

# WHICH TURKEY FOR WHICH EUROPE ?

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with the collaboration of the Kurdish Institute of Paris and the France-Libertés Foundation  
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The CILDEKT is an organisation specialising in the defense of prisoners of opinion in  
Turkey and encompasses national committees established in Germany, France, Norway and Sweden.

# *Letter to Euro-M.P.s*

*from*  
**Danielle MITTERRAND**

You know that for several years I have concerned myself with the fate of the Kurdish people and have, together with French and Western NGOs concerned with Human Rights, made efforts to awaken public opinion to this problem.

The affair of the Kurdish M.P.s, arrested and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment for crimes of opinion has breached the wall of silence that, hitherto, has surrounded the terrible tragedy of the Kurds in Turkey. Unfortunately, it is only the tip of the iceberg as far as the systematic destruction and depopulation of the Kurdish region is concerned, with the stifling or physical elimination of their cultural and intellectual elites. One only has to spend two days in these Kurdish provinces, subject to a State of Emergency, to completely arbitrary Army and police rule, to realise the extent and intensity of the oppression being suffered by the local population. Without having gone there in person, Mr Gonzales Carnero, rapporteur of the European Parliament, described the essential facts of the matter, on the basis of evidence collected in Ankara, in the report he made on his mission.

The European Governments, for a long time indifferent or not knowing how to reason with their Turkish ally, have, on the whole, followed a *laissez faire* policy up to now. Nevertheless, the democratic vigilance of the Euro-M.P.s, moved in particular by the fate of their Kurdish colleagues, has allowed a great step forward to be taken in linking the ratification of the projected Customs Union with the satisfaction, by Turkey, of certain basic conditions of Human Rights and democratic freedoms.

The European Parliament, which for years has unavailingly voted resolutions on the Kurdish problem or on Cyprus, now at last has an exceptionally important means of applying pressure to try and secure an improvement of the situation in this country, and particularly of the tragic fate of its 15 million Kurdish citizens. In my opinion humanitarian considerations should suffice in themselves. But, in addition, politically speaking, the Kurdish question is a veritable powder barrel, endangering the stability of not only Turkey and the Middle East but also peace in Europe, since the European Union shelters 3 million Turks and Kurds whose moods are tuned into those of their country of origin. When one remembers the tragic consequences for both the Near East and the West of the failure to settle the Palestine question earlier (and this affecting a much smaller population) one can imagine the dangers that could arise from a further deterioration of the Kurdish problem in Turkey.

This is why, contrary to many of our Governments who think only in terms of markets and short-term political interests, I believe that the European Parliament should postpone its vote for six months or a year and set up a good offices mission to initiate a process of

dialogue aiming at a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem in a democratic context and within existing frontiers. This problem is the keystone of the democratisation of Turkey and the source of most of the country's present difficulties. Your Spanish, Belgian, British, Italian or Finnish colleagues who have some experience of the problem of minorities could give the Turks the benefit of their *savoir-faire* and help them overcome their paranoia of separatism. For the Kurds of Turkey, who I have known for so many years, only aspire to a free expression of their identity and a certain degree of local autonomy which in no way calls existing frontiers into question. The dynamics of a peace process would oblige the PKK to progressively lay down its arms otherwise it would soon be marginalised, like the ETA in Spain.

To vote for the Customs Union in today's conditions, as your rapporteur Mr Carnero Gonzales so rightly stresses, would be "*a serious mistake*". European democratic opinion would be greatly disappointed. The same would be true of the real Kurdish and Turkish democrats, amongst whom your stand in favour of democracy has aroused so much hope and gratitude.

The attitude of the People's Republican Party which, in the present situation, is that which seems closest of our ideas of democracy, must not lead us astray. This Party, which has taken part in the Government coalition since 1991, has, alas, mainly served as a democratic alibi and a left hostage. Despite its anguished states of mind and its democratic declarations, it has had to screen the implacable policy of destruction of over 3,000 Kurdish villages, forced population displacement of 3 million Kurdish civilians and all the massive violations of Human Rights of which you know from others. It is possible, as the former Speaker of Parliament Mr Cindoruk suggests, that it did this in the hope of limiting the damage and saving the country from an extreme right dictatorship, but the results are what they are. It has lost its soul and most of its credibility amongst its Kurdish electorate and amongst Kurdish democrats; it is in danger of failing to reach the 10% threshold at the next elections, and thus not being represented in Parliament. The Europeans would then look pretty silly, having helped an authoritarian, not to say semi-fascist, alliance to emerge, collecting, behind Mrs Çiller's smiling face, the police chiefs, the generals, Colonel Türkeş' neo-fascist extreme right, the most backward-looking forces, speculators and ultra-nationalist in the country. If some people no longer wish to hear the cries of pain from the Kurdish population, they should at least listen to the appeals of the former Speaker of the Parliament denouncing the setting up of a police state and the danger of a "*Serbian type ultra-nationalist*" regime led by Mrs Çiller. When the Republican People's Party's General Secretary, commenting on the recent statement of its Chairman Mr Baykal on seizure of the State machine by the extreme right, calls Mrs Çiller the "*Trojan horse*" of the fascist extreme right, we must not remain deaf to this warning even if, simultaneously, these same people, whether out of chauvinism or national pride, ask you to vote for the Customs Union now.

Don't let's be impressed by the trotting out, for the occasion, the blackmailing evocation of Islamic fundamentalism or of strategic considerations! Turkey is certainly a strategic military ally of the West and thus a member of NATO, and for this she reaps rich dividends in military aid. With or without a Customs Union, she will continue to be part of the alliance, which is in her interest — and even though, because of the Kurdish conflict and her political instability, the military reliability of this ally is more and more doubtful, our Governments will maintain their militaro-strategic relations with Turkey! Of that you can be sure...

The argument that the Customs Union would be an “*encouragement*” of democracy is hardly worth any more. It has been used unceasingly since 1949 to maintain Turkey in the Council of Europe — with the results, in terms of Human Rights, that you know. Once the Customs Union has been voted, the resolutions and encouragements of the European Parliament will have no more effect than those, ineffectively lavish on her by the unfortunate Council of Europe which, as far as Turkey is concerned, has lost all political and moral credibility. You are, after all, in a position to know the effect that previous resolutions of the European Parliament have had on the Ankara leadership.


As for the Islamic fundamentalist danger, your rapporteur and that of the U.S. Senate Commission for Foreign Affairs have analysed this very well. It has domestic political, economic and moral origins, principally the war in Kurdistan, the marginalising and condemning to unspeakable poverty of millions of the country’s citizens. Even as it brandishes this danger, the Turkish Government continually encourages, and even “*sponsors fundamentalist activity as an antidote to Kurdish nationalism*” as the American Senate report shows. The European Parliament’s vote, in consequence, could have only a limited repercussion on the fundamentalists’ audience. Besides, the Turks are too dependent, economically and militarily, on the West to seek an alternative to the East, especially in view of their very bad relations with the other States in the area and the fact that this immediate neighbours on the ground are the Kurdish populations living on both sides of their frontiers with Syria, Iraq, Iran and Armenia.

In conclusion, I will say that rejecting or postponing the Customs Union provides an exceptional means of applying pressure for the democratic evolution of Turkey. Let us learn how to use it to establish peace and a genuine democracy in this country that we love, with both its Kurds and its Turks, which needs Europe as much as Europe needs it. A negative vote would, I hope, incite the Turkish leaders to question their intolerable Kurdish policy. A positive vote, in present day circumstances, would be seen as a moral abdication by the immense majority of those of our citizens who are aware of the fate of the Kurds of the intolerable situation regarding Human Rights in Turkey. On the other hand, a postponement of the vote would allow the European Parliament to safeguard the future and to play a positive role in building peace and democracy in this country. Turkey will be welcome when she has settled her Kurdish problem and established peace and stability at home. Just as, after the black night of the Franquist dictatorship, the European Community, which its forebears had built as an area of peace, democracy and mutual respect, was able to welcome a democratic Spain, so, when the time comes, will it make room for a democratic Turkey, able to ensure domestic peace, to accept its cultural and linguistic diversity and to guarantee the right of its Kurdish citizens to their own identity.

Following, as I do, the day by day evolution of the situation in this country which is so dear to me, in contact with a number of European, Turkish and Kurdish NGOs concerned with Human Rights, I am most anxious to give you the fruit of my reflections on this subject before the vote takes place.

In the hope that they may be of use in informing your own thinking on the matter, please receive my sincerest regards

*Danielle Mitterrand*



# Turkey — facts and figures

**Total area:** 779,452 Km<sup>2</sup>

Area of regions with Kurdish majority: 230,000 Km<sup>2</sup>

**Total Population:** 61.2 million in 1994.

Kurdish population: 15 to 20 million (estimate), half of whom live in Western Turkey, with important communities in the major Turkish conurbation's: Istanbul (2.5 million), Adana (1 million), Izmir, Mersin etc.

**Urban population:** 61.3% rural: 38.7% (1992)

**Population emigrated:** 2.8 million (of which 58% in Germany, 9% in France).

**Minorities:** Apart from the Turks and Kurds, the two main populations, each of which forms the overwhelming majority in a part of the country, Turkey also has recognised minorities: (Greeks, less than 5,000; Armenians, about 50,000; Jews) and others having no recognised status: Laz and Georgians (about 3 million) along the Black sea coast, Bosnians, Arabs (750, 000), Circassians.

**Religion:** Sunni Moslem 70%

Sunni Kurds practice the *shafeite* rite, while Turkish Sunnis practice the *hanefite* rite.

Alevi shiite Moslems: 28.5%

The Alevis differ from the very hierarchical and dogmatic *duodecimal* shiites of the Persians and Azeris in Iran. About 25% of the Kurds, essentially those living in provinces bordering Anatolia, are Alevis.

**Others:** Yezidis (a Kurdish variant of Zoroastrianism) 0.8%

Christians following the Eastern rites and Jews: 0.7%

Although officially secular, the state pays the clergy and staff of the Sunni mosques and the Sunni secondary schools and theological colleges. Other religions receive no state subsidies.

**Languages:** Turkish, Kurdish, Laz (a Georgian dialect), Arabic, Armenian and Greek. Turkish is the official language of government, education and the media. Armenian and Greek are taught in the community schools of these two minorities. Arabic is taught in the thousands of religious schools financed by the State as well as in the Coranic classes organised by the mosques.

The use of Kurdish is forbidden in teaching, publications and radio/television — even the private ones. An Indo-european language, it is as different

from Turkish, an Uralo-altaic one, as French or English are from Hungarian.

**Illiteracy:** 19.3% on average, nationally, 35% in the Kurdish regions, where many of the villages have no school and where, in anycase, 4,000 schools have been closed for several years because of the war.

**GNP:** \$ 171,000 million (1993).

Annual income per capita: \$ 2852.6 (1993)

Annual income per capita in the 19 provinces where Kurds form the majority of the population: \$ 204.

(In 1994 the GNP dropped by 6%)

**Position in UNDP's world ranking:** 68th on the basis of human development (HDI) in 1994

**External Debt:** \$ 67,356,000 million (1993)

**Imports in 1994:** \$ 23,270,000 million

European Union: \$ 10,278 million (44.2%) of which Germany: \$ 3,645 million (15.4%)

Italy: \$ 2,008 million (8.6%)

France: \$ 1,458 million (6.3%)

United Kingdom: \$ 1,189 million (5.0%)

United States: \$ 2,426 million (10.4%)

Japan: \$ 9,675 million (4.2%)

Moslem countries: \$ 3,372 million (14.5%) of which Saudi Arabia (oil) \$ 1,229 million (5.3%)

Russian Federation: \$ 1,046 million (4.5%)

"Turkic language" Republics: \$ 192.6 million (0.8%)

**Exports in 1994:** \$ 18,106 million

European Union: \$ 8,269 million (45.7%) of which Germany: \$ 3,934 million (21.7%)

Italy: \$ 1,033 million (5.7%)

France: \$ 851.2 million (4.7%)

United Kingdom: \$ 888.9 million (4.9%)

United States: \$ 1,520 million (8.4%)

Japan: \$ 186.5million (1.0%)

Moslem countries: \$ 3,051 million (16.9%)

Russian Federation: \$ 820.3 million (4.5%)

"Turkic language" Republics: 444.2 million (2.5%)

**Foreign Investments in 1994:** \$ 1,484 million

European Union: \$ 970.6 million of which France: \$ 256.3 million

Germany: \$ 223.5 million

Netherlands: \$ 196 million

Italy: \$ 164 million

United States: \$ 157.3 million

Japan: \$ 125.9 million

Moslem countries: \$ 45.3 million.

# THE POLITICAL SYSTEM:

## A Parliament sitting under the Sword of Damocles

Parliamentary system with only one chamber, called the *Turkish Grand National Assembly*, with 450 seats (to be increased to 550 in the next elections).

### **Percentage of women in Parliament: 2%.**

A one-Party State from 1923 to 1950 and run, at first, by the *Eternal Chief* Ataturk (literally Father of the Turks) and then, after his death in 1938, by the *National Chief*, Ismet İnönü (a former General). **Political alternance**, in 1950 with the Democratic Party, whose 3 leaders, the Prime Minister, Menderes and two of his principal ministers, elected by universal suffrage, were hanged by the authors of the military Coup d'Etat of 1960. Gradual transition to a Parliamentary regime which was interrupted by another Coup d'Etat which overthrew Demirel's government. Return to a civilian regime, under Army supervision, in 1974 but this was again "suspended" for 4 years by the Coup d'Etat of September 1980.

**Official ideology:** Turkey is the only European State to have, written into its Constitution, an official ideology. This is based on: "*the concept of nationalism and the principles and reforms brought about by Ataturk, founder of the Turkish Republic, immortal guide and incomparable hero*". According to the Preamble to the Constitution "*no opinion or thought can expect to receive any protection as against Turkish National interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the Turkish national entity, its State and its territory, the historical and spiritual values, inherent in the Turkish people or the nationalism, principles reforms and modernism of Ataturk*".

**Constitution:** Like the three preceding Constitutions in Turkish history, the present one, dating from 1982, was drawn up and imposed by the Army, in line with its own peculiar conceptions of society and democracy.

The constitution imposed by the Turkish generals in 1982 officially institutionalises the Army's tutelage of political life of the country through the National Security Council (NSC), a

sort of Politbureau on the Soviet model, consisting of the 5 top Commanders of the Armed Forces, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Interior and Defence. The real "*strong man*" of the regime is the Joint Forces Chief of Staff, who theoretically answers to the Prime Minister, not the Minister of Defense as would be the case in any other country. The Civilian Government is responsible for day to day administration and economic management, within the context of the "*recommendations*" of the NSC. To date these "*recommendations*" have always been, without exception been carried out by Government and Parliament, generally without discussion.

**Status of the Kurds:** Since the creation of modern Turkey in 1923, **Turkish Kurdistan has endured 49 years of special regimes:** martial law, states of siege, states of emergency etc. Ruled until 1950 by an *Inspector General for the Eastern Provinces*, they are now under the authority of a "*Super Governor*" of the State of Emergency Region. The two previous holders of this office are on Mrs Çiller's list of candidates for the General Election.

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## POLITICAL PARTIES

*The stifling straight-jacket of the Turkish Constitution only allows a limited political life, and under strict supervision at that. In this restricted framework some parties have been able to emerge — two right wing parties, both conservative and authoritarian, two left center nationalist parties, one Islamic party and one extreme right neo-fascist party.*

### **DYP**

**(Party of the Right Path).** Leader Mrs Çiller. Mainstay of the present coalition government,



has 178 seats in Parliament out of 450. Founded by Mr Cindoruk, this party was for a long time presided over by Mr Demirel and includes a strong faction of Turkish ultra-nationalists, ideologically close to Colonel Turkes. It also includes some conservative Islamists as well as a modernist wing close to the business world.

#### **CHP**

**(Republican People's Party).** Leader Mr Deniz Baykal. Junior partner in the coalition government. Following a number of defections, the CHP now only has 48 seats. Originally the sole party founded by Ataturk, with a secular, Jacobin, centralist tradition, this party was dissolved by the military Coup d'Etat. Its supporters then founded SODEP, later becoming the SHP, which fused with the reconstituted CHP last August and passed under Mr Baykal's leadership. Under a number of different names this party has been in the government continuously since 1991. It is affiliated to the Socialist International. Touchy heir of Kemalism and of his conception of a strong unitary state, it is hostile to any idea of autonomy or federalism for settling the Kurdish problem.

#### **ANAP**

**(Motherland Party).** Leader Mr Mesut Yilmaz. Main opposition party. Founded by former President Ozal, this party, which governed the country till 1991, has a basic ideology very close to that of Mrs Çiller's DYP. Despite pressure from business circles, who would like a strong coalition government, rivalry between the leaders has prevented fusion of these two right-wing parties.

#### **REFAH**

**(Prosperity Party).** Leader Professor Erbakan, this Islamic party, which preaches "order, justice and moral cleanliness", it already controls a number of the country's cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakir. Financially backed by the Arab states of the Near East, with its own newspaper and a television network with a wide audience, this party presents itself as the "only alternative to the present corrupt system" hopes to become the first party of the country, and to rule the country alone or in coalition.

#### **DYP**

**(Party of the Democratic Left),** leader Mr Bulent

Ecevit, is characterised by a virulent Turkish ultra-nationalism which goes so far as to deny the existence of any Kurds in Turkey, for, according to him, any such recognition would open the way to the partition of the country. Because of this obsession, Mr Ecevit and the former Foreign Minister Mr Muntaz Soyol (who has just joined his party) have become ardent defenders of Saddam Hussein. When he was Prime Minister, in 1974, he ordered the invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish Army. His party has 1 seat in Parliament.

#### **MHP**

**(National Action Party).** Leader Colonel Turkes. This extreme right neo-fascist party is usually entrusted, essentially through the action of its strong arm squads, the Grey Wolves of the dirty work of execution and terrorising the Turkish left wing movements and Kurdish activists. The bulk of the "special units" operating in Kurdistan are recruited amongst his supporters. Colonel Turkes has so far been an unofficial partner of the present government, but on November 2nd he concluded an open electoral alliance with Mrs Çiller, with whom he is on good terms. 7 Ministers in Mrs Çiller's government are close to him, including the famous Ayvaz Göldemir, called "commando Ayvaz". The MHP has, at present 17 seats in Parliament, an influential daily paper and a television network.

#### **YDP**

**(New Democracy Party).** Leader Mr Cem Boyner. In the beginning aroused lively hopes of a political renewal in Turkey but gradually the main media, controlled by Mrs Çiller chose to ignore or discredit this iconoclastic and modernist businessman and marginalise him. The YDP has only a single M.P. (a Kurd) and has little chance of passing the 10% threshold at the next General Elections.

#### **HADEP**

**(People's Democratic Party).** Created by some former officials of the banned pro-Kurdish Party for Democracy (DEP), dissolved in July 1994. As a result of a veritable campaign of political persecution of its activists by the authorities, especially in the Kurdish regions, this party, though for the moment tolerated, will have a job reaching the DEP's electorate.

# THE MEDIA:

## On the Official State Ideology's Service

Foreigners passing through Turkey or observers critical of certain political aspects of the country, are often shocked by the ultra-nationalist and militarist content of the principle Turkish media and the virulence of the press campaigns they orchestrate. At the same time they notice that certain media don't hesitate to criticise on or other of the Ministers or even the Prime Minister. To understand the Turkish system one must bear in mind that, apart from some publications of the Left or islamic opposition, *the principle Turkish media are at the disposal of the State and its official nationalist ideology (Ataturkism).*

The political police (MIT) and the General Staff, who have a whole network of influential "honourable correspondents" constantly keep watch over what they consider "*the superior interests of the State*" and launch orchestrated press campaigns against "*the internal and external enemies of the country*". Amongst the more famous victims of their campaigns: Nelson Mandela, "guilty" of having refused an Ataturk Peace Prize, which seemed to him rather out of place in a country that was martyrising its Kurdish population; Mrs Mitterrand, Senator Kennedy, the German Social-Democratic Party leader R. Scharping etc... Their network covering the media is sufficiently subtle to allow each paper to have some liberal editorial writers who criticise official policy from the standpoint of another idea of "patriotism". Those who cross the thin red line (criticism of Ataturk or of nationalism, defense of the Kurds) are promptly sacked, like Koray Düzgören from Hürriyet, Ahmet Altan from Milliyet or Ismet Imset of the *Turkish Daily News* — often following a simple phone call from an official of the Joint Forces General Staff.

Concentration of ownership also helps ensure a more efficient control of the media. Two groups

share the bulk of the market. The Dogan Group, with the two mass circulation dailies *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet*, each of which has its own television network, and the Dinç Group whose main standard bearers are the two dailies *Sabah* and *Yeni Yüzyıl* as well as the *ATV* television network. The industrialists who control these two groups also have large interests in sectors which depend heavily on State and Army contracts. The General Staff, also regularly calls the Managing Directors of the newspapers and television stations for "*briefings*" in which they are told how to treat matters affecting national interests and defense. It is, for example, "*inadvisable*" to publish anything on "*events in the South-East*" (Kurdistan) apart from official Army communiqués.

Finally, by a very generous policy of subsidies and loans on advantageous terms, the Government has been able to ensure the support of these media and their huge audience. The police and the courts can be left to stifle the few dissident voices, like the pro-Kurdish *Ozgür Grundem*, which was banned after the assassination of ten of its journalists and the blowing up of its premises by the police.

Despite the diversity of papers, publications, radios and televisions, those that really form public opinion are, with a few rare exceptions at the disposal of the State, its security organs and its official ideology. The "organs" only have to whistle and this powerful brain-washing machine gets under way to denigrate or vilify any opponent judged too iconoclastic, or to present as an enemy of the Turkish nation any foreign personality who dares to criticise excess of the Turkish Army or Courts or express a wish for an improvement in the fate of the Kurds in Turkey.

# The Turkish Gulag

## Through Ten Pictures

*“For 70 years the people of Turkey have got used to dictatorship and a system of oppression. Hitler’s dictatorship only lasted 12 years. Ours for seven decades. To justify it our leaders claim that the people is not ready for democracy.*

*Have they themselves understood anything about it? With such pretensions they have humiliated and insulted the people for 70 years by decreeing that they don’t understand democracy. And now see where they have led us! They have turned the country into a vast open-air prison. Now you want to shut me up in a little prison, inside this much greater prison because I expressed my opinions in a German publication?*

*Well, do it, honourable Judges !”*

This vehement charge indictment against the Turkish regime by the writer Yachar Kemal, on July 13th 1995 during his appearance before the Istanbul State Security Court, may seem “exaggerated” to those whose knowledge of Turkey is limited to its tourist sites, its courteous diplomatic staff or its State approved intellectuals — not to the intellectuals and politically active citizens who are crushed by the system and who, like Nazim Hikmet or Yilmaz Güney, and thousands of others less well known, have had to end their days in exile if they haven’t been gunned down by one of those elusive death squads and or other auxiliary police groups, or put to death by the States authorised torturers.

The Kurds, who have had to pass 49 of the 70 years of the Turkish republics existence under “special regimes” (martial law, states of siege etc.) handed over without appeal to the totally arbitrary will of the Army and the police, who have suffered so many massacres, deportations, forced evacuations, the destruction on a massive scale of thousands of their villages in the years 1920-30 and then again since 1992 can only agree with these remarks of the writer Kemal, forced, in the twilight years of his life to become pamphleteer to denounce the plight of the Kurds and the hypocrisy and indulgence of Ankara’s Western allies, who ease their consciences with a few verbal protests.

One third of Turkey’s territory, peopled by

Kurds, has been turned into an open hunting ground for human game, recently described as the “Kurdish Killing Fields” in a New York Times editorial. The Army, the police, the paramilitary militia can kill, with complete impunity, whoever they feel like and without any form of trial — all they have to do is class their victims under the catch-all category of “terrorists killed in the course of an engagement”. They can equally indulge at will in pillage, in wrecking havoc, in rape and in the most atrocious and sadistic forms of torture. They can burn down villages with flame throwers, use fighter-bombers to bombard villages and forests, machine-gun defenceless civilians from helicopters, massacre Kurdish women and children — all in complete impunity and in silence since the area is subject to a total blackout. Observers and press are not allowed in. The Army was even able to forbid Prime Minister Çiller and Mr Baykal to visit the town of Lice (70 Km from Diyarbakir) which it had just destroyed (see Lice, Forbidden Kurdish City, in the Documentation section). A U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Mr John Stattuck, on a mission to Diyarbakir in October 1994, wishing to visit the Province of Dersim (Tunceli), where a vast operation of village destruction was in progress, also was categorically refused permission by the Turkish generals, although it is Washington that supplies them with arms.

Local people who could bear witness to the fate of the population and denounce these massacres

and this destruction, have been massively "eliminated". At least 3,840 civilians — lawyers, teachers, trade unionists, and students have thus been assassinated by the "death squads" or "finished off" in the torture and interrogation centres said the Turkish daily *Milliyet* on December 11th 1994. Tens of thousands of others have been kept in secret detention for the standard 30 days and systematically tortured to terrorise and intimidate the population — much as the Turkish sultans dealt with disturbed regions by impaling a group of randomly picked subjects to terrorise the rest. Out of this enormous mass of detainees, nearly 12,000 have been charged before State Security Courts. Over 85% of these political prisoners have been condemned to heavy prison sentences for "*collaboration with the terrorist organisation PKK*" under Article 168 of the Penal Code.

When one remembers that the same Article was used against the Kurdish M.P.s in a trial generally described as "Kafkaish" by international observers one can easily imagine the summary and caricatural nature of these trials, held in an atmosphere of indifference of public opinion before the State Security Courts of the Kurdish provinces, resulting in mass condemnations. Many of those charged refused to defend themselves against such parodies of justice. It is, of course, probable that some of those 12,000 prisoners were PKK sympathisers or supporters. But does a state of laws worthy of the name try people on the basis of their sympathies and *supposed intentions* instead of their acts? Moreover it is notorious that the Turkish forces give no quarter. — those involved in clashes or acts of violence are slaughtered on the spot, without any formality of arrest or trial.

According to the evidence of Turkish soldiers, published in the opposition press, the commanders of some units have set up a sinister system of bonuses — paid in ration to the number of heads or pairs of ears brought in.

These horrors have not led to any inquiry or disciplinary action in the Army or the police. A Parliamentary commission of inquiry on "mysterious murders" had to give up, faced with the refusal of the Army and the Ministry of the Interior to co-operate. In October 1994 about a hundred mayors of villages in the Kurdish province of Tunceli came to Ankara to protest about the destruction of their villages by the Army, and the civilian massacres. The Prime Minister tried to make them believe that they were "*PKK terrorists disguised as Turkish soldiers*" who had come

to burn down their villages. To those who pointed out that those who had destroyed and burnt their villages came in Army helicopters Mrs Çiller unhesitatingly replied "*We have information that the PKK has bought helicopters in Armenia and Russia — that is where they came from*".

Since the Armenian frontier is 400 Km from Tunceli, and the whole of that Kurdish region is patrolled and quartered by 350,000 Turkish soldiers and gendarmes, the Prime Minister's reply, if it were to be taken seriously, would indicate such criminal negligence on the part of the Army as to require the resignation of its leaders. But, of course it was just one more tragi-comic example of disinformation.

A policy of disinformation which, in a letter reproduced in this folder, the former President Özal warmly recommended to his Prime Minister. A Kurdish M.P. for Mus, Sirri Sakik, in a Press Conference given in Paris in 1993, gave another striking example of this government disinformation. Having heard, on television, that a whole family had been savagely murdered by the PKK in a village near Mus that happened to be his home, he went to his village, questioned the survivors and established that his relatives had been burnt alive in their house by a unit of the Army. When, on returning to Parliament, he questioned the government on the matter the whole Turkish political world and the media accused him of being "*an ally of terrorism*" since "*it is impossible that the State and Army should massacre citizens!*" Mr Sakik's courage earned him a jail sentence with the other Kurdish M.P.s.

The PKK, by all accounts quite capable of murdering the families of pro-government militia and Turkish Civil Servants, has a broad back. In a region subjected to its arbitrary rule, the Army can easily load the PKK with responsibility for all the atrocities it commits in the course of its policy of **terrorising the Kurds and of "scorched earth"**. It thinks, in this way, to kill two birds with one stone — break the largest possible number of Kurdish "*suspects*" and blame the PKK for all these killings so as to pose before public opinion as "*defender of citizens of Kurdish origin against the terrorist actions of the PKK*".

Despite the threats to their lives the Kurdish M.P.s and Turkish and Kurdish writers, journalists and University professors have had the courage to denounce this military version, erected into a State article of faith, dangerous for civil peace and the co-habitation of Turks and Kurds. Some pay with their

lives for this courage. Others at present inhabit the visible part —that of the class of prisoners of opinion incarcerated at Ankara and Istanbul — of the enormous iceberg of the Turkish Gulag. Here, in 10 pictures, are a few persons representative of this Turkish Gulag.



**MUSA ANTER**  
The Assassinated Poet

Kurdish writer, playwright, and poet, psalmist of Kurdo-Turkish friendship, Musa Anter was assassinated on the 20th September 1992, at the age of 74, by a death squad near the city of Diyarbakir where he was attending a "cultural week". His defence of Human Rights and of the Kurdish community has earned him a dozen periods of residence in Turkish jails. Figure-head of the Kurdish intelligensia, he was equally valued by the Turkish intellectuals. The following are extracts of a requiem written by Yachar Kemal: "I could not believe that any man, however blood-thirsty he was, a torturer or executioner hardened by hundreds of murders, could attack people like Musa Anter. I came to know Musa Anter when I was twenty-three years old. Our friendship has lasted ever since. He was a man who always had an optimistic view of the world. Even in the darkest periods, the most oppressive, he remained radiantly optimistic, always full of hope and firm in his convictions. He sought, and found, in even the most infamous of men a positive side, and made the effort to understand and love that man because that tiny positive side. He sought, and always found, a

*gleam of light at the bottom of even the deepest darkness and, in the midst of the densest pessimism he shone with hope.*

*He belonged to a hard stricken people who have known so many sufferings, so much persecution, yet he was not beaten by oppression, by pain or by humiliation. He embodied the radiance and honour of those who, despite everything, remained unvanquished and unbowed. It was the feeling of pride in having never accepted submission that was, to a great extent, the basis of his exceptional personality. He believed in the culture of his people. He also believed that its culture was a contribution to universal culture. He was never racist — he never mixed nationalism and racism. He remained, to the end, a socialist and a democrat. He opposed, with all his being, the annihilation of his culture and identity. His fight lasted, without a break to the very end, until his death. It is, in fact, for that reason that he is dead. He was not able to see the end of his struggle, but he saw its influence.*


*Those who killed him, who procured his death, have done ill to Turkey as well. Just like those who attacked the town of Sirnak and reduced it to ruins, like those who provoked the blood-bath at Göle. Like those who have transformed Eastern Anatolia into a lake of blood."*



**ISMAIL BEŞİKÇİ**  
Two hundred years jail for crime of opinion

A sociologist and a University professor of 56 years. Author of numerous critical works on Kurdish society, on the Turkish version of history, and on different aspects of the official

ideology of the Turkish state. 27 of his 31 books have been banned. His writings have earned him an avalanche of trials. To date, according to the *TurkishDaily News* of 17th November 1995, the total of sentences passed against him amount to 200 years imprisonment — and the State Security Courts continue to examine fresh charges against him. At present jailed in Ankara, Mr Besikçi has **already served 14.5 years in Turkish prisons**, and is resolved to continue his peaceful struggle to defend the Kurds *“in the name of scientific debate, which must never admit taboos and interdictions, and to save the honour of the Turkish people”*. The Turkish sociologist stigmatises the lack of civic courage of the Turkish intellectuals who he describes as *“scribblers at the service of the State”*. He has so far refused the distinctions and Human Rights prizes proposed by Western organisations, to *“denounce the hypocrisy of those countries, whose governments arm and finance a Turkey guilty of the destruction of the Kurdish people while the NGOs want to ease their consciences by rewarding some of the victims of this savage policy”*. The only exception to this rule — the Scandinavian countries who don't sell arms to Turkey. For this reason he accepted, in September 1995, the annual prize for Freedom of Expression awarded by the Norwegian writers.




**MEHDI ZANA**

**Already 15.5 years in prison for defending the Kurdish identity**

A pacifist activist for the Kurdish peoples rights, Mehdi Zana, 55 years old, was mayor of Diyarbakir, the Kurdish capital, from 1977 to

1980. Since 1971 he has spent 15.5 years in Turkish jails. In May 1994 he was again sentenced to 4 years for his evidence to a Commission on Human Rights of the European Parliament, then to 2 years more for a speech made in Istanbul and 2 years more for a love poetry book written in Kurdish. He is at present incarcerated in Ankara jail. 3 of his 4 books have been siezed and banned. One of his works, published in French under the title of *“Prison N° 5, eleven years in Turkish Jails”* (Editions Arléa, Paris) is a terrible testimony of torture in Turkey.




**MEHMET SINCAR**

**A murdered Kurdish M.P.**

Like the majority of his colleagues in Parliament, he could have used the privileges and facilities of his office to enrich himself rapidly by acting as intermediary for winning contracts for public works then, at the end of his mandate, spend the rest of his days quietly and prosperously in a major Turkish city. But the M.P. for Mardin had another conception of his job. Elected by the people, he wanted to express, as best he could, the aspirations and complaints of the population. This earned him the hatred of the Army special units. At a time when he was at Batman, with other officials of his Party for Democracy (DEP) to attend the funeral of the local chairman of his party, assassinated on the 1st September 1993 by a death squad, he was shot down, on the 4th September, at the age of 41, in a commercial street of that Kurdish oil-


producing city by another group of killers. He thus became the 54th leading member of the DEP to be thus assassinated, in all impunity, in Turkey. The killers, obviously, have never been arrested. Individuals claiming to belong to a mysterious "*Turkish vengeance brigade*" rang certain newspapers to declare that "*all 17 M.P.s of the DEP, beginning with Leyla Zana, would be assassinated in the same way, because there was no room in Turkey for Kurdish traitors*". Also at Batman, but too tired to accompany her colleague on his visit to the market, L. Zana thus narrowly escaped her programmed death. During Mr Sincar's funeral there was another attempt on her life with a bazooka. The house where she was staying was damaged, but as she was not there at that moment she again managed to escape the Turkish Army's commandos.



**LEYLA ZANA**  
An M.P. ready "to die for her ideas"

At 34 years of age, this first Kurdish woman M.P. needs no introduction in Europe. After spending 11 of her young years outside the gates of the Turkish prisons where her husband, Mehdi, was detained, and suffered a number of ill treatments, privations and humiliations, she first organised a movement of the wives of prisoners against torture and for respect of human dignity, then was active in the Diyarbakir section of the Association for Human Rights. Triumphantly elected M.P. for Diyarbakir, in October 1991, she shocked the Turkish establishment by adding to her oath of office a

sentence in Kurdish in support of Kurdo-Turkish friendship. Indefatigable witness to the Kurdish tragedy, accompanying Western media and fact-finding missions to the Kurdish provinces to show them the atrocities committed by the Army, multiplying her statements and actions abroad she rapidly became the *bête noire* of the Army. Her photos became the choice targets in the army and police rooting ranges. Narrowly escaping two assassination attempts, she was, on her return from a tour of Europe, deprived of her parliamentary immunity and incarcerated with five other Kurdish M.P.s. She is at present serving a fifteen year sentence, confirmed by the Turkish Court of Appeals. Three of her fellow M.P.s, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan and Selim Sadak, also condemned to 15 years, are also jailed in Ankara. "*I love life. I have two children, a husband and friends who I love very much. But my love of Justice is even greater and, if I must, I am ready to die for my ideas*" the woman, who has been described as the "*Kurdish Passionaria*", wrote in a resounding article published in the Washington Post of December 3rd 1994 to sum up her fight and her philosophy. Nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, Leyla Zana received the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of thought, awarded on the 9th November 1995 by the European Parliament.




**RECEP MARASLI**  
A publisher who has already spent  
15 years in prison

Publishing books on the Kurds is a trade as dangerous as actually writing them. The Kurdish publisher and journalist RECEP



MARASLI, 39 years old, has every reason to know it. After having spent 14 years in jail between 1971 and 1991, for having published books and periodicals on Kurdish culture and history, he was freed following the amnesty decreed by President Özal. On July 8th 1994 he was again arrested, severely tortured and charged, on July 21st, under Article 8 of the so-called Anti-Terrorist Law with "*separatist propaganda*". Amongst the "incriminating exhibits" siezed at his home were a Spelling Book in Kurdish and a book about the Armenians. A first condemnation of 2 years imprisonment was confirmed in February 1995 by the Court of Appeals. Adopted by Amnesty International on several occasions as "prisoner of opinion", R. Marasli is at present facing seven other trials for opinion offences.



### MEDET SERHAT

**A lawyer, leader of a Peace Movement,  
assassinated**

A Kurdish lawyer, long established in Istanbul, this personality, highly respected in both Turkish and Kurdish progressive circles, without any political affiliations, was one of the founders of the Association for Peace. According to the Turkish opposition press, his name was on a list of people to be eliminated, drawn up by the Turkish political police (MIT) and presented to Mrs Çiller when she took office, so as to break the Kurdish liberal intelligensia. Feeling very threatened, Mr Serhat prepared to leave the country. A few days before his planned

departure, when returning home after the wedding of one of his relatives, his car was attacked and riddled with bullets in a very busy Istanbul street. He was killed out-right, at the age of 59, as was his chauffeur. This publicly announced murder aroused very lively indignation, but the killers were, obviously, never bothered. One of his friends, the Kurdish businessman Behcet Canturk, guilty, in the eyes of the authorities, of having helped finance the opposition daily *Özgür Gündem*, and also named on the MIT's "red list" was also assassinated.



### VEDAT AYDIN

**A Human Rights activist, assassinated  
at 37 years of age**

A Kurdish teacher, imprisoned from 1981 to 1985 for his peaceful defence of Kurdish cultural rights, he created, on his release, the Diyarbakir Section of the Association for Human Rights. In October 1990, at the annual Conference of this Association, whose ranks contain many Kurds, he made a speech in Kurdish which attracted a virulent press campaign against him, and a trial for "*separatist propaganda*". Having become President of the Diyarbakir Section of HEP (the predecessor of the DEP) he was taken away from his home around midnight of July 5th 1991 by armed men in plain clothes but shoeing police cards. On the 9th of July his body, mutilated beyond recognition, was found on the side of the road about 60 Km from Diyarbakir. He had been killed with 8 bullets, his right leg broken, his



body covered with signs of torture. On July 10th, several tens of thousands of people attended his funeral in Diyarbakir. Masked members of the Army special units opened fire on the crowd killing 7, including 2 children.

## YUSUF EKINCI

### A non-political Kurdish lawyer assassinated to set an example

To set an example and destabilise a whole population, State terrorism must strike in all sectors of society. Amongst the victims of the campaign of assassinations launched in 1991 by Ankara, as part of its "special war" were well known Kurdish personalities but also teachers, doctors, lawyers, shop-keepers, and ordinary students, attached to their Kurdish identity but uninvolved politically. The case of Mr Yusuf Ekinci, a prosperous Kurdish business lawyer living in Ankara, well known for his indifference to politics, clearly illustrates this last category. On 24th February 1994, at about 6 pm, he left his office after ringing his wife to say he would soon be home. He never arrived. The next day his body was found about 30 km from Ankara. The report of the autopsy established that he has been murdered that night around 2.30 or 3.00 in the morning by 14 bullets, commercially unavailable in Turkey. Mr Ekinci was 52 years old. As far as his brother, Dr Tarik Ziya Ekinci, former M.P. for Diyarbakir, is concerned *"there is no doubt that it was the shady forces of the State that committed the murder. The aim is clear: to sow fear throughout society, and terrorise the population. They want to show intellectuals that even the most innocent of them can become targets of assassination. No one must feel safe, no one is sheltered. A State that thus assassinates its citizens, without trial, but gangster-like methods is anything but a respectable State of laws"*.

## KUSKONAR

### A martyred Kurdish Village

According to the statistics of the State of Emergency Region, quoted in the daily paper Milliyet of the 25th July 1995, by the end of 1994, 2,664 Kurdish villages and hamlets had been evacuated and destroyed. By June 1995 the figure of 3,000 had been exceeded. The towns of Lice, Kulp, Sirnak, formerly lively and prosperous, had been largely destroyed and have become ghost towns. Behind the abstract data of these statistics are painful human realities. The case of Kuskonar, in the Sirnak province, quoted in a recent report by the American humanitarian organisation, Human Rights Watch, is typical of these tragedies, suffered in silence, and of the methods used by the Army in its scorched earth policy in Kurdistan.

*"On March 26th 1994, two Turkish fighter-bombers dropped 4 powerful high explosive bombs on the village of Kuskonar. The bombs were dropped after an overflight by helicopters, and a reconnaissance flight by bombers. There was, consequently, no doubt that the bombardment was deliberate. Two bombs landed right in the middle of the village, at that time inhabited by 150 civilians. Twenty-four peasants were killed, including twelve children of under 15 years of age. Seven of the bodies were so ripped apart as to be unidentifiable, except by shreds of clothing."* (HRW Report. Case 3) Several days before the bombardment the Army had apply considerable pressure to try and persuade the villagers to enroll in the pro-government "village guards" militia, which they had refused to do. In its report to Congress of June 1995 the U.S. Government confirmed that *"this bombardment occurred and civilians were killed"*. Turkish Human Rights organisations indicated that during the same period of 24-26 March 1994 the Turkish Air Force had carried out four other raids killing eighteen civilians. The published a list of names of the victims. At least 4 F-16 bombers were used in these raids, carried out by a State against Civilians under its rule. After this blood bath the village of Kuskonar was evacuated and rased to the ground.

# A Critical examination of the Turkish Arguments

*In the debate on the Customs Union, the Turkish Government and its defenders, uncomfortable about the issues of Human Rights and the Kurdish problem, put forward a series of "geopolitical" arguments which one can group under ten heads for a critical examination.*

- 1°. The geopolitical role of Turkey.
- 2°. Is Turkey really the leader of 200 million Turkish speakers?
- 3°. Can the "Turkish model" attract other Moslem countries?
- 4°. The Islamic fundamentalist threat.
- 5°. Has Turkey any alternative to Europe?
- 6°. *"The Kurds are first class citizens" — Turkey can't, therefore give them any specific rights"*
- 7°. The Human Rights situation.
- 8°. The *"scorched earth"* policy and the dispersion of the Kurdish population justified by the *"fight against separatist terrorism"*.
- 9°. The effects of the recent amendments to the Turkish constitution?
- 10°. Will entry into the Customs Union encourage democratisation?

## 1°. THE GEOPOLITICAL ROLE OF TURKEY

A glance at the map of this part of the world shows that, in fact, the **exceptional geographical position** of Turkey, between the European Balkans and Asia, on the one hand, and the Caucasus and the Near East oil producing regions, on the other. This position has earned Turkey, since its integration into NATO in 1952, a very generous **situational rent** from the Western allies, essentially American and German. In exchange for its bases and listening posts along the "soft under-belly" of Russia, Washington has, over the last ten years alone, given Turkey \$ 7,800 million of military aid<sup>1</sup>. At present it, supplies 85% of Turkey's arms. For its part, Germany has, for several decades, made Turkey the principal recipient of its military surplus. Thus, in 1994 alone, Bonn gave its Turkish ally, free of charge, 300 tanks from the army of the former GDR, 100 Leopard tanks, 45 Phantom bombers, 250,000 Kalashnikovs and 100.000 anti-tank missiles<sup>2</sup>.

Despite the end of the Cold War and the break up of the Soviet Union, Ankara continues to benefit from this situational rent, and this will continue in the NATO framework, whether or not Turkey enters the Customs Union.

Having said this, let us look a bit more closely at this map of Turkey. One will then notice that, Georgia apart, **Turkey's relations with all its neighbouring states are tense and conflictual**. **Another factor of strategic importance:** apart from a small section of its frontier with Georgia, **Turkeys only neighbours along its land frontiers in Asia are the Kurds**, who inhabit both sides of Turkey's frontiers with Syria, Iraq, Iran and the whole region bordering on Armenia and the Azeri Province of Nakhitchevan. The most strategically important parts of Turkey, which contain the bulk of its hydro-electric power, oil, and mineral resources, is precisely the region of Kurdistan, which is the scene of a destructive conflict. Apart from its cost in human and economic terms, (\$ 12,500 million in 1994, according to the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, quoted by *Turkish Daily News* of January 29th 1995) this conflict daily widens the breach between the Turkish State and the martyred Kurdish population.

Unless one reduces geopolitics to a simple matter of geography, the value and reliability of an ally must be a function of its internal stability.

The example of the Shah of Iran who, with the "world's fifth most powerful army" was supposed to play the role of the West's local policeman, and of the "secular and modern" regime of Saddam Hussein, "bastion against Islamic fundamentalism" should still be fresh in every one's memory.

Exasperated by persecution and suffering, as well as by the indifference of the West and their indulgence towards Ankara, the Kurdish population could end up by swinging towards a massive rejection of the Turkish State, seeking refuge in Islamic fundamentalism or, in the event of conflict with a neighbouring state, rallying to the latter. This is not an academic hypothesis but a very probable scenario. Commenting on the recent meeting of the "Kurdish Parliament in exile", close to the PKK, held in a room at the Russian Parliament, the conservative German M.P. H. Lummer openly conjured up the danger of the Turkish Kurds swinging over to the Russian camp. The unconditional help given to a Turkish regime which is martyring its Kurdish population will finish by the losing Turkey as it lost the Iranian and Iraqi regimes.

Astute politicians, the Ottoman Sultans had understood the exceptional geopolitical situation of the Kurds to whom, as from 1515 they gave a very large measure of autonomy, thus ensuring 3 centuries of peace on their Eastern frontier. Since the abrogation of this statute, there has been no end to the revolts and wars between Kurds and Turks — a state of affairs is likely to continue so long as the Kurds, who are very attached to their identity, are unable to gain an autonomous control of their fate on their own land.

## 2°. IS TURKEY REALLY THE LEADER OF 200 MILLION TURKISH SPEAKERS?

The talk about a Turkish zone running from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China enjoyed a certain fashion just after the break up of the USSR and the emergence of the Moslem republics of ex-Soviet Central Asia. In fact its a *hoax* which even Turkish public opinion no longer believes. There is no "Turkish speaking world", in the way one can talk about French speaking, English speaking, Spanish speaking or Portuguese speaking world. The Turkish language of Turkey, the fruit of nine centuries of contact and exchange with the indigenous populations of Asia Minor (Greeks, Armenians, Kurds and Arabs) followed by a radical

linguistic reform and renewal ordered by Atatürk, is unintelligible to other peoples speaking languages of the Uralo-altaic family in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Even Atatürk himself, if he were to revisit his country, would need an interpreter to understand the press and the Turkish intellectuals today. In fact, all his speeches and writings have been translated into "new Turkish" to make them accessible to the new generations!

Certainly there are similarities of grammar and lexicology between Turkish, Azeri, Turkomenian and Uzbek — just as there are similarities between French and Rumanian! As for Kazakh and Kirghiz, while they belong to the same linguistic family, they have less words in common with Turkish than Kurdish or French, although the latter both belong to the Indo-European family. But culturally and linguistically, the last contacts between the Turks of Anatolia and Central Asia (from which they emigrated in the 11th Century) goes make to the campaigns of military by the Uzbek, Tamerlan, who inflicted a crushing defeat on the Ottoman Turks at Ankara in 1402!... Since then, Central Asia has remained in the Iranian cultural sphere — and Russian as from the 19th Century.

At the beginning of them 20th Century, the Turkish nationalist leaders, influenced by the pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism of their most important neighbours, envisaged a pan-Turkic Empire, called Turan, going from the Balkans to China. To achieve it they started, in 1915, with the Armenian genocide and the deportation of 700,000 Kurds, because the territories of these two peoples prevented the junction of Turkish Anatolia with the Caucasus and "Turkish-speaking" Central Asia. This blood-soaked utopia, which had succeeded in rallying part of the more credulous Turks, collapsed in 1920.

Today, at a time of mass communication and air travel, neither the Turkish citizens nor the people of Central Asia seriously believe in such rubbish. It is curious that the Ankara leadership, despite their own statistics, showing such derisory trade figures with the "Turkish speaking republics" (2.5% exports and 0.8% imports) imagine they can tempt the Western countries with such fantasies. The more so as all these republics, consequent to Stalin's deportations, are home to large and active Kurdish communities who keep their compatriots regularly informed on the tragic situation of the Kurds in Turkey. The Turkish

political model is thus not exportable to these countries who, as a result of their own recent history, maintain at least a tradition of respect for the cultural and linguistic rights of national minorities. For other reasons the Iranian model has no more chance of gaining a foothold in these republics — with the possible exception of Persian-speaking Tadjikistan.

### 3°. CAN THE "TURKISH MODEL" ATTRACT OTHER MOSLEM COUNTRIES?

The Moslem world is, like the "Christian world" of an enormous cultural, linguistic, geographic and religious diversity. The Moslem countries with the highest populations, Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh, are in Asia, and have no cultural, political or historic links with Turkey. The latter, moreover, quite apart from its Ottoman imperial past, has a very negative image in North Africa and the Arab Moslem countries of the Middle East. A many century-old rivalry, based on successive Turkish invasions and on cultural and religious cleavages, oppose Turks and Iranians. In fact the Turks of Turkey are ethnically and culturally isolated in the Moslem world, and this feeling of isolation is at the root of an old adage: "The Turks have no friends but the Turks". The Turkish model of a Parliamentary, civilian, secular and semi-democratic regime, under army tutelage has little chance of being a serious attraction to the elites of the Moslem countries. The American idea of an exportable "Turkish model" sins by its ignorance of the historical, cultural and psychological realities of the region.

On the other hand, because of its geographical position, Turkey can act as a **regional staging post for European industries**, a sort of industrial warehouse with cheap labour where the latter could assemble or manufacture products aimed at the Middle Eastern or Western Asian markets.

### 4°. THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST THREAT.

This really does exist and could even be potentially dangerous. Since the 1960s a political, legal and organised political Islamic movement has won 15 - 16% of the votes. Before the military coup of 1980, Mr Erbakan's Islamic organisation even took part in coalition governments led by Mr Demirel. The fact that this movement has been able to appreciably widen its appeal over the last few years, to the

point where it has won a number of large towns, is one of the diverse consequences of the war. In particular, the way that it has driven some 5 or 6 million Kurdish peasants from their land and forced them to squat in shanty-towns on the outskirts of big cities like Diyarbakir. The Islamic charitable organisations come to the help of these distressed and up-rooted people, bitterly hostile to all the traditional Turkish parties, Right or Left, who have supported the army in its atrocious repression in Kurdistan.

In a country where the vote is compulsory and where the pro-Kurdish parties are banned, a significant fraction of the Sunni Kurdish electorate voted for the Islamic *Refah* party. Many Turks, marginalised by the disastrous social and economic crisis, *itself a consequence of the enormous cost of the Kurdistan war*, and shocked by the ostentatious display of wealth by a small group and by the financial scandals involving both the parties in the coalition government, the Prime Minister and a number of her Ministers, are also, more and more, turning towards *Refah* who promises "*order, justice and moral cleanliness*".

In addition to these structural causes, one should add **the support of the Army and Government to Islamic fundamentalist activities in the Kurdish areas**, in the hope of thus blocking the progress of Kurdish secular nationalism. This fact, well known in Turkey, is also confirmed by a recent report of the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, extracts of which, together by an article by a Kemalist Turkish journalist on the role of the Army in the propagation of Islamic fundamentalism are reproduced on the *Documentation* part of this file.

Even while brandishing the *Islamic specter* abroad to sell herself as a "*secular bulwark*" against this threat, Mrs Çiller is not above holding tête-à-tête meeting with the leaders of the Islamic brotherhoods, nor even of flirting with *Refah*, as in November 1995, to draw up new electoral laws favouring the larger parties. In fact, the slogan "*Turkey, the only secular State in the Moslem world*" is just a crude bit of propaganda. Without going any further, Ankara should remember that its two neighbours, Syria and Iraq, are also secular states! Is secularism without democracy really a sign of progress? Is *nationalist fundamentalism* any less dangerous for peace and stability than the religious variety?

## 5°. HAS TURKEY ANY ALTERNATIVE TO EUROPE?

One often hears it said: if we don't bring Turkey into the Customs Union we will humiliate them and in their anger they will turn away from Europe. To go where? To ally themselves with whom? In reality, neither economically, politically nor militarily **has Turkey any alternative to Europe**. She conducts 45% of her export and import trade with the European Union. The level of her trade with the other Moslem or "Turkish speaking" countries, shows clearly that her economy is in no way complementary to theirs. Unlike Iraq and Iran, Ankara does not possess any oil to enable her to survive a few years isolation. Having tense, not to say downright conflictual, relations with her neighbours (Greece, Syria), and plunged into a ruinous internal conflict, Turkey cannot survive without Western military and economic aid. Knowing, from long experience, the latter, their weaknesses and obsessions, Ankara knowingly play a strategy of the edge of the precipice — "*if you don't accept us as we are, the country could swing over to Communism (yesterday) or Islamism (today) and you will be the losers*". One must say that for half a century this strategy has paid off very well — for the Turks.

## 6°. "THE KURDS ARE FIRST CLASS CITIZENS" — TURKEY CAN'T, THEREFORE GIVE THEM ANY SPECIFIC RIGHTS".

This argument is often used by Turkish leaders who, to strengthen their case, never fail to mention this or that Minister or General who is of Kurdish origin, or quote "confidentially" the percentage of Kurds in Parliament or in the Government. It is true that those Kurds who renounce their identity and declare themselves Turks do not, individually, suffer discrimination. In a country with a long tradition of *janissaries*, there are also *janissaries* of Kurdish origin, co-opted by the system, who can reach very high positions of responsibility provided they show themselves even more Turkish nationalist and hostile to the Kurdish claims of an identity, than the Turks themselves. But, to this day, every Kurd who has openly proclaimed his identity and demanded collective cultural and linguistic rights for his community has been subjected to criminal charges, arrested, imprisoned, condemned to heavy prison sentences or to exile — or just simply assassinated if he is considered "*a serious danger to State security*".

The most eloquent example is the pacifist activist Mehdi Zana, former mayor of Diyarbakir, who, so far has passed 15.5 years in Turkish prisons for having, peacefully, claimed cultural rights for the Kurds. His wife, Leyla Zana, an M.P. was called a "traitor to the country" exposed to popular opprobrium for having uttered a sentence in Kurdish on "Kurdo-Turkish brotherhood".

As Turkish regime, is not racist or discriminatory when it comes to repression, Turkish democrats who advocate collective rights for the Kurds suffer the same fate. The best known of them, the sociologist Ismail Besikçi, to date been sentenced to **two hundred years imprisonment**, has already spent 14.5 years in Turkish jails.

That some individuals have been able to choose assimilation is their right. That, in so doing, some of them have been able to reach high office is good for them! That the Ankara authorities, short of arguments, should exhibit these few co-opted Kurds, unrepresentative of their people, as "*proofs of the participation of Kurds in power*" is a tactic that is worth no more than that of Saddam Hussein who puts forward token Christians and Kurds make believe in the "representative nature" of his power.

It is time for Turkey to face the facts. Despite all its efforts, all the political, economic and military means used, its policy of forced assimilation of the Kurds has failed, and has no chance of succeeding. Alongside a tiny assimilated minority, the overwhelming majority, that is to say millions of people, categorically refuse to renounce their identity, their culture. Whatever the reasons for this refusal of Turkisation, this visceral attachment to their Kurdish identity is a *fact*, as inescapable as the will of the Quebecois, Catalan, Basque or Flemish peoples to remain themselves.

Hence the Turks have only two solutions: continue to refuse to recognise this reality, using coercion, terror and a policy of denial which will inevitably give birth to more conflicts and revolts, which will further devastate the country and regional peace. Or else fully recognise the Kurdish reality and try to respond to Kurdish legitimate aspirations in a democratic framework which respects the territorial integrity of the country.

In a country that has more than ten television

channels, several hundreds of radio stations, over fifty Universities *all in the Turkish language*, to refuse the Kurds, who make up at least a quarter of the population, the right to a single radio, one television or one school in their own language, and then dare to talk of the equality of Kurds and Turks in Turkey is an insult to intelligence and even simple common sense. Similarly, to refuse to recognise the slightest cultural right, the slightest specific status, to 15 million while claiming a confederal bi-community system for 120,000 Turkish Cypriots requires an extraordinary degree of cheek! (On the fate of the Kurds, see, in the *Documentation* enclosed, the evidence of Yachar Kemal and the satirical editorial "Atakürt" by the famous Turkish journalist Ahmet Altan — which got him fired from the daily *Milliyet* and earned him a 20 month suspended prison sentence from the Istanbul State Security Court for "*inciting racial hatred*").

#### 7°. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION.

The documentation of this subject, summarised by the European Parliament's rapporteur is both varied and coherent. The principle Western NGOs concerned with Human Rights: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, France-Libertés, International Law Group — have published unbearable reports on the destruction of over 3,000 Kurdish villages, summary executions of opponents, the systematic use of torture, the disappearances, the assassination of 2,000 civilians by death squads of the Turkish counter-guerrilla forces, drumhead trials after 30 days sequestration in the Kurdish regions, the fate of three million peasants driven from their land and condemned to utter misery. They have equally condemned the murder of civilians and other exactions perpetrated by the PKK against members of the pro-government militia (village protection units) or Turkish Civil Servants. This hasn't prevented them from being described by Turkey as *objective allies of terrorism*. Ankara has also declared *persona non grata* Amnesty International's research officer on Turkey as well as Lord Avebury, Chairman of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group. In February 1995, a fact finding mission of the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Foundation, led by Ambassador Blackball, was refused access to the town of Lice, which had been largely destroyed by the Turkish Army. The Co-Chairman of the U.S. Congress Helsinki Commission, Senator D'Amato, while on a visit to Ankara, was also rebuffed by the Turkish

authorities when he asked to investigate the Kurdish region. In October 1994, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Mr John Shattuck, was not allowed, despite his insistence, to visit the province of Tunceli, where the Army had just forcibly evacuated and burned several dozen villages.

**In Turkish Kurdistan, placed under a state of emergency and handed over to the completely arbitrary rule of the Turkish Army, is subject to a total blackout.** Neither the media, nor the NGOs, nor fact finding missions are allowed free access. For having broken this rule and sent a telegramme on the Army's destruction of Kurdish villages, an American journalist working for Reuters, Miss Aliza Marcus, was charged by the Istanbul State Security Court with "inciting racial hatred". As a result of very strong pressure from the Administration and Congress, she was finally acquitted but the message of intimidation had been received — journalists no longer dare conduct inquiries in the Kurdish provinces where the bulk of the massive violations of Human Rights take place.

Having realised the extent of the massive and systematic use of torture in the Turkish police stations and prisons, the UNO Committee against Torture decided, on February 1995 to break its confidentiality rule to awaken public opinion to the situation in Turkey.

Finally, those who might be sceptical about NGO reports may refer to the very official Annual Report on Human Rights, published by the U.S. State Department, in February 1995, which devotes 36 pages, stuffed full of facts, on Turkey. A summary, made by the Turkish Daily News, is reproduced a little further on in this folder.

Even by Turkish standards, the violations of Human Rights *under a civilian government* have never been on such a scale. To the extent that the Turkish Minister for Human Rights, Mr Azimet Köylüoğlu, felt obliged to publicly denounce "State terrorism" (see *le Monde* 13 October 1995). He was, obviously, quickly brought to heel and had to resign his (purely decorative) ministerial functions as soon as possible.

**8°. THE "SCORCHED EARTH" POLICY  
AND THE DISPERSION OF THE  
KURDISH POPULATION JUSTIFIED BY  
THE "FIGHT AGAINST SEPARATIST  
TERRORISM".**

Ankara unceasingly asks its allies to be more

understanding of its massive violations of Human Rights on the grounds that they are the result of the "difficult conditions of a fight against a terrorist organisation that threatens the country's territorial integrity". This argument which might, at first sight, seem "reasonable" to some of those who think that any state has the right to defend its territorial integrity by any means is, in fact, just one propagandist theme in a vast panoply of "disinformation" proposed by President Özal in his confidential letter of April 1993 to his Prime Minister, Demirel, which we reproduce further on in this folder.

First, one must remember that *even before* the beginning of the PKK's uprising in 1984, Turkey *already* carried out massive violations of Human Rights on a scale unequaled by any contemporary European country. According to *Cumhuriyet's* issue of 12th December 1989, after the *coup d'état* of September 1980 650,000 people were detained, 210,000 of whom were subsequently charged; over 100,000 people were condemned to various sentences; the military courts asked for 6,353 death sentences; 50 people were hanged, 171 died under torture, 30,000 had to flee the country for political reasons and 14,000 were stripped of their nationality by decree of the Council of Ministers; 133,000 books were burned and another 118,000 repulped; 29,000 Civil Servants, magistrates, policemen and teachers were sacked; 937 films (including 114 by Yılmaz Güney) were banned; 23,667 clubs and associations were closed down.

In his book *Prison N°5, eleven years in Turkish Jails* (published in French by Editions Arléa, Paris 1995), Mehdi Zana provides an intolerable testimony of the tortures and other humiliations of this period — *at a time when neither the PKK or "terrorist threat" existed.*

Five European countries — France, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden — have jointly charged against Turkey before the European Court for Human Rights with massive and detailed violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The PKK which, at first, was just one of a number of ultra-leftist grouplets was enabled to grow by the fertile soil of State terrorism — it is, in fact, the *product*, not the *cause*, of Ankara's intolerable Kurdish policy.

The outbreak of the PKK armed struggle, largely amplified and magnified by pro-Government media, has provided the Turkish authorities with

the long awaited excuse to recommence their policy of evacuating Kurdistan and dispersing its population so as to destroy the territorial basis of the "Kurdish problem" and gradually assimilate the uprooted Kurds. This policy, conceived at the beginning of the century, is the last stage in the Turkish grand design of creating a Turkish Nation State with a single language and a single culture. As part of this design, Turkey first exterminated, in 1915, its Armenian population then, in 1920, expelled 1,200,000 Anatolian Greeks in the biggest ethnic purification operation of the inter-war period. The Kurds, last of the *original local populations* (the Turks themselves only arrived in the 11th Century) were then also to be deported and dispersed to the four corners of the country. One third were, in fact deported in the period of 1925-1939. Ankara even went so far as to pass a law (5th May 1932) decreeing the deportation and dispersal of the Kurds, to provide a "legal basis" for its policy and systematize it. However this had to be postponed by the stormy events of the Second World War.

Taking advantage of a favourable international situation and "the pretext of the fight against terrorism" Turkey thus openly proceeded with its plans for "dekurdising" Kurdistan and scattering the Kurds. President Özal even fixed quantitative targets for this policy; "there must only remain 2 or 3 million Kurds" in this region, half as large as France which, in 1980 had a population of 10 million. Interviewed by the daily paper *Hürriyet*, General Güres, former Joint Forces Chief of Staff affirmed "the objective is to disperse the maximum number of Kurds. President Özal used to say "scatter them! scatter them!".

It is in this perspective that one must analyse what the officials of the U.S. State Department, quoted by a report of Human Rights Watch dated 21 November 1995 (Cf Documentation) called "the scorched earth strategy" carried out on Kurdish land by the Turkish Armed Forces.

This American humanitarian organisation, after long months of investigation, has established 29 "incidents" in which "American arms, in particular bombers, have been used against civilian villages, and American-built helicopters used in a wide range of abusive practices, including the destruction of villages, extra-legal executions, torture and indiscriminate machine-gunning". The report also quotes the use of arms made in Germany, Britain and Belgium in the war against Kurdish

civilians. It also quotes "substantial violations of the rules of war by the PKK, including summary executions, indiscriminate shootings and the fact of aiming deliberately at non-combatants".

These violations and the violence committed by its activists in Europe have earned the PKK the reputation of being a "terrorist organisation", and being banned in France. On the other hand the Turkish State, which practices a scorched earth policy in Kurdistan, that has wiped thousands of villages off the map, that has bombed and burned millions of acres of Kurdish forests (see the testimony of Yachar Kemal further on) continues to be regarded as perfectly respectable!

Finally, one must remember that *no Kurdish movement*, including the PKK, calls the existing frontiers into question. Separatism only exists in the minds of Turkish leaders for whom all those who affirm the existence of the Kurds, or of a Kurdish language and culture, are *ipso facto* separatists and racists. In Ankara's eyes, the only Kurds who are not separatist and racist are those who keep silent or who publicly declare "What happiness to be a Turk!" in conformity with official State ideology!

## 9°. THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION?

These amendments to the military constitution of 1982 alter neither the preamble nor the official State ideology ("the immortal principles of Atatürkism" which deny the very existence of Kurds); nor Article 118 institutionalising, through the National Security Council, the Army's control over the basic political orientations of the country; nor the principle clauses restricting the fundamental freedoms of opinion, expression, association or assembly. The amendment to Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorist Act certainly allowed the release of about a hundred prisoners of opinion nearing the end of their sentences, but the *crime of opinion remains liable to 2 or 3 years imprisonment* even with this amendment. There remain 19 other articles of the Criminal Code, in particular Article 312, which criminalises non conforming opinions. These laws, recently described as "rascally" by Miguel Angel Martinez, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and an astute connoisseur of Turkey, all remain on the statute books and the Turkish courts will delay in applying them to arrest other intellectuals —



perhaps even some of those recently released, and again condemn them for offenses of opinion. In April 1991, as part of a "charm offensive" directed at the West, the then President Özal had passed a law reducing sentences that allowed the release of 40,000 prisoners. Since Turkish repressive legislation remained unchanged, we now have 50,000 prisoners, 12,000 of which are political. More than 80% of these were condemned after 30 days detention with torture and a mockery of a trial, for being members of a terrorist organisation, under Article 168 of the Criminal Code.

Knowing how, in the center of Ankara, under the eyes of international observers, the State Security Court was able, in 5 summary hearings, to condemn the Kurdish M.P.s to 15 years imprisonment under the same Article of the Criminal Code, one has no difficulty in imagining the essentially political character of the sentences passed on these obscure Kurdish political prisoners whose fate has in no way been altered by the cosmetic amendments recently passed as a sop to satisfy the Euro-M.P.s.

#### 10°. WILL ENTRY INTO THE CUSTOMS UNION ENCOURAGE DEMOCRATISATION?

"Yes" if one is to believe the leaders of the present coalition and Turkish businessmen. In reality, (unless one has such a cast iron faith in economic determinism in its crudest form that one believes that economic exchange inevitably means more democracy) no such correlation is visible. Once they have actually voted the Customs Union, what can the European Parliament *do* to influence Turkey's political evolution? Pass resolutions? Since 1987 it has passed some excellent ones on the Kurdish problem, on Cyprus, on the necessity to democratise Turkey. At best these have provoked vague objections from Ankara and the usual passing fury of the Turkish media, without having any more effect than similar resolutions from the Council of Europe, of which Turkey is a full member. The Turko-European dialogue in the Council has generally been a sterile exercise of parallel monologues. Even the threat of suspension of the Turkish delegation failed to alter Turkish policy one iota. As the Council of Europe has lost, in consequence, much of its prestige and credibility.

What more can the European Parliament do, once it has thrown away the master card of ratification it possesses? Block the financial protocols? Lay down

conditions for economic aid? Introduce suspensive clauses into the Customs Union agreement?

I would, in any case be crazy to count solely on the good will of Turkish civilian authorities, who are prisoners of a system dominated and controlled by an authoritarian Army. To hope to "*educate the Turks*" through dialogue and exchanges brought about by the Customs Union is a paternalist illusion, since the Turks think that they will have to educate their future European partners who so misunderstand them!

In any case, **the keystone of Turkish democratisation is a settlement of the Kurdish problem.** If this problem is settled satisfactorily, without calling into question the territorial integrity of the country, Turkey will no longer need its present liberty-stifling legislation whose victims, with some rare exceptions, are Kurds claiming their rights and Turks who defend them. Without the specter of separatism this country, which only just reaches 64th position in the UNDP classification, wouldn't need to devote a large part of its resources to maintain the second largest army in NATO (about 800,000 soldiers) and this army would no longer have any excuse to maintain its domination of the country. Without a settlement of the Kurdish problem, which is at the root of most of Turkey's conflicts and difficulties, democratisation will remain limited, dependent upon a fortuitous combination of circumstances and without real future.

The European Parliament must, if it *really wants* to favour democratic development in Turkey, set this as a priority. A number of countries in the European Union, such as Spain and Belgium, have valuable experiences of the problems of the cohabitation of different languages and cultures. The European Parliament could draw on these experiences. The Sakharov Prize awarded to Leyla Zana is an important symbolic step towards the taking into account of the Kurdish problem by Turkey and the search for a peaceful solution. Excluded from Bosnia and the Near East, Europe can still play a leading role in establishing peace and democracy in the country, Turkey, that it wishes so strongly to anchor Westwards.

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<sup>1</sup> *New York Times* editorial of October 17th 1995, *America Arms Turkey's Repression.*, reproduced in part in the *Documents* part of this folder.

<sup>2</sup> *The European*, 7th April 1995.

# WHO WILL BENEFIT FROM THE CUSTOMS UNION

The European Parliament will be called upon to express an opinion on the Customs Union agreement reached in Brussels on March 6th last.

This long awaited vote will have lasting effects on Turko-European relations. It could also have a considerable impact on the way in which European citizens see their Parliament, its moral standing and democratic vigilance.

Despite certain speeches which have tried to present the Customs Union as a simple commercial arrangement, many European citizens, elected representatives and NGOs, not to mention the Turks themselves, regard this as the thin end of the wedge for Turkey's full membership of the European union.

Can the European Union, which defines itself as an area of peace, democracy and mutual respect sign such an agreement with a country which, according to the conclusions of the Parliament's own Rapporteur, is far from meeting the most basic criteria?

Who will benefit from such a ratification, voted 10 days before a Turkish General Election, organised in the most utter political and constitutional confusion? Certainly not the opposition parties, whether of the Right or the Left who are all pro-European (except for the Islamic fundamentalist *Refah*) but who will not be able to claim any electoral advantage from this "*Turkish victory in Europe*". Nor, to any great extent, will Mr Baykal's People's Republican Party (CHP) which, for the first time in its long history runs the risk of failing to reach the 10% threshold, and thus may not be represented in the next Parliament at all. Its traditional electorate — Kurds, alevites, the labour movement, liberal intellectuals — bitterly reproach it for having served as a "left" stooge to a coalition government responsible for the destruction of over 3,000 Kurdish villages, forced deportation of several million Kurdish peasants, the assassination of thousands of civilians by death squads or under torture in interrogation centers

and, finally, of provoking the most serious social crisis in the country's history.

That this party had decided to stand bail for this policy reluctantly, in a tormented state of mind, in order to "*limit the damage*", as its leaders claim, in no way alters the extent of the disappointment and disaffection of the voters who seem to give little credit to its promises of "*democratisation*" and "*peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem*" since, in the last four years it has kept none of its promises in these areas. Disaffection has struck to the very heart of this organisation, with the resignation of 17 of its 65 M.P.s. Amongst those resigning are seven former ministers, including Mr Mumtaz Soysal, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Group, Mr Kamer Genç. Even before these resignations, Mr Inonu, former President of the party, had decided not to stand for re-election and retire from political life.

It thus becomes clear that, in the present circumstances, only Mrs Çiller stands to gain anything from ratification of the Customs Union. She boasts that she has captivated Bill Clinton and John Major by her "*charm*" and convinced Felipe Gonzales by her "*promises*" of Turkish support for the candidature of the Spanish Foreign Minister to the position of General Secretary of NATO and is already parading before the Turkish public as the "*conqueror of Europe*". A highly symbolic image of this conquest (in Turkish eyes), a photo of Jacques Chirac kissing her hand on the steps of the Elysée Palace, will be used as the principal poster in her elections campaign — *this in a culture where kissing of hands is not a sign of gallantry but of allegiance and submission!*

For, despite her modern language and democratic declarations of faith abroad, Mrs Çiller, to judge by her actual practice in office since 1993, is everything but a trustworthy democratic leader. Taking office with the promise of "embracing the 12 million Kurds of

the country with motherly love" and of "granting them an autonomous status modeled on that of the Basque country in Spain", she very rapidly concluded a fatal pact with the ultra-nationalists in the Army to intensify the policy of destroying Kurdish villages and depopulating Kurdistan, already begun under the previous government; of drawing up lists of "suspect" Kurdish intellectuals and business men who were then assassinated one after the other; and installing a total blackout on *"the events in the South-East"*. It was she who, at the request of the Joint Forces Chief of Staff, dragooned Parliament into lifting their Parliamentary from Leyla Zana and her colleagues of the Party for Democracy (DEP) and then banning the party on the grounds of "separatist proposals" that its ex-President is alleged to have made abroad; to have ensured the passing of heavy sentences on the Kurdish M.P.s, guilty of having peacefully expressed the aspirations of the people they represented.

The 21st September, the present Deputy-Prime Minister, Mr Baykal, in a press statement denounced her saying: *"Mrs Çiller is a puppet whose strings are manipulated by others. She is weak and indecisive. She said she agreed with me but she wasn't able to take certain decisions regarding democratisation. What can one do with a Prime Minister who is just a toy in the hands of the secret coalition that runs the country"*. This "secret coalition" being that of the Army General Staff and the heads of the political police (MIT).

The 2nd November, commenting on the conclusion of an electoral alliance between the Turkish Prime Minister and Colonel Türkes, leader of the neo-fascist National Action Party, the General Secretary of Mr Baykal's Party, her coalition partner, had no hesitation about declaring to the press: *"Tansu Çiller is the Trojan Horse of the fascist and racist extreme right. The future of democracy and of the country is in great danger"*.

Another of Mrs Çiller's major political partners, the former Speaker of Parliament, H. Cindoruk, warned public opinion of *"the danger of fascism, which is lying in wait for the country and means to extend its control in Mrs Çiller's shadow"*. Appearing on the private television network *InterStar* he denounced: *"the Serbian-type nationalism of the Çiller Government, which claims to be achieving national unity by burning down villages and by violent, criminal and racist practices"*

before adding *"a gang of extreme right militarists, usurers, speculators, plunderers of the State, has seized control of the State, thanks to Çiller. The are the rabid partisans of violence, and can only prosper with the war and violent policies. So long as this gang has not been eliminated, there will be no democracy in Turkey, there will be no end to the bloodshed and Turkey will no be able to enter European Union"*.

The list of candidates put forward by Mrs Çiller's Party of the Just Path (DYP) for the coming General Elections can only reinforce Mr Cindoruk's fears. In addition to General Gures, former Joint Forces Chief of Staff, and the two former "super-governors of the Kurdish state of emergency region, one finds the principle police chiefs and Security Directors of the country, Directors of several State Banks and top Treasury officials implicated in gigantic financial scandals to the benefit of the Çillers, husband and wife, and close associates of the Prime Minister, Public Prosecutors, and Judges who have *"smothered"* this plundering of the State; people implicated in the torturing and disappearance of prisoners etc. All these shady characters want to get elected to Parliament so as to shelter, for the five years of the next Parliament, behind their parliamentary immunity from any possible legal proceedings and so continue going about their fraudulent businesses — at the same time as 12,000 people, including 4 M.P.s and many intellectuals, rot in Turkish jails for political "offenses". In the face of public mockery at her *"Police Academy"* party, Mrs Çiller retorted *"we are the State's army"*. A few questions our Euro-M.P.s should ponder over:

Do you really want to favour and encourage such a Turkish party?

If Mrs Çiller, despite your urgent pressures over the last year and the spurring of her coalition partner, has not met the minimum of your requirements on Human Rights do you think that tomorrow, once the Customs Union is ratified, and finding herself at the head of a party dominated by police chiefs and extreme militarists, ruling on her own or in alliance with Colonel Türkes' extreme Right party — will she then keep her vague promises of democratisation, when you no longer have any concrete means of applying pressure?

What will happen if, tomorrow Turkey again

falls under an extreme right dictatorship? Do you have any control mechanisms other than that of being asked your advice about grants of financial aid to Turkey?

Finally there is no doubt that, in the present circumstances, ratification of the Customs union with Turkey will be interpreted by it as a **final discharge**, an approval by democratic Europe of its political system, of its intolerable Kurdish policy, its brutal oppression of all opponents, its freedom stifling laws. This discharge will give Mrs Çiller and her party an undeserved political bonus which cannot fail to undermine Europe's moral credit in general, and the European Parliaments in particular, in the eyes of Kurdish and Turkish democrats.

These will not fail to reproach you for having sacrificed your principles on the altar of their businessmen's commercial interests. The Kurdish and Turkish victims of the Turkish regime, activists for Human Rights, for democracy and peace will feel deceived and humiliated by a European Parliament which, having first laid down firm conditions for democratisation, respect for Human Rights, freedom for the Kurdish M.P.s and all prisoners of opinion, then when the moment of truth arrives, contents itself with vague cosmetic measures to bow before the pressure of Governments and industrial groups for "reasons of State".

Ratification would also have harmful effects on the integration of the 3 million Turks and Kurds living in the various European Union countries and, often, very much tuned in to the conflicts and passions of their country of origin. The overwhelming majority of these, who have experienced the reality of democracy, in the European sense of the term, has a pretty negative attitude to the Turkish political regime, and deplore the Western governments' indulgence towards Ankara. An unprincipled ratification of the Customs Union would be a new and powerful argument for all the groups who denounce the "*hypocrisy and mercantile spirit of the Westerners*" and their indifference to the Kurdish tragedy and the fate of democrats in Turkey. Here, too, loss of faith in democracy and in the moral vigilance of its institutions is grist to the mill of the extremists who vehicle the conflicts.

You would also be wrong to under-estimate the sensitivity of European public opinion. According to an opinion poll quoted by the Germany

newspaper *General Anzeiger* of June 29th, more than 80% of Germans disapprove of Turkish policy on the Kurds and on Human Rights and 60% expect stronger initiatives from the German government on the matter. Losing all hope of democratisation by the political leaders in Ankara, 80% of the Germans questioned said they were in favour of the creation of a Kurdish State. Sensitivity on this issue is no less in France, Britain, Benelux or the Scandinavian countries, not to speak of Greece and Austria, long familiar with this cause, which is also finding new defenders in Spain and Italy.

With settlement of the Palestinian and Bosnian conflicts under way, the Kurdish problem stands out even more sharply as the keystone of problem of peace and stability and democracy in Turkey and several other states in the Near East. The European Union, if it doesn't want the Americans once more to pull their chestnuts out of the fire, has at its disposal the political, economic and human means of playing a role in this area. The Customs Union could be a first and important means of negotiating the issue with Turkey.

All these reasons seem, to us, to argue in favour of an adjournment any ratification for six or twelve months. This will allow Europe to remain strictly neutral in the Turkish General Elections and wait for a new political majority to emerge having the time and the will to seriously engage in the democratic reforms demanded by the European Parliament. Turkish public opinion will appreciate the concern of the Euro-M.P.s not to intervene in the Turkish elections; European public opinion and the millions of victims of the Turkish Governments repressive policies will appreciate the fact that the European Parliament surrender its democratic requirements and had the wisdom and patience to propose a constructive dialogue to Ankara aiming at a genuine democratisation of the Turkish political system, the freeing of all prisoners of opinion and the initiation of a political settlement of the Kurdish problem.

To sum up — immediate ratification can only benefit Mrs Çiller, her Party and some business interests. A postponement will allow you to maintain a hopeful option on the future, respect the democratic and civilised principles and values which are the basis if the European Union, and help a democratic evolution and eventual integration of a country which, when it becomes genuinely democratic, will find its rightful place in Europe.

## Reports and documents

- WHEN THE ARMY, SUPPOSED RAMPART OF SECULARISM, SUPPORTS ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST ACTIVITY:
  - Extract of a report to the U.S. Senate.
  - The Turkish Journalist O. Akbal explains how the Army helps the fundamentalists.
- HUMAN RIGHTS: EXTRACT FROM A REPORT OF THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
- THE KURDISH POLICY OF TURKEY EXPOSED BY EX-PRESIDENT ÖZAL
- THE ERROR OF BEING A KURD IN TURKEY; A PLEA BY YACHAR KEMAL, FOLLOWED BY THE SATIRE BY THE TURKISH JOURNALIST A. ALTAN "AND IF ATATÜRK HAD BEEN A KURDISH GENERAL?"
- THE SCORCHED "EARTH POLICY" IN KURDISTAN
  - A first list of destroyed villages
  - The testimony of İsmail Beşikçi:  
*"Lice, the Kurdish forbidden city"*
- USE OF WESTERN WEAPONS AGAINST KURDISH CIVILIANS
  - *Extract of a report of Human Rights Watch (nov. 95)*
  - *America Arms Turkey's Repression (New York Times)*
- GERMAN VIEWPOINT ON TURKISH-STYLE DEMOCRACY
  - This Turkey is not part of our world
  - Weak as a Turkish Prime Minister
- WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER FLIRTS WITH THE NEO-FASCIST EXTREME RIGHT: *"Tansu Çiller's dangerous liaisons"*.

## EAST OR WEST? TURKEY CHECKS ITS COMPASS

### A MINORITY STAFF REPORT

TO THE

### COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

SEPTEMBER 1995

#### A DANGEROUS FLIRTATION WITH ISLAM

Despite claims that it regards fundamentalism as a threat to its secular heritage, the government of Turkey appears to be encouraging and even sponsoring Islamic activities in an attempt to bring the country together and defuse separatist sentiments. Since Turks and Kurds share a common Islamic heritage, Turkey apparently is attempting to use religion to bind together the two ethnic groups. Such a strategy holds inherent risks. Several governments in North Africa and the Middle East, for instance, promoted Islamic groups as a counterweight to radical leftist organizations during the 1970's and early 1980's. Some of those Islamic groups now pose a direct threat to the stability of the very governments that promoted them. Turkey's flirtation with Islam accordingly could backfire and inadvertently provide a foothold for Islamic extremists and threaten Turkey's long history of secularism.

It would be interesting to determine whether or not Turkey's promotion of Islam contributed—either directly or indirectly—to the recent rise in prominence and electoral success of the Islamic Refah party. Such a determination was beyond the scope of our investigation, but would be well worth additional study and analysis.

#### THE KURDISH PROBLEM

In Diyarbakir, the largest city in Kurdish-inhabited southeast Turkey, local custom has it that just beyond the walls of the old city lies the site of the Garden of Eden. In today's context, it is hard to imagine that Diyarbakir could have ever been considered paradise. It is dirty, overcrowded, and while shops and marketplaces appear comfortably full, there appears to be little employment opportunity. By some estimates, the city's population has grown from roughly 300,000 to more than 1,500,000 during the past five years. The city has become a haven for rural Kurds forced to evacuate neighboring towns and villages destroyed by the Turkish military, and as such it has become a symbol of the ethnic difficulties that persist in Turkey.

Diyarbakir—like the country as a whole—is caught between a vise, with the Turkish military on one side and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on the other. It must not be overlooked that the PKK poses a grave threat not only to Turkey, but to regional stability as well. The PKK—which employs ruthless terrorist tactics against innocent noncombatants in Turkey and against innocent civilians elsewhere in the Middle East and Europe—bears direct responsibility for much of the tension in southeast Turkey and for prompting the recent Turkish invasions of Iraq. Surprisingly,

however, Turkish General Dogan did not include the PKK threat in his list of Turkey's greatest security concerns. When questioned about this, he said: "The PKK is a threat to Turkey's security, but it is not considered major threat because we have cracked down on the bulk of it."

As a result of the ethnic strife, Diyarbakir and nine other provinces in the southeast have been under a state of emergency for the past 8 years. Turkish officials, local residents, and some independent observers suggest that tensions have subsided during the past 2 years, and there is anecdotal evidence to support such a claim. In prior visits to Diyarbakir, it was commonplace to see armored personnel carriers and other military vehicles patrolling the streets, machine gun-toting security personnel posted throughout the city, and checkpoints at main thoroughfares. During this visit, we saw only one checkpoint and witnessed many city residents on the streets after dark.

From these observations, one should not conclude that Turkey's policies and actions in Diyarbakir have been an unqualified success. It is evident that the existing calm is tenuous and the result of Turkey's overwhelming—and at times oppressive—security presence, which has exacted a high cost in terms of human rights violations.

Turkey, in fact, has an almost paranoid fear of losing or compromising its Turkish identity. The Government of Turkey accordingly is unable—or unwilling—to distinguish the genuine threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) from the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Kurdish people. Contrary to how Turkish officials characterize the Kurds' desires, the overwhelming majority of Kurds with whom we met didn't speak of a separate Kurdish state or even a federation, but rather of their desire for an opportunity to express their cultural identity within Turkey. Turkey's government refuses even to acknowledge that there is a "Kurdish problem," and thereby is ignoring the real issue. Even U.S. Embassy officers admonished us not to speak of the "Kurdish problem" for fear of suggesting to Turkish officials that the U.S. supports a separate Kurdish state. Rather, we were encouraged to refer to it as "the problem in the Southeast."

There is independent data which belies official Turkish views of Kurdish goals and aspirations. Our visit to Turkey coincided with the release of a study, authored by Professor Dogu Ergil and sponsored by the Turkish Chambers of Commerce, which contained polling results demonstrating that few Kurds advocate separatism, and that most want to continue to live within Turkey—but to have greater cultural rights. The report continues to be the subject of a great deal of debate and discussion, with some Turks calling Ergil a CIA agent and others suggesting that the government may have had a role in sponsoring the report to test the level of public tolerance—or even to lay the ground work for reforming the Anti-Terror law.

Even the notion of cultural identity is misunderstood by Turkish officials. One official who is close to the Prime Minister automatically equated calls for cultural identity with demands that Kurdish be declared an official language. He could not conceive that Kurds would be satisfied with something less—such as being rid of the fear of prosecution and incarceration for speaking or teaching Kurdish, or for engaging in political discussions on Kurdish issues, or for publishing articles on the Kurdish identity.

# Les militaires complices de l'islamisme

*Les généraux ont trahi Atatürk au nom d'Atatürk*

**L'islamisme turc, qui a surgi en force en 1994, n'est pas tombé du ciel. Les généraux au pouvoir après 1981 en ont fait le lit, obsédés qu'ils étaient par le "péril rouge". Aujourd'hui, ils mesurent leur erreur, mais un peu tard.**

**Oktay Akbal**  
MILLIVET - ISTANBUL

Il est vrai que le Refah [Parti de la prospérité, islamiste] a remporté un grand nombre de municipalités l'an dernier. [Il a notamment gagné la mairie d'Istanbul, avec 24 % des voix, et celle d'Ankara. Son score a été de 19 % sur l'ensemble du pays.] Comment a-t-il réussi ? C'est une longue histoire, allant des bulletins de vote qui finissent dans les poubelles aux divisions absurdes entre les candidats des partis de gauche.

Cela fait donc un an que les islamistes dirigent des municipalités, un anniversaire qu'ils ont récemment célébré par une grande fête. L'épouse du leader du Refah, Mme Nermin Erbakan, a reçu une ovation quand elle y a déclaré : *"Ce ne sont pas les douze millions d'habitants d'Istanbul, ni les soixante millions de Turcs, mais un milliard cinq cents millions de musulmans du monde entier qui nous attendent. J'espère que, demain, nous fêterons la révolution."*

On sait très bien ce qui se passerait si, d'aventure, un homme de gauche exprimait aujourd'hui ouvertement le souhait de *"fêter demain la révolution"*. Il serait aussitôt accusé de tentative de *"changement ou abo-*

*lition de la Constitution par la force"* et vite conduit derrière les barreaux. Or les intégristes expriment, par l'écrit et la parole, l'idée de changer le régime. Ils n'hésitent pas à se référer au massacre de Sivas en le qualifiant de *"glorieuse émeute"*. [En juillet 1993, des islamistes avaient incendié un hôtel de cette ville où se tenait une réunion en hommage à un poète alévi du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle : 37 intellectuels avaient péri.] Mais, là, les procureurs de la République ferment les yeux !

Les partisans de la charia progressent un peu plus chaque jour. En nous regardant droit dans les yeux, en plus. Qui faudra-t-il accuser si un jour ils répandent le sang, comme en Egypte ou en Algérie ? Ceux qui ont piétiné les principes laïcs depuis des années dans leur chasse aux votes n'y sont-ils pas pour quelque chose ? Le problème ne date pas d'aujourd'hui, il remonte à la fin des années 40. Son aggravation dans les années 50 a pu être freinée en 1960 [avec le coup d'Etat d'officiers progressistes], pour se transformer après en une force redoutable sous les gouvernements Demirel (1975-77 et 1979-81). Puis vinrent le putsch de 1981 et le régime de Turgut Özal [Premier ministre désigné par les militaires, il fut ensuite élu président par le Parlement]. Les écoles coraniques, les "séminaires" d'imams poussèrent alors comme des champignons. Les aides aux partisans de la charia ouvrirent la voie à ceux qui voulaient changer le régime laïc.

Même ceux qui minimisaient ce danger jusqu'à récemment commencent à se réveiller. Nous savons tous que le Conseil national de sécurité et le général Kenan Evren [qui avaient dirigé le putsch de 1981] ont écrasé la gauche pendant qu'ils pro-

tégeaient la droite. Ils ont détruit toute l'œuvre d'Atatürk en se camouflant derrière son nom, qu'ils ânonnaient du matin au soir. Evren avait d'ailleurs récité des passages du Coran sur les places publiques pour étayer ses arguments et même tenté de défendre la charia.

Or, que vient nous dire ce même monsieur (aujourd'hui général en retraite) dans un récent discours télévisé ? *"Si une menace risque de dénaturer la République et ses caractéristiques, notre réaction sera légitime. Dans un tel cas, on abandonne le principe du maintien de l'armée hors de la politique. Si un système fondé sur la charia avance, même par des voies démocratiques, les forces armées turques ne sauraient rester spectatrices."*

*"Comme si ce n'était pas lui"*, rappelle le chroniqueur du quotidien *Cumhuriyet* Server Tanilli, *"qui avait introduit dans la Constitution les leçons obligatoires de religion dans les écoles et les lycées, chose qu'aucun pouvoir civil n'aurait jamais osé faire ! Seraient-ce des djinns qui ont signé la loi de 1983 ouvrant les portes de l'administration aux diplômés des établissements religieux, alors que normalement ces élèves, pour leurs études supérieures, ne pouvaient être admis que dans les facultés de théologie conformément à leur vocation ?"*

La Turquie n'est ni l'Algérie, ni l'Afghanistan, ni même l'Égypte. Les héritiers d'Atatürk formés depuis soixante-dix ans ne se plieront certainement pas à un retour de plusieurs siècles en arrière. Ni eux, ni sans doute le général Evren, qui a pourtant ouvert la voie, sciemment ou non, aux forces de la charia, mais qui commence à voir maintenant, lui aussi, le terrible danger ! ●



# US says state of human rights in Turkey is getting worse

## Despite PM Çiller's pledges in 1993, torture persisted throughout 1994, says Washington report

Turkish Daily News

WASHINGTON- A U.S. State Department human rights report, released in Washington on Wednesday, provides a comprehensive chronicle of alleged human rights abuses by Turkish authorities in 1994 and gives extensive coverage to crimes committed by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) during the same year. The 36-page section in the report on Turkey concludes, on the basis of findings provided by U.S. diplomats in Ankara and other Turkish cities, that "the human rights situation in Turkey worsened significantly in 1994."

"Despite the Çiller government's pledge in 1993 to end torture and to establish a state of law based on respect for human rights, torture and excessive use of force by security personnel persisted throughout 1994," the report says in its introductory section.

"The police and security forces often employed torture during periods of incommunicado detention and interrogation and continued to use excessive force against noncombatants (in the fight against the PKK), the report adds.

"Various agencies of the government continued to harass, intimidate, indict and imprison human rights monitors, journalists, lawyers and professors for ideas which they expressed in public forums," the report says.

"Disappearances and mystery murder cases continued at a high rate in the Southeast. The PKK and the radical Islamic Hezbollah (not related to the Lebanese Hizbullah) appear responsible in some cases. In other cases, however, the evidence implicated government security forces," it adds.

"In many human rights cases, the targets of abuses were ethnic Kurds

or their supporters. Moreover, the government infrequently prosecutes police or security officers for extrajudicial killings, torture and other abuses; in the cases which produce a conviction, lenient sentences were usually given," it says. "The resulting climate of impunity that has been created probably remains the single largest obstacle to reducing unlawful killing, torture and other human rights abuses," the report concludes on this subject.

This year's human rights report by the State Department covers 193 countries. By law the State Department must report on human rights in all countries that are members of the United Nations. Originally the report was limited to those nations receiving aid from the United States.

U.S. officials explained that the State Department is mandated by Congress to produce the report and that the format of the sections on each country is standard and also follows the guidelines set down by the congressional mandate.

The 36 pages devoted to Turkey in this year's report was surpassed only by the 39 pages devoted to China. The report devotes only 16 pages to human rights violations in Syria, 23 pages to Serbia, 29 pages to Russia, 32 pages to Israel and the occupied territories, 17 pages to Iran, 26 pages to Iraq, 12 pages to Armenia, 18 pages to Algeria, 13 pages to Cyprus and 26 pages to Greece.

John Shattuck, assistant secretary for democracy, human rights and labor, during his introductory remarks at a State Department briefing on Wednesday, said countries like China, Iraq, Iran, Burma, North Korea and Cuba were engaged in "flagrant and systematic abuses of basic human rights."

But he noted that such flagrant abuses were not limited only to authoritarian governments. "Torture, arbitrary detention or repression of free speech and dissent" existed in a wide variety of other governments, he said. As examples, Shattuck mentioned Saudi Arabia, Egypt, India, Guatemala and Turkey.

Dealing with "Respect for the integrity of the person, including freedom from political and other extrajudicial killings" in Turkey, the report says in categorical terms that "Government authorities were responsible for the deaths of detainees in official custody; suspects in houses raided by security forces; and other types of civilian deaths in the Southeast."

Indicating that under Turkish law authorities are obliged to investigate all deaths in police custody, the report says that prosecution of security force mem-

bers for such deaths are rare. Dealing with "Respect for the integrity of the person, including freedom from torture and other cruel inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" in Turkey, the report says the following:

"Despite the Constitution's ban on torture, Turkey's accession to the U.N. and European conventions against torture, and public pledges of successive governments to end torture, the practice continued. Human rights attorneys and physicians who treat victims of torture state that most persons charged with or suspected of political crimes usually suffer some torture during the period of incommunicado detention in police stations and gendarmerie headquarters before they are brought to a court." According to the report, the commonly employed methods of torture in Turkey reported by the Turkish Human Rights Foundation include: "high-pressure cold water hoses, electric shock, beating on the soles of the feet, beating of the genitalia, hanging by the arms, blindfolding, sleep deprivation, deprivation of clothing, systematic beatings, and vaginal and anal rape with truncheons and, in some instances, gun barrels."

"In southeastern Turkey, a security official boasted of having deprived a suspect of sleep for six days to obtain a confession," the report said.

"In the few instances in which law enforcement officers are convicted of torture, sentences tend to be light. In July, Ekrem Güner, a non-commissioned officer, was convicted of torturing two persons in Ordu in 1989, sentenced to two years in prison, suspended from duty for five months and 15 days, and fined TL 375,000 (roughly \$12)," the report said.

Pointing out that Turkey recognizes the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights, the report says Turkish citizens may file complaints alleging violations of the European Convention on Human Rights with the Commission. It adds that there are currently 250 cases before the Commission.

The report goes on to say that there is no guaranteed attorney access under law for persons whose case falls under the jurisdiction of the State Security Court.

These cases include those charged with smuggling and with crimes under the anti-terrorism law.

"Attorneys and human rights organizations affirm that this lack of access is a major factor in the continuing, widespread use of torture by police and security forces," the report says. "The decision concerning access to council in such cases is left to the independent prosecutor, who generally denies access," it adds.

Referring to the activities of the State Security Courts (DGM) the report says the following:

"In 1994, State Security Courts predominantly handled cases under the anti-terrorism law. The state claims these courts were established to try efficiently those suspected of certain crimes. In fact, the law provides that those accused of crimes falling under the jurisdiction of these courts may be detained twice as long before arraignment as other dependents and the courts may hold closed hearings and may admit testimony obtained during police interrogations in the absence of council." Dealing with "Respect for the integrity of the person, including freedom from use of expressive force and violations of humanitarian law in internal conflicts" in Turkey, the report says that

"the PKK's campaign of violence in southeast Turkey is directed against both security forces and civilians, most of whom are Kurds, whom the PKK accuses of cooperating with the state."

"The Turkish National Police, Gendarmerie and Armed Forces in turn have waged an increasingly intense campaign to suppress terrorism, targeting active PKK units as well as those they believe support or sympathize with the PKK, and committing many human rights abuses in the process."

"On March 26, a Turkish Air Force plane bombed up to four villages in Simak province, killing approximately 20 persons, according to press reports. Journalists were not allowed into the area. The government stated that the inhabitants had left the village some time before and that the PKK had then moved in, along with some civilians. When the PKK was hit, the government explained, there was perforce some collateral damage," it said, "Section 2" of the report on Turkey goes on to deal with "Respect for civil liberties, including freedom of speech and press."

Touching in detail on the trials and conviction of the pro-Kurdish deputies of the former Democracy Party (DEP), the State Department report also highlights the cases of trade union Chairman Münir Ceylan, journalist Haluk Gerger, academic Dr. Fikret Başkaya and former Diyarbakır Mayor Mehdi Zana — all convicted to prison sentences for expressing their views in writing or otherwise.

It goes on to quote Turkish government figures and says 407 newspapers, 490 periodicals and 35 books were confiscated in the first nine months of 1994.

It indicated that while legislation has partially removed the ban on the use of the Kurdish language, Kurdish language broadcasts are still illegal.

"President Süleyman Demirel stated that Kurdish television and education would constitute concessions to terrorists and should be allowed only after terrorism ends," the report says. Indicating that the "pro-PKK" daily *Özgür Gündem* had been harassed consistently since its April 1992 inception, the State Department report says the following of the Turkish press coverage of the situation in the Southeast:

"Turkish press coverage of the situation in the

Southeast tended to be unreliable underreporting in some instances and grossly sensationalizing in others. Government decree 430 requires self-censorship of all news reporting from or about the Southeast and upon the request of the regional governor, gives the Interior Ministry the authority to ban distribution of any news viewed as misrepresenting events in the region. In the event such a government warning is not obeyed, the decree provides for a 10-day suspension of operations for a first offence and 30 days for subsequent offences."

The State Department goes on in its report to touch upon the demonstrations during the year by Turkish civil servants seeking union rights and said one of these demonstrations was dispersed by the police "through kicking and the use of truncheons." Also touching upon religious freedoms, the report says the following regarding the Alawis:

"Turkey's Alawi Muslim minority (an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam) is estimated to number at least 12 million. There are, however, no government-paid Alawi religious leaders, no Religious Affairs Directorate Funds go to the Alawi community, and some Alawis allege informal discrimination in the form of failure to include any Alawi doctrines or beliefs in religious instruction classes. Alawis are disgruntled by what they regard as the Sunni bias in the Religious Affairs Directorate and the Directorate's tendency to view the Alawis as a cultural group rather than a religious sect."

Referring to the governmental attitude regarding groups or organizations investigating human rights allegations, the report says: "Government agents have increasingly harassed human rights monitors, as well as lawyers and doctors involved in documenting human rights violations."

It says that since 1991 the Turkish Parliament has had a human rights commission but adds that this commission has been "inactive and ineffective."

"While representatives of diplomatic missions who wish to monitor the state of human rights in Turkey are free to speak with private citizens, security officials may have an intimidating effect upon those interviewed," the report says.

# THE KURDISH POLICY OF TURKEY EXPOSED BY EX-PRESIDENT ÖZAL

- Progressive evacuation of villages and hamlets in the Kurdish region
- Dispersion of the Kurds and planning their emigration to Western Turkey
- Intensified efforts of disinformation by the State.
- A free hand to Counter-guerrilla units
- Economic development in some urban centers
- Free debate on the problem
- Final objective: not to have more than 2 or 3 million Kurds in the region by the next 5 or 10 years.

Tuesday, November 16, 1993

## Late Özal's letter to then PM Demirel

Shortly before his sudden death, the late President Turgut Özal sent a top-secret letter to the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, listing a number of proposals for a possible solution to Kurdish subversive activity, which he looked upon as the gravest danger Turkey faced.

The following is a translation of the letter.

### Introduction

In the southeast, we are faced with perhaps the most significant problem in the republic's history. The "Kurdish Question" in southeastern Turkey, what with its political, social and economic aspects, and with bloody acts of terrorism, poses an ever-growing danger. The beginnings of the problem date back to the final years of the Ottoman rule. In the 15 years that ensued after the declaration of the republic, the state had to put down a number of rebellions [by Kurdish secessionists]. Blood was shed when necessary, and a certain portion of the local population was forced to migrate to the west of the country.

With the annulment of a policy of forced migration following the introduction of democracy in 1950, some of those forced to settle in the west returned. Yet starting from the 1960's, the local population again began shifting towards the west.

Despite the lack of definitive official figures, 60 percent of those called Kurds probably live in sectors of the country west of Ankara. Because the migrations were not planned ones, in certain provinces in the West — such as Adana, Mersin, İzmir, Antalya, and even Istanbul — our Kurdish citizens live in close proximity in certain districts.

### Suggestions for a solution

The problem we face is way beyond the simple dimensions of terrorism. Therefore, it is imperative to consider short-, medium-, and long-term solutions and to adopt two separate approaches for dealing with the local population and the terrorists.

### Short- and medium-term suggestions

Despite the availability of information on the causes of the problem, no in-depth analyses have as yet been made. In order to add to the efficiency of the policies we have been pursuing, our struggle against terrorism must be backed by comprehensive analyses by scientists, both foreign and Turkish. Research groups should immediately be set up with a view to conducting investigations on socio-economic and psychological aspects of the issue. Public opinion polls should be conducted to improve understanding of the problem. Research groups should comprise scientists, state officials, statisticians, soldiers, and other relevant experts.

■ It must be borne in mind that owing to military measures being taken to wipe out terrorist activity, the locals in the Southeast have been subjected to harsh treatment and fear, as a result, estranged. If there have been mistakes made in tackling terrorism, they should be frankly discussed and realistic solutions must be sought.

turkish daily news

■ A complete overhaul of the training system of security forces is necessary. This should be accompanied by the modernization of their equipment and of the methods they employ to fight against terrorists. They need re-education on "public relations."

■ Starting with the most troubled zones, villages and hamlets in the mountains of the region should be gradually evacuated. With this group of PKK (outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party) supporters, in number no more than 150,000 to 200,000, being resettled in the Western parts of the country according to a careful plan, logistic support for the PKK will have been cut off and their standard of living will have improved. This group should be given employment priorities.

■ With the evacuation of mountain settlements, the terrorist organization [PKK] will have been isolated. Security forces should immediately move in and establish complete control in such areas. To prevent the locals' return to the region, the building of a large number of dams in appropriate places is an alternative.

■ On all highways in the region, 24-hour patrol duty by special teams is a must. Helicopters in daytime, and night-vision armoured personnel carriers at night, must be on patrol duty. A complete overhaul of the security network in the region is urgent. Security personnel must be transformed from a defensive force to one that is offensive.

■ The purchase of 20 Cobra and 20 to 30 Sikorsky helicopters for the security forces deployed in the area will help create a mobile force that can handle incidents that might occur simultaneously. The restructuring of state intelligence organizations active in the Southeast is an urgent priority, to make up for lack of sufficient information on the [PKK's] plans. Coordination must immediately be effected between the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the gendarmerie's intelligence command, the armed forces, and police.

■ A 40,000 to 50,000-strong special force, comprised of fully professional units, with at least one year of special training behind them, should be set up to fight against the PKK. They should be paid satisfactory salaries. Unit commanders in this force should be given leeway to take initiatives on any issue when conditions necessitate it. The special force must not be a force on the defensive. It must be a force that tracks terrorists down and attacks them. Naturally, they should maintain contact with other units deployed in the area and cooperate with them. Ordinary units of the standing army must only be used for routine military duties such as security checks and control.

■ Border trade, an important source of income for the local population, must be free. The opening of new border posts with Syria, and the reopening of those that have been closed, are necessary. An improvement in border trade will mean new opportunities for the locals and make life easier for at least some.

■ In order to cut off logistic support for the PKK, the local people should be won over to the side of the state. The people settled in faraway mountain villages and hamlets should be encouraged to move into bigger settlement areas.

■ Given a tendency for the locals to migrate to the west of the country, it would appear that only 2 to 3 million people will inhabit the region in the future. If this migration is not regulated, only the relatively well-off portion of the population will have moved and the poor will have been left behind. Thus the area will turn into a breeding ground

for further anarchy. To prevent this, the migration must be regulated by the state. A planned, balanced migration, including members from all segments of society, to pre-determined settlements in the West is essential.

■ In addition to committing terrorist acts, [the PKK] is spreading widespread, effective propaganda with the purpose of intimidating and ultimately brainwashing the local people to win them over to its side. Counter-propaganda to strengthen local support for the state, to boost morale, and correct disinformation is of crucial importance.

■ Therefore, it is imperative that special efforts be spent to inform both the public and the international community of the true nature of developments. In order to do this, the setting up of a special team of experts to create a favorable climate of public opinion is necessary. Thus the scope of our activity in releasing press statements, leaking news, and, if need be, spreading "disinformation" will increase.

■ It is of the utmost significance that the statements made to the press regarding the security forces' struggle against terrorists be regulated with the greatest possible care. Press reports, both written and visual, which could be exploited by [the PKK] to highlight itself as either a "heroic or an innocent" organization, must be avoided.

#### Medium- and long-term suggestions

■ Such cities as Adiyaman, Diyarbakır, Urfa, Mardin, Batman, Siirt, Elazığ, Malatya, Erzincan, Erzurum, Kars, Ardahan, and Iğdır must be turned into centers of attraction for the local population currently settled in the countryside. This should be done through special incentives for investors. Thus, the evacuation of the countryside will have been facilitated.

■ Incentives must be provided for the private sector to invest in the region. Corporate tax should be lifted for a long period. Income tax levied on the locals must be decreased and the electricity supply must be cheapened.

■ This problem should be debated freely, in an unbiased manner, in a prejudice-free atmosphere. Through debate, the rights and wrongs will come to light, thus leading us closer to the truth. To bar discussion, to cover up the truth, will not alleviate the problem. On the contrary, it will lead to further chaos because of the adoption of a mistaken approach.

#### Conclusion

If mistakes are not committed, and inconsistent, unnecessarily hurried action is not taken, the fire in the Southeast will die out in five to 10 years, with the weakening of nationalist sentiment and the decrease of foreign involvement. (Because the fire has undoubtedly been started and fuelled by foreign powers which desire to prevent Turkey from using its historic opportunity to accomplish its aim of becoming a powerful nation.)

State officials must not project an image that shows Turkey as a country afraid of, and intimidated by, terrorism. It will be of great help to show to the world outside Turkey that the state is capable of tackling such an issue and that it is not at all wary of, or worried about, terrorism.

Therefore, it is the responsibility of all state officials, whatever their rank may be, of politicians, and of the press, to differentiate between terrorists and the local population and to treat them accordingly, in order to maintain our unitary state apparatus and to wipe out terrorism by taking the above-mentioned measures to prevent its incidence.

# What Ozal suggested & what is being done

## Suggestion:

If mistakes have been made in the campaign on terrorism, resulting in harm being inflicted on the people, or the harassment and even alienation of the people, solutions for these problems should be sought without covering up the truth, and all realities should be spelled out.

## In Practice:

In an effort not to demoralize the country's security forces, and based on the argument that at crucial times like this, any action or speech even hinting at criticism of their conduct would lead to such a result, governments and military officials have refrained from investigating any claims. Torturers have gone unpunished, along with those who have alienated people through the burning of their settlements and/or treatment of the locals. Had "examples" been made of these, had the instigators of such pain been caught and punished, this would have raised confidence in the state. The people would then have known that the state exists to protect them — not only to punish them.

## Suggestion:

A gradual migration to western Turkey of locals settled in mountain villages and hamlets is necessary to cut off logistic support to the PKK. These people should be allocated their new settlements in western areas, compensated and even given employment priorities.

## In Practice:

Villages suspected of cooperating with the PKK or of giving logistic support to the separatists are often raided and evacuated by troops. The people are neither compensated nor provided with a place to go. This practice, instead of stopping logistic support to the PKK, actually channels many more recruits into the organization's ranks. Some end up joining the mountain units of the organization. Others go to larger cities where they are often contacted by the PKK militia. Those left on their own and who attempt to reach the West frequently end up being harassed there. Unemployed, they too join the PKK.

## Suggestion:

To prevent the return of villagers to the evacuated settlements, a large number of dams in appropriate places can be constructed as an alternative.

## In Practice:

Once the settlements are raided and

evacuated, troops are said to be burning them down so that the villagers cannot reuse them. Kurdish politicians claim more than 700 villagers have been systematically evacuated in this way. As the recent incidents in Lice and Kulp indicate, larger settlements are hit with tank and artillery fire as part of security operations. Military sources say only two buildings escaped damage in Kulp after the October operation there.

## Suggestion:

24-hour patrol duty on state highways by helicopters in the daytime and by night-vision armored personnel carriers at night, is a must.

## In Practice:

Turkish troops are rapidly withdrawing from the rural areas, closing down patrol stations there and pulling back into larger and better-protected forts. Many highways are PKK-controlled at night. In many areas, security personnel go back into their barracks as evening approaches. Instead of taking the offensive against terrorism, as Özal has suggested, Turkey is giving the signal that it has been forced onto the defensive.

## Suggestion:

An overhaul of intelligence activity is necessary. Coordination must be effected between the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Armed Forces, Gendarmerie, and police.

## In Practice:

Even Prime Minister Tansu Çiller has said recently that there is an internal struggle in the state apparatus — while referring to the death of Cem Ersever. There is a struggle for the top position within the MIT as well as a struggle against the current MIT boss, according to officials close to Çiller. None of Turkey's security or intelligence departments see eye to eye, and despite attempts at coordinated intelligence, information reaching Ankara is often still an exaggeration or a playing-down of realities.

## Suggestion:

A professional force of 40,000 to 50,000 should be specially trained and made ready for five years deployment in the area.

## In Practice:

The Tansu Çiller administration has put the idea into practice, and the first group

of special forces are to be sent to the region by the beginning of the new year. There is suspicion, however, that the new forces will be made up mostly of idealist right-wing activists and may turn into an alternative militant force which may not be controlled in the future.

## Suggestion:

Counter-propaganda activity against the PKK is necessary. Such propaganda should aim to boost the locals' morale and win the local population over to the side of the state. If need be, it should also contain disinformation.

## In Practice:

Counter-propaganda and disinformation in the Turkish media, especially in past months, is at an all-time high, seriously threatening both the people's right to correct information and Turkey's attempt to find a solution to the problem. The state management itself appears to have fallen into the trap of disinformation, and is introducing prescriptions for the problem which are based on a mistaken or distorted diagnosis.

## Suggestion:

Certain big cities in the region should be turned into centres of attraction. The state must encourage investors. Taxes should be decreased and the electric supply made cheaper.

## In Practice:

Giving in to terrorism, the government has halted almost all investments in the region. Other projects have been seriously hindered by separatist attacks. Employment promises have turned out to

be bogus, and the state is discouraging investors for the time being — spreading the idea that investments will be attacked anyway. This too is an indication of a defensive position as far as Ankara is concerned.

## Suggestion:

All debate focusing on a solution to the problem should be free, held in an unbiased manner, in a prejudice-free atmosphere.

## In Practice:

Under the current laws, hundreds of people have been arrested for speeches and/or writings on the issue. 15 journalists have been killed. The chairman of the Democracy Party (DEP) is under arrest for a statement he made in neighboring Iraq, and 17 parliamentarians are being persecuted for speeches they have made on different occasions. No one is free to express opinions, facing the risk of being charged with treason by officials or by their extensions in the media. The lack of an atmosphere of debate or tolerance is leading only to a deepening of the crisis.

26 janvier- 1<sup>er</sup> février 1995



# LE TORT D'ÊTRE KURDE EN TURQUIE

*Plaidoyer*

Le 13 janvier dernier, la Cour de sûreté d'Istanbul ordonnait une enquête judiciaire à l'encontre de l'écrivain turc Yachar Kemal. Le 23, elle décidait d'ouvrir un procès. Le motif? L'article paru dans l'hebdomadaire allemand *Der Spiegel* que nous publions ici. Dans ce texte, le romancier dénonce la répression d'Ankara contre la minorité kurde et s'insurge contre un régime pourtant désireux de s'intégrer à l'Europe démocratique. Selon la loi antiterroriste turque, le délit de "propagande séparatiste" est passible d'une peine de deux à cinq ans de prison et d'une lourde amende.



Né en 1923 près d'Adana, Kemal Sadik Gözçeli, dit Yachar Kemal, est devenu célèbre, en 1955, avec la publication de son premier roman, *Mémed le Mince*. Depuis, ses œuvres ont été traduites en plus de trente langues\*. Homme de gauche, il a payé son engagement et sa dénonciation de la situation sociale en Turquie par un séjour en prison au lendemain du putsch militaire de mars 1971. La presse turque a abondamment commenté les poursuites dont il est aujourd'hui menacé.

# Yachar Kemal contre la répression

*“Décuple ta cruauté pour précipiter ton déclin”  
(Proverbe anatolien)*



**Scène de la vie quotidienne** Le 17 janvier dernier à Sirnak, au sud-est de la Turquie, la population manifeste ; les chars avancent dans les rues. De par la volonté d'Ankara, une guérilla devient peu à peu une guerre civile.

H H A / Sipa Press

**C**'est peut-être la première fois dans l'Histoire qu'un siècle porte un nom avant même d'avoir commencé : le XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle sera le siècle des Droits de l'homme. Car, au cours de ce siècle finissant, les progrès accomplis en ce domaine ne peuvent nous satisfaire. Pis encore, au seuil du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, de nombreux indices donnent à penser que nous avons fait demi-tour en cours de route et que nous sommes en train de rebrousser chemin. Depuis sa fondation – le 29 octobre 1923 – jusqu'à

YACHAR KEMAL  
DER SPIEGEL  
HAMBURG

aujourd'hui, la République turque est devenue un insupportable système de contraintes et de brutalités. Elle a cherché à dissimuler cette évolution aux yeux de l'humanité, avec tout l'art oriental de la mascarade et du double discours. La République turque a imposé une telle tyrannie à la population de l'Anatolie [Turquie d'Asie] que celle-ci n'aspire qu'à retrouver le système autocratique de l'ancien Empire ottoman.

Jusqu'à l'introduction du système multipartite, en 1946, il n'est pas un seul villageois – pas une fille, pas une femme, pas un Kurde, Turc ou Laze [peuple du Caucase] – qui n'ait eu à goûter de la matraque du gendarme. Comme un ouragan balayant tout sur son passage, le pouvoir républicain a soufflé vio-

lemment sur l'Anatolie. Comment la population de Turquie a-t-elle pu supporter autant de brutalités et de tortures, autant de pauvreté et de famine pendant plus de soixante-dix ans ? Cela tient du miracle. Instaurer un tel régime d'oppression dans un pays situé à la lisière de l'Europe n'a pas été une entreprise facile, mais l'Etat turc a réussi ce tour de force. Les citoyens en paient le prix exorbitant – ils paient de leur dignité humaine.

Notre peuple n'a-t-il aucune part de responsabilité dans cet état de fait ? Evidemment, il n'est pas complètement innocent. Mais où la population aurait-elle pu trouver la force de résister à la terrifiante domination de la République, après avoir été, pendant un millénaire, opprimée, piétinée, torturée ; après avoir été, pendant un millénaire, projetée d'une guerre dans l'autre ? N'oublions pas que des centaines de Kuyucu Murat Pacha\*\* ont marché sur l'Anatolie, chacun d'eux étant d'un "calibre" dix fois supérieur à Gengis Khan.

En 1946, la Turquie a adopté le système multipartite et, en 1950, le Parti démocrate a pris le pouvoir des mains du Parti républicain du peuple, qui, jusque-là, avait exercé une domination tyrannique. C'était là un nouveau miracle accompli par une population asservie et dépossédée de ses droits.

Les fondateurs du Parti démocrate venaient cependant des hautes sphères du Parti républicain du peuple. Pour eux, le mot démocratie n'était qu'un rideau noir opaque derrière lequel ils se cachaient. Et c'est avec ce "mensonge démocratique" que la Turquie s'est ouvert la porte du Conseil de l'Europe et celle de l'OTAN. L'Europe s'est-elle laissé abuser par ce mensonge ? Loin de là. Mais les démocraties occidentales avaient besoin d'alliés contre l'Union soviétique – et c'est ainsi qu'elles ont, en toute connaissance de cause, accepté la Turquie dans leurs rangs.

Cependant, il s'est produit par la suite une chose inattendue : alors que le peuple turc végétait, paralysé par des décennies d'oppression, la résistance – hésitante et timide – a commencé à se développer au sein du peuple kurde. Car ce fut le peuple kurde qui, pendant cette période de domination autoritaire, eut à subir l'oppression la plus brutale. Il souffrit de la faim, fut écrasé par la pauvreté et livré aux massacres ethniques. Sa langue fut officiellement interdite. On dénia aux Kurdes leur identité en leur donnant le nom de "Turcs des montagnes" et, tous les dix ou quinze ans, on les poussa à fuir aux quatre coins de l'Anatolie.

Dogan Güres,  
chef d'état-major,  
a déclaré :  
"Pour prendre  
les poissons, il faut  
assécher l'étang."  
Et Tansu Çiller, notre  
Premier ministre,  
s'est écriée :  
"L'opération sera  
menée jusqu'à sa fin !"

Au fur et à mesure que s'intensifiait la résistance kurde, qui déboucha finalement sur un conflit armé, la machine répressive révéla son véritable – et terrifiant – visage. On commença d'abord par abuser la population en menant une incroyable campagne de propagande. Car, sans duper la population turque, la résistance kurde ne pouvait être brisée. C'est ainsi que débuta une vaste

opération d'intoxication : les Kurdes voulaient, disait-on avec force, émotion et suprême raffinement, diviser la patrie et fonder un Etat kurde indépendant. Ensuite, les obsèques de soldats turcs, morts sous de violentes attaques des Kurdes, furent mises en scène avec de tels excès que l'on pouvait en arriver à croire que chaque Turc n'avait d'autre choix que celui de tuer le premier Kurde venu.

Par chance, les Kurdes et les Turcs se connaissaient suffisamment depuis des siècles pour que tous les efforts du gouvernement

\* Plusieurs romans de Yachar Kemal ont été publiés aux éditions Gallimard, parmi lesquels *Mémed le Faucon*, *le Pilier et Terre de fer*, *ciel de cuivre*, qui, tout comme ses poèmes, évoquent les paysans d'Anatolie.

\*\* Kuyucu Murat Pacha, mort en 1611, grand vizir ottoman et général d'armée, a fait massacrer les insurgés dans les monts du Taurus, puis a fait jeter leurs cadavres dans des puits.



visant à déchaîner les haines entre les deux populations échouent. Le président Demirel et les autres membres du gouvernement ne prononcent pas deux phrases sans affirmer : *"Personne ne nous prendra jamais le moindre caillou, la moindre poignée de terre de notre pays."* Mais qui a jamais demandé un caillou ? Qui a jamais voulu une poignée de terre ? Autant que je le sache, il n'y a en Turquie qu'une minorité de Kurdes à vouloir un Etat indépendant. Et, s'ils avaient revendiqué l'indépendance, ne serait-ce pas leur droit ? Car, selon toutes les Déclarations des droits de l'homme, chaque peuple a le droit de prendre en main son propre destin.

Désormais, la Turquie connaît la guerre la plus vile qu'on puisse imaginer. La force des meilleurs écrivains ne suffit pas à la décrire. Pour mettre rapidement un terme aux soulèvements, la République turque a créé un *"système de protection des villages"*, avec un type de milice comparable à celui instauré par l'armée américaine au Vietnam.

Une milice de 50 000 hommes a été mise sur pied, en plus d'une unité spéciale de 12 000 hommes. Par-dessus le marché, l'Etat a mobilisé une armée de 300 000 soldats contre les Kurdes. Personne ne sait ce qui a pu encore être mobilisé par ailleurs. Mais le pire était sans doute que les forces armées turques organisaient la contre-guérilla.

Dans les montagnes, les partisans kurdes ont commencé à tuer les miliciens, et les miliciens à tuer les partisans. Les partisans sont venus assaillir les miliciens jusque dans leurs maisons et les ont abattus avec femmes et enfants. Et les miliciens ont de la même façon exécuté les partisans en même temps que leurs proches. Quand la guérilla frappait, elle accusait l'Etat de ses crimes ; quand l'Etat tuait, il accusait la guérilla.

Puis est apparu un général qui a dit : *"Donnez-m'en l'autorisation, et je ne laisserai pas deux pierres debout, pas une tête sur un corps dans l'est de l'Anatolie."* Le chef d'état-major, Dogan Güres, a déclaré : *"Pour prendre les poissons, il faut assécher l'étang."* Et notre femme Premier ministre, Tansu Çiller, s'est écriée au Parlement : *"L'opération sera menée jusqu'à sa fin !"* Même les Allemands – pourtant les mieux placés pour saisir la portée profonde de ces propos – n'ont guère sourcillé.

d'Atatürk. Très rapidement, de l'avis même de nombreux commentateurs turcs, elle se lance dans une *"funeste alliance"* avec l'armée. M<sup>me</sup> Çiller a noué d'étroites relations avec le chef de l'état-major, Dogan Güres, qui ont profondément irrité beaucoup de démocrates. Jusqu'à son départ en retraite l'automne dernier, c'est le général Güres qui a apporté le plus fort soutien politique au Premier ministre, lorsqu'elle s'est trouvée sous les feux croisés de la contestation.

A l'arrière-plan, le pouvoir et l'influence des officiers se sont de nouveau renforcés. M<sup>me</sup> Çiller a laissé le champ libre aux forces armées, notamment pour ce qui est de la question kurde. A son avènement, elle avait promis d'*"embrasser"* les 12 millions de Kurdes *"avec l'amour d'une mère"*, de faire la différence entre la guérilla du PKK et le peuple. Depuis, un plan d'autonomie sur le modèle du Pays basque en Espagne a fini dans les tiroirs, tout comme un programme de développement, avorté, destiné à combattre l'effroyable pauvreté dans le Sud-Est anatolien. M<sup>me</sup> Çiller s'est ralliée aux nationalistes ultras au sein de l'armée.

Ceux-ci ne voient dans la question kurde qu'un *"problème de terreur"*, qui ne se résoudra que par la force. Le chef du gouvernement a donc fait marche arrière sur toutes les timides tentatives d'ouverture. Les associations culturelles et les journaux kurdes sont interdits. Avec une grande fierté, M<sup>me</sup> Çiller a déclaré l'an dernier qu'elle avait évacué du Parlement *"d'un coup de pied"* les députés kurdes du Parti de la démocratie (DEP), qu'elle a ensuite interdit. Depuis, cinq d'entre eux ont été condamnés pour *"séparatisme"* à des peines allant jusqu'à quinze ans de prison.

Les promesses de garantir davantage de liberté aux citoyens ont été oubliées, les entorses aux droits de l'homme se sont multipliées sous son régime à un degré jamais connu sous aucun gouvernement civil précédent. Sur les questions sécuritaires et à l'égard des Kurdes, M<sup>me</sup> Çiller a perdu toute influence. Son manque de vision politique, sa faiblesse en tant que leader et, en partie aussi, les profondes dissensions qui déchirent son parti promettent à la Turquie, secouée par les crises, un avenir peu stable. ●

## ATAKÜRT\*

*Editorial by Ahmet Altan*

*Ahmet Altan was one of the most brilliant editorial writers of Milliyet, one of the main Turkish daily papers..... Until 17th April 1995.*

*On that day the paper published, over his signature, the article reproduced below.*

*Under the title "Atakürt" he offered his readers an iconoclastic and savage pastiche of the official version of the country's history. As a result of this publication he was fired, officially sacrificed on the altar of "indignant" reactions of readers.*

*On April 24th the State Security Court started proceedings under Article 312 of the Penal Code. Accused of "inciting racial hatred"*

*he was condemned, on October 18th, to 20 months suspended sentence.*

*Mr Altan's comment: "in this country there are still free journalists, but the press bosses aren't free".*

If Mustafa Kemal, an Ottoman pasha, had been born in Mossul instead of Salonika, if he had given the name "Republic of Kurdey" (Kürdiye Cumhuriyeti) to the state which emerged from the common struggle of Turks and Kurds which he led, if Parliament had given him the name of Atakürt ...

If we were called Kurds, because all the citizens of the Republic of Kurdey were "Kurds", if on the walls of Taksim, Kadiköy, Kizilay, there were signs which read "Happy is he who can call himself a Kurd" ...

If in Kurdey (Kürdiye) it were declared that the Turks do not exist, that the so-called Turks were simply Kurds, that those who considered themselves Turks were really "Sea Turks" (Deniz Kürdi) ...

If we had to learn in school that the Kurds have 7000 years of history behind them, that Anatolia belonged to them alone, that in fact the Mongols, Huns and Etruscans should be considered their ancestors, and that the Kurdish pashas were the greatest heroes of the Ottoman Empire ...

If it were forbidden to bear the names of Teoman, Cengiz, Attila or Osman, if it were compulsory to take the first names of Berfin, Biruj, Tiruj or Nevruz ...

If the creation of a Turkish television station were prohibited, and if all the television programs were in Kurdish ...

If we were compelled to write our novels, stories and poems in Kurdish, if we could listen only to Kurdish songs and if we had to publish our newspapers in Kurdish ...

If, in school, the lessons were only given in Kurdish and if it were strictly forbidden to give them in Turkish ...

If for claiming that "we are Turks, we have a language and a history", we could be arbitrarily thrown into jail ...

If the police in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Bursa persecuted us endlessly, if the "special units" accused us of being "separatists", of trying to divide the "Republic of Kurdey", and treated us as though we were "guilty", if we could be insulted just because we were Turks ...

If after the coup d'état of 12 September the entire population of Western Kurdey had been thrown into prison, if they had been subjected to incredible tortures, crammed into cells where they sank into mud up to the neck, if their internal organs had been damaged by high pressure jets of water, if mad dogs ripped off their legs ...

If they searched our homes on the pretext that we supported "separatist Turkish" terrorists, if our homes were then destroyed, if we had to take refuge in Diyarbakir and Hakkari, without being allowed to take our belongings, and if we had to live in a tent ...

Would we take it? Would we agree that declarations like - "Citizens of the Republic of Kurdey, you are all Kurds. Why are you always bringing up Turkish separatism? You can even become Prime Minister if you want to" - were signs of true equality? Or would we fervently demand that the state recognize our equal right to our own identity, our language and our Turkish culture?

This country includes people of Kurdish and Turkish origin, but history took the "Turkish road", and today we ask the Kurds to accept things that we ourselves would probably have refused as "Turks". This pretentiousness has brought us to the point of explosion and has led the country first to terrorism and then to civil war.

Although some people are convinced that only democracy and recognition of Kurdish identity will allow us to find a solution, the circle of our leaders is still asking the same questions: What is a democratic solution? What is Kurdish identity?

To be a democrat means above all to listen to the Kurds' demands, demands which would have been our own if we had lived in the Republic of Kurdey.

Is it worth shedding blood so that people we consider assimilated have no access to things which for us are natural? Is it worth bringing the country to the brink of disaster for that? If you think that it is not worth it, then you are democrats.

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\* The French translation of the Article in Al Ahram first appeared in the book "*Paroles Interdites*" (Forbidden Words) published by *Reporters sans Frontières*, Paris, June 1995.

# State terror in Turkish Kurdistan

At the same time as we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Normandy landings and honouring the victims of past barbarities, close at hand, in an allied country armed and financed by our democratic regimes, in an atmosphere of general indifference, a people long ill-treated by history is suffering systematic destruction of its villages, the forced depopulation of its towns and the decimation of its intelligentsia.

Every month about thirty Kurdish villages are wiped off the map, forests are burned, several Oradours\* are perpetrated under cover of «the fight against terrorism». Public opinion and the international community remain silent.

In the face of an intense disinformation campaign from Ankara, which tends to reduce the problems and aspirations of the 15 million Kurds in Turkey to «PKK terrorism», the undersigned non-governmental organisations, which support the Kurdish civilian population but oppose all forms of violence, wish to bring the following facts to the attention of the public :

## PROVISIONAL LIST OF KURDISH VILLAGES DESTROYED BY THE TURKISH ARMY .

**Batman District** : Sebane, **Beytüşşebab**: Bersikera, Bilbesi, Birman, Bordikel, Çemê Pirê, Dara Hinê, Gebe, Gelikani, Girê Gabelya, Gwîjokê, Govok, Govike, Gundikê Siparkuyan, Gurgavik, Hacçya, Henke, Hevsebe, Hewsa Berê, Hîmolinos, Holukar, Hoz, Kacete, Kelehok, Kevzanke, Komir, Kutnus, Mehî, Melixa, Mirikute, Newalê Genuma, Pertavine, Pirdoda, Pirrana, Selbeke, Setkar, Sêxbubukir, Sirke, Surge, Suxurpasa, Torane, Xenzonk, Xantorek, Xura Bekdas, Xuzrut, Zoravan, **Bingöl**: Ruz, Varruk, Yazkonak, Yolaçû, **Bismil**: Kazancı, Kurhacı, **Bilis**: Gomsek, Herde, Heveke, Hevene, Holckan, Ingol, Muryanes, Otlu Mezrası, Peremate, Sinabedo, Suwe, Westin, **Çatak** : Bezanos, Cencele, Cican, Destan, Enines, Ezdinar, Fernanes, Govax Hedlan, Haceros, Hacboye, Kelehe, Kete, Komur, Konarga, Koranan, Kurk, Martenus, Mela Keles, Onk, Sabat, Sul, Turanus, Turbeset, Xumar, Xwarg, Zeferan, **Çizre**: Sax (Çağlayan), Xasar, **Dargeçit**: Çêlka Aliyê Remo (Çelik), Zevika (Çavuşlu), **Dêrik**: Demurlu, Erbelus, Girik, Girxank, Kubuk, Masmask (Incesu), Melevi, Sisan, Meskina (Bozok), Mixat (Kayacik), Sadan (Cat), Serê Mergê (Bozok), Sêva Jorin, Sevting (Gulçeqek), Sexamed, Sicana (Karabayir), Usûbê Pirê (Yusuf Pire), Xirbê Arîyê, Xirbê Azin, **Dicle**: Alebengi, Bawodin, Degirmenci, Derik, Gelincik, Gendale Hole, Gozel (Bogazkoy), Gundikê Hacı Ibrahim, Heliliye, Karamus, Kelkom (Kelekçî), Kıracete (Mezrîke), Pileka, Pırhasan (Ozbeke), Pınjına (Kursunlu), Xacek (Tasagi), **Diyarbakır**: Meznî, Xacek, Zangir, **Elazığ**: Okçular (Alan), **Elbistan**: Çelikli, Serbet, **Ergani**: Cumat, Hindis, Kavurma Kupu, **Erub**: Eykent, **Geaç**: Argat, Botan, Kancuwan, Kansan, Merg, Nezra Maho, Vertug, Zellek, **Gercis** : Aobe, Bakoline, Behve, Çalan, Derete, Gundikê Kolan, Malimhe, Xuna, Zwiğra Abirbinya, Zwiya Sor , **Güçlûkonak**: Kerxwar (Demirboğaz), Zwiğra Sıkaca, **Hakkari**: Baglica, Benckli, Berus Kilsesi, Beyurd, Binevsyan, Çanakkli, Çelptepe, Çeltik, Cemtog, Çiçekli, Çimeli, Comme, Degimren, Dergezli, Doganli, Geçimli, Gelezso, Gelimli, Geliyê Suxê, Genis Dere, Gir Dina, Goksu, Guluce, Gumuslu, Han, Herge, Igdeli, Kandi, Karasu, Knik, Kutina, Korta Xanê, Kost, Kuçuk Koy, Lata, Manefan, Melota, Merkez, Nergiz, Nivaner, Ordeklî, Orla Derecik, Pınarli, Rezok, Sarp, Selmana, Serçeli, Seriya, Su, Sulak, Sumanan, Suvar, Suwarê Xelo, Tahi, Tashasi, Tashik, Turbeli, Unluce, Yayla Deresi, Yuce, Yukan Pınçeken, Zerekli, **Hani**: Bateyt (Cagli), Combalaj, Commanas, Derkan, Goma Bekira, Hun, Kaledibi Koyu, Koçeran, Kuyular (Nenb), Seklat, Serde, Zana, **Hazro**: Beskel, Cumat, Geman (Çokeskî), Halhal, Hendez, Kani, Licoke, Mermani, Sagedkî, Selma, Simsin, Xodik, Xondol, Zenge, **Hizan**: Awiyan, Axkus, Cinda, Giradifin, Giyazrayet, Haccan, Os, Pista Resan, Simban, Sirck, Tasu, Us, **Kars**: Sorgulu, Seban (Bostankale), **Kasuri**: Beitar, Silrezan, Zavit, **Kuzulagaç**: Geliyê Aliyan, Kurt Meydan, Laçika, Senkoy, Sexela, Welî, Zengok, **Kocaköy**: Tepeçik, Saklat, **Kozluk**: Manskut, Permas, Sengalik, Tanze, Timo, Xani, Xargidik, Xerbeluk, **Kulp**: Adrok, Gomak, Araska (Uçkoy), Asagielma, Badika Hawrê (Yayik), Bawcanka (Savas), Bayir (Mala Dinare), Belin, Besist, Çağlayan (Zirakti), Çiçek, Dehlezere, Delit, Dilet Koylen, Dumliya (Baloglu), Dinli, Dudcriya, Eskere (Yayla), Gawgas (Akduruk), Gehiya Pînsê, Geliyê Amanika, Geliyê Gomak, Geliyê Hunê, Geliyê Mussur, Gerendes, Godemê, Gomicek, Hedaknê, Hêlîna, Herta, Hinza, Hiskabut, Kamika (Akbulak), Kevrxan, Kocka, Koprubasi, Kupuka), Kuye (Islamkoy), Mala Calê, Medera (Alaca), Medlat, Mirnska, Nedera (Alaca), Nedera (Hiskubut), Nerçik (Girndes), Nevre, Norsin, Oyjke, Panax, Qaysar (Aygün), Qeytera, Resika (Baskoy), Safurmuta Hizne, Safurmuta Merga Bota, Safurmuta Omer, Safurmuta Tiraka, Salten, Serefsa, Sinsor Elmali (Deyaz), Simas (Gungeçû), Taxoke, Tıyax (Narlica), Uçkuyu, Xacuga, Xwiyar, Yacuga, Yakut, Yukan Polati, Yukanelma, Zavnor, Zikte, **Kurtalan**: Beyin, Cemkurik, Comaniye (Atabag), Fawlike, Gozak, Kocak, Mala Mihê Biro, Malagir, Neban, Pecar (Guldiken), Pirik, Pinnisk, Piroz, Resan, Resane, Savat, Serdeni, Seren, Sexmus, Sise, Xiraba, Xosor, Xurmek, Zenegasor, Zenge, Zengile, Zikte, **Mardin**: Ahmetli (Kaynak), Kaniyexex, Ahmetli, Xirbê Res (Karaburun), Yardere, **Mazidag**: Durakli, Geryayi, Golague (Ansu), Golika Geryayi (Yalinagac), Hesenca (Ulutas, centre), Hesenca, Kebabçi, Lolan (Cayonu), Lolan Bira, Lolan Xirbe Azim, Melebi (Meseli), Mendep (Ikisu), Orunlu (Korca), Sebajor (Kaniyê Alyê), Sebajor, Sexmuka (Karatas), Sulot, Tavusi (Derecik), Xarok (Atalar), **Midyat**: Kohere, Mecna, Nuwelle, Senite, **Mus** : Giyans, Gundê Zilan, Kanxumar, Malcosuwar, Memode, Perz, Telefan, Zoravan, **Mus**. Kırkalki (Golagly), **Norduz** : Bergane, Difne, Gereçir, Lafena, **Ömerli**: Duvgulu, Fıstıklı, Harmankaya, Kayabali, Kayagozu, Kayagozu, Kocakuyu, Komurlu, Ovabasi, Sivnitpe, Sulakdere, Tasgedik, Yasica, **Pervari** : Axer, Axuyan, Baglica, Besa, Beta, Ceman, Hestan, Hoç, Hol, Hol, Inceler, Kal, Kelch, Kcsnk, Kevrin, Kocins, Kundes, Medrese, Meseh, Mexes, Neçer, Omyanus, San yaprak, Xirbikê Bestan, Xwaro Sero, Zoravan , **Sason**: Cacece, Çay, Gerok, Hardaye (Gunesli), Helis, Herende, Heribe, Mala Demira, Mala Heciya, Mala Mele, Malaner, Pemisa, Sebane (Karamese), Sexhamza, Sexika, Tenze, Teras (Omurlu), **Silri** : Bana, Bilons, Bingof, Bingol, Bizenka, Çemê Gevr (Narlıdere, Bicimli), Ceme, Daran, Dergalip, Dodays, Elazz, Emte, Fındıklı, Garsan, Gebir, Geli, Geliyê Osman, Geravus, Gere, Gevar, Girdaya, Gorudoruk, Habran, Heraresk (Ozbenoglu), Kalender, Kaniya Bxye, Mehina (Kaykili), Mehke, Milan, Miwelle (Keleka), Nenguv, Newiyan, Nivla (Çizmeli), Qesra Cello, Qesrik, Schveli (Erenkaya), Semse (Gunesli), Serkan, Sekturk, Sikefia, Sisl, Tarham, Tatlik, Yanilmaz, Yusufhan, Zevce , **Silopi**: Besere, Besen (Koyunoren), Bespin (Gorunlu), Bezgin, Dene Sor, Deredes, Deresor (Derecik), Dradev (Selçuk), Girabiya, Gite (Çalışkan), Hesenca (Korsali, village Assymen), Selçuk, Sulp

(Damlica), **Silvan** : Ferhend (Kayadere), Kurbeyr, **Sırnak** : Amuryan, Atlabil, Avha, Avyan (Dereler), Avka Mezaya (Topitepe), Ax, Bacrit, Bakartal, Bane Mihenda (Koçbey), Bani Cındiya, Baska, Basrete (Inceler), Basrit, Bejen, Bekimne, Benabya, Bere Mired (Gulerli), Berezan, Berkesir, Besuke, Bezokê (Kocaglı), Biçia, Bina Butyan (Guncyce), Binderuk, Biryen, Biyanas (Gumec), Biyava, Buluze Canver, Cala, Çemê Mezin, Canete (Balpınar), Dastel, Dehrebun, Dêrik, Destik, Dihde, Diru, Driyan, Divin, Dostdelala (Kırkkuyu), Dumliya, Fınsan (Atbas), Gardila, Geliya Kazn, Gerne, Gezerok, Gilindor (Kemerli), Girê Colya, Gre, Ginspi, Gohina, Grok, Gundik (Balveren), Gundikê Osu, Gundikê Remo (Anlms), Gundikemintp (Tekçinar), Guncyçam, Guvere (Kuskonak), Hema, Kani Ferske, Karni (Gonedonmus), Kendali (Çadırli), Kerxor, Kikor, Kola, Kopanlı, Kurta Xanê, Kurum (Arakoy), Labmeydin, Mafiyen (Guncyçam), Masya, Mavyan, Mehujku, Mendik, Mendikeyan (Basagac), Mergesh, Mindikera, Mistaxê, Nanuf, Nerex, Nerey (Dagkonak), Nevay (Kuzali), Ramuran, Rerenus, Ripin (Yesilyuva), Robozik, Rusur, Sara, Sarbiteme, Sehraon, Semka, Serefi, Serefi (Karabuyun), Sikefuya, Silyan (Çakırsogut), Sorgoza, Spındarok (Boyunkara), Spriyan (Karageçit), Talika, Tengi, Turzik, Ustaveskur (Sandalli), Xanbizu, Xnbalisa, Xudan, Zeviya Kera, Zeytunik, Zifka, Zihê, Zirun, Zivigok, Ziyaret, **Tatvan** : Askus, Corcin, Çorsen (Duzcealan), Engesor Inzan, Engasor, Hirekçevir, Histus, Inzan, Kınzok, Kırivan, (Çavuslar), Kutinstus, Oranas, Pettevut, Pihde, Pihok, Sancak, Seras, Telever, **Uludere**: Bileh, Delokan (Kalemlî), Hilal, Kadun (Baglica), Kals, Mijun (Akdaman), Nerweh (Asdelen), Sexan, Sırs (Sapaca), Siwet, Uludere (centre), Zeviyen (Tarlabasi), Zaravik (Inceler)

The Kurdish towns of Sırnak, Kulp, Lice and Çukurca, have been physically destroyed to a great extent and become ghost towns. Half the population of others, like Cizre, Silvan, Idil, Midyat and Nusaybin have fled as a result of a policy of terror and assassination carried out by Turkish security forces. In the last two years they have assassinated 1638 Kurdish intellectuals, political personalities, Trade Unionists and teachers, including the Kurdish poet Musa Anter, 74 years of age, Member of Parliament Mardin Mehmet Sincar and 72 other cadres of his Democracy Party and 34 journalists and newsagents.

Many thousands of Kurdish political activists are in prison, solely because of their opinions. Amongst these are M.Ps Leyla Zana, Mahmut Alınak, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan, Sirri Sakik and Ahmet Turk, who have been in preventive detention since March 4th and risk death sentences for their opinions; Mehdi Zana, former Mayor of Diyarbakir, who had already spent 15 years in prison and is now serving a 4 years sentence for his testimony before the European Parliament; Turkish sociologist, Ismail Besikçi, who has already spent 12 years in jail for his writings on the Kurdish question and is back in prison for another 5 years; 64 journalists and many university lecturers and lawyers

Since January 1, 1994, 5899 people have been taken into custody and tortured; 164 have died or «disappeared» while held incommunicado (officially 15 days, renewable) As a result of this systematic policy of State Terrorism since 1980 half the population of the Kurdish provinces has been driven out. It is clearly the Turkish authorities' aim to depopulate Kurdistan, destroy the territorial basis of the Kurdish question and scatter the Kurdish people so as to insure assimilation. This is in the spirit of the traditional Turkish policy of «ethnic recomposition of the country». This began with the genocide of the Armenians was followed by the expulsion of 1,200,000 Greeks from Anatolia in the 1920s and now is to be completed by the scattering of the Kurds, the last indigenous non-Turkish community in the country.

All these facts are well known to our governments who also know that the war in Kurdistan has already caused more than 15,000 deaths and cost the Turkish Government over \$ 25 billion.

We are thus all the more indignant at their refusal to punish Turkey, which they continue to accept in our Western institutions, such as the Council of Europe and NATO, thus giving it a completely undeserved certificate of good conduct.

The undersigned organisations consider that, in the present situation, any state selling arms to Turkey or providing it with economic aid, which is being diverted for this war, is an accomplice of Turkey's campaign of destruction and depopulation in Turkish Kurdistan.

They urge Western Democracies to act decisively to persuade their Turkish ally to stop persecuting the Kurdish people and to initiate a political solution for the Kurdish question under the aegis of the CSCE, the European Union or UN. If Ankara persists in its present policy, they should withdraw all political, economic, financial or military support and exclude Turkey from Western institutions where its presence can only discredit and dishonour the West.

*Agir ensemble pour les Droits de l'Homme, Agrici, CGT, CIMADE, Comité national de solidarité au peuple kurde, CRIDEV, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, Fédération Internationale des SOS-Racisme, Fondation France-Libertés, FSU, LICRA, Maison du Monde, Médecins du Monde, MRAP, Nouveaux Droits de l'Homme, Peuples Solidaires, SNES, SNESUP, SOS-Racisme, Terre des Hommes-France, Comité de Défense des Libertés et des Droits de l'Homme*

*This campaign is funded by the signatories. If you want to support it, please send your cheques marked "for the Kurds" to*

AGIR ICI, 14, passage Dubai, 75010 PARIS

\* A village, in France, wiped out by the SS in 1944

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# Lice, ville kurde interdite

PAR ISMAIL BESIKCI \*

Ismail Besikci, emprisonné dans la petite ville d'Iskilip depuis le 13 novembre, risque 115 années de prison pour une quarantaine de délits d'opinion. Il a déjà passé plus de douze ans dans les prisons turques sous les régimes militaires pour « atteinte à l'unité nationale » et « insulte à la mémoire de Mustafa Kemal ».

Les opérations lancées le 22 octobre à Lice (ville kurde de Turquie) par l'Etat turc ont le mérite de mieux faire comprendre le système de souveraineté turc. Ces opérations initiées au prétexte que « les terroristes ont tué un général » ont duré cinq à six jours. Dès le début de ces opérations, l'accès à Lice a été interdit, toutes les lignes téléphoniques coupées, la ville a été complètement isolée des bourgades et villages des alentours.

La méthode avait déjà été utilisée à Simak, Çukurca, Varfo, Kulp, Yüksekova, Dogubeyazit, etc. (villes kurdes totalement ou partiellement détruites par l'armée turque depuis 1992). Les forces étatiques interdisent l'accès à ces agglomérations, et en deux ou trois jours d'opérations les incendient et les détruisent. Des armes de guerre comme des chars, des canons, des obus, des hélicoptères sont utilisées avec une grande efficacité. Les forces de sécurité présentent toujours ce genre d'opérations comme « des affrontements avec le PKK ». (...)

Dans la mort du général Bahtiyar Aydin, deux points méritent réflexion et analyse. Le premier est que dès l'annonce de cette mort, le PKK a publié un communiqué affirmant : « Nous n'avons pas tué le général et aucune unité de guérilla n'est rentrée à Lice le 22 octobre selon Cemil Bayik, l'un des commandants de l'ARGK (Armée de libération nationale du Kurdistan, branche militaire du PKK), c'est l'Etat qui a tué le général. Le deuxième point est la déclaration faite par le président de la République, Suleyman Demirel, le 22 octobre à la télévision nationale. Demirel affirme que le général Bahtiyar Aydin a été tué par une balle accidentelle. La presse turque n'a fait aucune investigation sur ces déclarations ; elle les a même soigneusement écartées, ignorées. Même le président de la République, qui apporte pourtant un soutien ferme à la terreur de l'Etat, a par sa déclaration pris le soin de ne pas établir de lien entre les opérations de Lice et la mort du général.

En analysant l'escalade de la terreur d'Etat à Lice, il faudrait aussi retenir le fait qu'au cours de ces jours les parlementaires n'ont pas été autorisés à entrer dans Lice. Pendant les opérations, le président général du Parti républicain du peuple (CHP, opposition du centre-gauche), Deniz Baykal se trouvait à Diyarbakir (capitale kurde située à environ

70 km de la ville de Lice). Le 23 octobre, la délégation du CHP se met en route pour Lice. Elle veut mener sa propre enquête sur ce qui s'est passé. Elle est accompagnée de journalistes. A 25 km de Lice, la délégation est arrêtée par les forces de sécurité qui lui indiquent que l'accès à la ville est interdit. Une discussion s'engage alors entre la délégation et les responsables militaires. Ces derniers finissent par consentir à laisser passer Deniz Baykal et les parlementaires de son parti, à condition que les journalistes ne les accompagnent pas. (...) Mais à 7 ou 8 km de Lice, l'autobus de la délégation est à nouveau arrêté. Les militaires refusent à la délégation du CHP l'autorisation d'entrer à Lice. Le président général du CHP, Deniz Baykal, déclare à ce sujet : « Le ministre a donné des ordres, mais les sous-officiers et les gendarmes nous ont dit qu'ils ne nous laisseraient pas y aller. Malheureusement, la parole du gouvernement n'a pas cours là-bas... il a dû se passer des choses qu'ils ne souhaitaient pas que l'on voie... » (Salah, 24 octobre 1993).

Une semaine après l'escalade de la terreur à Lice, le Premier ministre Tansu Çiller a voulu se rendre sur place pour voir elle-même ce qui s'y est passé. Les milieux influents n'ont pas autorisé le Premier ministre à se rendre à Lice pour s'informer directement sur les événements. « Le président de la République rend visite à Kars (NDT, ville kurde située à environ 400 km au nord de Lice), si vous voulez, vous pouvez l'y accompagner », lui a-t-on dit. On a indiqué au Premier ministre qu'elle pourrait se rendre à Lice dans 15 à 20 jours (Hümyet 30 octobre 1993).

Le fait que le Premier ministre n'ait pas été autorisée à se rendre à Lice apparaît comme un troisième élément important dans l'analyse des événements de Lice et de la terreur d'Etat. Si une délégation du CHP incluant des parlementaires n'a pas été autorisée à aller à Lice, si le Premier ministre est empêchée de s'y rendre, il est évident que des choses effroyables, dont on ne veut pas à qu'elles soient vues, s'y sont produites. Les forces de l'Etat ont utilisé des armes lourdes comme des chars et des canons, des bombardiers, des hélicoptères, des blindés, des panzers pour détruire et brûler Lice. Les commerces ont été pillés, les biens, l'argent et les bijoux des habitants confisqués. Les maisons ont été incendiées, les provisions alimentaires détruites. Le nombre de morts dépasse très largement les

chiffres officiels. En interdisant l'accès à Lice, en coupant les communications téléphoniques, en empêchant les journalistes et les parlementaires de s'y rendre, on a voulu tenir l'opinion publique dans l'ignorance de ce qui s'est passé. S'il s'était agi d'une attaque du PKK contre des familles des protecteurs de village (la milice pro-gouvernementale), au lieu d'interdire l'accès, on aurait spécialement convoqué les journalistes, on les aurait conduits chez les victimes pour qu'ils les photographient, recueillent leur témoignage.

Tout cela a un rapport étroit avec le système de souveraineté turc. Dans la politique turque, les partis politiques, le gouvernement, l'Assemblée nationale ne pèsent d'aucun poids. Cela est tout à fait clair sur la question du Kurdistan. Dans l'appréhension de la question kurde, dans la définition des politiques visant à trouver des solutions à cette question, la plus importante force est le Conseil national de sécurité (qui réunit autour du président de la République, le Premier ministre, les ministres de la Défense et des Affaires

***On a voulu tenir l'opinion publique dans l'ignorance de ce qui s'est passé dans la ville kurde de Lice. Ce point de vue sur l'attitude du pouvoir turc face à la destruction par l'armée de la ville est paru dans le quotidien «Ozgür Gündem» du 19 novembre. Le lendemain le journal était suspendu pour une période de quinze jours.***

étrangères et les principaux chefs de l'armée). Face au poids déterminant du Conseil national de sécurité, les partis politiques, le gouvernement, l'Assemblée nationale n'ont aucun poids réel. Cela signifie que les institutions issues du suffrage populaire ne pèsent guère face aux organismes nommés. (...)

Lorsque le Premier ministre Tansu Çiller évoque la télévision en kurde ou les cours de kurde optionnels, le leader de l'Anap (NDT, Parti de la mère patrie, principale formation de l'opposition), Mesut Yilmaz, dans sa réaction à ces propositions, montre d'une façon claire quel est le centre qui détermine et oriente la politique turque. Mesut Yilmaz demande au Premier ministre: «Avez-vous discuté de cette opinion, de cette proposition au Conseil national de sécurité?»

Les propositions du Premier ministre sur «la télévision kurde» et «les cours optionnels de kurde» ont rencontré une vive réaction de la part du Conseil national de sécurité et de la presse servant de porte-voix aux vues du Conseil. Le Premier ministre a dû retirer ses propositions. Sa proposition de «modèle basque» (NDT, pour résoudre le problème kurde en Turquie) a subi le même sort. Les soldats refusent d'appliquer les ordres d'un ministre d'Etat. Le Premier ministre ne possède pas assez de volonté politique pour se rendre à Lice quand elle veut. Il serait important d'observer l'attitude que va adopter désormais le Premier ministre.(...)

\* Sociologue turc.

USE OF WESTERN WEAPONS AGAINST KURDISH CIVILIANS

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**HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CHARGES THAT U.S., NATO WEAPONS  
PLAY KEY ROLE IN TURKISH ABUSES**

William M. Arkin  
Kathi L. Austin  
Monica Schurtman  
Frank Smyth  
Consultants

*In Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey*, a 179-  
page report released today, Human Rights Watch charges that weapons supplied by  
Turkey's NATO partners, especially the United States, play a central role in abuses  
committed by Turkish security forces in their campaign to evacuate and burn Kurdish  
villages in southeastern Turkey.

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For the past eleven years, the government of Turkey has fought a bitter war  
with insurgents of the Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK. To date, the war's toll is  
estimated at over 19,000 deaths, including some 2,000 death-squad killings of  
suspected PKK sympathizers, two million internally displaced, and more than 2,200  
villages destroyed, most of which were burned down by Turkish security forces. In  
the report released today, Human Rights Watch charges that both Turkey and the  
PKK have committed grave abuses of international humanitarian law; that Turkey has  
adopted increasingly brutal counterinsurgency measures to fight the PKK; that NATO

**HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH**

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weapons play a key role in abuses committed by Turkish security forces; and that the Clinton administration, which is fully aware of Turkey's misuse of U.S. weaponry, has consistently refused to link arms transfers to improvements in Turkey's human rights record, and has downplayed Turkish violations for strategic reasons.

This report, which draws on investigations of twenty-nine incidents that occurred between 1992 and 1995, supplemented by interviews with former Turkish soldiers, U.S. officials and defense experts, for the first time links specific weapons systems to individual incidents of Turkish violations. The most egregious examples of Turkey's reliance on U.S. weaponry in committing abuses are its use of U.S.-supplied fighter-bombers to attack civilian villages and its use of U.S.-supplied helicopters in support of a wide range of abusive practices, including the punitive destruction of villages, extrajudicial executions, torture, and indiscriminate fire.

U.S. and NATO-supplied small arms, tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery also play an important role. One particularly troubling example is the preference displayed by Turkey's special counterinsurgency forces, who are renowned for their abusive behavior, for U.S.-designed small arms such as the M-16 assault rifle and for British armored cars. Other Turkish forces, many of whom routinely engage in human rights abuses, rely on German-designed rifles and machine guns, Belgian rifle grenades, German-supplied armored personnel carriers, and a wide variety of other military products sold or donated by NATO governments.

Turkey has been a regular recipient of significant economic and military aid since it became a NATO member in 1952. Wealthy NATO members have both sold and donated a full range of weaponry to Turkey, including more than 500 combat aircraft, 500 combat helicopters, 5,000 tanks, and thousands of artillery pieces, mortars, machine guns and assault rifles. Studies indicate that Turkey was the largest weapons importer in the world in 1994. The United States has been Turkey's dominant arms supplier, currently providing Turkey with about 80 percent of the defense equipment used by the Turkish Armed Forces. Over the past decade, the U.S. Congress has appropriated \$5.3 billion in military aid (grants and loans to purchase weapons) to Turkey, making Turkey the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid, after Israel and Egypt. Germany has been Turkey's second largest supplier of arms, and other NATO suppliers have included Italy, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain and Canada.

Although several NATO governments have occasionally protested Turkish policies, most have continued to supply Turkey with arms. The U.S. government has adopted a significantly less critical attitude toward Turkey than have other governments. Several NATO nations, and Germany in particular, have debated arms transfers to Turkey and examined Turkey's human rights practices. On more than one occasion, Germany has suspended arms sales to Turkey, including after receiving information from non-governmental organizations about the use of German-supplied weapons by Turkish counterinsurgency forces. Unlike the U.S., Germany applies strict conditions on the weapons it supplies Turkey, requiring that they not be used against the Kurds. At least four nations have at some point suspended military sales to Turkey because of its abuses in the conflict in the southeast: Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and South Africa. But NATO itself has done nothing to set up oversight mechanisms to restrain Turkey's armed forces, many of which are integrated into NATO's operational structure and are slated for U.N.



peacekeeping missions. In addition, powerful interests throughout Western Europe are pressing for Turkey's entry into a customs union with the European Union and have deflected opposition to the union based on Turkey's human rights record.

U.S. officials interviewed for this report indicated that they were fully aware of the abusive nature of Turkey's counterinsurgency campaign. One official told Human Rights Watch: "It's a scorched earth strategy, or very nearly so. They're eliminating the countryside in an effort to deny the guerrillas support." Another official said: "There's a lot of misery being caused by the village evacuations. It's being done in a very brutal way, and no provision is being made for the refugees."

The same officials have also stated unequivocally that U.S. weapons are predominant throughout Turkey's armed forces, and that consequently, they must play a role in the abuses that take place. "The majority of what their military has is from us, so of course U.S. weapons are involved in whatever it is they do," one official declared. But he claimed that obtaining concrete proof of the use of U.S. weapons in specific incidents was far more problematic: "The Turks won't tell us what they used in specific incidents, and of course we can't spy on them; they are our allies." Another official, who was involved in researching and writing a June 1995 State Department report on Turkey's use of U.S. weaponry, told Human Rights Watch that "the embassy is not an investigative body. If we start asking detailed questions and seeking detailed replies, we will be in trouble with the embassy and with our Turkish counterparts." He added that senior officials in the U.S. embassy in Ankara "made it very clear to all of us that we are not an investigative unit, and that we are not going to run around Turkey with cameras taking pictures."

U.S. officials attribute the unwillingness to criticize Turkey for human rights abuses to Turkey's role in the post-Cold War era. They claim that Turkey is NATO's "frontline" state, supports U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, and shares the West's concern about Islamic fundamentalism. In June 1995, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, wrote a letter to the U.S. Congress urging U.S. lawmakers not to cut military assistance to Turkey because of its human rights record.

Rather than reining in weapons transfers to a human rights abuser, it appears that the Pentagon is more eager than ever to sell Turkey U.S. weapons, including M-60 tanks, helicopter gunships, cluster bombs, ground-to-ground missiles (ATACMS) and small arms. The U.S. is also involved in co-production agreements with the Turkish defense industry, most notably helping to build the F-16 fighter-bomber, which the U.S. State Department acknowledged in June may have been used indiscriminately to kill Kurdish civilians, and a new armored personnel carrier.

Despite having been denied access to southeastern Turkey, Human Rights Watch has documented that the PKK has committed substantial violations of the laws of war, including summary executions, indiscriminate fire and the intentional targeting of non-combatants. The bulk of the PKK's arsenal appears to have been purchased in arms bazaars scattered across Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia, including Antwerp, Hamburg, northern Iraq, and the former Soviet Union. The PKK reportedly raises money for weapons purchases through a variety of both peaceful and coercive methods, including voluntary contributions from sympathizers and

The Human Rights Watch report is based on twenty-nine case studies of specific incidents of abuses that took place in southeastern Turkey in 1992-1995. The following are brief summaries of some of these cases:

*April 1995*

A former infantry soldier in the Turkish Army told Human Rights Watch of an April 19, 1995 incident in which a suspected PKK recruiter was shot, tortured, and then later summarily executed while in official custody. The killing followed the brutal beating of male villagers by Jandarma troops in the hamlet of Kuruçayır, connected to the village of Heybelikonuk in the Silvan district of Diyarbakır province, and the hamlet's burning by the security forces. The operation was overseen by the commander of security forces in the southeastern emergency region, General Hasan Kundakçı, who arrived in a U.S.-supplied Huey helicopter and carried a U.S.-designed M-16 assault rifle. The Jandarma forces involved in the incident used British-designed Land Rover Shorland armored patrol cars and German-designed G-3 assault rifles. The Turkish Army forces carried G-3 rifles and German-designed MG-3 light machine guns. (Case 1 in the report).

*October 1994*

The Tunceli province operation of autumn 1994 was especially fierce between the towns of Hozat and Ovacık. Prior to the operation, according to local residents, the Ovacık area contained some sixty villages; by the operation's end, they said, only eighteen remained intact. Human Rights Watch interviewed three witnesses from Ovacık district, two of whom were kidnapped by Turkish security forces to act as porters. From the witnesses' testimony, it appears that troops, backed by helicopters, destroyed the villages of Buzlutepe and Bilekli by aerial bombardment, burning and shell fire on October 4 and 5, 1994, killing six persons. The soldiers then burned down a number of other villages in the area during the following week. At no point during the events, the witnesses said, were the Turkish forces engaged by PKK guerrillas. From the witnesses' description, it appears that security forces used mortars, warplanes, air-launched bombs and U.S.-designed LAW anti-tank rockets to assist in the village destruction. The warplanes, bombs and helicopters were most probably U.S.-supplied; the LAWs were U.S.-designed, but probably produced locally; and the mortars were of undetermined origin. According to the witnesses, Army commando officers and some special force troops were armed with U.S.-designed M-16 infantry assault rifles, while rank-and-file soldiers carried German-designed G-3 rifles and MG-3 light machine guns. Several soldiers in each platoon were armed with U.S.-designed M-203 40mm grenade launchers mounted on M-16 rifles. (Case 14).

*April 1994*

On April 8, 1994, according to three witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, village guards attacked the village of Kutlu, located in the Lice district of Diyarbakır province. The attack followed the village's failure to participate in local elections the week before. Kutlu, which was surrounded by three villages recruited into the village guards, had withdrawn its participation a year earlier from the government's rural paramilitary system. According to the

witnesses, the village guards shot and killed six villagers, including one seventy-eight-year-old man and two children aged fourteen and eleven. Three more were wounded by gunfire, and another thirty were badly injured from beatings. Thirty-three homes were burned, and both the male and female villagers were severely mistreated. At one point during the raid Kutlu was visited by Jandarma troops based in a post three kilometers away, who arrived in armored vehicles. The troops, supported by three helicopters, at least one of which landed near the village, acted in support of the village guards—rather than arresting them or questioning their actions. The troops loaded dead bodies into the trucks, left the wounded in the village, and then withdrew, leaving Kutlu under the control of the village guards. The village guards used AKM assault rifles, most probably supplied to Turkey by Germany from East German stocks. The Jandarma used unidentified armored vehicles and undetermined small arms. The helicopters used in the incident were probably U.S.-supplied. (Case 4).

#### *March 1994*

On March 26, 1994, according to five witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, two Turkish fighter-bombers dropped four large bombs on the village of Kuşkonar in Şırnak province. The bombs were dropped after a helicopter overflight and after the fighter-bombers made an initial dry run over the village. There is little question, therefore, that the bombing was deliberate. Two of the bombs landed directly in the middle of the village, then inhabited by about 150 civilians. Twenty-four villagers were killed, including twelve children aged fifteen and under. Seven of the bodies were so badly mangled they were unrecognizable except for the remaining shreds of clothing. The reasons for the bombing remain unclear. According to witnesses, there were no PKK fighters in the village at the time of the bombing, but for several days prior to the attack villagers had been under intense pressure from the government to join the village guard system, and there is also some indication that the villagers were planning to boycott the local elections, scheduled for the following week. According to the U.S. State Department, the Turkish authorities denied responsibility for the raid when asked; the U.S. government said in its June 1995 report to Congress, however, that its personnel “have determined that raids did take place and that some civilians were killed.” According to Turkish human rights groups, at least four additional air raids took place in the same area during March 24-26, 1994, killing an additional eighteen persons. All the names of the dead are available. A helicopter, most probably of U.S. origin, was used to overfly Kuskanar village before the air bombardment. Then two warplanes, most probably U.S.-supplied, dropped four bombs, again most probably U.S.-supplied, onto the village. According to the U.S. State Department, at least four F-16s were reportedly involved. In the attack on Sapaca, five or six F-16s were probably involved. (Case 3).

#### *October 1993*

On October 22, 1993, according to five witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, a large military force, supported by heavy artillery, armored vehicles, tanks, helicopters and aircraft, attacked the village of Zengök (Turkish name: Yörecik), located in Muş province. The security force raid was apparently part of a large operation in retaliation for an earlier PKK attack on a Jandarma post near the village of Altınova, in which one officer and several soldiers were killed. In addition, villagers had been ordered to evacuate Zengök a week earlier, because of their

suspected support for PKK guerrillas active in the area. The village was burned and then shelled by a ground-based force. Later, it was bombed and strafed from the air by helicopters and aircraft. All of the villagers' livestock were killed, but no villagers were killed in the initial assault. Five villagers who returned to Zengök the next day, however, were killed; witnesses later found them burned in their home. They had apparently burned to death while bound together by electric cable and chain. Aircraft, helicopters, heavy weapons (artillery or mortars), and tanks were used to destroy Zengök. Armored personnel carriers and transportation vehicles were used to take troops to the scene. The make of the helicopters and aircraft is unknown, but both were most probably U.S.-supplied. The make of the artillery, mortars, armored personnel carriers and tanks used is unknown, but it is likely that some were U.S.-supplied. The tanks were most probably U.S.-supplied M-48s or M-60s. The identity of the small arms used by the troops is unknown. (Case 24).

### *February 1993*

On February 21, 1993, according to a witness interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Turkish troops, some of whom arrived by helicopter, raided and burned down the village of Ormaniçi, located in the mountains of Güçlükönak district in Şirnak Province. The raid was part of a retaliation for an earlier PKK ambush during which one Jandarma trooper was killed. After being forced to lie in the snow for over eight hours, the witness, together with six other villagers, one of whom was a child, was taken to a nearby Army base. After several days in freezing temperatures in a room exposed to the weather, the witness and four others developed frostbite and gangrene. The prisoners were then taken by helicopter to a larger military base in Şirnak town. One villager eventually died, and four, including both the witness and the child, had their feet amputated. Several transport helicopters, most probably of U.S. origin, were used in the operation. The identity of the small arms used is unknown. (Case 19).

### *August 1992*

According to a former soldier interviewed by Human Rights Watch, U.S.-supplied arms, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters and small arms played a key role in an assault by Turkish security forces on the town of Şirnak on August 18-20, 1992. The attack, described by diplomatic sources as a disproportionate and overly harsh military response to a small-scale PKK attack, led to the deaths of twenty-two civilians, the wounding of over sixty non-combatants, widespread destruction of civilian structures, and the wholesale flight of the town's 25,000 residents. Some civilians may have been the victims of summary executions. In addition to the civilian casualties, four security force personnel were killed in the fighting. The Şirnak incidents were part of an attempt by Turkish security forces to crush support for the PKK in the urban areas along Turkey's southeastern border with Iraq, which was especially strong during late 1991 and 1992. The witness identified troops as using U.S.-made M-48 tanks, M-60 tanks, M-113 armored personnel carriers, and U.S.-designed M-16 rifles and LAW anti-tank rockets. He also said 105 mm artillery or mortars were used, which may have been of U.S. or Turkish origin. Other unidentified armored and soft-skinned vehicles were also used, he said. Many soldiers, including the witness, carried a German-designed G-3 assault rifle, while a few carried the German-designed MG-3 light machine guns. During part of the assault Turkish helicopters, most probably U.S.-supplied systems for transport or reconnaissance, hovered over the city. (Case 28).

*The New York Times, October 17, 1995*

## America Arms Turkey's Repression

Turkey lags behind only Israel and Egypt in receipt of U.S. military aid. Washington has approved \$7.8 billion in military sales to Turkey in the last decade, and has provided grants or loans to cover most of it. This year, unless dramatic events take place in the current House-Senate conference, Turkey will get \$320 million in U.S. credits to finish production, in Turkey, of F-16 fighter planes. America has traditionally used such aid to maintain its friendship with a strategically crucial ally, but the aid is now being used to prolong a war that both destabilizes Turkey and betrays American values.

The State Department has acknowledged that Turkey is using the F-16s and other American weapons to strafe Turkish villages in its war against a Kurdish guerrilla group, killing thousands of civilians and leaving millions homeless. Washington should end the sale of weapons used in the war, and condition further military aid and sales on Turkish respect for human rights.

One-fifth of Turks are Kurdish, a minority so repressed that its members are forbidden to speak Kurdish in many public settings. In 1984 the Marxist Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, began a brutal civil war, killing many civilian officials and Kurdish opponents. The government responded with an even more brutal campaign to bomb and burn Kurdish villages. It has prosecuted even peaceful Kurdish politicians, writers and human rights workers whose only crime was describing the human rights violations. An American reporter for Reuters, Aliza Marcus, may be sentenced to three years in jail for her reporting from Kurdish areas. The PKK is weak, but the government has made little progress toward winning the war. Polls show that Turks overwhelmingly favor a political settlement.

Turkey's human rights record has caused several European countries to cut off military relationships (although Germany just resumed aid) and has so far denied Turkey coveted membership in the European Union. But the White House has allowed Turkish troops to pursue the PKK into Kurdish areas of Iraq that America protects against Saddam Hussein. The incursions have killed many civilian Kurds.

Since the Turks' war against the PKK escalated in 1992, U.S. military aid has escalated as well. Washington now provides 85 percent of Turkey's arms imports and 90 percent of its military aid. Despite the efforts of Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative John Edward Porter to curtail aid, Congress has not yet managed to block or place conditions on substantial amounts of Turkish military aid.

Turkey has escaped a cutback because of its strategic importance. America depends on military bases in Turkey, and wants Turkey to spread its moderate brand of Islam to Central Asia and its pro-Western views in the Balkans and the Middle East. The Turkish government and the Clinton administration argue that any cuts in arms transfers would weaken and radicalize Turkey. But the war itself poses a greater threat to Turkey's stability and prosperity. The Islamic party, a relatively moderate one, gained support after a ban on Kurdish parties left it as the only non-mainstream alternative.

Any further aid should carry human rights conditions that would promote a political solution to a war that has undermined democracy, boosted the power of the military, drained the economy and divided Turkey from its European allies. Placing such conditions on assistance would also reduce America's complicity in Turkey's repressive internal war.

—THE NEW YORK TIMES.

# Madame le Premier ministre est une piètre politique

*Fort comme un (militaire) turc, faible comme Tansu Çiller*

**Nommée chef du gouvernement en 1993 parce qu'elle donnait de la Turquie une image féminine et moderne, le Premier ministre a multiplié les échecs et perdu toute indépendance, au profit de l'armée.**

**Birgit Cerha  
DIE ZEIT - HAMBURG**

**A**ussi télégénique et charmante soit-elle, Tansu Çiller est une lutteuse. *"La plus belle Première ministre au monde"* – pour reprendre les termes utilisés par le quotidien à grand tirage *Hürriyet* lors de son accession à la tête du gouvernement, en 1993

(...)

Il y a moins de deux ans, les Turcs fêtaient dans la liesse la première femme accédant au pouvoir dans cette République patriarcale. *"Nous avons changé l'histoire de la Turquie"*, exultait M<sup>me</sup> Çiller le 13 juin 1993, après que les délégués du Parti de la juste voie (DYP) l'eurent choisie comme chef du gouvernement. Cette femme dynamique aux allures d'adolescente a fait souffler un vent frais sur les structures poussiéreuses de son parti et du gouvernement d'Ankara. Son élection, commenta alors le libéral *Milliyet*, *"signifie que la société veut le changement"*.

La société voulait, en l'occurrence, prendre ses distances avec ces "figures de père" traditionnelles

d'un monde dominé par les hommes. Quelques délégués du DYP ont avoué par la suite qu'ils n'avaient pas élu M<sup>me</sup> Çiller pour ses capacités politiques, mais parce qu'ils voulaient donner à leur parti en-croûté, et même à la Turquie tout entière, une image de marque moderne, attrayante, pro-occidentale. De fait, cette femme émancipée personnifiait la volonté d'avoir une place en Europe.

"Lady Tansu", comme on appelait gentiment cette femme élégante aux cheveux châtain, faisait grande impression. Née en 1947 dans une famille aisée d'Istanbul, elle a suivi des études de sciences économiques à l'université Yale aux Etats-Unis. Dès l'adolescence, Tansu a montré son extraordinaire capacité à s'imposer. A dix-sept ans, elle a convaincu son fiancé d'adopter son nom à elle et répondu ainsi au désir ardent de son père, qui n'avait pas de progéniture mâle. Avec son mari, homme d'affaires et banquier, cette mère de deux garçons possède un solide patrimoine, estimé à 50 millions de dollars.

Elle n'est entrée en politique qu'en 1989, lorsque l'actuel président Demirel, à l'époque encore dans l'opposition, l'a intégrée dans son équipe comme conseillère économique. Un an plus tard, après la victoire électorale du DYP, Tansu

*L'interminable guerre contre les Kurdes engloutit chaque année plus de 8 milliards de dollars*

Çiller devenait ministre d'Etat chargée des questions économiques. Mais, après son ascension fulgurante, l'étoile de M<sup>me</sup> Çiller a très vite commencé à pâlir. Dans son domaine de prédilection – l'économie –, sa crédibilité s'effrite de plus en plus. A son accession au pouvoir, elle avait promis de réduire de moitié en quelques mois une inflation qui s'élevait à 71 %. Au lieu de cela, la hausse des prix a atteint en janvier dernier un record historique : plus de 150 %. Son programme d'austérité annoncé en 1994 n'a pas eu, jusqu'à présent, les effets escomptés. Sa libéralisation économique a renforcé les antagonismes sociaux et fait grimper de manière alarmante le chômage. Rien qu'en 1994, plus de 500 000 personnes ont perdu leur emploi.

Les salaires réels sont en baisse, les problèmes sociaux en hausse, l'impatience des ouvriers grandissante. La crise s'accroît du fait de l'interminable guerre contre les Kurdes qui, chaque année, engloutit plus de 8 milliards de dollars. Le sentiment de frustration parmi les déshérités nourrit le désir d'un changement radical et pousse de plus en plus de Turcs dans les bras du Refah (Parti de la prospérité, islamique). Même les milieux d'affaires ne cachent plus la déception que leur inspire cette économiste si fermée aux conseils des experts.

L'étonnante naïveté politique de M<sup>me</sup> Çiller transparait régulièrement. Ainsi, fraîchement arrivée au pouvoir en 1993, elle déclare : *"L'armée m'aime"* – une armée qui, en soixante ans, s'est pourtant emparée trois fois des rênes pour sauver l'héritage

DU 13 AU 19 AVRIL 1995

COURRIER INTERNATIONAL N° 252

## UNION EUROPÉENNE

# Cette Turquie-là n'est pas de notre monde

Comment l'Union européenne peut-elle s'y prendre avec une Turquie qui sape jour après jour ses propres revendications d'appartenance à l'Europe ? C'est une question que ne peuvent manquer de se poser ceux-là mêmes qui envisageaient des liens plus étroits entre Bruxelles et ce pays perçu comme rempart des valeurs occidentales face au fondamentalisme islamique, avant-poste de la démocratie, passerelle vers l'Orient et, enfin, facteur de stabilisation dans une région en effervescence.

Aujourd'hui, la Turquie est tout sauf un facteur de stabilité ou un phare des principes occidentaux. Le "professeur d'économie" Tansu Çiller l'a plongée dans une crise économique grave, avec une inflation de 150 %, une croissance négative, un budget de l'Etat pléthorique. Idéologiquement, le pays est de plus en plus la proie des fondamentalistes. Politiquement, c'est une semi-démocratie qui vit à l'ombre pesante des militaires. Socialement, elle est le théâtre de clivages profonds. Or la politique kurde du gouvernement empoisonne tout : la politique, l'économie et la société.

L'expérience l'a depuis longtemps démontré : quand on a pour seul outil un marteau, tous les problèmes deviennent des clous. Quand l'imagination politique fait défaut, l'armée a les mains libres. Qu'en est-il de l'enseignement du kurde, des émissions de radio et de télévision en kurde, de la reconnaissance du kurde comme langue administrative et juridique ? Quelques timides tentatives avaient été ébauchées au temps de la présidence de Turgut Özal (1989-93). Le pou-

voir actuel, lui, ne veut pas en entendre parler. Il préfère employer la force. Le bilan des dix dernières années est décourageant : 15 000 morts, 2 000 villages rasés, 2 millions de Kurdes déplacés, des centaines d'opposants disparus sans laisser de traces, des peines pour délit d'opinion infligées à des députés élus, la moitié de l'armée engagée dans le combat contre les Kurdes, un cinquième du budget de l'Etat englouti par la guerre. Comme il n'y a aucune alternative légale [au nationalisme kurde], les rangs du PKK grossissent sans cesse. Et, en appliquant une politique contraire aux droits de l'homme, on finit par violer sciemment ces mêmes droits, en intervenant avec 55 000 hommes sur le territoire d'un pays voisin, l'Irak. Quelle absurdité ! Cette zone d'exclusion établie par l'Occident pour les Kurdes au nord de l'Irak et dont le survol est interdit aux Irakiens, les Turcs peuvent la bombarder sans être condamnés ! L'Europe ne peut pas, ne doit pas accepter cela. Il est juste d'interrompre toute livraison d'armes à la Turquie - car il est évident qu'elle ne fait plus l'objet d'aucune menace extérieure. Il faut paralyser la ratification du traité d'union douanière signé en mars dernier. De même, il est essentiel de forcer la Turquie à respecter des réglementations civilisées en termes de droit des minorités, comme l'Union européenne a persisté à le faire avec les pays d'Europe de l'Est. Et si tout cela n'y change rien, pourquoi ne pas envisager une exclusion du Conseil de l'Europe ou même une suspension du statut de membre de l'OTAN ?

Theo Sommer DIE ZEIT - HAMBURG

DU 15 AU 19 AVRIL 1995

COURRIER INTERNATIONAL N° 252

## TANSU ÇILLER'S DANGEROUS LIAISONS

ISTANBUL, (Nov. 12) IPS - In the four years since she entered Turkish politics, Tansu Çiller has developed a reputation as a great survivor and skillful manipulator.

Few of the actions she has taken in the quest for survival has aroused as much anger as the prime minister's current attempt to forge an alliance of convenience with parties on the farthest right of the political spectrum ahead of next month's elections.

"She is like a widow who marries with the killer of the husband," says Husamettin Cindoruk, who was expelled from Çiller's True Path Party (DYP) and is now of the prime minister's harshest critics.

Cindoruk is angered by the prime minister's search for alliance with fascist parties. "I cannot call a 'Turkish nationalist' who lacks an understanding of justice, nationalist. This kind of nationalism is nothing but chauvinism" he declared.

The leader of one of the parties with which Çiller is seeking an electoral alliance — Alpaslan Türkeş, of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) — was forerunner the Democratic Party (DP).

After being tried in a special court, DP Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatih Rustu Zorlu and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan in 1961 were executed on charges of "high treason."

Türkes was then an Army colonel. He played a prominent part in the military takeover and is remembered as the junta's voice, having announced the takeover on national radio.

After playing a leading role in the ultra nationalist "pan-Turkist" movement as a young officer since 1940s, Türkeş was forced to resign from the army in 1962. He established his own party and uncontestedly holds the title "Basbug" — Turkish equivalent for the German word "Führer" —, since then.

Türkes and the MHP became notorious for violent "anti-communist" campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s while securing considerable support from state secret services.

Notorious for widespread human rights violations during a massive crackdown on left wing groups in the period of military rule, in the 1970s, the "counter campaign were called — as secret service forces involved in the anti-communist campaign were called — were charged by former prime minister Bülent Ecevit with being closely affiliated with the MHP.

MHP's "anti-communist" campaigns always support from the then Justice Party (AP) governments of Süleyman Demirel, now president of Turkey.

The Party was banned by the military in 1980. Türkeş and colleagues were tried in a military court under charges of involvement



in a series of killings of left-wing intellectuals, bombings and riots.

However, MHP officials responded to the charges by claiming "our ideas are in power but our bodies are in a military prison". They survived with minor punishment and later were released. They re-founded the MHP in 1984.

Nevertheless 24 members of the MHP you arm — the "Gray Wolves" — were executed on charges of murder, and hundreds of others were sentenced to heavier terms.

Yet, in a political atmosphere marked by a surge of "Turkish nationalism" which has risen as a counterpoint to the ongoing struggle by Kurds in the southeast to forge their own homeland, the MHP is now whitewashed from past sins.

Already at least 18,000 people, including Kurdish guerrillas, security force members and civilians have lost their lives during an 11-year-old war in that region. MHP is known for its hard-line refusal to reorganize even the notion of a Kurdish identity, and its relentless campaign for "the indivisibility of the country". It has support among young inhabitants of Turkey's western cities.

"The nationalist feelings and political nationalism is widespread among Turkish public, so that all parties are pursuing nationalist campaigns", says Riza Muftuoglu a senior MHP official.

"Citizens support us for they are sure that we are not afraid of those of 'Eastern origin' and we will not make concessions", claims Yakup Tabakoglu, an official from southern Adana municipality governed by MHP.

However, Çiller's DYP officials — especially in the region under emergency rule — are deeply concerned by the prospect of an MHP

alliance. "How are we expected to explain this bloc to the public", ask Galip Ensarioglu, DYP branch chair of the southeast city of Diyarbakir.

"We rely on the public here but not on security forces", he told IPS.

Ensarioglu implies Çiller's reliance of security personnel's votes in the polls in southeast provinces as well as big influx of resigned police chiefs to Çiller's party seeking favorable places on DYP election ticket.

Ensarioglu believes the MHP alliance will negatively affect DYP's support in the southeast. "Southeast is different than the west", he says. "Here we are making politics at the prince of our lives".

"We cannot accept such a strategy for a few more points in the West", he says. "However we will not resign from the party, but neither we will local blocks with MHP here", he concludes.

Ensarioglu smiles ironically when asked if the former emergency-case "supergovernor" would win if he ran on DYP ticket in Diyarbakir. "Oh, yes", he laughs.

Successful security chiefs, we reward them".

"Çiller under a modern and European guise couples her party with MHP", says political analyst. Dr. Tarik Demirkan. "It is all over now. The dark forces, abusive cadres may now come into open".

Demirkan is of the opinion that, one MHP is practically in power "extra-judicial executions, forcible execution of villages will be awarded legal endorsement".

"Thus fascism is institutionalized through public vote", he claims.

"Fascism institutionalized through election is even worse than worst military dictatorship, for having rooted among the public it can not be eliminated without burning civil strife", he concludes.

The MHP's main slogan seemingly confirms Demirkan's worries as MHP banners inscribed "Turkey... Love her, or leave", hang over streets of Turkey's major cities.

The MHP already holds 19 seats in the parliament gained in 1991 elections in alliance with the Islamist Refah Party. Recent Public opinion surveys show support for MHP revolves around nine percent while Çiller's DYP has about 13 percent. The majority of the voters are still undecided. Tansu Çiller and her husband Özer are also under massive media blitz for their

unregistered real estates and shares in the United States and Turkey.

Although the Çillers last year publicly pledged to sell of their assets in the United States and bring their wealth in the country, they are yet to do so.

Further, a parliamentary inquiry commission has recently found out that the Çillers have actually increased their investments in the United States. These include a shopping center, a hotel, several villas in New Hampshire and shares in a family firm.

The parliamentary commission has also found out that Çillers' domestic real estate and investments are also in the increased and revealed still unregistered belongings in tourist resorts.

**INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION  
OF THE KURDISH PARLIAMENTARIANS IMPRISONED IN TURKEY  
(C.I.L.D.E.K.T.)**

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**THE AIMS**

- To inform public opinion about the fate of the Kurdish parliamentarians imprisoned for their opinions, to undertake their defense, and to work toward their liberation, as well as the liberation of all those imprisoned in Turkey for their opinions.
- To promote actions on behalf of peace and democracy in Turkey and a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem in that country, within the framework of democracy and of the existing borders.

**TO ACHIEVE ITS AIMS**

The Association will be able to carry out activities to generate funding and provide technical support, both material and financial, such as:

- the creation of national committees in the democratic countries wherever possible;
- meetings, colloquia, conferences, debates;
- publications, both periodicals and others;
- sending missions to Turkey and other countries;
- and in general, broad use of all kinds of publicity and publication.

Each national committee is independent financially and administratively.

## **WHY THIS INFORMATION PACK ?**

*Is the Customs Union agreement with Turkey just a commercial arrangement or is it an important stage on the road to the latter's gradual entry into Europe? Will no ratification, in the present circumstances, appear to be an acquittal by the European Parliament of an ultra-nationalist regime guilty, amongst others, of the destruction of over 3,000 Kurdish villages, if the forced displacement of over 3 million Kurds and the assassination of thousands of civilian opponents.*

*The "cosmetic" amendments to Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorist Act has certainly allowed the freeing of about a hundred intellectuals, often nearing the end of their sentences, but what about the other 12,000 political prisoners of the Turkish Gulag, condemned after summary trials by special emergency courts using other clauses of the scoundrelly Turkish legislation? Would Europe have concluded a Customs Union with a Franco-run Spain, ruled by undemocratic laws and which ill-treated its Basques and Catalans? What is the worth of "geopolitical" arguments advanced to justify ratification above the considerations of Human Rights and democracy? What advantage can one hope to gain from an unstable country, undermined by a serious internal conflict, in a state of political chaos, in which the Deputy Prime Minister's party accuses the Prime Minister of being "the Trojan horse of the fascist extreme right", where the*

*former Speaker of Parliament denounces the "fascist danger and the setting up of a Police State" and, finally, where the President of the Republic says he would have "thrown the Prime Minister out of the window if she hadn't been a woman"? What will become of the Customs Union if, tomorrow, an extreme right coalition takes over in Turkey? Would it not be wiser for the European Parliament to wait for the emergence of a stable Turkish government fulfilling overall the conditions of democratisation required by the Euro-M.P.s for ratifying the Customs Union? Otherwise, if it is ratified even though Ankara clearly does not fulfill the majority of the conditions called for, does not the European Parliament risk losing its moral authority, as much in the eyes of European public opinion as that of the Turks?*

*This information pack, put together with the help of several NGOs who follow closely the day to day situation in Turkey, aims at helping answer these questions by bringing together documents, testimonies and other data to contribute an information base as complete as possible. Addressing ourselves to public opinion as well, we have sent this information pack, in English. German and French to the press and to the principal NGOs in Europe concerned with Human Rights. No one has the right to plead ignorance of a problem that so closely concerns the future of the construction of Europe, its political content and peace, inside the European Union as well as between Turks and Kurds.*

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