responsible KRG, therefore, would refuse to support any such
notion. Nevertheless, the very existence of the KRG inspires dreams of a
pan-Kurdish state among many Kurds.
In an effort to maintain their control over events, the KDP and PUK
joined most other smaller Kurdish parties to form a single electoral list of
candidates for the seats to be chosen both in the Iraqi national and Kurdish
regional elections held on January 30, 2005, and December 15, 2005. The two
main Kurdish parties argued that such a single list would avoid splintering the
potential Kurdish strength when no Arab electoral group offered to support
Kurdish demands. What was not as readily admitted, however, was that such a
single list would be most likely to guarantee the continuing dominance of the
KDP and PUK because those chosen for the two parliaments would be the KDP and
PUK candidates placed highest on the single all-Kurdish list.
Although one observer has argued that compared to a non-believer a
Kurd is a good Muslim, recent signs indicate a growing popularity for Islamic
parties like the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), which doubled its vote in the
Iraqi national elections held on December 15, 2005. Instead of advocating loyalty
to Islam over nationalism, Kurdish Islamist parties are attempting to seize the
moral high ground by accusing the KDP and PUK of corruption and economic
mismanagement. Mohammed Ahmed, a KIU member of the KRG parliament, declared
that the “people know that our followers and members are not corrupt.” The KIU
is also building a large, hi-tech TV studio to run a 24-hour satellite station
that should be operational by the end of 2006. If successful, this Islamist TV
station will attempt to compete with stations currently run by the KDP and the
Other minor secular Kurdish parties also exist such as the Kurdistan
Toilers Party now led by Qadir Aziz, the so-called Kurdistan Socialist
Democratic Party (KSDP) led by former but now disenchanted KDP warlord Muhammad
Haji Mahmud, and the Kurdistan Communist Party led by Kamal Shakir, among others.
The communists won 10 percent of the vote in Irbil municipal elections in 2002, while Muhammad Haji Mahmud’s KSDP
continues to maintain an armed militia just west of Sulaymaniya as does the
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) led by Mustafa Hijri. The Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) from Turkey
also maintains a troublesome military force within the KRG region near the
Iranian border in the Kandil Mountains. A militant PKK offshoot in Iran called the Free Life Party of
Kurdistan (PJAK) exists on the KRG-Iran border.
In the spring of 2006 and again in July 2006, Iranian forces
bombarded areas of the KRG in an apparent attempt to retaliate against both the
KDPI and the PJAK. The PKK’s presence in the Kandil mountains of Iraqi
Kurdistan and the reputed welfare of the region’s Turkmen minority give
neighboring Turkey a potential
excuse to intervene in the region. The Iraqi Turkmen Front established in April
1995 and currently led by Faruq Abdullah consists of some 26 groups, while the
Assyrian Democratic Movement is the main Assyrian party. Although the KRG has
some token Turkmen and Assyrian representation, potential problems remain over
land claims, voting, and parliamentary representation, among others. The
so-called Conservative Party of Kurdistan established in 1991 seeks to
represent the still potentially influential tribes. In 1996, the KDP killed an
influential Surchi tribal chief in a dispute that led to a bitter split between
the KDP and the Conservative Party, which since has operated from the PUK
In July 2006, Turkey
again threatened to send its army into northern Iraq to root out the PKK. Turkey justified such possible action on the grounds of self-defense while
also drawing parallels to the concurrent Israeli intervention against Hizbollah
in Lebanon, which the United States implicitly supported. The United States and the KRG strongly opposed
such Turkish measures, however, on the grounds they potentially could ignite
dangerous fighting between all the parties concerned. In an attempt to assuage Turkey, the KRG prime minister Nechirvan
Idris Barzani declared—with reference to PKK attacks upon Turkey from bases in the KRG—that the KRG
and Baghdad government “will
not permit our country to become a base for attaching neighbouring states.”
The Unified KRG
It remains to
be seen if the new unified KRG established on May 7, 2006 will prove to be a
positive step forward for the Iraqi Kurds or more of the same troubling
division between the KDP and the PUK. Previous attempts at achieving a unified
government for the KRG have always foundered, even leading to a civil war in
the mid-1990s. Indeed, some observers such as Gareth R. V. Stansfield have gone
so far as to argue that, given the divisions between the KDP and PUK, the
quasi-federal arrangements institutionalized by having two separate regional
governments based in Irbil and Sulaymaniya served the Kurds better than a
forced unified government.
The new unified KRG contains 13 ministries headed by the KDP and 14
by the PUK. Islamists hold 3 ministries, while Turkmen and Assyrians hold 1
each. The main problem with the new unified KRG is that it is not completely
united: four major ministries remain divided between the PUK and the KDP:
Interior, Finance, Justice, and Peshmerga (Defense) Affairs. Each portfolio has
two ministers. A truly unified or single KRG, of course, would have only one
minister for each position.
The remains of the two former regional governments in Irbil and Sulaymaniya
include a grossly overstaffed civil service, conflicting legislation in
personal status laws and foreign investment (the latter seemingly dealt with by
the new investment law passed on July 7, 2006), and different cultural
practices between civil servants from the two former KRGs.
In addition, the new cabinet has only two female members, lacks new
blood, and contains some ministers accused of corruption. The Kurdish people
remain frustrated at the lack of services, transparency, women’s and youth’s
rights, institutionalization, and, of course, the continuing corruption.
Several ministries should make changes to improve their efficiency. All the
security, intelligence, and armed forces should be united under the two
ministries of the Interior and Peshmerga Affairs. Furthermore, steps remain to
be taken for fashioning these ministries into truly representing Kurdish
interests instead of mere KDP and PUK interests. Party members and functions
should not be paid for by public funds. What is more, various bodies that still
have any judicial function should be placed under one Justice ministry. A
single ministry should be designated as the lead one responsible for the
coordination between the Kurdistan Parliament and the Kurdistan bloc within the Iraqi Parliament. The present penal code of Saddam
Hussein needs to be revised, and of course, Kurdistan needs a formal constitution.
Despite these continuing problems, the dynamics of change in the KRG
are encouraging, especially when compared to the rest of Iraq or for that matter much of the Middle East. The KRG has taken enormously positive steps toward Kurdish unity,
democratization, and modernization. The ultimate problem, of course, is who
will guarantee these accomplishments? The United States already has betrayed
the Iraqi Kurds twice in the past (1975 and 1991) and can hardly wait to pull
its troops out of Iraq now given the bloody quagmire it has become. Any
guarantee by the United Nations would only be as strong as the delicate unity
of the Security Council’s five permanent members. As for the neighboring states
of Turkey, Iran, and Syria, possibilities are even less promising. Thus, only time will tell
whether the achievements of the KRG are permanent or merely a false dawn.
 Two useful recent studies of the Kurds
are Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005);
and David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity,
Mobilization and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
 For a list, see “Ministers of the
New Unified Cabinet,” <KRG.org>, May 7, 2006.
 For a recent analysis, see Michael
M. Gunter, “The Iraqi Kurds’ Federalism Imperative,” Journal of South Asian
and Middle Eastern Studies 29 (Winter 2006), pp. 1-10.
 The following data and citations are
taken from “Iraq: Oil and Gas Rights of
Regions and Governorates,” <KurdishMedia>, June 14, 2006.
 The following data and citation are
taken from “Kurds Approve Foreigner-Friendly Investment Law,” Reuters, June 7,
 The following information is largely
based on “Foreign Investors See Northern Iraq as Gateway to Rest of Country,”
Voice of America, June 30, 2006. For further background to business
opportunities in Iraqi Kurdistan, see Michael M. Gunter, “Kurdistan’s Revival,” Worth
(Robb Report), May 2005, pp. 32-34.
 Cited in “Interview with Kurdistan Region President Masoud
Barzani,” Asharq Al-Awsat, June 7, 2006.
 Cited in Tanya Goudsouzian, “Prime
Minister: Kurdistan Open for Business,” Soma, June 8, 2006, as cited in
<KurdishMedia.org>, June 17, 2006.
 Cited in “Kurds Declare Right to
Have Their Own Armed Forces,” Associated Press, July 13, 2006.
 “Visiting Iraqi Prime Minister
Pledges to Strengthen Regional-Federal Relations,” KRG, July 12, 2006.
 “Al Maliki: We Will Respect the
Result of Referendum on Kirkuk,” <KurdishMedia.com>, July 13, 2006.
 For a report, see Robert F. Worth,
“Memorial Gathering in Iraqi Kurdistan Turns to Violence,” New York Times, March 17, 2006.
 These citations were garnered from
“AFP Account of the Halabja Events,” AFP, March 17, 2006.
 “Senior Kurdish Official Proposes
Mass Resignations,” IWPR, April 26, 2006.
 Cited in “Barzani: Kurds Are Entitled to a State but
in Due Time,” The Globe, July 22, 2006.
 Amnesty International, “Prosecutions
Threaten Freedom of Expression in Kurdistan-Northern Iraq,” March 29, 2006.
 Andrew Lee Butters, “Trouble in Kurdistan,” Time, March 21,
 Cited in “Barzani: Kurds Are
 The following information and
citation were taken from James Brandon, “Pro-US Kurds Eye Nascent Islamic
Parties,” Christian Science Monitor, July 6, 2006.
 Louis Meixler, “Turkey Prepared to Start 2nd
Iraq War with Kurds,”
Associated Press, July 19, 2006.
 Cited in “Nechirvan Barzani: Iraq Will Not Be Used as a
Base for Attacking Neighbouring States,” The Globe, July 22, 2006.
 Gareth R. V. Stansfield, “Governing
Kurdistan: The Strengths of Division,” in The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, ed. by Brendan O’Leary,
John McGarry, and Khaled Salih (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), pp.
 For further analysis, see Rebwar
Fatah, “Unification of Administrations: So Close, Yet So Far Away,”
<KurdishMedia.com>, June 19, 2006.
Gareth Stansfield, “Can Iraq’s Kurds Transcend
Persistent Factionalism?” Daily Star, June 19, 2006.
 Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American
Incompetence Created a War without End (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).
(*) Professor at Tennessee Technological University